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Preface: About M-POWER
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on Water, Environment and Resilience. The network brings together people 
committed to improving local, national and regional governance in Cambodia, 
China, Laos, Burma/Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam.
The ultimate goals of M-POWER are improved livelihood security and human 
and ecosystem health in the Mekong region. We contribute to this by focusing on 
improving water governance.
Our action research, practical policy support and facilitation involve pursuing 
fair and effective governance, which takes account of possible rewards, voluntary 
and involuntary risks, and rights and responsibilities of all authorities and 
stakeholders. We are committed to ensuring that water-related negotiations and 
decision-making, which almost always have political dimensions, are more fully 
informed and transparent.
M-POWER’s action research programme is organized around comparative 
and regional studies and cross-cutting governance themes. Synthetic activities are 
guided by research leaders that build up multi-country and multi-organization 
teams.
M-POWER is primarily supported by the efforts and resources of the partner 
organizations who choose to cooperate in this transnational effort to improve 
water governance. Substantial fi nancial support for 2006 to 2010 comes from the 
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) Challenge 
Programme on Water and Food via resources from Echel-Eau (Government of 
France) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).
M-POWER is coordinated by the Unit for Social and Environmental Research 
(USER), Chiang Mai University, Thailand. For more information, see www.
mpowernet.org.
This volume is the second of a three-volume multi-authored book series on water 
governance in the Mekong region produced as part of the Mekong Programme 
on Water, Environment and Resilience. The fi rst volume, Democratizing Water 
Governance in the Mekong Region, was published in 2007 by Mekong Press, Chiang 
Mai, Thailand. The series editors are Rajesh Daniel and Louis Lebel. 
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1Introduction: Changing 
Waterscapes in the Mekong Region 
– Historical Background and 
Context
François Molle, Tira Foran and Philippe Floch
INTRODUCTION
The Mekong region fans out from the folds of the eastern Himalayas that give birth 
to its main arteries, including, from west to east, the Irrawaddy, the Nu-Salween, 
the Chao Phraya, the Lancang/Mekong and the Red rivers (see Figure 1.1). These 
rivers have constituted defi ning features of Southeast Asian cultures, religions, ways 
of life and substantive economies. Winding through deep gorges in their upper 
reaches, the region’s rivers, together with their tributaries, have lent themselves to 
the construction of dams and hydropower generation plants. Entering large plains 
and ending in wide deltas, they have been diverted to support large-scale irrigation, 
while all along their course, they have long provided fi sh and other aquatic products 
to local dwellers, as well as means of transportation. In upper catchments, their 
tributaries have, for centuries, been tapped by highlanders for small-scale irrigation 
and other domestic uses.
As a result, agrarian landscapes have traditionally been divided between 
forested highlands, exploited directly or through swidden farming techniques; 
intermountain valleys with bottoms mostly under paddy cultivation; large plains 
and deltas devoted to rice cultivation under various guises; and uplands planted 
to both rice and fi eld crops. With time and the closure of agricultural frontiers, 
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water use and cultivation have intensifi ed; greater levels of control over water 
have also been achieved through continuing investments in embankments, 
canals, drains, reservoirs, pumping stations and on-farm irrigation infrastructures. 
More recently, water came to be partly ‘recaptured’ and further domesticated by 
urban and industrial interests, supplying cities, diluting waste and generating 
hydroelectricity.
This book focuses on the dynamics of waterscape transformation in the Mekong 
region: by waterscape we mean here the surface and groundwater resources of an 
area of land and their interrelationships with other physical, climatic and biotic 
elements, as well as with human activities. Waterscapes are an expression of the 
interaction between humans and their environment and encompass all of the social, 
economic and political processes through which water in nature is conceived of 
and manipulated by societies. In other words, waterscapes are landscapes viewed 
through the lens of their water resources, taken as a defi ning element of both 
ecosystems and human life.
As the subtitle indicates, this volume puts particular emphasis on three 
dimensions of Mekong waterscape transformations: fi rst, many current changes 
and challenges revolve around hydropower. For various reasons that include the 
Indochina wars and other political circumstances, the region is still characterized 
by a low density of large dams compared with other parts of the world. But current 
economic growth rates combined with high fossil fuel prices have spurred a rush 
towards hydropower generation that has the potential to completely remodel 
regional waterscapes. Second, livelihoods refer to the means of subsistence of 
rural, often impoverished, populations for whom a substantial part of their 
livelihoods is linked to the use and management of forest and wetland ecosystems, 
fi sheries and the practice of rain-fed and irrigated agriculture. As such, they are 
directly threatened by large-scale transformations designed and decided in other 
spheres, often without their knowledge. The third issue of governance refers to 
the distribution of decision-making power. All transformative options that result 
in large-scale alterations of the hydrological regime, in terms of quantity, quality, 
timing or sediment load, tend to generate externalities that affect particular 
ecosystems and users. These externalities result from the nature of the hydrological 
regime, which interconnects individual or groups across river basins, and from 
its manipulation through hydraulic infrastructure and associated management 
rules. All interventions, whether implemented by the state (dams, fl ood control, 
irrigation schemes, inter-basin transfers, etc.) or resulting from combined small-
scale decisions (e.g. individual well-drilling and construction of farm ponds), tend 
to generate costs, benefi ts and risks. Governance, thus, refers to the way in which 
decisions are made and power exercised, and to the spatial and social distribution 
of related benefi ts and externalities. The intent of this volume is to contribute to 
a better understanding of the transformation currently under way in the Mekong 
region, what is at stake, who benefi ts and who is at risk, and to improved water 
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Figure 1.1 The main river basins of the Mekong region 
Source: adapted from Kummu (2008)
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governance by reopening and investigating the political dimensions of decision-
making over water resources in the Mekong region.
BRIEF HISTORY OF WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 
IN THE MEKONG REGION
Much scholarly work has described and analysed the history of water resources 
development in the Mekong region, notably the Mekong Basin itself, both in 
physical and institutional terms (see, for example, Bakker, 1999; Friesen, 1999; 
Thi Dieu, 1999; Browder, 2000; Hori, 2000; Le-Huu and Nguyen-Duc, 2003; 
Ratner, 2003; Hirsch and Jensen, 2006). This section only recaps the main 
historical benchmarks as a way of contextualizing the questions addressed in the 
chapters of this volume.
Early planning and the formation and demise of the 
Mekong Committee (1951 to 1975)
The initiation of ‘modern’ and coordinated efforts to ‘harness’ the Mekong River 
are generally associated with the establishment of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), which was created in 1946 in 
an effort to promote post-war economic development in the region. But it was 
not until the seventh ECAFE session, held in 1951, that a call to study technical 
problems of river fl ood control would shape the Lower Mekong Basin’s water 
developmental visions for at least the next 40 years. By 1952, ECAFE’s Bureau 
of Flood Control had drawn up a working paper (ECAFE, 1952) that, far from 
dealing solely with fl ood control, also detailed a wider vision for water resources 
development in the Mekong Basin.
Apart from ECAFE’s interest in promoting regional development, the US 
increasingly looked at Southeast Asia as a critical terrain in its efforts to contain 
the spread of communism after Mao’s takeover of China in 1949, and saw 
economic development as one measure of its wider containment policy for the 
region. By 1955, the International Cooperation Administration (a precursor to the 
United States Agency for International Development, or USAID) commissioned 
the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) to conduct a study that was 
published in 1956 (USBR, 1956)1 but largely ignored by the riparian governments. 
ECAFE and its executive secretary produced their own study, which was presented 
at ECAFE’s tenth anniversary meeting (ECAFE, 1957). The consultants hired by 
ECAFE laid out a preliminary development scheme that identifi ed fi ve primary 
dam projects on the Lower Mekong mainstream (Pa Mong, Khemerat, Khone Falls, 
Sambor and Tonle Sap), two more mainstream possibilities (near Luang Prabang 
and Thakhek) and a tributary site (Nam Theun River in Laos).
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In October 1957, the Committee for Coordination and Investigations of 
the Lower Mekong Basin (in short, the Mekong Committee) was established 
with the mandate to ‘promote, coordinate, supervise and control planning and 
investigations of water resources development projects in the lower Mekong Basin’ 
(Article 4 of the statute). It was also given the authority to prepare and submit 
plans for coordinated research, study and investigations, make special fi nancial 
and technical funding requests, and recommend to the four riparian governments 
criteria for sharing water resources – an authority that would offi cially sanction 
the role of the committee in ‘harnessing’ the Mekong River (Friesen, 1999). An 
executive agent was posted in 1959 and a permanent offi ce created later.
A review study of the earlier USBR (1956) and ECAFE (1957) reports 
was entrusted to Lieutenant General Raymond A. Wheeler, a retired engineer 
from the US Army Corps of Engineering, who recommended three top-priority 
projects: the Pa Mong, Sambor and Tonle Sap dams. Wheeler was seized by what 
he called ‘a majestic river’ and was readily ‘convinced of the great potential of the 
Lower Mekong for service to the riparian countries in the fi elds of navigation, 
hydropower generation, irrigation and other related water uses’. The Japanese, 
likewise, promoted the development of the Lower Mekong and surveyed 34 
‘promising’ tributaries, among them the rivers of northeast Thailand, for which 
they envisioned a ‘remarkable development of agriculture’ if the Mekong waters 
could be diverted to this otherwise little fertile region (Hori, 2000). US geographer 
Gilbert White’s (1962) report called for carefully designed tributary projects, but 
underlined the economic risk of over-enthusiasm and large ‘monolithic concrete 
structures whose immediate return is infl ation of national ego’. The development 
focus of the Mekong Committee shifted somewhat to tributary projects, with a 
total of eight dams constructed up to the early 1970s under its auspices, including 
the Nam Ngum Dam in Laos and several others in northeast Thailand.
Thailand, the closest Cold War ally to the US in mainland Southeast Asia, 
received substantial economic aid and advice from the US and the World Bank, 
with an emphasis on electrifi cation, roads, reservoirs and canals (Muscat, 1990). 
Technical and fi nancial support were instrumental in helping Thailand to construct 
several large power generation projects, including the 535MW multipurpose 
Bhumipol (Yunhee) Dam on the Ping River (a tributary of the Chao Phraya), 
commissioned in 1964, and the early stages of Thailand’s electricity transmission 
network (Greacen, 2004). Under their advice, in 1968, Thailand established a 
state-owned electricity utility, the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
(EGAT).
The 150MW Nam Ngum 1 Dam, the fi rst large hydropower dam in Laos, 
was built with technical advice from the Mekong Committee and the World Bank 
in the late 1960s. Located in Vientiane Province, 90km north of the capital, the 
project was built as the US-backed Royal Army and the Vietnam-backed Pathet 
Lao Army fought for control of the country (Thi Dieu, 1999). To make way for 
the project, at least 800 families were resettled; yet none received any compensation 
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(Hirsch, 1998). Inaugurated in 1971 and foreshadowing what would become the 
predominant development strategy of Laos from the 1980s onwards, the Nam 
Ngum 1 Dam became a signifi cant earner2 for Laos and now sells 70 to 80 per 
cent of its power to Thailand.
The US was the largest non-riparian aid donor and provided 37 per cent 
of the total US$86 million contribution to the Mekong Committee in the fi rst 
ten years of its existence (Friesen, 1999). In 1958, the US government signed an 
agreement with the Mekong Committee for the collection of basic scientifi c data 
for the whole of the Lower Mekong mainstream, and in 1961 agreed to fund the 
phase 1 pre-feasibility study of the Pa Mong mainstream project, together with a 
later feasibility study. The Pa Mong Dam was the cornerstone and poster child of 
US strategy in the region. The dam, as laid out in studies by USBR (1970), was of 
truly awesome dimensions: 98m in height, a storage capacity of over 100 billion 
cubic metres, could generate up to 4000MW, irrigate some 2 million hectares 
and inundate a total area of almost 4000km2 (see Figure 1.2). It would displace 
250,000 people, a fi gure that was later revised upwards to 400,000. At the cost of 
US$1 billion, the Pa Mong would be the world’s largest multipurpose dam at the 
time, an engineer’s dream and a ‘once in a lifetime’ project for Lyle Mabbott, the 
Pa Mong project manager (Jenkins, 1968).
In 1970, the Mekong Committee published its first major basin-wide 
development plan: the Indicative Basin Plan (IBP) (Mekong Secretariat, 1970). 
The report built on the previous studies and was, by any standards, grandiose 
and comprehensive, listing some 180 possible projects on the tributaries and 
the mainstream: it defi ned short- and long-term (up to the year 2000) goals; it 
emphasized that large-scale irrigation was necessary to transform the agricultural 
sector; it saw hydroelectric power generation as a key to securing industrialization 
for greater prosperity; it found that fl ood control relied on dikes and dams on 
the mainstream; and it foresaw transportation from the mouth of the Mekong 
in Vietnam to upper Laos facilitated by a series of cascading dams equipped 
with navigation locks (see Figure 1.3). While the tributary projects were seen 
as attractive in dealing with the short-term developmental needs of riparian 
countries, it was the long-term development potential of the major dams that 
would comprehensively uplift the region (see Figure 1.3). The IBP report also 
proposed additional fi eld investigations that would include fi sheries, forestry, 
resettlement, wildlife, sedimentation, Mekong River crossings, navigation facilities, 
urban studies, archaeological studies and environmental studies (Friesen, 1999).
Four mainstream sites were to be completed by the 1980s (the Pa Mong in 
1983, the Stung Treng and Sambor in 1985 and the Tonle Sap Barrage in 1987) 
at a total cost of US$10 billion. However, growing unrest and resistance by the 
Pathet Lao guerrillas in the region eventually derailed the Pa Mong Project, making 
it both too costly and too risky (Biggs, 2006). The Mekong Committee ultimately 
disbanded in 1975, when the Pathet Lao and the Khmer Rouge acceded to power, 
while Vietnam was about to reunify.
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In Vietnam, throughout the Cold War period, Russia provided support in much 
the same way that the US and World Bank supported Thailand (Greacen and 
Palettu, 2007). Russian support for development of Vietnam’s electricity sector 
was channelled through the state-owned monopoly, Electricity of Vietnam (EVN). 
Signifi cant technical and fi nancial support was provided for Vietnam’s earlier 
hydropower projects, including the massive 1920MW Hoa Binh Dam that 
commenced in 1979, was completed in 1994, and remains mainland Southeast 
Asia’s largest dam.
Figure 1.2 The Pa Mong Dam Project (1970)
Source: USBR (1970)
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The Interim Committee and the revision of a development 
vision (1975 to 1992)
The US withdrawal from Southeast Asia left a large hole in project funding and 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which had picked up 
funding where the now-defunct ECAFE had left off, reduced its contribution from 
US$5.6 million in 1973 to zero in 1976. Contributions to the committee from 
riparian nations also dropped signifi cantly because of their own fi nancial situation 
(Friesen, 1999). These changes altered the working base of the Mekong Committee 
dramatically. In 1978, after one year of negotiations, the three remaining country 
members of the original group negotiated new terms of cooperation and decided 
to form the Interim Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower 
Mekong Basin, with a base in Bangkok.
Apart from the lack of fi nancial resources, the withdrawal of Cambodia made 
the dream of developing the Mekong mainstream look more distant; subsequently, 
Figure 1.3 Plans for hydropower development in Laos (1970)
Note: Reservoir water bodies appear in the darkest shade of grey.
Source: Mekong Secretariat (1970)
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the focus of the committee shifted to smaller and national (tributary) projects. 
This, however, did not entail that the vision of comprehensive development of 
the mainstream had vanished. In 1980, an Interim Mekong Committee study 
reiterated that a mainstream cascade of dams should have priority once the 
committee was reunited to its initial four-member structure. In an effort to reframe 
and reassess the options for water resources development, a revised Indicative Basin 
Plan was published in 1987 (Interim Committee, 1988) as only 16 out of the 180 
possible projects outlined in the Indicative Basin Plan had been implemented. 
Unlike the fi rst basin plan, out of pragmatism and political realism, the 1987 plan 
refocused its attention on the development potential of each individual country, 
yet still proposing a cascade of eight dams on the mainstream as the best option 
for long-term development of the basin’s water resources (Mitchell, 1998). The Pa 
Mong, still seen as the cornerstone of the overall development scheme, was now 
considered ‘problematic’ and its proposed height reduced from 250m above mean 
sea level (amsl) to 210m amsl in order to reduce the scale of resettlement. The 
Lower Pa Mong and Nam Theun 2 (NT2) projects were seen as ‘enjoy[ing] very 
attractive economics … [and] should, therefore, from an economic and technical 
point of view, be built as soon as possible’. Signifi cantly, unlike the 1970 plan, the 
revision now saw the generation of hydropower as the largest benefi t of developing 
a cascade on the Mekong mainstream, with other benefi ts, such as fl ood control, 
fi sheries and navigation, insignifi cant in economic terms.
In the wake of the 1987 revised plan, in 1990 the Interim Committee 
commissioned another study of the potentialities for mainstream development: 
Mekong Mainstream Development Possibilities: Summary Report (Interim Committee, 
1990). Although a more environmentally sensitive rhetoric was deployed and 
(minimal) changes to the cascade scheme were made, the report did not really 
change the overall confi guration of the Mekong development project. Resettlement, 
however, was – at least in this report – considered a priority parameter of a project 
selection process guided by ‘limitation imposed by resettlement requirements, 
conservation of the environment, minimum fl ow requirements for downstream 
interests, reduction of downstream effects caused by varying releases for power 
production in the case of peaking operations’ (Interim Committee, 1990). The 
total number of people to be displaced by the development of the cascade, however, 
was still estimated at 330,000; and this was only a rough and preliminary estimate, 
which led to the conclusion that more studies on social and environmental impacts 
would be required on a project-by-project basis.
In the late 1980s, Laos started to parallel Thailand’s effort at developing 
hydropower on the Mekong River’s tributaries. Following a 1991 World Bank-
endorsed feasibility study, which stated that it was the ‘best option’ for hydropower 
development in Laos, the NT2 Dam was more vigorously pushed forward; together 
with other plans at Ho Houay and Nam Theun-Hinboun, a total of 23 projects 
were targeted for construction up until 2010.
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In 1991, the Mekong Secretariat commissioned the Compagnie Nationale 
du Rhône (France) and Acres International (Canada) to study (again) alternative 
ways of putting the Mekong River’s resources to use. Unlike previous studies, the 
planners switched from the classical cascade of storage dams on the mainstream to 
a cascade of ‘smaller’ run-of-river projects (CNR and Acres International Limited, 
1994).
The Mekong River Commission and its Indicative Basin Plan 
(1992 to present)
The geopolitical implications of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the 
weakening of its satellite states since the mid 1980s set in motion substantial shifts 
in the Mekong region’s political and economic landscape. In 1986, the governments 
of Laos and Vietnam, while remaining socialist states, initiated market-oriented 
economic reforms (Doi moi tu duy in Vietnam and the New Economic Mechanism 
in Laos). In Cambodia, the signing of the Paris Peace Accords paved the way for 
democratic elections in 1993 and the country’s transition to a market-oriented 
econ omy. In Thailand, then Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan famously 
called for a transformation of the Mekong region ‘from battlefi elds to marketplaces’, 
heralding his government’s policy shift from that of Cold War hostility towards 
the promotion of regional trade and investment and triggering renewed hope that 
the Mekong Committee could fi nally be reinstated with all its original member 
states.
As regional stability was restored step by step, Western bilateral aid agencies, 
the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) returned in earnest, 
offering aid and investment opportunities. Support for hydropower projects was 
high on their agendas (Ryder, 2004). By 1991, with funding from Sweden, Norway, 
the ADB and UNDP, the second largest hydropower dam in Laos, the 45MW Xeset 
1 Dam, was completed, generating electricity for export to Thailand and domestic 
consumption. In 1995, a new arrangement between the four original members 
of the Mekong Committee was signed, and the four governments re-established 
their cooperative efforts under the new banner of the Mekong River Commission 
(MRC), despite its weakened mandate compared with that of the original Mekong 
Committee (Ratner, 2003; see Chapter 14 in this volume).
In 1992, the ADB launched the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) 
programme, endorsed by the region’s governments, which set a path towards regional 
economic integration (ADB, 2007). Centred on establishing a market-based 
economy, the GMS programme, to date, has emphasized physical interconnectivity 
of the region, entailing the construction of major infrastructure projects such as 
transnational highways, railways, hydropower dams and regional transmission 
lines, and programmes that encourage cross-border trade and the integration of 
markets. The GMS programme has shaped many Western bilateral donors and 
the World Bank’s aid strategies towards the Mekong region.
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Undeniably, aggregate economic wealth has grown remarkably throughout 
the region. Far less, however, has been achieved in addressing the environmental 
and social issues that have accompanied this economic growth (Cornford and 
Matthews, 2007). The fact that much of the economic activity promoted under the 
GMS programme relies on the exploitation of the region’s natural resources leads 
to a readily apparent contradiction within the programme’s goals of widespread 
economic growth and helping to ‘ensure sustainable development and conservation 
of natural resources’ (ADB, 2007). Furthermore, much of economic growth has 
benefi ted urban areas rather than rural areas, leading to negative impacts on 
subsistence-based rural livelihoods and growing inequality (UNEP and TEI, 
2007).
The ADB’s GMS programme has replaced the earlier Mekong Committee 
as the principal framework for channelling economic development assistance 
into regional projects (Ratner, 2003). This allowed the ADB to focus unhindered 
on regional economic development, while leaving the potentially contentious 
management of the Mekong River to the MRC (see Chapter 14).
CURRENT CHALLENGES AND DYNAMICS
The Mekong region’s economic dynamism is associated with social, economic 
and environmental transformations that include deforestation and environmental 
degradation; growing commercialization of agriculture and increasingly multi-
sectoral rural livelihoods; urbanization and industrialization; increased migration 
and the spread of diseases such as HIV; and population growth in the Mekong 
Basin that rose from 35 million in 1970 to 65 million at present (Parnwell and 
Bryant, 1996; Rigg, 1997; de Koninck, 2003).
Natural resources are under pressure and countries such as Laos or Cambodia 
are opening up to foreign investors interested in exploiting mines or expanding 
plantations of trees for either pulp or oil/biofuel production. A paramount current 
dynamic is the groundswell of hydropower projects in the region. Dams recently 
concluded or under construction include a cascade of dams in China’s upper 
reaches in the Lancang River (the Upper Mekong), the NT2 Dam in Laos, and 
several others in the ‘3S’ region3 shared by Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The 
growing enthusiasm for hydropower is increasingly driven and exploited by private 
companies, fi nanciers and government elites who largely bypass the traditional 
players such as the MRC, the ADB or the World Bank, with complex impacts 
upon political decision-making (Chapters 2 and 14). While electricity-dependent 
segments of society (particularly industry, but also urban elites) may benefit 
from hydropower plants, the manner in which many projects are currently being 
developed offers little comfort to those affected. Across the region, one fi nds no 
shortage of easy rhetoric about how export-oriented hydropower will help ‘kick-
start development’, help ‘eradicate poverty’ or ‘power progress’, but far fewer 
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examples of tangible links between investor-owned dams and rural electrifi cation 
or improved livelihoods.
In parallel with the interest in hydropower, Mekong countries display 
ongoing interest in expanding irrigation and fl ood control infrastructure. Despite 
disappointing experiences with recent irrigation development or rehabilitation 
projects in Laos and Cambodia, the promise of improved productivity, food security 
and poverty alleviation puts irrigation expansion on the agenda of politicians and 
development banks. Thai politicians also mobilize such arguments when making 
renewed proposals for massive irrigation development (e.g. with the Water Grid 
Project), most particularly in northeast Thailand (see Chapter 10). Opportunities 
for rent-seeking from large construction contracts may also drive irrigation agencies 
and consulting fi rms. Globally, the World Bank has argued that it is necessary to 
boost investment in water infrastructure (Grey and Sadoff, 2007), while high rice 
prices in 2007 to 2008 have quickened new donor interest in expanding irrigation 
works in Cambodia.
In the Mekong region, the burst of investor interest in hydropower and the 
revival of donor interest in irrigation take place in a governance context where 
developers externalize costs; where authorities do not systematically screen and 
rank projects according to economic, environmental and social criteria; and 
where planners think in terms of supply-side, not demand-side, alternatives 
(Greacen and Palettu, 2007). In short, recent water resources development 
occurs in a context where evidence of coordinated, rigorously justified river 
basin development is not strong. Despite a process of democratization and the 
emergence or strengthening of civil society organizations (NGOs, academics and 
community-based organizations), megaproject triumphalism complemented by 
faith that socio-political and ecological impacts can be mitigated and transcended 
remains pervasive.
As the volume’s opening chapters on hydropower assert, currents of modernist 
progress in the Mekong are being challenged by important counter-currents of 
critique and resistance. Such critique, when informed by credible knowledge 
(e.g. regarding irrigation design and implementation) offers a set of lessons about 
making development work (see Chapter 6). But, of course, in the gulf between 
lessons offered and lessons learned we fi nd the full spectrum of politics. How 
political processes unfold varies among Mekong countries; but one important 
dynamic since the 1990s is that of national and transnational civil society advocacy. 
Obvious targets for such advocacy are the MRC (ostensibly set up to harmonize 
river basin development plans) and international development banks. But advocacy 
networks have also raised concerns about the downstream impacts of China’s plans 
to build a cascade of hydropower dams on the Lancang (Upper Mekong) and 
similar plans to develop hydropower on the Nu-Salween River in China, as well 
as in Myanmar/Burma.
The governments in the Mekong region have often dismissed or constrained 
critical conversations about water, social change and development. The techniques 
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of constraint can be direct, as with the suppression of dissent in the military regime 
of Myanmar, or indirect, through the production of knowledge (see Chapters 3 and 
12) or ad hoc ‘participatory’ processes rolled out by a variety of agencies (see Chapter 
13). But instead of drawing only pessimistic conclusions about democratization in 
the region, the chapters in this book invite the reader to explore more thoroughly 
how waterscapes have been, and are being, imagined and transformed.
STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK
This volume is divided into three parts that follow this introductory chapter. The 
fi rst part focuses on hydropower expansion in the region, the second on issues of 
livelihoods and local development, while the third part refl ects on knowledge, 
discourses and power.
Chapter 2 by Carl Middleton, Jelson Garcia and Tira Foran focuses on the 
phenomenon of ‘new’ hydropower developers and fi nanciers, but also tracks how 
long-standing actors such as the World Bank and international civil society have 
responded to the entry of players with apparently lower environmental and social 
standards. Hydropower dam development in the region is then illustrated by three 
case studies of dams in various stages of development.
Chapter 3 by Tira Foran and Kanokwan Manorom provides an account of the 
history and politics of contention over Thailand’s Pak Mun Dam. Built between 
1990 and 1994 in a context of local support and resistance, the Pak Mun case 
offers a wealth of insights into the challenges of fair compensation, mitigation 
and participatory management, as well as a window into the complexity of 
rural livelihoods and democratization. Chapter 4 by Shannon Lawrence reviews 
the development of the Nam Theun 2 Dam, the largest as well as one of the 
most publicized and contentious water resource projects in Laos. Containing 
a trans-basin water diversion, hydropower and rural development scheme of 
unprecedented size, complexity and aspiration, the project breaks new ground in 
terms of promises made to better the lives of affected people. The chapter explores 
the enormous challenges of ‘doing dams right’, while a different perspective on 
the same challenge is given by Patchamuthu Illangovan of the World Bank as a 
chapter appendix. Chapter 5 by Darrin Magee and Shawn Kelly takes us to the 
Salween River in Myanmar, describing the emerging plans to develop a series of 
large hydropower dams on both the upper and middle reaches of Asia’s longest 
undammed river. The authors explore, in particular, the 7000MW Tasang Project 
in Shan State, showing how private enterprise has taken the lead from the Thai 
state in tapping hydropower from Myanmar. In what has so far been a decidedly 
non-transparent undertaking, the authors shed light on the project’s investors and 
lenders, the production of feasibility studies, likely impact on local inhabitants, 
and measures to ensure transparency and accountability.
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Part II of the book provides a series of case studies of distinctive Mekong 
livelihoods, situating them historically and in the context of modern development 
practices. Chapter 6 by Chu Thai Hoanh and colleagues explores irrigation, an 
activity that accounts for 80 to 90 per cent of all water abstractions in the Mekong 
region. Water is considered a key factor for shifting from single-crop, mainly rain-
fed rice, to multiple cropping systems and increasing crop yields. Large investments 
in irrigation systems have been made in all Mekong countries; more effort is also 
being paid to improving the effi ciency of existing schemes. But the rationale that 
underpinned irrigation development worldwide during the 1960s and 1970s is 
being increasingly questioned for countries such as Vietnam or Thailand. The 
potential for poverty alleviation in Laos or Cambodia seems substantial; but recent 
disappointing experience with projects demands caution.
Chapter 7 by David J. H. Blake, Richard Friend and Buapun Promphakping 
takes us to the Nam Songkhram, a river basin that drains into the Mekong River 
south of Vientiane. The Songkhram is Thailand’s largest fl oodplain wetlands in 
the Mekong Basin. Its fertile fl ood-dependent waterscape, however, is recurrently 
the subject of various infrastructure proposals designed to ‘develop’ a region that 
authorities classify as infertile and view its population as poor and vulnerable to 
both fl ood and drought. On the other hand, environmental organizations have 
documented and defended the productivity and diversity of the Songkhram’s fl ood 
and recession hydrology. Countervailing policy narratives, combined with new 
agricultural practices and markets, make the Songkhram a microcosm of social 
forces operating in the Mekong more broadly.
Vietnam’s Mekong Delta is another microcosm of important social forces. 
Chapter 8 by David Biggs and colleagues seeks to understand why certain land- 
and water-use policies prevailed over others and how historical patterns of land 
development and water use have had an enduring effect in local society and in the 
physical environment. The authors trace a transition from strategies of adaptation 
to strategies for regional state-driven technological control of the ‘delta machine’. 
Technology played a very important role in later reclamation efforts and a culture 
of scientifi c positivism still largely animates state plans. The chapter considers 
how this historical trajectory of physical remodelling of the delta has created huge 
permanent maintenance costs that are likely to increase as sediments are retained 
by upstream dams and as sea-level rise threatens the stability of coastal areas. The 
allocation of these costs is central to the current political economy of the delta.
Chapter 9 offers another approach to learning from the past as ecological 
modellers Juha Sarkkula and colleagues reconstruct the essence of the Mekong 
fl ood pulse system using time series data in order to explore the nexus between 
hydropower development and fisheries impacts. The authors explain how 
hydropower development changes the natural fl ood pulse and the hydrograph, 
directly undermining the productivity of the system by reducing inundated 
habitats, delaying the onset of fl ooding and shortening growth periods for aquatic 
organisms, with negative impacts upon fi sheries productivity, nutritional security 
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and economic activity for a signifi cant portion of Cambodians, as well as other 
populations in the basin. Quantifi cation of fi sheries productivity is diffi cult because 
of the complex fl oodplain ecosystem and the diffuse fi sheries. With the pace of 
hydropower development quickening, and with potentially damaging hydropower 
projects on the Lower Mekong, the authors argue that fi nding an acceptable balance 
between dams and productive fi sheries is an urgent issue for the region.
Building on the historical, political and ecological case studies presented above, 
Part III offers a set of analytical perspectives that unpack discursive and ideological 
dimensions of power and reveal several dimensions of the politics of knowledge.
Chapter 10 by François Molle and colleagues reviews the post-World War 
II history of Thai water resources development in Isaan, the northeast region 
recurrently cast as overwhelmingly dry, poor, overpopulated, vulnerable to 
radicalism, and therefore in need of large-scale interventions to secure it and 
make it prosper. The authors offer insight into what they call ‘meta-justifi cations’ – 
powerful, self-evident, overriding rhetoric that has served as a tool of state-building 
and elite aggrandizement. Interestingly, they show that both large and small-scale 
irrigation projects have been proposed by authorities as preferred solutions during 
the past six decades. Despite repeated setbacks and failed implementation, large 
projects and basin-scale diversion schemes are perpetuated. They deliver not just 
loads of wealth, but symbolic advantages irresistible to those who seek power. 
The authors argue that hegemonic discourses of greening Thailand’s Isaan have 
endured even though the evolution of the overall national economic context makes 
it unlikely that massive injections of capital to grow a second crop of rice (aside 
from problems of soil salinity and lack of labour force) are the best way to generate 
growth or alleviate poverty.
In Chapter 11 by Louis Lebel and colleagues, the focus shifts to the region’s 
cities: places such as Bangkok, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, situated in and 
expanding into fl ood-prone zones. A shift of focus – but the authors show how 
authorities have transformed landscapes by repeated appeal to ‘promises’ no less 
ideologically charged than the ones reviewed in the previous chapter. The authors 
demonstrate how diffi cult it is to keep all people and roads dry in these areas 
since preferred solutions privilege one area over another and inevitably displace 
the problem of unwanted water. They argue that better practices are possible, 
but require both a stronger state, able to restrict land use, and a more secure and 
refl exive state, able to make more realistic and considered promises.
Is this an impossibly tall order for Mekong societies? Chapter 12 by Richard 
Friend, Robert Arthur and Marko Keskinen deals with the neglected value of 
capture fi sheries, a case that offers the reader further insight into the challenge of 
making governance more refl exive. With transformation- and engineering-oriented 
mindsets dominant, what are the odds that wild fi sheries can be sustained at a level 
meaningful and vibrant enough to offer nutritional security? The authors show that 
part of the problem is a policy narrative that casts capture fi sheries as inevitably 
in decline as a result of numerous impacts. According to this dominant storyline, 
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capture fi sheries can be conserved, but will play no more than a marginal role in 
livelihoods and waterscapes of the future. The authors review empirical weaknesses 
in the dominant narrative. The time has come, they argue, for a counter-narrative 
in which fi shers and capture fi sheries are recast and reconceptualized as solutions 
to, rather than inevitable victims of, regional development challenges.
If dominant ways of thinking are to be challenged by new or better ideas, 
then advocates of alternative water futures might fi nd it useful to understand 
how certain institutions and ways of knowing bind to and reinforce one another. 
Chapter 13 by Mira Käkönen and Philip Hirsch offers such an introduction and 
examines how the production and legitimizing of knowledge is closely linked to 
interests and power. The example illustrates the role of modelling in the production 
of knowledge at the Mekong River Commission, how the World Bank and ADB 
interpret and use that knowledge, and how participatory policies eventually further 
legitimize rather than challenge it.
Chapter 14 by John Dore and Kate Lazarus offers a governance practitioners’ 
analysis of the Mekong River Commission, an organization subjected to great effort 
and attention from actors intent both on using it and crippling it. The authors 
review continuities and contrasts of the MRC from 1999 to 2007, drawing lessons 
from water-use negotiations and various basin and strategic planning processes. 
The authors argue that the MRC could play an important role as a space in which 
action is informed and deliberatively shaped; but in order to do so, its member 
states need to use it more actively, rather than bypass it, which, of course, entails 
redistribution of authority and revised decision-making processes.
In the concluding chapter, François Molle, Louis Lebel and Tira Foran offer a 
synthetic refl ection on water governance in the Mekong region. Two worldviews 
are clearly pitted against each other. One worldview is epitomized by the motto 
of the Lao official website on hydropower government: ‘Powering Progress’, 
which underpins a traditional developmentalist vision that associates capital and 
infrastructure investments with growth, and growth with poverty alleviation. 
The Mekong region and its ‘exceptional untapped potential’ is seen as ‘ripe’ for 
massive investments in hydropower, fl ood control and irrigation infrastructures. 
On the other hand, civil society groups operate with a more critical worldview, 
which emphasizes the social and environmental costs of transformations, and 
how they overwhelmingly benefi t political or economic elites. Current project 
planning and implementation in the region tend to confi rm that decision-making 
processes are often opaque and offer limited support to the claim that ‘we have 
learned from past mistakes’. The authors, however, identify processes that operate 
between these two divergent worldviews: from examples presented in the book, the 
conclusion presents fi ve ‘pathways’ that have the potential to challenge the process 
of knowledge production, instil a culture of negotiation and social learning, lessen 
power imbalances, and shift national and regional water governance.
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NOTES
1 This ‘quite modest’ report (Friesen, 1999) stated that ‘in the immediate future, power 
needs could probably best be met by continuing the present programme of addition 
small thermal and internal combustion plants as needed, and developing attractive 
small hydroelectric or multipurpose sites that may be found near load centres’. 
Regarding fl ood control, the report concluded that ‘fl ood control was of doubtful 
value except in localized areas’. It noted that ‘most of the offi cials questioned stated 
that fl oods were benefi cial to agriculture, fi sh production and high water navigation, 
and the fl ood control was of doubtful value except in localized areas’.
2 During the late 1990s, it provided around one quarter of Laos’s foreign exchange 
earnings, as well as most of Laos’s domestic electricity (Hirsch, 1998). Yet, if grants 
and concessional loans had not paid for its construction, and Japanese aid provided for 
its repairs, it is highly doubtful the project would have been profi table (IRN, 1999).
3 This region includes the catchment of the Sesan, Srepok and Sekong rivers.
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2Old and New Hydropower 
Players in the Mekong Region: 
Agendas and Strategies
Carl Middleton, Jelson Garcia and Tira Foran
INTRODUCTION
The countries of mainland Southeast Asia and Yunnan Province, China, threaded 
together by the Mekong River, are currently enjoying a period of stability and rapid 
economic growth not experienced for centuries. As a result, the region demands 
increasing quantities of electricity, especially in China, Thailand and Vietnam. 
Government electricity-demand forecasts and plans to meet this growth are, 
however, challenged by civil society. Since the early 1950s, frequently controversial 
and as-of-yet only partly fulfilled plans for extensive large-scale hydropower 
development have been high on the agenda of the Mekong country governments. 
Yet, in a region where millions of people depend upon the natural resources 
that rivers provide, many proposed dams pose risks for the environment and 
rural communities, as well as, ultimately, for project developers and the host 
governments.
The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), international agencies 
such as the United Nations (UN), bilateral donors and an entourage of largely 
Western hydropower companies and consultants have long played a role in 
pushing forward the hydropower agenda. Their motives have ranged from the 
ideological to the political to simple fi nancial gain. Yet, as the new century has 
dawned, new economic realities and political relationships have emerged. Today, 
private-sector hydropower developers, mainly from Thailand, Vietnam, China, 
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Malaysia and Russia, have picked up hydropower plans abandoned by Western 
companies during the Asian fi nancial crisis – often backed by infl uential political 
players and their governments’ bureaucracies and with the support of fi nanciers 
from their own countries. These new hydropower proponents appear to hold a 
new determination to get the job done without becoming entangled in what they 
consider to be burdensome environmental and social dilemmas that have often 
dogged dam projects in the past (Middleton, 2008).
This chapter explores how the ADB and the World Bank have infl uenced the 
development of dams and electricity infrastructure in the Mekong region, and have 
attempted to orientate national policies towards private sector-led development. 
It evaluates to what extent the banks have applied their environmental and social 
standards in the region, and discusses the implications of the banks’ evolving 
role and declining infl uence. The chapter identifi es the new actors that are now 
developing, building and fi nancing hydropower projects in each of the Mekong 
countries. The absence of environmental and social safeguard policies among 
these new actors, combined with the weak implementation of the host countries’ 
national law, is identifi ed as a threat to the ecological health of the Mekong Basin. 
The chapter argues that these new actors and the region’s governments should 
adopt international frameworks of best practices that will signifi cantly reduce the 
risk of developing poorly conceived projects.
OLD PLAYERS AND THE REGION’S NEW ‘ELECTRICITY HUNGER’
Driven by rapid industrialization, export-led economic growth and expanding 
domestic consumer markets, demand for electricity is growing in the Mekong 
region, although the magnitude of this growth is contested between government 
agencies and civil society groups (Greacen and Footner, 2006; VUSTA, 2007). The 
Thai government estimates that Thailand’s electricity demand will approximately 
double to 58,000 megawatts (MW) by 2021 (EGAT, 2008). In Vietnam, one of the 
world’s fastest growing economies, the government predicts that electricity demand 
will almost quadruple to 40,700MW by 2015 (EVN, 2006). Myanmar/Burma, 
Cambodia and Laos have more modest demand growth predictions, although 
all governments have committed to urgently develop electricity infrastructure to 
support economic growth and provide electricity services to rural areas.
In the eyes of water engineers and power planners, the limited exploitation of 
the Mekong River system’s hydropower potential – in a region undergoing rapid 
economic growth – seems a global anomaly (Ratner, 2003). Thailand, which has 
already developed much of its domestic hydropower potential and faces civil society 
opposition to further projects at home, plans to import at least 14,000MW of 
hydroelectricity from Myanmar, Laos and China’s Yunnan Province over the coming 
15 years (EGAT, 2008). Vietnam plans to develop almost all of its viable domestic 
hydropower over the next 20 years, and to import hydroelectricity from Cambodia, 
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China and Laos (EVN, 2006). Responding to this demand, the governments of 
Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are keen to develop their hydropower potential for 
electricity export and domestic consumption. Other global factors – particularly 
rising oil prices and the growing carbon offset market – have increased large 
hydropower’s attractiveness in the eyes of the region’s governments.
Over the decades, the World Bank and the ADB have played a signifi cant 
role in shaping the region’s electricity sector and in promoting hydropower. 
They have done this through hosting meetings between key decision-makers; 
supporting technical studies that promote hydropower development and the 
regional integration of power systems; offering fi nancial, legal and other forms 
of expert advice; providing concessional loans,1 grants, and risk guarantees; and 
brokering public–private fi nancing deals.
At present, all Mekong countries are members of the World Bank and ADB, 
although, over the decades, the extent of their interaction has varied as a result 
of the politics of the region and the banks’ policies (see Figure 2.1). The World 
Bank built a strong presence in Thailand from the 1950s, as did the ADB from 
the mid 1960s. Their relevance, however, as a major source of development aid 
Figure 2.1 History of World Bank fi nancing in Mekong countries
Source: World Bank projects portfolio online database
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has substantially decreased over the last ten years, particularly since the 1997 Asian 
fi nancial crisis. Cambodia and Vietnam’s membership was each suspended in 1975 
and 1979, respectively, and was only restored during the early 1990s. Lending to 
Cambodia and Laos has accelerated since the 1990s, although it is Vietnam that is 
now the region’s largest borrower. The World Bank and ADB ceased their lending 
to Myanmar in 1987 and 1986, respectively, a consequence of international aid 
embargos invoked in response to the Myanmar military junta’s ongoing human 
rights violations.
The Western government-backed Mekong Committee (and its most recent 
guise, the Mekong River Commission) has also actively supported large-scale water 
resource development (see Chapter 14).
BRIEF HISTORY OF DAM DEVELOPMENT 
IN THE MEKONG REGION
Early development
Plans for extensive multipurpose dam development in the Mekong region were fi rst 
conceived during the early 1950s by the US Bureau of Reclamation, which was 
convinced that the Mekong River’s annual fl ooding was destructive and needed 
to be tamed to pave the way for modern agricultural techniques (Sluiter, 1992). 
Inspired by ambitious mega-schemes under way along the major rivers in the US 
at the time, it envisioned a cascade of mighty dams along the Mekong River that 
could store water for irrigation and provide cheap hydroelectricity that would 
power the region’s industrialization process (Ryder, 1994; see Chapter 1).
In 1957, the governments of Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand 
established the Mekong Committee under the auspices of the UN, which hosted 
a secretariat to bring the vision to fruition (Bakker, 1999). With the technical 
support of the US Bureau of Reclamation, as well as funding from the US and 
other Western countries, the Mekong Committee drafted detailed plans for a 
cascade of seven massive mainstream multipurpose dams. With a combined 
reservoir capacity of more than one third the Mekong’s annual fl ow, the dams 
were conceived to provide 23,300MW of hydroelectricity, and to store water for 
irrigation, fl ood control and improved navigation (Ryder 1994). The Mekong 
Committee also prepared plans for dam cascades on the Mekong’s tributaries and 
large-scale water transfer projects for irrigation, identifying, in total, 180 potential 
dam sites (Bakker, 1999).
As the Cold War escalated, the work of the Mekong Committee also became a 
central plank of US and Thai strategy to prevent the Mekong region from slipping 
into the clutches of communism (Muscat, 1990; Ratner, 2003; see Chapter 1). 
US and World Bank technical advice and fi nancing supported several large power 
generation projects in Thailand (including the Bhumipol Dam, in 1964, and the 
early stages of Thailand’s electricity transmission network; Greacen and Greacen, 
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2004), as well as the establishment of a state-owned electricity utility, the Electricity 
Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), a central player of hydropower 
development to this day.
The 150MW Nam Ngum 1 Dam, the fi rst large hydropower dam in Laos, 
was built with technical advice from the Mekong Committee and the World Bank 
during the late 1960s. Located 90km north of the country’s capital Vientiane, the 
project foreshadowed what would become the predominant development strategy 
of Laos from the 1980s onwards, with Nam Ngum 1 selling 70 to 80 per cent of 
its power to Thailand. Inaugurated in 1971, the Nam Ngum 1 Dam became a 
signifi cant earner for Laos, although the project suffered poor water quality and 
at least 800 families were resettled to make way for the project, yet received no 
compensation (Hirsch, 1998). Furthermore, if World Bank and ADB grants and 
concessional loans had not paid for its construction, and Japanese aid provided 
for its repairs, it is highly doubtful the project would have been profi table (IRN, 
1999).
In Vietnam, throughout the Cold War period, Russia provided support in 
much the same way that the US and World Bank supported Thailand (Greacen 
and Palettu, 2007). Russian support for the development of Vietnam’s electricity 
sector was channelled through the state-owned monopoly, Electricity of Vietnam 
(EVN). Signifi cant technical and fi nancial support was provided for Vietnam’s 
earlier hydropower projects, including the massive 1920MW Hoa Binh Dam 
(commenced in 1979 but completed in 1994) – still mainland Southeast Asia’s 
largest dam. The project resettled between 50,000 and 60,000 mainly ethnic 
minority people, the majority of whom continue to suffer impoverishment, as do 
many more people affected indirectly (Hirsch, 1998).
From the mid 1960s, the Mekong region progressively descended into almost 
three decades of political instability and confl ict. As the war in Vietnam spilled 
over into Laos and Cambodia, the Mekong Committee’s mainstream dam cascade 
plans were shelved, and the committee itself disintegrated in 1975 (Sluiter, 1992; 
see Chapter 14).
From ‘battlefi eld to marketplace’
The geopolitical implications of the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 
1991 and the weakening of its satellite states since the mid 1980s set in motion 
substantial shifts in the Mekong region’s political and economic landscape. Starting 
in the late 1980s, as regional stability was largely restored, Western bilateral aid 
agencies, the World Bank and the ADB once again returned in earnest seeking 
aid and investment opportunities, and supporting hydropower was high on their 
agendas.
In 1992, the ADB launched the Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) 
programme, endorsed by the region’s governments, which set a path towards regional 
economic integration (ADB, 2007a). Orientated around establishing a neoliberal 
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market-based economy, the crux of the GMS programme to date has emphasized 
the physical interconnectivity of the region, entailing the construction of major 
infrastructure projects such as transnational highways, railways, hydropower dams 
and regional transmission lines, as well as programmes that encourage cross-border 
trade and the integration of markets. The GMS programme has replaced the 
earlier Mekong Committee as the principal framework for channelling economic 
development assistance into regional projects (Ratner, 2003).
The integration of electricity markets through a regional transmission grid 
and the establishment of a regional competitive power market is a priority of the 
GMS programme. The plan envisages a network of high-voltage transmission 
lines linking the Mekong countries and opening up mountainous regions mostly 
in Myanmar, Laos and Yunnan Province of China to hydropower projects, which 
would be developed mainly by the private sector. A study commissioned by ADB 
in 1994 (Norconsult, 1994) recommended the development of a series of large 
hydropower dam and regional transmission interconnection projects, and the 
formation of an intergovernmental Electric Power Forum (EPF) to coordinate the 
plan’s implementation, fi rst convened in 1995.
In 2002, the ADB consolidated its plan for a regional transmission grid with 
a second study that recommended a US$43 billion generation and high-voltage 
transmission system in the Mekong region fuelled exclusively by hydropower, 
with 12 dams in Cambodia, China, Laos and Myanmar (Norconsult, 2002). The 
ADB-led plan gained political momentum in 2002 at the fi rst GMS summit when 
the GMS country leaders signed the Intergovernmental Agreement on Regional 
Power Trade, committing to establishing a regional power market. The second and 
third summits, however, signalled a weakening of commitments and a growing 
reluctance to commit to the plan in full due to the region’s utilities’ reluctance to 
commit to privatization, as well as technical concerns.
Numerous criticisms have been raised against the ADB’s Mekong Power Grid 
plan. Chief among them is that the economic benefi ts appear marginal at best; 
the ADB’s own study estimated that a combined investment in transmission and 
generation of US$43 billion would reduce investment costs by just over 2 per cent 
compared to a limited power trading scenario (Norconsult, 2002). Yet, in this plan 
key costs are not accounted for, such as regional control centre facilities, and costs 
for hydropower schemes are based largely on assumption, rather than site-specifi c 
surveys – a fact pointed out even by the ADB’s own consultants – throwing serious 
doubts on the plan’s economic viability (Garrett, 2004; Soluziona, 2004). 
The ADB itself has recognized some of the weaknesses of the programme. 
It has questioned whether achieving competitive regional power trade is realistic 
given the current governments’ reluctance (ADB, 2007a). The ADB has also 
recognized that more needs to be done to address the social and environmental 
impacts of hydropower development. Despite these concerns, the ADB, as well as 
the Japanese, French and Swedish bilateral aid agencies, and the World Bank, all 
continue to provide fi nancial support to the programme.
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CURRENT TRENDS IN REGIONAL HYDROPOWER DEVELOPMENT
The technical studies, advice and fi nancing of the ADB, World Bank, Mekong 
Committee and bilateral donors fundamentally shaped the Mekong region’s 
electricity development path during its early stages. This section outlines recent 
developments in each Mekong country.
Figure 2.2 Location of dams in operation and under construction in the Mekong Basin
Source: Drawn by François Molle
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Thailand: A voracious power market
During the early 1980s, a credit crisis forced the Thai government to borrow heavily 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Conditionalities 
attached to the loan required the privatization of state-owned enterprises, including 
EGAT, although this was strongly resisted by Thai labour unions and academics 
and, ultimately, defeated. As Thailand’s economic growth continued and private 
capital became more readily accessible, the relative importance of the World Bank 
and ADB as fi nanciers declined (Greacen and Greacen, 2004). The World Bank’s 
fi nal loan to Thailand’s domestic hydropower sector was the controversial 136MW 
Pak Mun Dam project, commissioned in 1994 with co-funding from EGAT (see 
Chapter 3).
By the early 1990s, a series of pro-market governments increasingly supported 
power-sector reform, including a role for the private sector. Consequently, 
Thailand’s fi rst independent power producer (IPP), the Electricity Generating 
Public Company (EGCO), was formed in 1992 from an EGAT subsidiary and 
commenced trading on Thailand’s stock exchange in 1995. By 1997, EGAT had 
signed contracts with seven IPPs. As the Asian fi nancial crisis struck in 1997, 
the World Bank and IMF again provided major loans that were accompanied 
by conditionalities that pushed for the accelerated privatization of the electricity 
industry, the corporatization of EGAT and a competitive power market (Greacen 
and Greacen, 2004). However, before these reforms could be fully adopted, the 
government of Thaksin Shinawatra came to power and once again revised the 
privatization model, this time to a concept of ‘National Champions’ – a mode of 
privatization whereby the state-owned enterprises partly raise capital on the stock 
markets, but the government retains majority ownership.
Neither the World Bank nor the ADB currently have active lending 
programmes to Thailand. Both, however, have sought to build a relationship with 
the government through the transfer of knowledge and skills, rather than fi nancial 
resources – for example, promoting carbon trading under the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Clean Development Mechanism (World Bank, 2005a; ADB, 2007b). While 
Thailand’s government maintains wariness towards the banks, it has welcomed 
their efforts in smoothing the way for bilateral power trade, notably their role in 
pushing through the Nam Theun 2 Hydropower Project in Laos in 2005, which 
exports 95 per cent of its power to Thailand (see Chapter 4).
EGAT now faces increasing fossil fuel prices, a need to diversify its energy 
mix (which is currently dominated by natural gas), growing public concern about 
climate change, and strong opposition to building new large power stations at 
home. As such, EGAT has increasingly favoured importing hydropower from 
neighbouring countries. In its 2007 Power Development Plan, 4000MW of 
hydroelectricity imports are planned from Laos between 2008 and 2015, and an 
additional 8700MW from unspecifi ed neighbouring countries by 2021 (EGAT, 
2008). Developing hydropower projects in neighbouring countries – where public 
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opposition is stifl ed and the rule of law weaker – enables EGAT to export the 
social and environmental impacts of energy production. Thailand’s energy and 
construction companies, backed by the Thai government, fi nancial institutions 
and investors, are developing many of these new cross-border hydropower projects 
that will feed electricity into Thailand’s grid.
Laos: The aspiring battery of Southeast Asia
Past projects
Landlocked Laos lies at the heart of the Mekong region, sharing its borders with 
all of the region’s countries. Its mountainous topography offers an estimated 
18,000MW of hydropower potential. Generating revenues from power exports has 
been an ambition of the Government of Laos (GOL) since the 1960s. Although 
Laos did begin exporting power from the Nam Ngum 1 Dam to Thailand in 
1971, it was not until the late 1980s that extensive hydropower exploitation 
appeared politically realistic (IRN, 1999). Since the late 1980s, representatives 
from the ADB, World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
and bilateral Western donors have consistently advised the GOL that developing 
the country’s hydropower potential was one of its few plausible development 
options (IRN, 1999). They recommended that smaller projects for domestic power 
sales should be developed using concessional loans and bilateral aid, and owned 
and operated by the Laotian state-owned electricity utility, Electricité du Laos 
(EdL). Larger hydropower projects, mainly for power export, were advised to be 
developed by the private sector under build–operate–transfer (BOT) contractual 
arrangements, with the government taking an equity share in the project. In the 
latter case, the government would benefi t from concession royalties, taxes and 
revenues from power sales, which could be reinvested in funding the development 
of Laos.
EdL set about developing several smaller projects, with support from the ADB, 
Japan and Norway, amongst others, including the Nam Song Diversion Dam and 
the 60MW Nam Leuk Hydropower Project, completed in 1996 and 2000. Both 
projects sought to address the declining quantities of electricity generated by Nam 
Ngum 1 since 1982 by diverting additional water into its reservoir. Despite their 
relatively small size, both dams infl icted serious impacts upon local communities. 
In 2001, an ADB-commissioned study revealed that Nam Song had affected 13 
villages, including severe declines in fi sheries for more than 1000 families, the loss 
of boats and fi shing nets, agricultural lands washed away by fl ooding or erosion, and 
the deaths of eight people due to sudden releases of water from the project (Watson 
and Schouten, 2001). The Nam Leuk Dam likewise affected the livelihoods of 
thousands of villagers (ADB, 2004). Yet, only in January 2007, following prolonged 
pressure from civil society groups, did the ADB allocate resources for a livelihood 
restoration package.
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The promise of lucrative large hydropower export projects in Laos attracted 
private-sector hydropower companies from Korea, Australia, Europe and North 
America. By 1995, memoranda of understanding (MoUs) on 23 feasibility studies 
had been signed to build dams with a combined capacity of 6676MW (Phonekeo, 
1996). Yet, as it turned out, by the end of the 1990s, only two of these BOT projects 
had been built: the 150MW Houay Ho Dam and the 210MW Theun-Hinboun 
Dam, both of which imposed heavy costs on local communities (see Box 2.1).
As the Asian fi nancial crisis struck in 1997, Thailand’s shrinking power market no 
longer needed hydroelectricity imports from Laos, Vietnam focused on developing 
its domestic hydropower capacity, and most of the prospective foreign hydropower 
developers in Laos packed their bags and returned home (IRN, 1999). 
BOX 2.1 THE INJUSTICE OF THE THEUN-HINBOUN 
HYDROPOWER PROJECT
The 210MW Theun-Hinboun Hydropower Project (THHP), commissioned in 1998, is 
the fi rst build–operate–transfer (BOT) project in Laos. Partially funded by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and the Nordic Development Fund, the project is owned by 
Electricité du Laos (EdL) (60 per cent), Norway’s Statkraft (20 per cent) and Thailand’s 
Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) Power (20 per cent), and exports 95 per cent of 
its power to Thailand.
 While initially lauded by the ADB as a project with ‘little for the environmental 
lobby to criticize’, widespread impacts soon emerged that the ADB later reluctantly 
acknowledged (ADB, 1999). The project has reduced fi shery catches by between 30 
and 90 per cent along the three rivers it affected, and has caused extensive river erosion 
and severe downstream fl ooding, resulting in repeated loss of wet season rice crops, 
water contamination, skin diseases and death of livestock from drowning and disease. 
The net result has been a severe impact upon the livelihoods of 30,000 people living 
downstream and upstream of the dam (FIVAS, 2007).
 After sustained pressure from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the 
project’s owners released a Mitigation and Compensation Programme in September 
2000. While the programme has been able to address some of the material needs 
of the villagers, such as building wells, its efforts to replace lost livelihoods, such as 
encouraging villagers to grow dry season rice, cash crops and livestock, have been 
problematic and are mostly failing (Barney, 2007).
 Despite the fact that these problems persist, in April 2008 the project’s operators 
reported strong profi ts (Vientiane Times, 2008). EdL alone had received total dividends 
of US$145 million since the project was commissioned, which is greater than its initial 
investment. The Government of Laos has earned about US$27 million as royalty fees 
and US$9 million in taxes.
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A new wave of hydropower developers in Laos
It was not until 2003, when Thailand’s economy had recovered suffi ciently, that 
EGAT resumed its commitment to purchase power from Laos by signing a power 
purchase agreement for the 1070MW Nam Theun 2. The project, now under 
construction, will export 95 per cent of its power to Thailand. It is owned by 
Electricité de France (35 per cent), the Electricity Generating Public Company 
of Thailand (EGCO) (25 per cent), Lao Holding State Enterprises (25 per cent), 
and Ital-Thai Company (15 per cent), and is fi nanced by shareholder equity and 
loans from 27 Thai and Western banks, export credit agencies and multilateral 
development banks. Epitomizing the type of public–private partnership that the 
World Bank and ADB envision will pull Laos out of poverty, the project constitutes 
a central pillar of their Lao programme strategies.
The ADB and World Bank claimed that Nam Theun 2 would be a model 
project that would incorporate lessons learned from past mistakes, that its livelihood 
programmes would lift those affected by the project out of poverty, and that 
the revenues the government earned from the project would be reinvested in 
development programmes. Controversy, however, has continued to rage around 
the project throughout its implementation as construction deadlines have been 
prioritized over social and environmental commitments, and it remains uncertain 
at present whether the project will prove itself successful (see Chapter 4).
The World Bank and ADB also worked with the GOL to establish social and 
environmental laws and policies to underpin hydropower development. While some 
laws pre-dated Nam Theun 2, such as the 1999 Environmental Protection Law, 
others, such as the Decree on Compensation and Resettlement of the Development 
Project and the National Policy on the Environmental and Social Sustainability 
of the Hydropower Sector, were adopted in 2005 and were meant to incorporate 
some of Nam Theun 2’s standards to ensure sector-wide implementation.
The economic revival of the Mekong region and Nam Theun 2’s approval 
bought to Laos a new wave of hydropower developers. In contrast to the early 
1990s, however, which were dominated by Western hydropower developers, 
investors from Thailand, China, Vietnam, Malaysia and Russia now lead the 
hydropower push (see Table 2.1) (International Rivers, 2008). The GOL holds 
MoUs with Thailand and Vietnam to export 7000MW by 2015 and 3000MW 
by 2020, respectively.
Thai investors had already joined Western corporations in two major projects 
in the 1990s – namely, the Theun-Hinboun and Houay Ho hydropower schemes 
– and two Thai companies are also major shareholders in Nam Theun 2. Yet, it 
was the construction of the 615MW Nam Ngum 2 Hydropower Project, which 
broke ground in 2006, that really marked a transition in that it is developed and 
fi nanced largely by Thai actors. Its shareholders are primarily Thai construction 
and energy companies, including Ch. Karnchang and Ratchaburi. Thai commercial 
banks are the main fi nanciers of the US$832 million project, and EdL obtained 
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its equity through a bond issue that was guaranteed by Thailand’s Export–Import 
Bank. Thai power companies – led by Ratchaburi, EGCO and GMS power – and 
Thai construction companies, in partnership with companies from Malaysia, Japan 
and Korea, are now conducting studies on at least 15 new hydropower schemes 
in Laos, including 2 that are part of a list of controversial projects on the Mekong 
mainstream (see Table 2.2). As a result of Thailand’s partial privatization process, 
EGAT remains a major shareholder in Ratchaburi and EGCO, two of Thailand’s 
largest ‘independent’ power producers (Greacen and Greacen, 2004). As such, 
EGAT’s key role in determining future power-sector investments has been fl agged 
as a confl ict of interest by Thai civil society groups.
Chinese companies are currently involved in two hydropower projects that 
are under construction in Laos, the Xeset 2 Dam and Nam Lik 1-2 Dam, and 
have secured MoUs to conduct feasibility studies on at least ten more projects. 
Sinohydro Corporation, a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE) and China’s 
largest hydropower construction company, has spearheaded this push, signing fi ve 
MoUs, including one for a 1100MW cascade on the Nam Ou River and the Pak 
Lay Dam proposed on the Mekong River mainstream. Sinohydro Corporation has 
an extremely weak environmental and safety record; in 2004, 2005 and 2006, it was 
reprimanded by the Chinese government due to construction and environmental 
accidents (Haggart, 2006).
Meanwhile, the Vietnam–Laos Joint Stock Company (VLPC)2 began 
construction of the 250MW Xekaman 3 Project in southern Laos in 2006. 
Financing for the project was largely provided by Vietnamese fi nancial institutions, 
including the Vietcom Bank and the Bank for Investment and Development of 
Vietnam. The consortium is currently studying four more hydropower projects 
in the Sekong and Xekaman basins in southern Laos for electricity exports to 
Vietnam.
Table 2.1 Large hydropower projects in operation, under construction and 
planned in Laos*
Status Number of projects Total capacity (MW)
In operation  6 , 660**
Under construction  6 ,2249**
Project Development Agreement, Concession 
Agreement or Power Purchase Agreement signed 
or under negotiation
12 ,4024**
MoUs on feasibility studies signed 39 14,155**
Notes: * For projects over 10MW.
** Around two-thirds of this operated power generation is exported to Thailand, with the remainder 
for the domestic market in Laos.
Source: Lao National Committee for Energy (2008)
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Environmental and social safeguard standards in Laos
In Laos, a one-party socialist state, government criticism is rarely tolerated, press 
freedoms are curtailed, independent civil society organizations are restricted, 
and corruption is high (Stuart-Fox, 2006). These circumstances signifi cantly 
enhance the risks associated with hydropower development – particularly for 
the hundreds of thousands of villagers poised to lose land, fi sheries and other 
resources as a result. Hydropower development, while generating revenue for 
the government and generally proving profi table for private-sector investors, has 
incurred major environmental and social costs, a legacy of damage that remains 
largely unaddressed.
Many of the laws, regulations and policies developed in preparation for Nam 
Theun 2, with support from the ADB and World Bank, contain important provisions 







1300 Datang International Power 
Generation Company 
(China)
MoU for feasibility study 
signed on 29 August 2007
Luang Prabang Dam 
(Luang Prabang 
Province, Laos) 
1410 PetroVietnam Power 
Corporation (Vietnam)
MoU for feasibility study 





1260 Ch. Karnchang Public 
Company Ltd (Thailand) 
and the Government of 
Laos 
MoU for feasibility study 
signed on 4 May 2007
Pak Lay Dam 
(Xayabouri Province, 
Laos)
1320 Sinohydro Corporation, 
China National Electronics 
Import (China)
MoU for feasibility study 
signed on 11 June 2007
Pak Chom Dam 
(Loei Province, 
Pak Chom district, 
Thailand)
1500 Has not been offi cially announced, but consultants 
have been observed undertaking surveys in Pak Chom 
district
Ban Koum Dam 
(Ubon Ratchatani 
Province, Thailand)
1800 Ital-Thai Development Plc 
(Thailand)
Pre-feasibility study 
completed April 2008. 
Feasibility study underway




240 or 360 Mega First Corporation 
Berhad (Malaysia) and 
Government of Laos
MoU for feasibility study 
signed on 23 March 2006 
Project Development 






465 or 3300 China Southern Power Grid 
Company (China)
MoU for feasibility study 
signed in November 2007
Source: News reports from Bangkok Post, Cambodia Daily and Vientiane Times
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to ensure participation, consultation, information disclosure, compensation and 
resettlement with livelihood restoration for affected communities. However, in 
practice, these provisions are often not being followed by the new developers 
and are not being enforced by the GOL (International Rivers, 2008). These 
implementation failures are most evident during the development and review 
of the environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and resettlement action plans 
for hydropower projects, which have generally not been disclosed to the general 
public and are often of questionable quality. Although the Nam Theun 2 Project 
has surpassed the standards of early Lao hydropower projects and can be credited 
with piloting several innovative aspects in Laos, such as the presence of independent 
monitors, a revenue management framework and a commitment to public 
reporting, implementation within both the Lao context and the tight timeframe 
of investors is problematic (see Chapter 4).
For many of the new hydropower developers, the ADB and World Bank’s 
environmental and social safeguards are viewed as burdensome, time consuming 
and costly.3 Now that private sources of fi nance are more readily available, these 
hydropower developers are less inclined to seek the banks’ fi nancial support (World 
Bank, 2007a). Despite this, both the ADB and World Bank plan to remain involved 
in the hydropower sector in Laos, principally through their ongoing support for 
the Nam Theun 2 Project and for the development of several regional transmission 
lines (World Bank, 2005b; ADB, 2007c). Both banks also plan to build the capacity 
of the GOL to manage hydropower development and the public fi nances that 
will be generated, and to support policy reform that will further facilitate private 
sector-led hydropower development. The ADB is considering supporting two new 
hydropower projects in Laos – Nam Ngum 3 and Nam Ngiep 1 – and the World 
Bank Group’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency may provide a guarantee 
to Sinohydro’s Nam Ngum 5 Project.
Vietnam: Racing to meet power demand
The rapid economic growth of Vietnam has seen a massive forecasted increase 
in demand for power – currently growing at 16 per cent per year – which the 
state-owned electricity utility, Electricity of Vietnam (EVN), is struggling to meet 
(World Bank, 2006). The World Bank estimates that investments of US$3 billion 
annually are required for new generation and transmission infrastructure until 
2010 alone, signifi cantly exceeding EVN’s own resources.
Until the late 1990s, hydropower constituted the backbone of Vietnam’s 
power supply. More recently, however, fossil fuel-fi red power stations have become 
predominant. At present, around one quarter of Vietnam’s economically viable 
hydropower is in operation and efforts are well under way to exploit the remaining 
17,000MW potential by 2025 (EVN, 2006).
Since the World Bank and ADB resumed operations in Vietnam during the 
early 1990s, they have loaned heavily to EVN (ADB 2007d; World Bank, 2007b). 
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At the same time, they have also pushed for sweeping power-sector reforms, calling 
for a greater role for private-sector power generators, the restructuring of EVN into 
shareholding companies, and the establishment of a competitive power market. 
The reforms cumulated in the promulgation of a new Electricity Law in 2004 and 
the establishment of the Electricity Regulatory Authority of Vietnam.
As such, since 2004, EVN has undergone a process of corporatization that will 
ultimately involve selling shares in up to 50 of its power plants and other subsidiary 
enterprises, while maintaining a state monopoly over the transmission network 
and the largest dams such as Son La, Hoa Binh and Yali Falls (Reuters, 2007). 
The utility hopes to earn more than US$700 million by selling shares in many of 
its power plants. EVN is also borrowing heavily from commercial sources, export 
credit facilities, bond issues and overseas development aid to fund its expansion 
plans. A growing number of private-sector independent power producers are 
also operating in Vietnam, mainly developing profi table thermal power stations, 
leaving the development of less-profi table hydropower stations to EVN (World 
Bank, 2006).
To secure its electricity supply, Vietnam has also looked to its neighbours, partly 
facilitated by the ADB’s GMS programme. Since September 2004, Vietnam has 
imported growing quantities of electricity from China and has exported increasing 
volumes of coal (Bo, 2008). From Laos, by 2010, Vietnam will import power from 
the 250MW Xekaman 3 Dam, the fi rst of at least nine hydropower projects it is 
considering in Laos (Lao National Committee for Energy, 2008). In June 2007, 
EVN agreed with Cambodia’s government to undertake feasibility studies on the 
Lower Sesan 2, which would export some of its electricity to Vietnam.
Large hydropower dams in Vietnam have often caused serious social upheaval 
and high environmental costs (Hirsch, 1998; CRES, 2001; VUSTA, 2006). The 
planned Son La Dam, for example, requires the resettlement of up to 100,000 
mainly ethnic minority people (VUSTA, 2006). Although Vietnam passed a Law 
on Environmental Protection in 2005 and despite a growing recognition amongst 
hydropower proponents in Vietnam of the need to fairly address the environmental 
and social impacts of large dams, experience has been limited and implementation 
weak (World Bank, 2006).
The ADB and World Bank have been involved in various hydropower planning 
studies in Vietnam since the early 1990s. The World Bank, for example, conceived 
the preparation of Vietnam’s Hydropower Master Plan, completed in 2001 with 
funding by the Norwegian and Swedish development agencies (Lang, 2000). The 
ADB funded the Sekong-Sesan and Nam Theun River Basins Hydropower Development 
Study, completed in 1998, that prioritized six dams for further development within 
the three river basins shared by Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (Lang, 1998). The 
ADB would have gone on to fund the Sesan 3 Dam in Vietnam, but its own project 
preparation technical study prepared in 2000 revealed the ‘severe to catastrophic’ 
impacts of the Yali Falls Dam (commissioned in 2000, located upstream of the 
Sesan 3) on tens of thousands of Cambodian villagers downstream. EVN ultimately 
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acquired funding from Russian sources rather than conduct a transboundary study 
required by ADB that ultimately could have required them to pay compensation 
to the affected villagers (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004).
In June 2008, the ADB fi nanced its fi rst hydropower project in Vietnam, 
the US$270 million 156MW Song Bung 4 Hydropower Project in Quang 
Nam Province, central Vietnam. To give grounds for its involvement, the ADB 
established a river basin management organization and undertook a cumulative 
impact assessment; yet it approved the project despite the fact that its reservoir will 
submerge 143ha of Song Thanh National Park and the resettlement consultation 
process was found to fall short of ADB safeguard standards (RDSC and BIC, 
2008). The World Bank is also seeking to provide a loan for the US$310 million 
250MW Trung Son Hydropower Project in Thanh Hoa Province, north-western 
Vietnam.
Both the ADB and World Bank have also supported transmission infrastructure 
in Vietnam, including regional interconnections. The ADB’s US$360 million 
support for transmission lines in northern Vietnam connects the controversial 
Son La Hydropower Project to its domestic load centres. The ADB has justifi ed 
its association with the Son La Project – which is not subject to and certainly does 
not attain the ADB safeguard standards – by stating that the dam would have gone 
ahead anyway, with or without the bank’s support for the associated transmission 
infrastructure. Instead, the bank has claimed to try to improve the project by 
providing technical assistance for its resettlement and environmental programmes, 
although these have found limited success. Whether projects such as Son La should 
be considered as ‘associated projects’ and, therefore, subject to the ADB’s safeguard 
standards before supporting loans are supplied is questioned by civil society groups 
and is a grey area within the bank’s policy. Under similar dubious circumstances, 
the World Bank funded the transmission line that connected the Yali Falls Dam 
to Ho Chi Minh City (Trandem, 2008).
EVN has also welcomed other foreign assistance for its dam projects, especially 
from those whose fi nancing does not come with rigorous social and environmental 
conditionalities. In 2006, for example, partnering with EVN, China Southern Power 
Grid Company invested US$28 million in the 21.4MW Lao Cai Hydropower 
Station (Bo, 2008). In January 2008, the Indian Export–Import Bank provided a 
US$45 million concessional loan for the 200MW Nam Chien Hydropower Plant, 
complementing the US$156 million provided for the project mostly by Vietnamese 
banks. Russian fi nancial and technical support has continued to be important, 
especially on controversial projects such as Son La and Sesan 3.
Cambodia: Big plans for hydropower
Cambodia is on the threshold of an extensive domestic hydropower development 
programme, backed mainly by Chinese developers and fi nanciers. In Cambodia, the 
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cost of electricity is amongst the highest in the world and electricity infrastructure 
remains rudimentary, a result of decades of fi ghting and political turmoil (ADB, 
2005a). Cambodia’s political elites have expressed strong support for large-scale 
hydropower projects, citing the need to secure access to cheap electricity to supply 
Cambodia’s expanding economy (International Rivers and RCC, 2008).
Until recently, Cambodia has struggled to attract investment for major 
hydropower development. Western bilateral donors and the multilateral 
development banks have proven reluctant to provide support, in part over concerns 
about environmental and social impacts. The World Bank’s and ADB’s initial 
efforts focused on rehabilitating power supplies in Phnom Penh and the provincial 
centres, and have since focused mainly on expanding electricity transmission 
and distribution, rural electrification, and developing Cambodia’s electricity 
institutional and legal framework (ADB, 2005a; World Bank, 2005c). As a result, 
the Electricity Authority of Cambodia was established in 2001. In line with ADB 
and World Bank policy, this framework also places the private sector centrally to 
developing Cambodia’s power system.
Over the past several years, China’s political and economic ties with Cambodia 
have strengthened and the Chinese government has indicated high-level support 
for Cambodia’s hydropower plans. To date, deals have been fi nalized on four 
major hydroelectric projects, all of which will be built by Chinese companies. 
Construction of the 193MW Kamchay Dam, located in Bokor National Park, 
Kampot Province, by Sinohydro Corporation commenced in late 2007 (see Box 
2.2). The 120MW Stung Atai project, to be developed by the China Yunnan 
Corporation for International Techno-Economic Cooperation, was approved in 
February 2007, followed in June 2008 by the 246MW Stung Tatay Dam and the 
338MW Stung Russey Chrum Krom Dam (Associated Press, 2008). Reportedly, 
a further nine hydropower projects are planned to be built in Cambodia by 2019 
(XFN–ASIA, 2008).
In contrast to the intense competition between hydropower developers in 
Laos, Chinese hydropower companies appear to have largely cornered Cambodia’s 
hydropower market. Aside from Chinese companies, the only other hydropower 
developer known to be conducting a feasibility study in Cambodia is a subsidiary 
of EVN for the (controversial and risk-prone) Lower Sesan 2 Dam.
The ADB and World Bank, although not directly funding hydropower 
projects, have subsidized their development through supporting the construction 
of several domestic and regional high-voltage transmission lines (ADB, 2005a). 
Myanmar: Thai and Chinese companies move in
Myanmar has plans for extensive hydropower development to generate electricity 
for domestic use, and for export to Thailand and China for revenue generation (Win 
Kyaw, 2006). Myanmar’s total hydropower potential is a substantial 39,720MW, of 
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which approximately 25,000MW is large-scale hydropower dams (approximately 
35 projects). Myanmar plans to bank-roll these projects mainly through loans and 
suppliers’ credits from China, through government funds, and by encouraging 
private-sector investment. As of 2006, there were only ten hydropower stations 
larger than 10MW in operation in Myanmar with a total capacity of 745MW 
supplying domestic demand.
In Myanmar, many major development projects, including large dams, take 
place in ethnic minority areas. The country’s laws allow for no public participation 
in decision-making, require no environmental, social or human rights impact 
assessments, and effectively offer no access to justice (BRN, 2008). Increased 
militarization around project areas often results in the use of forced labour and 
forced portering, forced relocation and other human rights abuses. Increased 
troop presence leaves women particularly vulnerable to abuse, including to sexual 
violence. Large dams in Myanmar benefi t foreign investors while continuing to 
support Myanmar’s military junta fi nancially and politically.
BOX 2.2 KAMCHAY DAM, CAMBODIA
In April 2005, the Cambodian government awarded Sinohydro Corporation a contract 
to develop the Kamchay Hydropower Scheme – Cambodia’s fi rst large dam. High-
level Cambodian and Chinese government offi cials pushed forward the Kamchay 
Dam in closed-door negotiations that largely left other stakeholders, including the 
local authorities and the public, out of the process. Financing for the Kamchay Dam 
was secured in April 2006 from China Exim Bank. The project had previously been 
considered by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) a decade earlier, 
but was eventually dropped because of social and environmental concerns.
 The 110m high dam, now under construction, is located in Bokor National Park, 
southwest Cambodia, and will fl ood 2000ha of protected forest. According to a 2002 
survey, this forest is the habitat of 31 mammals and 10 endangered species, including 
Asian elephants, leopard cats and tigers. This area is also an important source of non-
timber forest products for local residents, many of whom depend upon the income 
earned through selling the forest products. It is not known if Sinohydro Corporation 
will provide compensation or support the development of alternative livelihoods. 
There are also concerns that poor river water quality could devastate the local tourism 
industry, pollute irrigation water that feeds the abundant durian orchards and rice fi elds 
nearby, and contaminate Kampot town’s water supply extracted just downstream of 
the planned dam site. Shortly after construction commenced, the Cambodia Daily 
reported that water contamination from construction activities and untreated sewage 
discharges from the workers camp into the Kamchay River had caused tourism to 
plummet from 60,000 people in February to 7700 in March at the popular Touk Chuu 
rapids immediately downstream (Cambodia Daily, 2008).
 Sinohydro Corporation will build, own and operate the Kamchay dam for 44 years, 
despite the unusual contract length having been questioned in political debates.
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Between 1997 and September 2007, at least 14 Chinese companies became 
involved in at least 40 hydropower projects in Myanmar (EarthRights International, 
2007a). Major hydropower dams being planned with strong Chinese backing 
include the Hutgyi and Tasang dams on the Salween River, the Shweli River cas-
cade, and seven dams on the Ayeyarwady (Irrawaddy), N’Mai Hka and Mali Hka 
rivers, the fi rst of which will be the 3600MW Myitsone Dam (see Chapter 5).
The Government of Thailand signed an MoU with Myanmar in July 1997 
to purchase up to 1500MW of power by the year 2010. In May 2005, Thailand’s 
Ministry of Energy signed an MoU with Myanmar’s Ministry of Electric Power to 
develop hydropower projects on the Salween and Tanintharyi rivers (EGAT, 2008). 
Thai companies have actively sought joint ventures with Chinese partners, such 
as Sinohydro and Gezhouba, to develop the hydropower dams on the Salween 
River.
Although the ADB and World Bank currently do not provide loans or grants 
to Myanmar, representatives of Myanmar’s regime continue to join regional 
meetings hosted by the banks, particularly those of the ADB’s GMS. This, in the 
eyes of some, constitutes a dubious interpretation of the bank’s current embargo 
on Myanmar (EarthRights International, 2007b). By attending the GMS’s regional 
electricity meetings and participating in its studies, the Myanmar military junta has 
gained the opportunity to further Myanmar’s integration into GMS, undermining 
Western-led pressure for political reform.
A CHANGING WORLD: THE BANKS SEEK TO 
REINVENT THEMSELVES
In the aftermath of the 1997 Asian fi nancial crisis, Mekong governments made 
deliberate efforts to expand their options to fi nance development plans. Except in 
Myanmar, the economies of the Mekong countries, in general, are exhibiting strong 
growth, and, especially in Thailand and Vietnam, there is increasing domestic 
liquidity. The growing infl uence of international private capital and bilateral 
funds from new economic powers, such as China and India, are radically shifting 
the architecture of international fi nance and are increasingly predominant over 
development bank fi nancing.
Shifting roles and expanded lending instruments
These new sources of project fi nancing have forced the ADB and World Bank to 
reconfi gure their operations. An examination of the banks’ key operational and 
sector strategy papers reveals that the banks refuse to become totally redundant 
in the Mekong region’s project financing. Although bypassed by private and 
institutional banks, it seems too early to dismiss them as irrelevant because they 
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appear to be making inroads into reinventing their roles to maintain regional 
infl uence.
In middle-income countries, such as Thailand, the banks have sought to 
redefi ne their role from project-led fi nanciers to ‘knowledge solution’ providers 
(ADB, 2008). In order to achieve this, the banks’ country offi ces now host more 
in-house experts that help, if not initiate, the identifi cation of priorities and reform 
targets for countries to access more funding. The banks claim to root their policy 
advice and analytical studies in alignment with the borrowers’ own development 
plans.
The ADB and World Bank agenda also remains unchanged. The banks justify 
their engagement in the Mekong hydropower industry on the basis of fulfi lling 
their self-assigned mandate to reduce poverty. As energy is seen as a prerequisite 
to economic growth, the banks view the Mekong region’s water resources as a vast 
opportunity for investment in hydropower, and their support for the sector as 
critical to alleviating poverty.
The banks have refi ned their overarching strategy towards promoting private 
sector-led investment, using their expertise and fi nance to build public–private 
partnerships or otherwise lever private capital (ADB, 2001, 2005b). The banks do 
not necessarily see private equity funds, commercial banks and independent power 
producers as competitors. Instead, the banks are confi dent that they can adapt 
to the entry of new players by striking co-fi nancing agreements, direct lending, 
investing in equity or providing risk guarantees.
To build these new partnerships with the private sector, as well as appear 
more attractive to low- and middle-income countries, the ADB has sought to 
repackage itself, especially through expanding its lending instruments (ADB, 
2007e). They now include loans in local currency rather than in US dollars, and 
a multi-tranche fi nancing facility under which the bank commits to fi nancing 
an entire sector or multiple tranches of a large project. The ADB is also now 
offering loans and guarantees to sub-sovereign government agencies, such as 
provincial governments, and state-owned enterprises, without requiring guarantees 
from central government. The ADB is moving ahead to mainstream its lending 
instruments despite concerns about possible loopholes that would avoid rigorous 
application of environmental and social safeguards, lessen compliance with 
information disclosure and anti-corruption policies, and reduce the bank’s board 
and management’s project oversight (Fried et al, 2008). 
Pressure on the ADB to keep its business afl oat has led the bank to push for 
the dilution of its environmental and social safeguard policies, and in 2005 the 
ADB launched a process to redraft the policies. A consultation draft released in 
October 2007, in the eyes of civil society organizations, essentially eviscerated the 
bank’s current environmental, indigenous peoples and involuntary resettlement 
safeguards policies, and replaced them with far shorter and more vague ‘policy 
principles’, together with a weakened commitment to information disclosure for 
lending operations to the private sector (Fried et al, 2008). 
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Since 2005, the World Bank has piloted a Country Safeguard Systems (CSS) 
approach that relies more heavily on national procedures and laws instead of the 
bank’s own policies. Principles rather than policies and mandatory procedures 
are used in the CSS approach. This approach is considered applicable if the host 
country’s laws are judged by the bank to be equivalent in content, intent and spirit 
to its own safeguard policies. Responding to demands from borrowing countries, 
the CSS approach is intended to shorten the bank’s loan transaction period and 
to reduce project costs. The ADB now plans to adopt an equivalent Country 
Safeguard Systems approach, and intends to pilot the method in Vietnam. 
Independent evaluation of the World Bank’s application of the CSS approach, 
however, has revealed that environmental and social standards can slip because: 
• the principles used to implement the CSS approach can be less stringent than 
the bank’s original environmental and social policies; 
• the borrower’s national laws, policies or measures can be inconsistent with or 
weaker than the bank’s previous project management standards; 
• national capacities to implement safeguards may not be suffi cient and are not 
realistically addressed by the bank; and 
• an affected community’s ability to invoke the World Bank’s ‘accountability 
mechanism’, which can halt a project if the bank’s safeguard policies are 
violated, is more diffi cult because it can be unclear whether a policy has been 
violated (CIEL, 2007). 
The World Bank has yet to prove that its CSS approach – still at pilot stage 
– ensures that environmental and social standards are of equal quality to the bank’s 
existing safeguard policies. 
Regional initiatives: A key role for the development banks
The ADB and World Bank, in the face of declining demand for their conditionality-
tied project fi nancing loans, have attempted to recast themselves as purveyors of 
international best practice for the region and as ‘honest brokers’ of regional 
cooperation initiatives.
In a working paper released in June 2006, the World Bank, the ADB and 
the Mekong River Commission (MRC) outlined their major new collaborative 
initiative: the Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy (MWRAS) (World Bank 
and ADB, 2006). It promotes the construction of controversial water infrastructure 
projects in three sub-regions of the Mekong Basin where transboundary impacts 
would occur that include dams, irrigation schemes and water transfer projects 
– namely, north-eastern Thailand and north-western Laos, where large-scale trans-
basin water transfers are proposed; the Sesan, Srepok and Sekong (‘3S’) river basins 
where the interests of Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos coincide under extensive 
hydropower development plans; and the Mekong Delta shared by Vietnam 
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and Cambodia to address fl ood/navigation/agriculture and wetlands-associated 
projects. The strategy claims that livelihood restoration programmes for affected 
communities could mitigate any negative impacts from the projects, suggesting 
that affected communities might even benefi t from the new river fl ows, leading to 
potential win–win situations.
The MWRAS project drew wide criticism from civil society groups (IUCN 
et al, 2007). Key concerns included:
• The MWRAS claimed that economic and other pressures on each of the Mekong 
countries mean that it is inevitable that large-scale water infrastructure projects 
will go ahead. The MWRAS did not question whether the infrastructure 
projects themselves are the most effective way to reduce poverty in the region 
or if they are sustainable.
• The MWRAS misleadingly extrapolated the results of a hydrological model 
to suggest that the Mekong River could accommodate further extensive 
infrastructure development. The model’s results were narrowly hydrological 
and failed to account for ecological or socio-economic impacts, particularly 
the subtleties of the fl ood pulse ecosystem (Lamberts, 2008; see Chapter 13).
• The MWRAS calls for closer collaboration between the banks, the MRC and 
the four member states to develop new infrastructure projects. It encourages 
reorienting the MRC’s role from that of a basin management organization to 
that of a basin development organization. Given that numerous actors, including 
the banks, are already heavily promoting infrastructure-oriented development 
in the basin, civil society groups and some of the MRC’s donors argue that the 
MRC should work to emphasize the joint management and conservation of 
the river basin, embracing local participation and diverse perspectives (Hirsch 
and Mørck-Jensen, 2006).
Independently from the ADB, the World Bank has also led recent regional 
initiatives. In September 2007, the World Bank hosted the Thai–Lao Sustainable 
Hydropower Forum in Bangkok, which invited senior representatives from the 
governments of Laos and Thailand, existing project operators, project developers, 
fi nanciers and civil society to discuss working towards a triple bottom line approach 
(economic, environmental and social) for the Laos hydropower sector (World 
Bank, 2007a). The forum indicated a move by the World Bank to address the fact 
that hydropower projects subsequent to Nam Theun 2 were failing to replicate 
its standards. The forum issued a joint communiqué, co-signed by Thailand’s 
minister for energy and the Laos minister of energy and mines, which indicated a 
commitment to work towards ‘enhancing the quality of investments to make the 
hydro power sector both environmentally and socially responsible and sustainable 
in Laos’. The governments agreed to form a bilateral task force to develop an action 
plan, and a second forum is planned for late 2008. Whether these commitments 
will translate into action on the ground remains to be seen.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We are witnessing a revived rush to develop hydropower in the Mekong region, 
a rush fraught with pitfalls for project developers, fi nanciers, host governments 
and, most of all, for communities whose livelihoods would be affected. The legacy 
of many earlier projects already stands testament to the environmental and social 
costs of large dams.
Despite this, the new hydropower proponents have so far demonstrated little 
commitment to social and environment standards or to public participation in 
decision-making.
Have the ADB and World Bank raised 
hydropower project standards?
While the ADB and World Bank claim to have strong environmental and social 
policies, as well as commitments to public participation, in reality these measures 
have often proven inadequate to mitigate the risks of large dams. Existing 
hydropower projects backed by the ADB and World Bank have failed to ensure 
that project impacts were mitigated and livelihoods restored, let alone that the 
project’s benefi ts were shared. Recent examples include the Theun-Hinboun and 
Nam Song dams in Laos and the Pak Mun Dam in Thailand (where impacts 
were lessened only after multiple rounds of protest by affected people and their 
advocates; see Chapter 3). While the banks’ most recent project, the Nam Theun 
2 in Laos, has substantially raised the bar compared to earlier project studies of 
environmental and social impacts, it remains to be seen whether promises made 
to affected communities can be kept or will be adequate. Early indications are that 
they will not be (see Chapter 4).
Both the ADB and World Bank have invested considerable time and resources 
into hydropower development in the Mekong region, including cross-border power 
trade through the GMS programme. Hydropower helps to provide electricity 
necessary for economic growth, but also undermines the livelihoods of the rural 
affected communities. The failure of the GMS programme to adequately address 
the environmental and social impacts of its projects, as well as the issues of equity 
(between GMS countries and between rural and urban), ultimately undermines 
sustainable development and remains its biggest shortcoming (Cornford and 
Matthems, 2007; UNEP and TEI, 2007).
Indeed, in some instances, the ADB’s GMS programme is directly incongruous 
with the ADB’s own country-level programmes. In Cambodia, for example, the 
ADB’s country programme has identifi ed the Tonle Sap Basin as its geographical 
focus, recognizing the area as one of Cambodia’s poorest and most environmentally 
sensitive regions (ADB, 2005a). Yet, extensive regional hydropower development 
promoted under the GMS programme constitutes a serious threat to the lake’s 
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ecosystems and its fi shery productivity – and, ultimately, therefore, to efforts to 
alleviate poverty (CNMC and WorldFish Centre, 2007).
The evolving role of the old players
The entry of new hydropower developers and fi nanciers into the Mekong diminishes 
the infl uence of ‘old actors’ such as the development banks and donor agencies, as 
well as some NGOs. But it does not make them wholly irrelevant.
As reviewed above, both the ADB and World Bank have new hydropower 
projects in their lending pipelines. Yet, given the large number of projects planned 
in the Mekong region by the new hydropower developers and the wide array of 
private-sector and government-backed fi nancing options available to them, it is 
clear that the role of the ADB, the World Bank and Western bilateral donors as 
project developers and fi nanciers has signifi cantly lessened.
The effi cacy of the development banks in their self-assigned new niche as 
knowledge providers and purveyors of best practice remains to be seen. As relatively 
minor and, now, replaceable fi nanciers, it will be challenging for the banks to make 
‘best practice standards’ attractive enough to appeal to the short-term interests of 
the new hydropower proponents and, perhaps even, the region’s governments.
A recommendation, for example, of an ADB-supported cumulative impact 
assessment (CIA) completed in early 2008 for the proposed Nam Ngum 3 Dam 
was that several smaller dams proposed for the Nam Ngum Basin not be built in 
order to protect fi sheries vital to livelihoods. This advice, however, has been ignored 
by other hydro-developers in the basin (and apparently also by the GOL), who 
are pushing forward with construction of contentious projects on the Nam Lik 
River (Norplan, 2008).
In addition to hydropower dams, the ADB and World Bank are fi nancing or 
planning to fi nance several regional transmission lines that will facilitate bilateral 
power trade between Laos, Thailand, Vietnam and Cambodia. These transmission 
lines will export power from numerous private-sector hydropower projects that 
do not meet each country’s regulatory standards, let alone the banks’ safeguard 
policies. The banks are able to indirectly support (and therefore subsidize) these 
hydropower projects because of the lack of clarity surrounding how their safeguards 
apply to ‘associated facilities’. Exploiting this loophole, the development banks 
appear increasingly keen to support associated transmission lines rather than 
hydropower projects directly.
The ADB and World Bank, and its donors, also continue to support regional-
level meetings and to undertake studies that promote regional integration of the 
electricity sector, to which hydropower development is central. An ADB study, 
now being fi nalized, recommends that regional integration should be expanded to 
the wider energy sector, including natural gas, coal and oil (Nangia, 2008). These 
studies largely build on existing government plans, providing justifi cation to move 
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mostly large infrastructure-intensive plans forward, yet incorporate the same lack 
of vision of alternative scenarios to meet energy needs.
The Mekong River Commission has struggled to defi ne its role as a basin 
management organization, especially in the face of the current wave of extensive 
hydropower development plans. The MRC has only recently funded its hydropower 
programme in 2008, and, alongside other programmes such as the Environment 
Programme and Fisheries Programme, it is uncertain to what extent the MRC 
can project its scientifi c knowledge to infl uence the politicized decision-making 
process.
The need for international standards 
for new hydropower proponents
The new Mekong hydropower developers – predominantly energy and construction 
companies from Thailand, Vietnam, China, Russia and Malaysia – have yet to 
commit to international best practice standards, such as those outlined in the 
recommendations of the World Commission on Dams (WCD) report (WCD, 
2000). These developers are not even striving to meet the ADB and World Bank’s 
social and environmental standards and commitments to public participation, 
which are notably weaker than the WCD’s recommendations. Very few project 
developers have developed and published corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
policies. The companies that have, such as Thailand’s EGCO and Ratchaburi, have 
adopted a very narrow interpretation of CSR that provides only limited support 
for affected communities (and, apparently, only for those in Thailand).
Amongst the commercial banks from Vietnam and Thailand that are known 
to be fi nancing hydropower projects, none have adopted environmental and social 
standards, such as the Equator Principles, or hold an equivalent set of standards.4 
In China, the Equator Principles are only just beginning to gain momentum: the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection has embraced them as part of its domestic 
green credit policy. Amongst the new export credit agencies actively supporting 
hydropower projects in the Mekong region, only China’s Exim Bank is known to 
have an environmental policy and guidelines, released in April 2007 and August 
2007, respectively. There is little evidence, however, of its rigorous implementation 
on the ground.
These frameworks could reduce the risk of developing poorly conceived 
projects. Given the massive interest in developing hydropower throughout the 
region, the region’s governments are in a strong position to only select those 
developers of sound reputation. In general, best practices address issues of concern 
to wider society through eliminating or minimizing externalities and sharing project 
benefi ts. While, in principal, such practices also reduce project developer risk – for 
example, from protests or legal measures that could delay project construction or 
add unforeseen additional cost – where the rule of law is weak, corruption high or 
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local protest stifl ed, such risks appear smaller to project developers; therefore, they 
have less impetus to implement best practices. Commercial or strategic short-term 
interests favour poor practices that constantly override consideration or application 
of precautionary measures or standards. Past dam projects, unfortunately, confi rm 
that all the compensation schemes and other concessions from dam builders and 
governments have been secured only after substantial mobilization or protest.
The need for better electricity and water planning practices
Environmentally sustainable and socially desirable solutions to meeting the 
Mekong region’s energy needs do exist, although, at present, they are not a part 
of any regional energy plan (Greacen and Footner, 2006; VUSTA, 2007). The 
planning processes currently in place both at the national and regional levels fall 
well short of international standards in electricity planning.
Hydropower projects begin as abstractions, as a series of numbers, drawings 
and equations shaped by experts (Foran, 2006; Greacen and Palettu, 2007). How 
these coalesce over time to establish a particular hydropower plant as an attractive 
option to expanding energy supply is one of the most diffi cult and important 
questions. This diffi culty stems from a number of factors.
First, the fi nancial incentive structure of power utilities is a ‘rate-of-return’ 
structure. All utility costs are periodically submitted for review to a regulator; 
if approved, the organization will be permitted to recover its costs, plus a profi t 
margin, by passing them on to captive customers (Foran, 2008a). This incentive 
structure rewards utilities for investing in power plants, not for saving energy 
through energy effi ciency programmes.
Second, electricity planning is done on behalf of society, not by society. 
Planners report to state-owned power utilities or state energy agencies, not to other 
branches of the state (such as legislative committees or an independent regulatory 
body). These two forces – institutionally shaped interests and practices – combine 
with the aura of technical complexity promoted by insiders. It leads to relatively 
closed ‘state-knows-best’ planning processes.
Civil society groups have questioned Thailand and Vietnam’s power 
development plans, which heavily promote the development of new large-scale 
electricity generation plants (Greacen and Footner, 2006; VUSTA, 2007). They 
claim that future electricity demands are overestimated, and the role that energy 
effi ciency measures, renewable energy and decentralized energy options could play 
is downplayed. In Thailand, they argue that existing plans mostly serve the interests 
of the state-owned electricity utilities, energy companies and the construction 
industry, rather than the needs of Thailand’s electricity consumers. Civil society 
groups in Thailand are calling for reform of the power planning process towards 
integrated resources planning (IRP), a process that considers a full range of feasible 
supply- and demand-side options, as well as the full cost to society – including 
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social and environmental costs, as well as risk –  rather than the lowest commercial 
cost to investors.
Electricity savings programmes implemented by EGAT between 1995 and 
2006 have reduced actual peak demand by 6 per cent. Studies indicate that by 
2018, Thailand should be able to avoid adding 7900MW of generation capacity 
through further savings, offering slightly higher tariffs to renewable energy 
projects and accepting bids to sell electricity from both renewable and high-
effi ciency natural gas cogeneration (Foran, 2008b, Tables 31–32; cf. Greacen and 
Footner, 2006). Vietnam and China likewise have signifi cant energy effi ciency and 
renewable energy potential (USAID, 2007).
Furthering the IRP concept, the WCD put forward a wider framework in 
the form of a Comprehensive Options Assessment that combines sustainable water 
and energy planning practices with public participation to prepare congruous, 
sustainable and publicly acceptable electricity- and water-sector plans.
Coupling electricity and water planning is critical to determining the true cost 
of hydropower development. It is therefore surprising and of serious concern that 
despite more than 15 years of ADB support for extensive hydropower development 
and regional power trade, the ADB has failed to evaluate the cumulative impacts 
of widespread hydropower development on the Mekong River’s ecosystems and its 
people, which are anticipated to be severe (Ratner, 2003; UNEP and TEI, 2007; 
Lamberts, 2008). 
Recognizing the river’s existing values
The Mekong region’s rivers continue to provide abundant natural resources for the 
region’s riparian peoples, as well as the wider basin population, as they have done for 
millennia. By changing the river’s hydrology, blocking fi sh migration and affecting 
the river’s ecology, the extensive construction of hydropower dams throughout the 
Lower Mekong Basin – especially on the mainstream – is likely to have serious 
repercussions throughout the entire basin, both on the region’s economy and its 
food security (see Chapter 9). According to the MRC, the economic value of the 
Mekong River’s fi sheries alone is in excess of US$2 billion per year (MRC, 2005). 
The value of this natural resource is largely unrecognized in regional infrastructure 
development plans.
Where a comprehensive and participatory assessment of all options has 
concluded that a hydropower project is the best option to meet water and energy 
needs, all parties involved should commit to implementing international best 
practice standards. An atmosphere that encourages a race to the top, not to the 
bottom, needs to be fostered. Currently, the region is far from that vision. As 
new hydropower proponents (such as those from China, Thailand and Vietnam) 
become increasingly infl uential in the Mekong region and step onto the global stage, 
they should accept their international responsibilities and adhere to international 
standards when developing and fi nancing large infrastructure projects.
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NOTES
1 These are loans that are extended on terms substantially more generous than 
market loans. The concessionality is achieved either through interest rates 
below those available on the market or by grace periods, or a combination of 
these (see http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=5901).
2 VLPC is a Vietnamese consortium, formed of Song Da Corporation (49 per 
cent), PetroVietnam, the Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam, 
the PetroVietnam Finance Company and the BIDV Securities Company.
3 This observation is based on comments by Thai bankers during a 2007 forum 
on Thai–Lao hydropower development sponsored by the World Bank (see 
World Bank, 2007).
4 The Equator Principles (EP) are a voluntary set of environmental and social 
standards in development project fi nance globally that have been adopted by 
60 private banks around the world.
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3Pak Mun Dam: 
Perpetually Contested?
Tira Foran and Kanokwan Manorom
INTRODUCTION
Ever since its approval in 1989, Pak Mun Dam has sparked controversy, linked 
to resistance networks that have sought to defend, mitigate and restore fi sheries-
dependent livelihoods. This chapter provides a history of the Pak Mun Project 
and summarizes its main features – ecological, engineering and governance. It 
explores the project’s trajectory in the context of wider changes in Thai state–society 
relations. We review important debates between proponents and opponents, and 
unresolved controversies and risks. Finally, we refl ect on the consequences of the 
dispute over Pak Mun Dam and discuss critical lessons from the case.
The fi rst publicized dispute in Thailand about a large dam was over the Nam 
Choan Project (on the Upper Kwae Noi River), proposed in 1982 by the state-
owned Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT). Nam Choan Dam 
would have fl ooded 223km² of a wildlife sanctuary in Kanchanaburi Province 
northwest of Bangkok. The same year, a coalition of Bangkok environmentalists, 
students, local middle-class people, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and some of the up to 2000 Karen minority people who would be displaced 
joined in protest against the project. Opponents argued that the project imposed 
unacceptable social costs, would deplete forests and harm wildlife. Twice during 
the 1980s, the government of Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda reviewed and 
shelved the Nam Choan Project. This signalled new complications for the dam-
building programme of EGAT and the Royal Irrigation Department (RID), the 
main builders of large dams in Thailand. Partly as a product of the Nam Choan 
Dam campaign, Project for Ecological Recovery, a new NGO, emerged in 1986 to 
56 HYDROPOWER EXPANSION IN THE MEKONG REGION
defend forests and resource-dependent livelihoods. Some observers have interpreted 
the state’s determination to proceed with Pak Mun Dam in 1989 as a reaction to 
EGAT’s earlier setback at Nam Choan.
Pak Mun Dam is located approximately 80km downstream from the provincial 
centre of Ubon Ratchathani and 5.5km upstream of the confl uence of the Mun 
and the Mekong rivers (see Figure 3.1). Constructed during 1990 to 1994, the 
dam is 17m high, 300m wide, with eight radial gates that can be fully opened to 
release water.
The Mun’s living aquatic resources are noted for their high biodiversity 
and contribution to subsistence and trade (Roberts, 1993; Sretthachau, 2002). 
When the gates of Pak Mun were opened between 2001 and 2002 for a year-long 
experiment, two studies counted more than 150 species of fi sh (Sretthachau, 2002; 
UBU, 2002). Fishermen use a variety of gear, including hook and line, traps, nets 
and beach-haul seines. Total catch has not been estimated for a number of reasons, 
including the large number of landing sites, subsistence consumption and – most 
importantly for sustaining important fi sh populations – lack of a long-term fi sheries 
assessment programme. A concrete fi sh ladder was installed in 1996, but its design 
does not allow signifi cant upstream migration (Roberts, 2001). Instead, in a 2003 
decision that we explore below, EGAT was requested to fully open the dam’s gates 
during the annual wet season, nominally for four months beginning in June.
Because it is a ‘run-of-river’ dam operated for power generation, Pak Mun 
cannot also be used to store signifi cant amounts of water. Yet, since the early 
2000s – partly as a result of populist development policy – the state has expanded 
small pumped irrigation systems near and upstream from the dam. Critics view 
this initiative as a justifi cation for not opening the dam gates beyond four months 
(Foran, 2006, Chapter 8), reserving the dam instead for power generation at 
least eight months per year, including during Thailand’s peak power demand hot 
season.
Our Pak Mun Dam ‘case’ (see Table 3.1 for chronology) consists of a complex 
series of interactions between local people (including anti-dam campaigners), civil 
society organizations and state agents during the period of 1989 to 2008. Resistance 
against Pak Mun began in 1989 to 1990 with informal networking among villagers 
who opposed the dam and the state’s process. The state worked through local 
authorities such as district and sub-district offi cers and village headmen.1 Prior to 
construction, they tried to elicit public support at meetings which they summoned. 
The state’s paternalistic process and threats of repression failed to intimidate a 
few articulate and confi dent middle-aged women. They helped to form a larger 
network and sought advice from a small civil liberties NGO in Ubon Ratchathani 
(Missingham, 2003). Opposition spread to town people: fi rst to vendors opposed 
to the fl ooding of Kaeng Saphue, a large rapids and tourist attraction. Later it 
spread to a segment of the middle class in Ubon Ratchathani.
In the earliest stages, people seemed to be responding to a lack of information 
and fear of widespread impacts. When it became understood that the run-of-river 
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Figure 3.1 Lower Mun Basin and Pak Mun Dam
Source: village data from EGAT (undated)
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design chosen by EGAT would lead to a much smaller area inundated, and when 
EGAT undertook not to fl ood Kaeng Saphue, most of the opposition dissipated. 
The protest campaign narrowed to a core of villagers and alternative development 
NGOs. Local people were apparently the fi rst to raise the concern that the Pak 
Mun Dam would destroy wild fi sheries harvests after they witnessed blasting 
of the river bed during construction in 1991. By 1994, a villagers’ organization 
representing some 2500 families from more than 50 villages had formed to press 
for compensation in terms of land and fi sheries. A pro-dam network led by village 
headmen and other local authorities also emerged, promising equal compensation 
to people without the need to protest. In 2008, Pak Mun’s 15th year of operations, 
pro- and anti-dam coalitions still existed.
Regardless of their level of engagement in dam disputes, villagers in the Lower 
Mun River Basin pursue similar livelihood strategies. They are smallholder farmers 
who grow one main crop of rice during the May to October monsoon season. 
Holdings are typically 5ha to 7ha; but soils near the dam are often poor. By Thai 
standards, many households are income poor. Almost all households supplement 
their income by off-farm labour, with signifi cant rates of seasonal and long-term 
out-migration, especially among younger people (UBU, 2002).
The degree to which local people derive benefi t from living aquatic resources, 
especially wild fi sheries, has been a topic of multiple rounds of dispute. Although 
marginalized in state-sponsored livelihood surveys, and difficult to quantify 
because diffuse, variable and politicized, living aquatic resources make meaningful 
contributions to livelihoods (Sretthachau, 2002; UBU, 2002; Foran, 2006, 
Chapter 8). This is especially true for land-poor farmers.
PRE-OPERATIONAL PATTERNS OF CONTENTION, 1989 TO 1994
By the 1980s in Thailand, the public sphere vital to engage state decision-making 
had distinctly increased as a result of contentious democratization during the 1970s 
(Foran, 2006, Chapter 4). Yet, advocates calling for more deliberation over Pak 
Mun Dam in the early 1990s met with predominantly aloof responses from state 
agents (Foran, 2006, p193). As in many other confl icts over rural development at 
the time, Thai NGOs stepped in to help villagers publicize their grievances.
NGOs sensed that EGAT’s application for World Bank fi nancing generated 
opportunities to amplify their concerns internationally and to mobilize transnational 
opposition (Hubbel, 1992).2 They cast the problem in terms developed since the 
late 1960s. A ‘community culture’ school of thought portrayed the village economy 
as inherently superior to dependent capitalist development (Phongpaichit and 
Baker, 1995, p387). It defended local peoples’ common natural resources, such 
as wild-capture fi sheries and tourist attractions against resource-grabbing by state 
agencies and private interests.
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Table 3.1 Pak Mun Dam case: Key events (1982 to 2007) 
Year Actions 
Events under Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda (March 1980–April 1988)
1982 Environmental impact assessment (EIA) for a dam located above confl uence of 
Mun and Mekong rivers at 112m above mean sea level (amsl) crest indicates 
4000 households would need resettlement.
1983–1987 1983: Kaeng Tana National Park declared; the Electricity Generating Authority 
of Thailand (EGAT) conducts new feasibility study for dam located upstream. 
1985: EGAT lowers water retention level to 108m amsl, relocates site to lower 
inundation impact. 
1987: Pak Mun Dam appears in EGAT’s Power Development Plan.
Events under Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan (April 1988–February 1991)
1989 April: Pak Mun Project fi rst approved by cabinet; fi rst protest at Ubon 
Ratchathani provincial hall.
1990 EGAT applies for World Bank loan to develop power system, including Pak 
Mun.
February: campaigns begin to increase transparency about the number of 
affected households; three-day anti-dam rally/confrontation with supporters’ 
rally.
May: cabinet approves Pak Mun budget of 3.88 billion baht (US$155.2 million); 
sets up committees for compensation and resettlement; 262 households 
understood affected.
May: northeast NGOs support anti-dam villagers.
June: site preparation work commences.
August: government releases environmental mitigation plan.
October: World Bank completes pre-investment staff appraisal report.
1991 January: completion of preliminary site works.
Events under Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun (national peacekeeping council junta) 
(February 1991–April 1992)
1991 February: military coup led by General Suchinda Kraprayoon ousts Chatichai 
government, appoints Anand as prime minister; EGAT sticks to its estimate of 
262 affected households; proceeds with construction.
March: 12,000 petition World Bank against making loan.
May: two-week rally ends with agreement to establish participatory impact 
assessment committee.
June: Anand government appoints multi-stakeholder problem-solving 
committee.
October: World Bank directors meet with Pak Mun opponents. 
December: World Bank approves loan, with two objections and one abstention.
1992 March: EGAT, Royal Forest Department, National Parks Department and Fine 
Arts Department defend rapids blasting in Kaeng Tana National Park as legal 
and not harmful.
April: 200 villagers protest against rapids blasting, claiming damage to fi sheries 
migration.
April–May: Bangkok demonstrations against Suchinda assuming prime 
ministership; Suchinda resigns after large-scale demonstrations turn violent; 
Anand reappointed as prime minister. 
September: Chuan Leekpai (Democrats) win elections.
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Events under Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai’s fi rst administration 
(September 1992–July 1995)
1993 February: oppositional villagers begin new campaign for just compensation.
1994 June: dam commissioned, impoundment begins, fi sh pass completed.
April–June: rallies against dam in Bangkok.
October: 2000 villagers rally for fair fi shing livelihood compensation at Ubon 
Provincial Hall; after two weeks, march to dam site. 
December: 300 villagers affected by Sirindhorn Dam march to join Pak Mun 
rally, demanding compensation for the earlier project.
1995 January: government approves new consensus-based participatory fi sheries 
compensation committee, chaired by Plodprasop Suraswadi.
March: government agrees to pay for three years’ lost fi shing income; 157-day 
rally ends.
May–November: Plodprasop committee approves 2932 out of 4530 
applications for fi sheries compensation.
June: fi rst round of compensation to 571 households; agricultural co-operative 
formed to hold two-thirds of payment in trust.
May: Chuan dissolves parliament amidst corruption scandal; Chart Thai Party 
wins elections.
Events under Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-Archa (July 1995–November 1996)
1995 December: Assembly of the Poor (AOP) announces Mun River Declaration; 
600 demonstrators present this sustainable development manifesto to ASEAN 
leader in Bangkok.
1996 March: AOP stages multi-issue farmers’ rally with up to 12,000 people.
April: participatory problem-solving committee set up with Prime Minister 
Banharn as chair. Sirindhorn Dam villagers’ movement for retroactive 
compensation grows to 2500 households.
September: Banharn’s coalition government collapses; Chavalit’s New 
Aspiration Party wins subsequent elections.
Events under Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (November 1996–November 1997)
1997 January: AOP begins 1999-day multi-issue rally.
April: government agrees to pay perpetual fi sheries compensation for 3080 Pak 
Mun fi shermen.
July–November: fi nancial crisis erupts; Chavalit devalues baht and resigns in 
November; Chuan assumes prime ministership.
Events under Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai 
(second administration November 1997–February 2001) 
1998 April: Chuan cabinet refuses to honour Chavalit government resolution of 29 
April 1997.
July: Thaksin Shinawatra launches Thai Rak Thai Party. 
1999 March: campaign against Pak Mun demands dam decommissioning, builds 
protest village adjacent to dam.
Late 1999: World Commission on Dams (WCD) multi-stakeholder process 
begins. 
Table 3.1 (continued) 
Year Actions 
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2000 March: WCD draft report criticizes performance of dam and fi sh pass.
May: AOP villagers blockade Pak Mun and Rasi Salai dams.
June: government establishes ‘neutral’ problem-solving committee, chaired by 
Bantorn Orndam.
July: Bantorn committee proposes four-month trial opening; local university to 
study social, economic and ecological impacts; Chuan government declines; 
AOP villagers scale walls of Government House, resulting in mass arrests.
Events under Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (February 2001–September 2006)
2001 April: government accepts trial opening; commissions Ubon Ratchathani 
University (UBU) study.
2002 June: after Pak Mun open for 12 months, EGAT Governor Chalermchai 
Ratanarak offers four months per year seasonal opening policy.
September: problem-solving committee chaired by Deputy Prime Minister 
Pongpol Adireksan votes for four-month seasonal opening.
October: cabinet resolution ratifi es Pongpol committee decision.
Late 2002: UBU Pak Mun study publishes interim and fi nal conclusions; Tai 
Baan research completed.
December: Thaksin chairs roundtable with academics and anti-dam villagers; 
National Statistics Offi ce (NSO) surveys the opinions of 3750 household heads 
in 150 villages.
2003 January: government reconfi rms fi nal decision of four-month seasonal opening; 
Bangkok governor evicts 500 demonstrators.
March: Ministry of Agriculture announces Pak Mun Irrigation Project and fi sh-
stocking investments.
2003–2006 Four-month seasonal opening policy implemented.
Events under Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont (National Security Council junta) 
(September 2006–February 2008)
2007 February–May: local authorities organize villager survey (n = 20,592); claim 
overwhelming support for a year-round dam closure policy; results unpublished.
March: 3000 villagers hold a pro-dam rally.
June–July: government abandons, then readopts, the four-month opening 
policy; devolves operational management to multi-stakeholder provincial 
committee.
Source: adapted from Foran (2006)
NGOs also presented an injustice narrative: the state trampled over basic rights 
such as the provision of transparent information and wider participation in project 
planning. Opponents complained about the state’s closed practices, its lack of 
reliable information and its occasionally arrogant handling of public meetings. 
They decried plans to resettle inundated farmers on land often of marginal value 
and with less secure titles.
How did villagers’ opposition emerge and sustain itself? Missingham (2003) 
credits the strength and effi cacy of an NGO-led internally democratic social change 
Table 3.1 (continued)
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network. However, the movement’s internal structure was not the only cause of 
sustained mobilization. Events during 1989 to 1994 suggest that one important 
reason people kept on challenging the state’s handling of Pak Mun was that state 
agents persistently responded with a mixture of concession and repression. Process 
concessions made during Anand Panyarachun’s government needed to be fought for 
again during the subsequent Chuan Leekpai administration. Chuan’s government 
fi rst granted these concessions in the form of a multi-stakeholder committee to 
review the scope and eligibility of compensation. Later it revoked the multi-
stakeholder process when senior decision-makers perceived it as too threatening 
to established practices. This tantalizing and frustrating dance of concession and 
denial spurred opponents to keep struggling. Defi ning and identifying affected 
households was a point of contention. 
State response to dam opponents
The collective action that emerged was perceived as very threatening to established 
notions of political order. Many immediate responses by state agents were repressive.3 
The police described people who distributed leafl ets, wrote letters and attended 
demonstrations as a ‘minority’, as ‘paid’ agents or even as ‘communists’ (Bangkok 
Post, 1991). A second dimension of repression was state-owned radio and television 
coverage that failed to report on anti-dam activism, and consistently reported 
favourably on public meetings in Ubon Ratchathani. Provincial media also gave 
the project favourable coverage (Arthit, interview 2 July 2002). A third dimension 
of repression involved mobilizing local support. EGAT and the state instructed 
local leaders to speak out in favour of the dam and to strongly discourage villagers 
from voicing dissent (Missingham, 2003, pp73–76).
Impacts and consequences of protest
Until 1993, the civil society opposition campaign had limited impact. The 
government of Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan moved forward with approval 
and construction during 1989 to 1991. The military-appointed government of 
Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun did not halt construction during 1991 to 1992 
when the dam was less than 10 per cent complete. Some World Bank directors 
voted against the project in late 1991, but not a majority.
Opponents, nonetheless, opened up spaces for debate, and notable concessions 
were made. Early discursive concessions underpinned subsequent campaigns. 
Under public pressure, the governments of Prime Minister Anand and, later, 
the fi rst administration of Chuan Leekpai set up committees to review fl ooding 
and livelihoods compensation. A 1991 committee under the Anand government 
validated protesters’ claims that EGAT was not handling Pak Mun as transparently 
as they and the government desired. It also helped to legitimate the idea of problem-
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solving committees with ordinary villager participation. Campaigns in 1993 to 
expand recognition of affected households built directly on promises made in 
Anand’s committee in 1991. By December 1993, the state had accepted demands 
for a process devolved down to a set of village-level committees, with villager 
participation, to help process residents’ grievances (Foran, 2006, p191).
A devolved process helped to deliver compensation but was not suffi cient to 
hold the state accountable for all types of impact. The state and protesters were 
particularly in dispute over land higher than 108m above mean sea level (the 
nominal maximum water level). EGAT initially claimed that it would pay only 
for earthworks to raise affected structures. Opponents claimed their homes would 
be surrounded by water. After more demonstrations at the construction site, they 
prevailed in getting the state to pay the costs of moving and re-erecting houses (see 
Table 3.2; Foran, 2006, p192).
Table 3.2 Categories of households recognized for compensation of structures and 
fi xed assets
Set (1): Recognized in 1982–1983 studies by Team Consulting Engineers Ltd Number
1.1 Affected by construction, Ban Hua Haew village   11
1.2 Living below 108m amsl  136
1.3 Living 108m–108.5m amsl   96
Sub-total  243
Set (2): Recognized in 1994 by civil society campaigns, 1990–1994
2.1 Affected by river bed blasting  227
2.2 Agriculture land inundated  706
2.3 Living above 108.5m amsl, chose to relocate  473
Sub-total 1406
Total 1649
Notes: Non-fi sheries impacts only. ‘Recognized’ refers to recognition of categories; 
numerical estimates vary. Original set (1) estimates ranged from 241 to 379, but at least 
1821 households eventually received compensation (Missingham, 2003, p72).
Source: Amornsakchai et al (2000, p58) 
Dam opponents did not succeed in defeating some powerful pragmatic arguments, 
such as the argument that the dam had already been approved, construction 
had started and, therefore, the dam must proceed. In light of this discursive and 
institutional context, the fact that activists successfully forced the state to recognize 
broader categories of people and impacts was a very important outcome. It 
delivered collective benefi ts to those otherwise invisible to the state.
Protest also produced important unanticipated consequences. The mobilization 
of pro-dam villagers frequently led to violent encounters. Displacing protesters from 
a given site could trigger sympathetic media coverage. Protesters’ non-violent forms 
of contention, when met with violence, tended to generate social movement and 
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media frames of innocent and displaced victims, which governments subsequently 
had trouble dismissing.
A second outcome unanticipated by activists was that local communities 
divided. As Chanchai, a pro-dam local leader, remembers it, generous compensation 
divided local people between people whose land or structures would be inundated 
and those not:
Land around here was cheap before the compensation process because 
it wasn’t great paddy land. It was worth only about 500 baht per rai 
[US$125 per hectare]; it would fl ood almost every year. The state 
announced it would compensate at US$8750 per hectare, up to 1.6ha, 
and would provide another 1.6ha of land. It would compensate trees on 
fl ooded land and structures. This led to envy. People were divided into 
two factions: those getting impacts, and those not. Everyone wanted to 
receive fl ooding impacts. The protesters joined [anti-dam rallies] out of 
envy. ‘Nam ko tong thuam khoi bang’ [‘The water has to fl ood me as 
well’]. (Kamnan [Sub-District Offi cer] Chanchai, interviews 2 June 
2002 and 12 November 2005)
During subsequent years, these divisions and pressures for a wider distribution 
of compensation benefi ts proved to be a great challenge both to authorities and 
activists.
To sum up the pre-operational period, campaigns against Pak Mun produced 
potent discourses of transparency and accountability. Occasionally, sympathetic 
and open-minded policy-makers exercised agency, but were constrained by 
institutions and associated discursive practices. Opponents did not change these 
powerful practices and institutions, but won some important concessions, such 
as recognition of a broader range of affected people (see Table 3.2). Doing so 
required strong and sustained collective action, as well as the ability to broaden 
problem defi nitions and solutions. The state’s responses to the strategic actions of its 
opponents ranged from repression, to opening negotiation, leading to concessions. 
Outcomes hinged on decision-makers’ reactions to the emergent process of sustained 
collective action. Two plausible processes are involved in those outcomes: 
1 deliberative processes that changed problem defi nitions and solutions; and 
2 conciliatory openings offered by elites, after peak protest events or unexpected 
episodes of violence.
POST-OPERATIONAL PATTERNS OF CONTENTION, 1994 TO 2003
After completion of the dam in 1994, a new round of collective action emerged 
around a discourse to hold the state explicitly accountable for impacts upon 
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fi sheries. Fisheries impacts had been argued about since 1991, but were only 
beginning to be processed by a provincial-level sub-committee two years later. 
In late 1993, Maliwan and Pho Siang, two protest leaders, emerged from jail to 
demand that the state pay fi sheries compensation of 35,000 baht ($US1400) per 
household for each year of the three-year constructions (Buchita, 1997; Foran, 
2006, p197).4
After Pak Mun’s commissioning in June 1994, the state’s response to dam 
opponents continued to range from repression to negotiated concessions. As 
during the prior period, violence against the protesters (e.g. police crackdowns on 
direct actions) provoked a temporarily empowering media backlash. Despite these 
similarities, the post-operation period is qualitatively different. The main movement 
organizations opposed to Pak Mun – the Mun River Villagers’ Committee and, 
later, the Assembly of the Poor (AOP) – began to stage larger demonstrations. This 
was, in part, because the new campaign for fi sheries compensation appealed to a 
larger set of villager benefi ciaries, and also because of proven successes in earlier 
campaigns and the entry of new aggrieved groups into the AOP.5
Faced with the challenge of sustained mobilization, the state, beginning during 
the fi rst Chuan Leekpai administration, deliberately stalled and otherwise refused 
to budge on protesters’ demands. The Prime Minister’s Offi ce devolved confl ict 
management responsibilities to provincial government, but did not, despite claims 
to the contrary, devolve authority adequate to resolve those confl icts (Foran, 2006, 
Chapter 7).
Opposition to Pak Mun triggered defensive action. In 1994, the year Pak 
Mun was commissioned, Kamnan Chanchai (the leader quoted above) formed a 
new group to oppose the protesters. He did so, he said, out of loyalty to the ‘80 
per cent’ of villagers who still respected their leaders, and found the protesters’ 
behaviour outrageous. Chanchai remembers the protesters as aggressive, wilful 
and immoral: ‘If they felt like blocking a road to demonstrate, or a district offi ce, 
they just did it.’ He found that his peers in three local districts felt the same way: 
villagers increasingly viewed them as having lost their power. District offi cers and 
the provincial governor supported his effort, as did senior EGAT management. 
‘They gave me a green light’, said Chanchai (interview, 12 November 2005).
Thus emerged the Kamnan and Village Headmen’s Group (KVHG). Lacking 
a broad change agenda, its primary objective was to dissuade villagers from 
joining anti-dam action. KVHG did this by making claims on behalf of villagers 
who stayed out of protests. It administered interim fi sheries compensation claims 
for more than 2000 villagers, without their having to join any of the anti-dam 
campaigns. It reasoned that whatever claims anti-dam protesters established would 
eventually be granted, on equity principles, to other fi shing households. But some 
members of the KVHG also organized counter-demonstrations against the anti-
dam villagers.
Meanwhile, faced with protests, the central government learned to withhold 
force. It let protesters languish and, especially post-1997, espoused their right 
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to protest. Such a response helped to produce marathon demonstrations for 
livelihoods restoration: in 1994 to 1995 (157 days); 1997 (99 days); and a ‘protest 
village’ adjacent to the dam during 1999 to 2002. A counter-response by the 
protesters was to stage actions in ways calculated to maximize the odds of favourable 
media coverage. Outcomes were mixed: the 157-day sit-in (during the fi rst Chuan 
government) and the 99-day rally in Bangkok (during the government of Prime 
Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh) led to negotiations resulting in unprecedented 
agreements to compensate for damage to fi shery-dependent livelihoods (see Table 
3.2). By contrast, the protest village sit-in campaign during the second Chuan 
government yielded 15 months of impasse.
Reinvigorated protest campaign and World Commission on 
Dams Assessment, 1999 to 2000
During 1999 to 2000, as the protest village campaign wore on, the Pak Mun 
confl ict was transformed. This was partly as a result of an expert assessment made 
on behalf of the World Commission on Dams, and partly as a result of the second 
Chuan Leekpai government’s hardened stance towards protesters. After the Thai 
fi nancial crisis and regime change in late 1997, Chuan’s incoming government 
decided to withdraw the concessions made by the previous Chavalit government for 
lost fi sheries income. In April 1998, after several weeks of another large dry season 
rally, Chuan’s cabinet resolved to not pay any compensation for past development 
projects, arguing that this would open a never-ending series of claims and that the 
government was broke. Essentially, it refused to honour any of the commitments to 
the AOP made by the preceding Chavalit government. These reversals meant wider 
setbacks – for Thai highlanders who had won some rights to live in protected areas, 
for opponents of two other dams in northeast Thailand, and for villagers claiming 
compensation for Sirindhorn and Pak Mun dams (Missingham, 2003).
In March 1999, the AOP launched a new campaign. It established a protest 
village occupying several hectares of a public park and riverbank immediately 
adjacent to the Pak Mun Dam site. The assembly announced that it was abandoning 
its previous claim for permanent loss of fi sheries income. In 1997, Chavalit’s 
administration had agreed to provide 2.4ha of land (or the monetary equivalent 
at US$8750 per hectare) for 3080 Pak Mun fi sher households. After the Chuan II 
government refused to compensate, the assembly demanded that the government 
decommission the dam in order to restore fi sheries to the river.
In 1999, another process began that was to prove infl uential. The World 
Commission on Dams (WCD) – a multi-stakeholder process funded by a range of 
development and private-sector donors – was a sophisticated attempt to conduct a 
series of participatory studies about the performance of large dams worldwide. For 
its eight in-depth case studies, the WCD asked governments, including Thailand, 
for permission to study the economic, environmental and social impacts; the 
benefi ts, costs and distribution of these impacts; and the decision-making processes 
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for these dams. WCD chose to study Pak Mun in part because its sponsors 
considered it an exemplary project. In June 1998, the World Bank’s Operations 
Evaluation Department released a report stating that Pak Mun’s resettlement 
programme was ‘overly generous’ and denied that the dam caused any decline in 
the fi sh population in the Mun (World Bank, 2000). On the other hand, members 
of the WCD, such as the International Rivers Network, had helped to campaign 
against the dam.
Thailand has limited experience with formalized knowledge-building multi-
stakeholder processes. The only such process during the 1990s was the Constitutional 
Drafting Assembly of 1996 to 1997 (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2000).6 Considering 
the immediate political context at Pak Mun, the WCD assessment was ambitious. 
Thailand appears to have been the only WCD case study that proceeded while dam 
opponents staged ongoing protests; tensions required the WCD to hold separate 
meetings with EGAT and civil society.
In November 2000, the WCD released its Pak Mun case study. The evaluation 
was critical – of its intended hydropower benefi ts, the dam delivered only 21MW of 
actual dependable capacity versus 75MW planned. Thus, its economic cost-benefi t 
ratio, calculated from the higher number, had been overestimated. Furthermore, 
despite installation of a fi sh pass, Pak Mun had reduced the diversity and overall 
supply of fi sh to income-poor, labour-exporting rural households (Amornsakchai, 
et al, 2000, Chapter 4). The report included dissenting reviews from the World 
Bank and EGAT, and responses to those reviews. It was a dense multi-vocal 
compilation of knowledge.
Unfortunately, despite its well-designed process, the WCD Pak Mun study 
ended in acrimony. EGAT steadfastly argued that:
• The dam produced peaking power benefi ts of 126MW to 136MW, consistent 
with the original feasibility studies justifying the project (EGAT, 2000a, 
pp102–103).
• The study over-exaggerated the decline in the number of fi sh species found 
in the Mun after construction of the dam; the decline resulted from multiple 
causes and should not be attributed to the Pak Mun Dam alone (EGAT, 2000a, 
pp105–111).
• By 2000, it had compensated more than 6200 families for fi sheries impacts, 
paying out more than 989 million baht (EGAT, 2000b).
• Grievances were driven by villagers’ material incentives for compensation and 
were manufactured by Thai and foreign environmental NGOs (EGAT, 2000a, 
p111).
In short, EGAT congratulated itself for producing power benefi ts and compensating 
generously, while limiting its responsibility for fi sheries decline. Its response to 
WCD repeatedly took the form of categorical assertions that certain methods and 
studies were credible, while other studies and methods were invalid (EGAT, 2000a). 
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The World Bank defended the project, but conceded defi ciencies in resettlement 
planning, the failure of the EIA to account for local fi sheries dependence, and lack 
of consultation with affected people (World Bank, 2000).
A debate between WCD and project sponsors EGAT and the World Bank over 
Pak Mun’s ‘dependable capacity’ goes to the heart of the dam’s benefi ts. Dependable 
capacity refers to a threshold level of peak power output, which is exceeded by 
a given proportion of all peak power output values. It is a measure of reliability. 
During the early 1980s, EGAT defi ned dependable capacity of hydropower plants 
as the value of power production that will be ensured (or exceeded) half of the 
time.
Based on this defi nition, EGAT presented Pak Mun’s dependable capacity as 
75MW to the Chatichai government in 1988 for approval. It took the 75MW 
fi gure from SOGREAH consulting engineers (SOGREAH, 1985). To get this 
result, SOGREAH estimated the dam’s average monthly energy production. 
Averaging, however, leads to overestimating dependable capacity because high 
values in the time series bias it upwards (Kansuntisukmongkol, 1994, pp51–52).
During the late 1980s, EGAT toughened its defi nition of dependable capacity, 
specifying it as power production that will be exceeded 90 per cent of the time, 
based on long-term hydrological records (Amornsakchai et al, 2000, p26). Based 
on this later defi nition, the WCD found that dependable capacity was less than 
45MW. Furthermore, analysis of operating performance during 1995 to 1998 
revealed:
The actual dependable capacity of Pak Mun project calculated from 
daily power output between 1995–1998, assuming that all available 
power gets assigned to a 4-hour peak demand period, is only 20.81MW. 
This 21MW is what the Pak Mun project [reliably] offsets in gas turbine 
capacity. (Amornsakchai et al, 2000, pv).
The 21MW dependable capacity was only 15 per cent of Pak Mun’s total generation 
capacity. Lower dependable capacity means lower benefi t-cost ratios. The WCD 
argued that if Pak Mun was treated as a 21MW peaking power plant, its economic 
rate of return would be less than 8 per cent, below the opportunity cost of capital 
in Thailand, and, hence, uneconomic (Amornsakchai et al, 2000, pv).
The dispute over Pak Mun’s ‘dependable capacity’ was, thus, partly about 
which method of computing reliability was most appropriate for estimating the 
power benefi ts of a hydropower plant. Interestingly, SOGREAH estimated Pak 
Mun’s total energy production accurately, at least during the period of 1995 to 
1999, when the dam was operated for maximum hydropower benefi t (WCD, 
2000, p22). But EGAT planning practice did not adequately take into account 
the effect of low fl ows during dry months. These depress peak power output. 
They also lower the dependable capacity (as defi ned by a 90 per cent probability 
of occurrence standard).7
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Adverse media publicity surrounded successive drafts of the WCD report 
(e.g. Chang Noi, 2000). Drafts were leaked on several occasions to the press by 
dam opponents participating in the WCD process. Finally, confl ict over Pak Mun 
intensifi ed in May 2000, when protesters blockaded the powerhouse. Both the 
WCD report and the media coverage caused project proponents EGAT and, to 
a lesser degree, the World Bank to lose face. All of these factors provided EGAT 
motive and ammunition to attack the conduct and integrity of the process.
For encamped protesters, however, the emerging WCD fi ndings provided a 
signifi cant morale boost (AOP, 2000). In May 2000, after more than a year of 
government inattention to their protest village campaign, the Assembly of the Poor 
dramatically escalated its campaign. It launched a sit-in demonstration, disrupting 
access to the Pak Mun Dam powerhouse, as well as a simultaneous blockade of Rasi 
Salai, an upstream irrigation dam in Srisaket Province. At Pak Mun, the protesters 
denied EGAT staff access to the powerhouse for a number of days. They later agreed 
to move aside a few metres so that access could continue.
This dam blockade achieved what months of sit-in demonstrations outside 
Government House since 1994 could not: it conveyed to EGAT senior management 
that they needed to take much more active measures to resolve the conflict 
(Surapong, interview, 20 August 2004). In June 2000, Chuan’s cabinet established 
a bilateral Neutral Committee to Solve Problems of the Assembly of the Poor. It 
was chaired by Bantorn Ondam, a former academic and respected social activist. 
Bantorn had previously served on the 1995 fi sheries compensation negotiating 
committee chaired by Plodprasop Suraswadi.8
The committee’s fi ndings were ‘overwhelmingly in support’ of the assembly’s 
positions on all disputed issues, which included land tenure, just compensation 
and the need for further impact assessments at several large dams (Missingham, 
2003, p207). For Pak Mun, Bantorn’s committee recommended a four-month 
experimental opening to restore fi sheries migration (NC–AOP, 2000).
Chuan initially downplayed Bantorn’s committee fi ndings, treating them 
as non-binding advice. However, he and his advisers revised their positions 
one month later, when a contingent of assembly demonstrators again rallied 
outside Government House. They staged a night scaling of the perimeter walls 
on 16 July 2000, an event that ended in bloodied heads, several hundred arrests 
and condemnation in the print media about police violence (Nation, 2000; 
Chalermsripinyorat, 2004). A week later, Prime Minister Chuan ordered EGAT 
to open the gates of Pak Mun. But the government justifi ed the action as a special 
operation to manage unusual fl ooding that year, and EGAT closed Pak Mun in 
late October once the fl ooding subsided.
During the remainder of 2000, a small contingent of protesters remained outside 
Government House to pressure Prime Minister Chuan to reopen negotiations, but 
without success. By this time the economic crisis had truly set in; Chuan faced 
regular calls from critics to dissolve parliament and call fresh elections.
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Contention under the Thaksin government, 2001 to 2003
In January 2001, Thaksin Shinawatra toppled Chuan in the national elections. 
In March, acting on campaign promises, he visited AOP protesters encamped 
outside Government House. His government quickly established a Committee 
to Resolve Problems of the Assembly of the Poor led by Deputy Prime Minister 
Pongpol Adireksan; but the committee included no representatives or observers 
from the AOP.
In April 2001, three days after the fi nal contingent of protesters returned home, 
Thaksin’s cabinet accepted the recommendations originally made by the Bantorn 
committee: it ordered EGAT to open all eight sluice gates of Pak Mun for four 
months, during May to August, and for Ubon Ratchathani University (UBU) to 
conduct a multidisciplinary study.
Pongpol’s committee set up several sub-committees. The university study was 
to be submitted to a task force chaired by the university’s president. This group 
included representatives from the university, EGAT and the AOP. It was supposed 
to report directly back to Pongpol’s committee. In addition, EGAT commissioned 
its own study, led by the Thailand Institute of Scientifi c and Technological Research 
(TISTR et al, 2003). A notable component of this study consisted of questionnaires 
administered to 94 per cent of the 6176 households that had received fi sheries 
compensation. Villagers themselves, coordinated by Southeast Asia Rivers Network 
(a Thai NGO that campaigns against large dams), initiated the participatory Tai 
Baan research project to document all fi sh species caught by villagers, along with 
other evidence of ecological change in river condition (Sretthachau, 2002; see also 
Chapter 7 in this volume).
The new studies were attempts to generate different knowledge discourses 
from which to argue competing options: should Pak Mun Dam open indefi nitely, 
as opponents demanded? Should it stay closed to generate hydropower, as EGAT 
would prefer? Should it, as a compromise, open seasonally and, if so, during what 
months and based on what evidence?
By the end of the fi rst four-month trial opening period, the AOP felt that it 
had strong evidence that the opening had allowed fi sh migrations to occur. Some 
activists embarked on a long march to publicize the good news. In December 
2001, the four-month experiment was extended to one year after the trial dam 
opening task force accepted an argument from its AOP member that the study 
needed a full year to observe all seasonal effects. In June 2002, a few days before 
the one-year opening of the dam was to expire, EGAT offered to open Pak Mun 
Dam seasonally, from July to October, ceding the option to generate hydropower 
from approximately 52 per cent of the river’s average annual fl ow.9
UBU began presenting fi ndings in September 2002. It reported that although 
households interviewed wanted irrigation water in the dry season, new river-
pumped irrigation systems would have a minimal positive impact. Soils were 
poor, pumping costs were high and farmers lacked capital inputs needed to grow 
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high-value dry season crops. For at least another fi ve years, the dam’s chief benefi t 
– improving electric power reliability in the lower northeast – could be substituted 
by increasing electricity imports. Technical substitutes existed for goods provided 
by the dam; but none existed for improving the security of community-based 
livelihoods (UBU, 2002).
Nevertheless, in October 2002, Thaksin’s cabinet, acting on the recommendation 
from Pongpol’s committee, resolved that Pak Mun would henceforth be operated 
with a four-month seasonal opening. The AOP quickly denounced this decision, 
taken without benefi t of public deliberation, and prior to fi nal submission of the 
university’s government-commissioned report.
The following month, on petition by the AOP and its allies, the Senate 
Committee on Public Participation held a hearing. EGAT Governor Sitthiporn 
Rathanopas conceded that EGAT could reliably supply the lower northeast’s 
growing power needs by expanding transmission lines – hence, hydropower from 
Pak Mun was not indispensable. Based on this admission, university President 
Mongkhon Visetsuk reversed his position and backed a year-round opening for 
Pak Mun (Foran, 2006, Chapter 7). In December 2002, following unexpected 
harassment of demonstrators outside Government House, Prime Minister Thaksin 
intervened in the case, ordering the National Statistics Offi ce (NSO) to survey 
occupations and attitudes towards dam management of residents in the Lower Mun 
Basin. NSO reported that among 3750 householders sampled from 150 villages, 
the least disruptive and most favoured option was a four-month dam opening. 
Only 4 per cent stated that fi shing was their primary ‘occupation’ (achip); less than 
7 per cent stated it was their secondary occupation (NSO, 2003).
Several weeks after the poll, NSO held a public meeting about its survey. Dam 
opponents argued that in the context of rural livelihoods, it would have been more 
accurate to ask villagers about their fi shing activities, not if they regarded fi shing as 
their ‘occupation’. One villager asked: ‘Why didn’t you gather information using 
wording such as “Pho Yai’’[grandfather], do you have children or grandchildren 
that fi sh?’ This implied that the response to this question would have been different 
than to questions based on achip.10
In any case, in January 2003 the cabinet reiterated its resolution to operate Pak 
Mun Dam with a four-month opening, while offering a package of limited support 
for fi sheries-dependent villagers. On 29 January 2003, some 500 villagers outside 
Government House were evicted by the Bangkok governor. As of 2008, the 14 
January 2003 cabinet resolution still represents Thailand’s basic policy statement 
regarding the value of Pak Mun and its future mode of operation.
Pak Mun politics since the decision on the four-month opening 
As part of the 2003 cabinet resolution, the Royal Irrigation Department announced 
an 807 million baht (US$20 million) fi ve-year pumped-water project to expand 
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existing stations and to build new works. Investment focused on villages in the 
upstream vicinity of Pak Mun Dam, but would eventually extend almost 80km 
upstream towards the provincial centre. The Pak Mun Irrigation Project was 
framed as a special development project and did not require a cost-benefi t test. 
The project would build a constituency of local people interested in dam-induced 
high water levels.
Pumped-water irrigation supplies river water to fi elds by large electric pumps 
mounted on fl oating platforms.11 First provided during the 1980s, about 70 such 
systems exist on the Mun River in Ubon Ratchathani. But as of 2003, the three 
Lower Mun districts of Phibun, Khong Chiam and Sirinthorn had only 16. Unlike 
gravity-fed irrigation, which is currently supplied without user charges in Thailand, 
farmers using pumped water had to pay up to US$2 per hour in 2002.
As part of the UBU study discussed above, a team from the Faculty of 
Agriculture studied farming practices in four districts in the Lower Mun. They 
found that pumped water was used primarily at the end of the dry season to raise 
rice seedlings for the main rain-fed rice crop, and, second, to grow higher-value 
crops, such as watermelon and chillies, and to stock fi sh ponds in the dry season. 
However, in 2000 to 2002, the average usage rate in the existing scheme was 
only 14 per cent of the total projected irrigable area (UBU, 2002, pkhor-6). Dam 
supporters argued that during the trial dam opening, water levels in the Mun were 
too low to operate the pumps, but UBU (2002) concluded that such problems 
could be solved with relatively minor retrofi ts.
To better accommodate wet season upstream fish migrations, the AOP 
requested the Thaksin government to allow Pak Mun’s annual four-month opening 
to begin slightly earlier, in May rather than June. The change was agreed and 
announced in June 2004. But since then implementation of the dam’s four-month 
opening policy has been far from smooth.
In April 2007, six months into the military-appointed government of Prime 
Minister Surayud Chulanont, 3000 pro-dam villagers (mobilized by the KVHG) 
rallied at the provincial hall to keep the gates closed and, thus, to overturn the 2004 
Thaksin cabinet resolution. As well, local leaders, allegedly with the backing of the 
National Security Council junta and EGAT, organized a survey of 8091 Lower 
Mun households (AOP, 2007; Sangsok, 2007). Administered by village headmen 
and household heads, the survey asked for the name, identifi cation number and 
signature of each household member, and for a simple yes/no response to the 
question of whether EGAT should store water at 106m to 108m amsl (i.e. normal 
operating levels for power generation).
In late May 2007, on the recommendation of the Ministry of Energy, Surayud’s 
cabinet resolved to open Pak Mun in June. But shortly after this announcement, 
results of the new survey were presented privately to cabinet, claiming overwhelming 
support for dam closure from 20,592 people (8091 households). On the basis of 
this unpublished survey (see discussion below), Surayud’s cabinet then reversed 
its earlier decision and decided on 23 June 2007 to keep Pak Mun closed. This 
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triggered another protest rally in Bangkok by the AOP. After pressure from NGOs, 
academics and criticism in the broadsheet print media, the Surayud government 
fi nally resolved in July 2007 to delegate decision-making about Pak Mun’s opening 
and closing to the provincial governor.
Understanding operating decisions during the 2000s
For dam opponents, the 1997 economic crisis ushered in the unfriendly second 
Chuan Leekpai administration, but also hastened the passing of the 1997 
Constitution, which protected a much higher level of civil liberties. The crisis 
increased calls from farmers and business people alike for governance reform. These 
events were conducive to the rise of Thai Rak Thai, the fi rst political party offering 
coherent policies to benefi t both constituencies.
The manner in which activists’ claims were processed depended upon framing 
contests between dam opponents and the state. These unfolded over time and were 
contingent on micro- and macro-political contexts. Some contexts, such as norms 
of confl ict management and participation, were durable. Some were novel, such 
as the widespread groundswell for reform after the 1997 crisis and Thai Rak Thai’s 
populist policy initiatives (initially well received by anti-dam villagers).
After Thaksin’s unprecedented decision to have a trial opening in 2001 to 
2002, EGAT proposed a four-month opening policy. It made the offer in 2002, 
prior to a formal decision from government, to pre-empt more drastic concessions. 
Although activists rallied against it, and academics urged Prime Minister Thaksin 
to declare a year-round opening during a televised hearing in late 2002, his 
administration regarded this as too regressive and institution-bending for the state. 
By allowing only a face-saving four-month opening, Thaksin and his men defended 
their party’s vision of development and their authority to rule. In doing so, they 
also upheld dominant institutions.
The January 2003 cabinet resolution was followed by a fi ve-year period in which 
Pak Mun’s seasonal opening and closing were periodically disputed at the local level. 
Operating rules were not signifi cantly elaborated upon. This pattern shattered 
in early 2007 under the military-appointed Surayud government. EGAT and its 
allies in the military intervened; the government reversed its operating policy. After 
renewed criticism, it devolved detailed management responsibility to committees 
reporting to the provincial governor. Such ad hoc problem-solving characterizes 
Thai policy-making when elites face popular pressure (Foran, 2006).
Both the four-month seasonal opening decision under Thaksin (2003) and the 
short-lived year-round dam closure decision under Surayud (2007) were justifi ed 
based on surveys of citizens’ preferences. The validity of rapid, high-n, non-
confi dential sampling on a politically sensitive issue is debatable (Foran, 2006). 
However, assuming that the responses accurately captured local people’s opinions, 
why did local households who won fi sheries compensation during the 1990s and 
early 2000s turn away from the assembly’s position in subsequent years?
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We suggest an explanation that involves:
• the power of broad development discourse (hegemonic storylines promising 
water security);
• the power of specifi c counter-framing rhetoric (e.g. ‘the dam has already been 
built, so why not use it’); and 
• the unpopularity of the AOP (see Foran, 2006, for detailed political analysis).
This unpopularity was a contingent and emergent outcome of multiple rounds 
of struggle, during which time state agents ultimately prevailed in framing dam 
critics as a disruptive social force, even as they set new agendas and delivered 
unprecedented benefi ts to protesters and free-riders alike.
During the 1990s, authority delegated to provincial-level committees failed to 
resolve confl icts over compensation, particularly fi sheries compensation. In early 
2008, however, the Provincial Pak Mun Dam Commission chaired by Governor 
Chuan Sirinuntaporn stressed reconciliation and participation of affected people 
(supporters and opponents), local NGOs and academics. The second author 
(Kanokwan) is a member of a steering committee on quality of life, development 
and resilience of affected people. In May 2008, this sub-committee recommended 
rigorous monitoring of dam opening and closing, and quantifi cation of fi sheries 
and agriculture benefi ts. It also raised the larger question of how to improve 
developmental outcomes for the Lower Mun River Basin people during the eight 
months of the year the dam is closed.
Will devolution lead to structured deliberation? Detailed and participatory 
monitoring of livelihood outcomes might weaken the authority of EGAT 
and RID. On the other hand, it might institutionalize more effective use of 
knowledge in decision-making, and contribute to confl ict resolution via structured 
deliberation.
PAK MUN DAM: PERPETUALLY CONTESTED
This chapter presented Pak Mun as an important case in dam decision-making, one 
that has mobilized large numbers of supporters and opponents, and contributed 
to the reshaping of state–society relations in Thailand. A dam planned and 
implemented with low transparency and accountability helped to trigger an 
unfolding, emergent series of disputes. Disputes over Pak Mun attempted to 
democratize an authoritarian state. The movement against Pak Mun has helped 
to socialize Thai society in order to tolerate, and participate in, vigorous street 
demonstrations. It helped to open up new spaces for deliberative politics: on 
campuses, in the offi ces of independent organizations set up under the 1997 
Constitution (e.g. the National Human Rights Commission), and – when routine 
politics fails ordinary people, as it often does in Thailand – on the street.
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Pak Mun offers lessons about rhetoric contests in a democratizing setting. The 
manner in which activists’ claims were processed depended upon framing contests 
between dam opponents and the state. By ‘framing’ we refer to rhetorical work 
deployed to champion a particular interpretation. Such discourse ranges from 
terse speech acts (e.g. ‘Pak Mun opponents [or supporters] are paid to protest’) 
to more elaborate rhetoric in policy statements and scientifi c reports. Framing 
by power-holders is particularly worth tracking. It justifi es government inaction 
on activists’ demands. In closed venues of fi nal decision-making, such ‘counter-
framing’ disarms radical policy narratives. One important example is the shifting 
justifi cation of Pak Mun heard repeatedly over the years of the project. It took 
the form: ‘The project has already been approved’, or ‘Construction has already 
started’, or ‘The dam has already been built’ so ‘therefore the project must proceed’. 
Framing contests are driven by competing interests; but as discourse they also 
constrain what can be imagined and what is reasonable.
In addition to authorities and activists, mass media and technical experts also 
engaged in framing disputes. Dam opponents presented themselves as worthy 
citizens and courted media coverage; but coverage, following norms of news 
reporting, required campaign escalation. Media framing was divided: more serious 
broadsheets provided detailed and sympathetic coverage. High-circulation papers 
have been sites of hostile counter-framing (Chalermsripinyorat, 2004). Most 
technical studies were commissioned by EGAT or the state in an attempt to inform 
or legitimize decision-making. When experts were called in to assess debates over 
Pak Mun, the knowledge they produced was not neutral and immune from attack 
by contending parties, including the original research sponsors.
Pak Mun offers sobering lessons about politics of knowledge. Sustained 
production of knowledge for dispute resolution (e.g. the WCD study) occurred 
relatively late in time. This meant that knowledge production did not always 
contribute in a ‘rational’ way to informed negotiation. New knowledge could, 
instead, trigger reactive framing, as, for example, when Thaksin’s advisers disputed 
the fi ndings of Ubon Ratchathani University (2002) and ordered an opinion poll. 
Concepts such as dependable capacity, occupation, fi sher and farmer were contested 
by laypeople and by experts using different methodologies. Contending research 
sponsors required simple conclusions on key issues such as the importance of 
wild-capture fi sheries to local livelihoods. They ignored the nuances of smallholder 
livelihood strategies. With authority highly concentrated in the state’s executive 
branch, knowledge production was manipulated. The ‘politics of knowledge’ thus 
should not be abstracted from the politics of blame, threat and other forms of 
contention present in a particular dispute (McAdam et al, 2001; Foran, 2006, 
p6).
What practical lessons does Pak Mun offer? Proponents of large water 
infrastructure in Thailand such as EGAT have been compelled to move to 
neighbouring countries such as Laos or Myanmar/Burma to build projects that 
can supply power and water to Thailand. Analysts and advocates for affected people 
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– not just in Thailand, but as a result of Pak Mun’s international prominence – have 
learned to question all project studies from their inception (the fundamental need 
for the projects), extending to ramifying impacts (WCD, 2000). Civil society 
actors have learned to mobilize, often in cross-scale coalitions, and to re-politicize 
knowledge and capture public arenas of deliberation by undertaking, compiling 
and publishing their own data and research. After 20 years of debate over Pak 
Mun, some infrastructure sponsors have learned to approach complex questions 
of livelihoods restoration with more humility. 
Far from disappearing under agricultural modernization, Pak Mun shows that 
dependence upon wild-capture aquatic resources persists. This important fi nding 
from relatively ‘modern’ Thailand implies that hydropower development will lead 
to even stronger negative impacts for small farmers elsewhere in the Mekong region. 
With national economic development as the overriding priority, rural people face a 
spate of large new water proposals, wrapped in powerful discourses of modernization 
and poverty alleviation. In practical terms, how might reformists encourage better 
decision-making? Reforming water and energy governance challenges power 
interests and institutions; therefore, advocates encounter resistance. They can 
expect counter-framing, oppositional elite intervention and rejection of dialogue. 
Advocates of improved governance and sustainability could, nonetheless, promote 
particular combinations of processes. One idea is to promote processes that are 
scientifi cally credible and legitimate to different stakeholders, while savvy about 
the many faces of power.
Will the provincial-level management initiated in 2007 lead to reasoned 
problem-solving? The answer hinges on stakeholders’ ability to agree upon and 
formalize decision-making processes. Otherwise, as we saw, concessions such as 
the seasonal opening can be withdrawn. For any operational policy at Pak Mun to 
work, it also needs to be presented and run as an experiment aimed at delivering 
meaningful livelihood outcomes to supporters and opponents alike. If not, both 
factions – which claim to represent poor farmers – will abandon it in favour of 
prior understandings.
In 2008, Thailand’s instantaneous peak demand was less than 21,395MW. 
Pak Mun running at 136MW would have lowered it by 0.6 per cent, equivalent 
to the peak demand of two large commercial buildings in Bangkok.12 The dam has 
made a slim contribution to energy security, but generated two decades’ worth of 
hardship for those who dared question its value, spoke up about its impacts upon 
their way of life, and pushed for a better deal from the state.
If Pak Mun’s fate is to be perpetually in dispute, it is for several good reasons. There 
are competing interests and contested interpretations. A nuanced understanding 
requires going beyond an engineer’s worldview, optimizing trade-offs between 
power generation, wild-capture fi sheries and water for pumped irrigation. It also 
demands that we understand rural development as an ongoing intensely political 
conversation. During two decades of such conversation, some of the most articulate 
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voices on how to sustain resource-dependent livelihoods in the face of change and 
regional integration have come from the activists at Pak Mun.
NOTES
 1 Elected village headmen report to appointed sub-district offi cers (kamnan). Both 
serve as line offi cers of the Ministry of Interior.
 2 In addition to its long-standing role articulating Thai post-World War II development 
policy, the World Bank has been a signifi cant lender to Thai energy projects, though 
not always the majority fi nancier. In the eyes of commercial banks, the bank’s various 
project review processes reduce political risk. Associated with World Bank project 
review are channels for foreign donor and transnational advocacy (Fox and Brown, 
1998).
 3 By repression we mean any deliberate action by authorities or bystanders that increases 
the diffi culties of collective action (della Porta et al, 1996).
 4 The two leaders were charged with offences related to a construction site protest 
occupation in early 1993 and released on bail.
 5 The Assembly of the Poor, a national social movement organization, emerged in 
late 1995. Resistance against Pak Mun constituted one of its core local networks 
(Missingham, 2003).
 6 In late 1987 the Prem government commissioned a multi-stakeholder process chaired 
by General Tienchai Sirisamphan to review Nam Choan Dam (Foran, 2006, Chapter 
4).
 7 The World Bank (2000, p127) claimed that it had anticipated the intermittent 
nature of Pak Mun’s hydropower production. It claimed that the energy Pak Mun 
generated during the wet season allowed Thailand’s large storage dams to save water, 
which they could release for power production during the dry season. In response, 
the WCD noted that EGAT had presented no evidence of coordinated inter-seasonal 
power production.
 8 Plodprasop served as director general of the Department of Fisheries during 1989 to 
1997.
 9 Critics argued that less than 100 per cent of total annual fl ow was available for 
power generation to begin with. Some rainy season peak fl ow events force EGAT 
to spill fl ood water (Amornsakchai et al, 2000), so EGAT’s 52 per cent fi gure is an 
overestimate. EGAT has, however, ceded the option to generate electricity during 
those months.
10 Foran (2006, Chapter 8) provides an extended discussion.
11 Canals are concrete lined, approximately 2m wide, and run inland with occasional 
branches for a total length of 3km to 4km. Water reaches fi elds through simple open-
ings that can be raised by hand. Requesting water usually requires agreement among 
three or four farmers, and the pump is operated by a resident employee of the RID.
12 Chuenchom S. Greacen, pers comm, 10 September 2008.
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4The Nam Theun 2 Controversy 
and Its Lessons for Laos
Shannon Lawrence
INTRODUCTION
The US$1.45 billion Nam Theun 2 (NT2) project is the biggest hydropower 
project under development in Laos, with costs approaching one third of the 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP). When it reached fi nancial closure in 
May 2005, NT2 became the largest ever foreign investment in Laos and the largest 
hydroelectric project with private-sector fi nancing (NTPC, 2005d). The project 
will export 95 per cent of its 1070MW power output to neighbouring Thailand 
starting in late 2009.
NT2’s electricity sales will generate revenue for Laos, considered in conventional 
development indicators as one of the economically poorest countries in Asia. But 
these revenues come with a big trade-off: NT2 is fl ooding 450km2 of land, river, 
forest and wildlife habitat, and displacing thousands of predominantly ethnic 
minority peoples. As a trans-basin diversion project, NT2 will have signifi cant 
impacts upon two river basins, reducing fi sh catches, affecting water levels and 
water quality for tens of thousands people downstream (ADB, 2004; International 
Rivers, 2008b).
In 2005, the NT2 project received support from the World Bank and other 
investors, becoming the fi rst major dam approved by the World Bank in almost a 
decade. At that time, NT2 was lauded by the World Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) and other project proponents as a ‘model’ that could pave the way for 
best practice dam development in the region. But NT2 has attracted controversy 
ever since it was fi rst proposed in the 1980s. As the project’s construction nears 
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completion, the debate about its costs and benefits – and about large dam 
development, more generally – continues.
In order to overcome the challenges of developing such a high-risk hydro project 
in a country characterized by low capacity, poor public fi nancial management 
and weak governance, NT2’s primarily Western backers insisted on a number 
of commitments from the Government of Laos (GOL) and the Nam Theun 2 
Power Company (NTPC). Through these commitments, they attempted to turn 
a private-sector energy project into a development initiative – an experiment that 
NTPC and the GOL were prepared to go along with in order to access concessional 
funding and guarantees from the multilateral development banks (MDBs). 
In a country with a one-party authoritarian government, no independent 
judiciary or independent civil society organizations, no free press, and a ranking 
as one of the world’s 25 most corrupt countries by Transparency International 
(Transparency International, 2008; US State Department, 2008), dams have left a 
legacy of broken promises and uncompensated losses. As a result of these projects, 
tens of thousands of Laotians lack suffi cient food to eat, clean water to drink and 
income to meet their basic needs.
But river-rich Laos, which contributes about one third of the Mekong River’s 
fl ow, is experiencing a dam-building boom. In its bid to become ‘the battery of 
Southeast Asia’, the GOL has signed memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with 
foreign companies to build more than 45 dams on Mekong tributaries, and is even 
considering at least six projects on the Mekong River. Power from these projects 
will be sold primarily to neighbouring Thailand as well as Vietnam and, possibly, 
China. 
As the Lao hydropower sector takes off, observers are wondering just what 
sort of lessons may be learned from NT2, the country’s most controversial large 
dam. Is NT2 a model for how to plan and build sustainable hydropower projects? 
Are NT2’s social and environmental risks being managed adequately during the 
construction stage, and planned for during the operations stage? If not, why not? 
How is the NT2 experience affecting other hydro projects in Laos? This chapter will 
seek to answer these questions by examining NT2’s planning and implementation 
and drawing lessons for the future.
The chapter starts with an overview of NT2’s history and the debate focused on 
World Bank support for NT2. It then examines the planning process for NT2 and 
describes the project and its notable features, including social and environmental 
commitments and revenue management plans. Problems with implementing 
NT2’s social and environmental mitigation and compensation measures three years 
into its construction phase are also discussed. Finally, the chapter examines why 
problems have occurred with NT2 and what lessons can be learned, and concludes 
with general recommendations to promote better outcomes in Laos. An alternative 
perspective from the World Bank is included as an appendix to the chapter. 
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THE HISTORY OF NAM THEUN 2 (NT2)
By the time NT2 lined up fi nancing in 2005, the project had already been in 
the GOL’s and the World Bank’s sights for more than two decades. World Bank 
support for NT2 began in the mid 1980s when it fi nanced a feasibility study for 
the project (GOL, 2002). During those early years, Thailand was identifi ed as the 
likely market for NT2’s power.
In 1993, the GOL awarded Transfi eld Holdings Ltd, one of Australia’s largest 
construction companies, the rights to develop NT2 as a build–own–operate–
transfer (BOOT) project for a 25-year concession period. Transfi eld established 
a consortium called the Nam Theun 2 Electricity Consortium (NTEC) with 
Electricité de France (EDF), Ital-Thai Development (ITD), Jasmine International, 
Merrill Lynch Phatra Thanakit Securities and the GOL. Electricité de France later 
took over the lead shareholder spot from Transfi eld, acquiring a 35 per cent stake 
in NT2.
By the mid 1990s, concerns about the economic viability of NT2 and its social 
and environmental impacts were being raised by international non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and some academics (International Rivers Network et al, 
1997). Conscious of the growing public opposition to the project, in 1995 the 
World Bank called for additional economic, environmental and social studies 
(Scudder, 2005) and urged the GOL to conduct public workshops to discuss NT2. 
The importance of World Bank support for NT2 was already apparent; David 
Iverach, NTEC’s director in Laos, emphasized in January 1997: ‘If the World Bank 
does not proceed with the project, nor would we’ (Nette, 1997). 
But the Asian fi nancial crisis put the brakes on NT2’s development in late 
1997 (Manolom, 2002) and the lull lasted for a few years. As Thailand’s economic 
situation improved, their interest in NT2 returned. An electricity tariff MoU 
between the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) and NTEC was 
signed in 2000 (GOL, 2002). Meanwhile, in 1999 and 2000, Jasmine International 
and Merrill Lynch Phatra Thanakit sold their equity stakes, and the Electricity 
Generating Company of Thailand (EGCO) joined NTEC. 
In 2002, a Concession Agreement was fi nally signed between the GOL and the 
renamed Nam Theun 2 Power Company (NTPC). The World Bank, waiting for 
the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) between Thailand and Laos to be fi nalized, 
was on the verge of initiating formal appraisal of the NT2 project. But in July 
2003, a day before the PPA was to be signed, lead shareholder EDF announced 
that it was withdrawing from NT2. EDF attributed its pull-out to ‘advice from 
French government offi cials’ (Reuters, 2003) and a ‘strategy to consolidate assets 
and re-focus priorities in Europe’ (Praiwan, 2003). 
According to news reports, the GOL gave the consortium three months to 
identify a new shareholder to take over EDF’s 35 per cent stake (Lang, 2003). 
For a short while, NT2 once again seemed to be in jeopardy. But EDF decided 
to rejoin the NT2 consortium – with little explanation – and in November 2003, 
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Figure 4.1 Nam Theun 2 Transmission tower
the PPA between EGAT and NTPC was fi nally signed and the search for project 
fi nancing began.
The US$1.45 million NT2 was expected to be fi nanced with approximately 
30 per cent equity from the shareholders and 70 per cent international loans and 
THE NAM THEUN 2 CONTROVERSY AND ITS LESSONS FOR LAOS 85
guarantees from the World Bank, the ADB, the European Investment Bank, the 
Agence Française de Développement (AFD), export credit agencies and commercial 
banks. Given the size of the investment and the risks of operating in Laos, 
commercial banks were unlikely to fund the project without guarantees from the 
World Bank. The potential fi nanciers also primarily relied on the World Bank to 
lead the economic, social and environmental due diligence for NT2.
WAITING FOR THE WORLD BANK: THE NT2 DEBATE IN BRIEF 
In June 2002, the World Bank outlined a ‘Decision Framework’ for NT2 that 
identifi ed three criteria that would have to be met for the GOL to receive the 
World Bank’s support. The Decision Framework clarifi ed that: 
… the project must be embedded in a development framework aimed at 
poverty reduction and environmental conservation; must be technically, 
fi nancially, managerially and economically sound and adhere to the 
Bank’s environmental and social safeguard policies; and must have 
greater understanding and wider support within the international 
donor community and civil society. (World Bank, 2002). 
More economic, social and environmental studies were required of NT2’s 
developers, as well as local and international consultations.
Civil society organizations, including International Rivers Network, Towards 
Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA), Environmental Defense, 
Mekong Watch, Friends of the Earth–France and Probe International, had by 
this time launched a concerted campaign against World Bank support for NT2, 
asserting that the dam’s risks would outweigh its benefi ts and that the GOL did not 
have the political will or capacity to implement such a large and complex project. 
NGOs and academics in Thailand questioned whether or not NT2’s power was 
needed, citing Thailand’s faulty energy planning process (Permpongsacharoen, 
2004; Greacen and Sukkamnoed, 2005). These and other NGOs had been raising 
concerns about NT2 since the project was fi rst proposed, but the intensity of their 
campaign increased once the PPA was signed and the World Bank’s support for 
NT2 became more likely.
The civil society campaign against NT2 was founded largely on concerns 
about the GOL’s track record and the lack of legal and political protections for 
affected communities in Laos. Smaller hydropower projects in the country, such 
as Houay Ho, Nam Song, Nam Leuk and Theun-Hinboun (most of which had 
been fi nanced by the ADB), had been poorly managed from an environmental and 
social standpoint. Tens of thousands of Laotians were still awaiting compensation, 
livelihood restoration and mitigation measures to replace the fisheries, land, 
drinking water and other resources that they had lost to these dams (International 
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Rivers Network, 2004). Even the ADB noted in its technical assistance paper 
for NT2 that ‘the Government’s capacity to implement large-scale complex 
hydropower projects still remains a major concern’ (ADB, 2003, p3).
NGOs, donors, the World Bank and others also cited concerns about the 
GOL’s lack of transparency and poor performance in terms of public expenditure 
management and other governance indicators. A June 2004 World Bank evaluation 
of Bank-supported fi nancial management reforms in Laos found that ‘budget 
discipline [had] not improved signifi cantly’ over the previous decade and – in 
addition to a lack of implementation capacity – there was a ‘weak commitment 
to reform at the level of the true policy-makers’ (World Bank, 2004a, p8). The 
World Bank’s December 2004 Country Economic Memorandum for Laos warned 
that without signifi cant governance improvements upfront, hydropower revenues 
would not result in good development outcomes (World Bank, 2004b, p72).
Flaws in the NT2 planning and preparation process
In response to the concerns raised by civil society organizations, NT2 promoters 
argued that the project’s preparation was a model for future hydropower development 
and could be used to strengthen the GOL’s capacity to manage new dam projects. 
The World Bank and others touted the transparency and participation of the 
process – especially compared to that of other dam projects in Laos – and pointed 
to the volumes of studies that had been completed to assess NT2’s environmental 
and social impacts and plan for mitigation measures. 
But NT2’s critics were not convinced. An analysis by International Rivers 
Network and Environmental Defense in 2005 found that the NT2’s planning 
process violated six of the seven strategic priorities of the World Commission on 
Dams (WCD), including priorities on gaining public acceptance, comprehensive 
options assessment, and sustaining rivers and livelihoods (Imhof and Lawrence, 
2005). Another analysis documented numerous violations of  World Bank safeguard 
policies, including on environmental assessment, involuntary resettlement, 
indigenous peoples and natural habitats, as well as the failure to comply with World 
Bank guidelines on procurement and economic evaluation. Finally, NGOs asserted 
that the requirements of the NT2 Decision Framework – namely, concerning 
adherence to the World Bank’s policies and support from civil society – had not 
been met. These concerns and others were outlined in a letter sent to then World 
Bank President Wolfensohn from 153 civil society organizations in 42 countries 
in March 2005 (Friends of the Earth–Japan et al, 2005). Some of these issues are 
elaborated upon further in Table 4.1.
As Table 4.1 demonstrates, sponsors argued that NT2 was needed, was 
exemplary in the quality of its studies, and was based on extensive consultations 
with local people. Critics vigorously debated all three claims; but their arguments 
did not prevent the project from moving forward. Pressure from NGOs and others 
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Table 4.1 Problems with the Nam Theun 2 planning process 
NT2 claim NGO response
NT2 achieved public 
acceptance through a highly 
participatory consultation 
process.
 World Bank and other 
NT2 supporters claimed 
the project had achieved 
public acceptability in 
Laos through consultation 
processes conducted 
throughout the project 
development period. 
True participation is limited in Laos; consultation was late and 
focused on mitigation options.
  Although NT2 involved more consultation than other 
Lao dam projects, the political climate in Laos does not 
allow for genuine participatory processes. Access to 
independent sources of information is limited. There are no 
independent local NGOs and there is no independent media. 
The GOL continues to arrest and imprison critics (Amnesty 
International, 2003; United Nations Committee on Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination, 2003; US State Department, 2005).
  The legal system is at a rudimentary stage of 
development. There is no independent judiciary: it is 
impossible for affected communities to bring legal actions to 
protect their rights.
Nakai Plateau: villagers to be resettled for NT2 were 
consulted on numerous occasions, but logging commenced 
and the decision to build the dam was taken before any 
participation processes were conducted. Most discussions 
with villagers focused on improving resettlement outcomes, 
not debating whether or not the project was appropriate 
or desirable. Affected communities had no access to 
independent legal or other professional support (Imhof and 
Lawrence, 2005, pp4–5). 
Downstream areas: discussions along the Xe Bank Fai 
were only initiated in mid 2004, so many people were not 
consulted prior to project approval (NTPC, 2005b). Villagers 
were given misleading information about NT2’s risks and 
benefi ts, being told repeatedly and erroneously that ‘more 
water means more fi sh’ (Les Amis de la Terre et al, 2003, 
p6; NTPC, 2005f; Scudder, 2005). Most of the 1500 families 
living along the Theun River were also not consulted before 
project approval (NTPC, 2005b, Vol 3, Chapter 6, pp7–8). 
Consultations with villagers whose lands and assets would be 
affected by NT2 construction were only initiated at the end of 
2004, and were not completed prior to NT2 approval (NTPC, 
2005c, Vol 4, Chapter 6, pp2–3).
 
NT2 is the best option for 
Laos and for Thailand.
 The World Bank had 
promoted NT2 as an 
important revenue earner 
for Laos since 1986, 
claiming that Laos had few 
other means, aside from 
timber exports, to generate 
revenue and reduce the 
country’s dependence upon 
foreign aid. 
No comprehensive options assessment was conducted.
  These claims were not based on comprehensive and 
participatory analyses of options and alternatives. NT2 
revenues were estimated to be no more than 5% of total 
annual government revenues over the life of concession 
(World Bank, 2005c). There were probably other development 
options for Laos since the direct contribution of natural 
resources (such as hydropower) to GDP growth is relatively 
small (World Bank, 2004b): for example, broadening the tax 
base, improving revenue administration nationally (AusAid, 
2005) and investing in agriculture (World Bank, 2004b, p17) 
would increase GOL revenue and support poverty reduction 
without NT2’s signifi cant social/environmental impacts.
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NT2 is the least expensive 
means of meeting 
Thailand’s energy needs. 
  The World Bank states 
that Thai energy demand 
is growing and NT2 will be 
easily absorbed. NT2 will 
not compete with renewable 
energy and demand-side 
management options (World 
Bank 2005a).
There is no evidence that NT2 is, undeniably, the least-cost 
option for meeting Thailand’s energy needs. 
  A World Bank-commissioned study – not disclosed until 
after NT2 was approved – showed that feasible demand-side 
management, energy conservation measures and renewable 
energy generation in Thailand would ‘exceed the output of 
NT2 and would provide energy to the customer at a cost 
approximately 25% less than NT2’ (duPont, 2005). Thai 
energy projections have historically overstated future energy 
demand estimates (Kuankachorn, 2005).
NT2 is the most studied 
hydropower project ever.
  NT2 proponents 
highlighted the large number 
of environmental, social and 
economic studies produced 
over the decade-long 
project development period. 
The World Bank asserted: 
‘sound methodologies were 
utilized to address data 
gaps commonly found in 
lower-income developing 
countries’, and that there 
would be additional time 
during the construction 
phase for technical 
support, improving social 
programmes and identifying 
markets (World Bank, 
2005b).
NT2 studies have critical gaps in data and analysis; some 
livelihood programmes are infeasible.
  Hydrological data and analysis were defi cient: it is diffi cult 
to predict how much water will be available for power 
generation (Willing and Knoop, 2005). Inadequate data was 
used to characterize baseline water quality: it is impossible to 
accurately predict water quantity and quality changes in the 
reservoir and in downstream rivers (Lanza, 2005).   
  The proposed agriculture programme for resettled 
villagers relied on heavy inputs of fertilizer and experimental 
cropping systems, and was of questionable long-term 
viability. The market for the sale of cash crops to buy rice was 
unclear (International Rivers Network, 2005). 
Table 4.1 (continued)
NT2 claim NGO response
did help to encourage NT2 developers to make important changes, however, before 
the project proceeded, such as increasing the budget for downstream mitigation and 
compensation to US$16 million and incorporating a purpose-built downstream 
channel to reduce erosion and sedimentation downstream. 
NT2 MOVES FORWARD
In March and April 2005, the boards of directors of the World Bank and the ADB 
approved loans and guarantees for NT2 totalling US$270 million and US$107 
million, respectively. The US was the only MDB shareholder that did not support 
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the project, citing concerns about environmental and social risks, the macro-
economic environment in Laos, and the lack of potential recourse measures (US 
Treasury Department, 2005).
With the World Bank and the ADB’s endorsement, other lenders – such as the 
European Investment Bank, the Nordic Investment Bank, the Swedish, Norwegian, 
French and Thai export credit agencies, AFD and a number of private banks 
– committed to fi nance NT2. Construction had already commenced a year earlier, 
in 2004, and power production was scheduled for December 2009.
About NT2
NT2 is a trans-basin diversion project that is dramatically altering not one, but two, 
key Mekong River tributaries. A 39m high dam has blocked the Theun River to 
form a 450km2 reservoir on the Nakai Plateau where 6200 predominantly ethnic 
minority people have been resettled. Habitat for the endangered Asian elephant 
and other wildlife is being inundated by the NT2 reservoir. Downstream from the 
dam, only 2 cubic metres per second (m3/s) of water will be released.
Once the reservoir has been filled, water will be directed down a 350m 
drop to the power station before being transferred to the Xe Bang Fai River via 
a 27km downstream channel. According to independent research (Shoemaker et 
al, 2001), approximately 120,000 people living in the Xe Bang Fai area will be 
affected by increased water fl ows, resulting in fi sheries and aquatic resources losses, 
erosion, fl ooding and sedimentation. Water quality problems, caused by anoxic 
water released from the reservoir area, are also anticipated. NTPC asserts that 
approximately 75,000 villagers in the Xe Bang Fai region will experience negative 
impacts as a result of NT2.
NT2 will operate under an intermediate peaking power regime, and the 
resulting weekly fl uctuations in water levels will exacerbate erosion and pose 
safety hazards to downstream villagers. NTPC has proposed both engineering and 
operational measures to try to reduce the negative effects downstream. However, 
while the NT2 regulating pond, aeration weir and concrete-lined downstream 
channel will help to mitigate some of these impacts, their design is insuffi cient 
to prevent these problems (Mekong River Commission, 2007). NTPC has also 
committed to stop power production (and therefore water releases) when the Xe 
Bang Fai is close to over-bank fl ooding at Mahaxai town. 
In order to secure the World Bank’s approval and to meet the standards of 
other lenders, NTPC and the GOL made a number of social, environmental, 
disclosure, accountability and revenue management commitments. While these 
commitments generally surpassed those made by other hydro developers in the 
region, many NGOs argued that they would still be insuffi cient to address the 
signifi cant risks that NT2 would pose to tens of thousands of Lao people. Project 
critics were sceptical of NTPC’s and the GOL’s ability and will to implement 
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these commitments based on experience with other dam projects in Laos. The 
commitments made by NTPC and the GOL, and the response of project critics, 
are highlighted in Table 4.2.
The commitments outlined in Table 4.2 were trumpeted as part of an aggressive 
and extraordinary communication strategy led by the World Bank to rebrand a 
large, destructive dam project as a ‘poverty-reduction’ and ‘conservation’ initiative. 
These communication efforts were necessary to convince the World Bank’s member 
governments, as well as the general public, that the Bank had learned from its dam 
mistakes of the past.  
Figure 4.2 The Nam Theun 2 project area
Source: International Rivers
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Table 4.2 Summary of key Nam Theun 2 commitments and NGO response
NT2 commitment NGO response
Social and environmental
US$90.5 million provided for social and 
environmental mitigation and compensation, 
including US$31.5 million over 25 years to 
support protection of the Nakai-Nam Theun 
watershed area. 
NTPC and GOL required to comply with 
World Bank and ADB safeguard policies, 
as well as environmental and social 
commitments in the Concession Agreement. 
Grievance procedure would allow affected 
people to submit complaints.
NTPC committed to raise resettled villagers’ 
income to national poverty level within fi ve 
years after resettlement. 
NTPC acknowledged late in the planning 
process that villagers dependent upon 
the Xe Bang Fai River would suffer from 
destruction of riverbank gardens, loss of 
buildings close to the riverbanks due to 
erosion, ‘a collapse in the aquatic food 
chain’, and impacts upon domestic water 
supply and transportation diffi culties (NTPC, 
2005b, Chapter 5, pp12–
15). NTPC committed to ‘at least restore’ 
livelihoods on a sustainable basis by year 
nine of project implementation. US$16 million 
would be provided for the downstream 
programme to address these impacts upon 
75,000 people (NTPC’s estimate). 
Inadequate social and environmental budget, 
particularly to address downstream impacts. 
Lack of any legal enforcement measures to 
ensure that agreements are complied with. 
Since the grievance mechanism relies 
on offi cial district/provincial government 
channels in a closed political climate, 
villagers may be unwilling or unable to submit 
grievances – fearing retribution instead of 
redress.
Livelihood plans for resettled villagers are 
inappropriate and unrealistic given poor-
quality soils, reduced availability of land for 
farming and grazing, and high risk that village 
forestry and reservoir fi sheries components 
will not meet targets. 
Key baseline information on the pre-project 
livelihoods of downstream villagers was 
lacking, and no clear compensation plan was 
provided. The proposal to replace freshwater 
fi sheries with aquaculture will be diffi cult in 
Laos: uptake is slow and the poorest people 
often lack necessary land and capital to 
develop and sustain fi sh ponds. More money 
will be required to address downstream 
impacts.
External monitoring
An International Panel of Environmental and 
Social Experts (PoE) would continue to visit 
the project area at least once per year and 
advise the GOL on social and environmental 
issues. An International Advisory Group 
(IAG) would also visit the project regularly 
and advise the World Bank on implementing 
environmental, social and revenue 
management measures.
  
External project monitoring is critical; but 
there are no enforcement mechanisms to 
ensure that the recommendations of the 
PoE and IAG, in particular, are implemented, 
which limits monitors’ effectiveness. A more 
streamlined but transparent and enforceable 
system of external monitoring would better 
ensure that NTPC and the GOL meet their 
NT2 commitments.
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Independent monitoring agencies 
(IMAs) would monitor resettlement, 
watershed management and downstream 
compensation activities, reporting to the 
GOL. A Lenders’ Engineer would visit NT2 
quarterly and provide confi dential reports to 
NT2 lenders on construction, environmental 
and social issues until the commercial debt 
was repaid. A Dam Safety Review Panel 
would advise project developers and the 
World Bank on safety issues.
Information disclosure
Key documents have been disclosed during 
project preparation and implementation, 
such as project updates and social and 
environmental plans required by World Bank 
and ADB disclosure policies. The World 
Bank and the ADB would also produce 
semi-annual implementation updates.
While NT2 released more information than 
many other projects, complete analyses of 
potential economic and fi nancial risks and 
benefi ts of NT2 have never been disclosed. 
The PPA and the complete Concession 
Agreement are not public. Key underlying 
studies on hydrology and water quality were 
not made available. Reports of the IAG, PoE 
and the IMAs are made public only several 
months after their visits once they have been 
reviewed by NTPC, the GOL and the World 
Bank. 
Revenue management
Given the weaknesses in Laos’s public 
expenditure management system, the World 
Bank insisted on a revenue management 
framework for GOL’s NT2 revenues 
(estimated to be US$250 million net present 
value over the 25-year concession). The 
framework includes the identifi cation of 
eligible programmes based on GOL poverty 
reduction strategies. NT2 revenues are 
channelled through a dedicated Lao Treasury 
account so that the transfer can be verifi ed 
and funds withheld from programmes if they 
fail to meet standards. Budget execution 
reports, fi nancial statements, summaries 
of internal audits and audits of NT2-eligible 
programmes will be published (World Bank, 
2005d, pp17–18). 
Although a revenue management plan 
is welcome and necessary, critical gaps 
in the framework minimize the likelihood 
of success. According to World Bank 
indicators, Laos rates below most countries 
in terms of control of corruption, citizen 
participation and freedom of expression. 
The revenue management system would 
not provide adequate transparency and 
anti-corruption controls to ensure that 
these constraints would be overcome. NT2 
revenues will be ‘co-mingled’ with other 
revenues and managed following standard 
procedures (World Bank, 2005c). Revenue 
allocation, monitoring and reporting will 
be left to the Ministry of Finance and the 
fl edgling State Audit Organization. The 
revenue management arrangements 
specifi cally reject the use of an independent 
oversight body or the external independent 
auditing of NT2 revenues. 
Table 4.2 (continued)
NT2 commitment NGO response
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NT2’S IMPLEMENTATION 
The NT2 legal framework includes the Concession Agreement between the GOL 
and NTPC, and loan agreements with project fi nanciers such as the World Bank 
and the ADB. The World Bank and ADB loan and guarantee agreements with 
the GOL and NTPC, in turn, require compliance with these institutions’ own 
policies. Essentially, these legal agreements constitute the promises made to Laotian 
villagers regarding compensation and mitigation measures, and the allocation of 
responsibility amongst NTPC and the GOL. 
In the fi rst three years of project construction, NT2’s developers have already 
failed to meet some of their social and environmental obligations. Dated covenants 
have been missed and NTPC and the GOL have not complied with key provisions 
of the World Bank’s policies and the Concession Agreement, though neither party 
has been penalized (International Rivers Network, 2007a). The provisions that 
have not been adhered to include paying compensation before the taking of land 
and assets, timely disclosure of project information, and provision of irrigation 
systems for resettled villagers, among others (International Rivers Network, 2007a; 
International Rivers, 2008a; McDowell et al, 2008).
NT2’s construction has proceeded largely on schedule, and the project is on track 
to start power production by December 2009. However, soon after construction 
was initiated, it became clear that social and environmental programmes – often 
more challenging and time consuming than engineering works – were falling 
behind schedule. 
In 2006, the PoE raised the possibility of risks posed to affected villagers and 
to NT2’s reputation of this two-speed process continuing (McDowell et al, 2006a): 
villagers would lose land and natural resources upon which they depend before 
compensation and alternative livelihood programmes are in place, causing income 
declines and other hardship. 
The NT2 project did attempt to minimize the risk of construction overtaking 
social and environmental programmes by including a provision in the Concession 
Agreement requiring that all Nakai Plateau resettlement infrastructure be completed 
and resettled villagers moved to their new sites before reservoir fl ooding began. This 
provided an important incentive to NTPC and the GOL to achieve these targets, 
as delays in reservoir fi lling could impact upon the NT2’s ability to deliver power 
to Thailand on time. The PoE was given the important responsibility of evaluating 
whether physical resettlement and other Concession Agreement requirements had 
been met before recommending that reservoir fl ooding proceed. 
All 17 villages on the Nakai Plateau were initially to be resettled by the 
2006 to 2007 dry season. But due to delays in permanent housing construction 
(International Rivers Network, 2007a, p23; International Rivers, 2008a, p16), this 
deadline was not met. Instead, the fi rst villages were relocated in mid 2006. They, 
and many of those that followed, moved into temporary houses in their new village 
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sites. It was expected that villagers would remain in these temporary houses for just 
a few months, and they were instructed to build their houses with that in mind. 
In the end, many villagers had to spend two rainy seasons in temporary 
substandard housing. Two fi eld visits in 2007 by staff of International Rivers 
documented villagers’ frustration with this arrangement (International Rivers 
Network, 2007a; International Rivers, 2008a). As late as March 2007, NTPC said 
that only 20 to 30 permanent houses had been completed (Salignat, 2007), and 
by December 2007, approximately 30 per cent of new houses were built (World 
Bank and ADB, 2007, p7). 
In February 2008, NT2’s resettlement and other social and environmental 
programme delays reached a critical stage. The PoE submitted a report (McDowell 
et al, 2008) to the GOL and NTPC that raised doubts about the project’s ability to 
proceed with reservoir fi lling as scheduled, given the serious ongoing delays. This 
threat helped to galvanize NTPC and the GOL to action. By the time the PoE 
returned to Laos in April 2008, the company and the GOL completed (or were 
likely to complete) the resettlement infrastructure, move the remaining villagers, 
and meet the other minimal requirements of the Concession Agreement. The PoE 
issued a follow-up report that commended NTPC and the GOL for the progress 
made since February and noted that the sturdy houses constitute ‘one of the most 
impressive aspects of the entire project’ (McDowell et al, 2008, p39). As a result 
of these achievements, the PoE recommended that the fi rst step towards reservoir 
impoundment could proceed as scheduled. On 10 April 2008, NT2’s diversion 
tunnel was sealed and preparations began for closure of the dam’s spillways in July 
2008. By June 2008, nearly all the 1272 houses on the Nakai Plateau had been 
completed (Gasparini and Rex, 2008).
Although physical resettlement and reservoir fi lling represents an important 
milestone for NT2, problems with livelihood restoration programmes for resettled 
villagers on the Nakai Plateau, downstream villagers along the Nam Theun and 
Xe Bang Fai, and villages affected by downstream channel construction remain. 
In recent reports (McDowell et al, 2007a, 2007b, 2008), the PoE has been 
critical of NTPC’s and the GOL’s performance in these areas, while praising their 
achievements in terms of the physical resettlement of Nakai Plateau villagers 
(McDowell et al, 2008). Even as the water began rising on the Nakai Plateau, the 
PoE warned that the main challenges lay ahead:
In a very real sense, the more easily accomplished phase of the project’s 
environmental and, particularly, the social programmes is coming to 
an end and the hard part is upon us. By comparison with the largely 
physical tasks of infrastructure building, the challenge now is [to] move 
on to help convert these aggregations of houses, community facilities, 
cleared patches of still smoking vegetation and disrupted families into 
self-managed and self-sustaining communities, viable in all dimensions. 
(McDowell et al, 2008, p48)
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Livelihood programmes for Nakai Plateau resettled villagers
Before reservoir fl ooding began, villagers in the resettlement sites were primarily 
surviving on rice and protein supports from NTPC, income earned from the 
project for land clearance and other work, fi shing, and forest product collection. 
During visits by International Rivers in 2007, a number of villagers reported that 
the amount of rice provided each month is often not enough for large families. 
There was also concern about premature cut-offs of rice and protein support for 
resettled villagers (International Rivers Network, 2007a; International Rivers, 
2008a). Some people said that they missed the fruit trees in their old villages, and 
still returned there to get fi sh from the river and bamboo and vegetables from the 
forest. A number of villagers worried about how they would fi nd food in their new 
sites, especially ‘after the fl ood’. 
Despite these apprehensions, many villagers said that they are pleased with the 
better houses, improved water supply and sanitation, electricity and roads to the 
new villages. Health improvements, particularly as a result of access to safe water 
and better sanitation, were quickly noted by the PoE and other monitors. The 
income from project-related jobs also contributed to initial increases in villagers’ 
living standards.
However, the greatest challenge for NT2 continues to be developing and 
implementing sustainable livelihood programmes for Nakai Plateau villagers. 
Resettled villagers have been moved to what will become the reservoir shores so 
that they can remain, by their request, on their traditional lands. However, soil 
quality is generally poor on the Nakai Plateau, and two-thirds of the land that 
villagers once used for farming, grazing livestock and collecting non-timber forest 
products (NTFPs) will be fl ooded by the large reservoir. The water buffalo and 
cattle populations on the Nakai Plateau can no longer be maintained, and the total 
herd will need to be reduced by approximately half (NTPC, 2008b, p29). 
NTPC has committed to raise resettled villagers’ income to the national poverty 
level within fi ve years. To this end, resettled villagers will be provided with: 
• house gardens;
• 0.66ha plots (to be irrigated by the end of 2009) for growing some rice, fodder 
and vegetables;
• use of the reservoir drawdown zone for rice cultivation and grazing land;
• a community forest area for collecting NTFPs and sustainable timber extraction 
(some of which will also be used for grazing and fodder cultivation); and
• boats for fi shing in the reservoir, an area to which they’ve been granted exclusive 
access rights for ten years (NTPC, 2005a).
NGOs and academics began to point out shortcomings in these livelihood 
restoration plans before NT2 received World Bank approval (International Rivers 
Network, 2005; Lanza, 2005; Willing and Knoop, 2005), and many of these 
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problems have not been addressed. Villagers will be expected to grow cash crops 
on poor-quality land to sell in an as yet unidentifi ed market. They were originally 
promised 10,000ha of production forest to be managed as a village ‘business’; but 
the area has since been reduced by at least 40 per cent and is further threatened by 
illegal logging (McDowell et al, 2008). The forest area will be diffi cult for some 
villages to access, and important NTFPs such as bamboo will be fl ooded by the 
reservoir. Villagers were promised bountiful fi sh in the new reservoir, but it is likely 
to have initial poor water quality due, in part, to degrading and fl ooded vegetation, 
thereby threatening the development of a productive fi shery (International Rivers, 
2008a; McDowell et al, 2008, p18). While exact numbers are still unclear, as many 
as 2000 buffaloes may still need to be sold, which will weaken a critical livelihood 
safety net for villagers (NTPC, 2008b, p29).
In early 2007, the PoE warned that ‘for a range of reasons, the forestry and 
agricultural livelihood programmes are unlikely to meet their originally planned 
targets before impoundment’ (McDowell et al, 2007a, p9). A more recent PoE 
report indicates that after an initial boost from project jobs and other support, 
resettled villagers’ living standards are likely to decline once the reservoir is fl ooded 
(McDowell et al, 2008, p11). Finally, the July 2008 World Bank–ADB update 
Figure 4.3 Nam Theun 2 resettlement homes
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notes that while ‘encouraging progress’ is being made on the various livelihood 
programmes, signifi cant challenges remain (World Bank and ADB, 2008, p6).
Villagers affected by construction activities
More than 10,000 people1 (World Bank and ADB, 2007, pp23–24) have been 
affected by the construction of NT2’s transmission lines, roads and project facilities, 
losing land, assets and access to natural resources. Households in Gnommalat 
District near the NT2 power station, the regulating pond and the downstream 
channel have been the most severely affected.
The downstream channel is 27km long and approximately 100m wide, cutting 
through paddy fi elds and other village land. The channel also blocks access to the 
forest and villagers’ gardens and rice paddies on the other side. Villagers in the area 
have lost paddy land, houses, gardens, fruit trees, fi sheries, irrigation water supply 
and other assets to varying degrees. 
According to the NT2 Concession Agreement, villagers who lose less than 10 
per cent of their productive assets are entitled to cash compensation, and those 
who lose more than 10 per cent are entitled to replacement land. Compensation 
payments only began in mid 2006, more than a year after NT2 construction 
activities had started to impact upon villagers’ land and resources (International 
Rivers Network, 2006a), and it was not until mid 2008 that most compensation 
payments were fi nally made (World Bank and ADB, 2008, p12). As mentioned 
previously, the taking of land and assets before paying compensation is a violation 
of the Concession Agreement and of the World Bank’s involuntary resettlement 
policy (International Rivers Network, 2007a).
There have also been problems with the assessment of entitlements and the 
delivery of compensation; nearly 400 grievances have been submitted to the 
District Grievance Committee (World Bank and ADB, 2008). It is unclear if the 
situation for the 200 households who are entitled to replacement land has been 
resolved. Only six households had received land-for-land replacement as of late 
2007, and NTPC and project backers have said there is a shortage of available 
paddy land in the area (NTPC, 2008a). 
In late 2007 and 2008, villagers indicated to International Rivers and to 
the PoE that replacement land was, indeed, available. Following more detailed 
investigations by the PoE, NTPC committed to work with villagers to identify and 
purchase adequate replacement land. While it was recommended that ‘signifi cant 
progress on land-for-land issues’ should be made by the end of 2008, the PoE also 
noted that the Concession Agreement requirement to restore villagers’ incomes 
within 18 months had not been complied with in many cases (McDowell et al, 
2008, p16). 
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Downstream programmes
NT2 will affect more than 120,000 villagers (Shoemaker et al, 2001), or 75,000 
people, according to NTPC’s estimates, in the Xe Bang Fai River Basin. Villagers 
living along the river and some of its tributaries can expect more frequent and severe 
fl ooding, decimated fi sheries and inundated riverbank gardens. About 40 villages 
that fi sh in the Theun River will also experience declines in fi sheries and aquatic 
resources due to the reduced river fl ow downstream from the dam site.
In an attempt to mitigate NT2’s impacts and compensate villagers in the 
Xe Bang Fai area, NTPC has developed a Downstream Livelihood and Asset 
Restoration Programme (Downstream Programme). This programme will be 
implemented in approximately 220 villages, including nearly 90 riparian villages. 
In breach of World Bank and ADB involuntary resettlement and information 
disclosure policies, the Downstream Programme Implementation Plan had still not 
been publicly disclosed as of this writing, although information has been provided 
to affected villagers. 
The Downstream Programme focuses on microcredit funds to support 
agriculture, aquaculture and livestock projects. NTPC is also supporting water 
and sanitation improvements, and, in some villages, water-gate rehabilitation or 
mini-polder fl ood protection. In late 2007, NTPC said it intended to expand 
the programme to all the riparian villages in 2008 and to initiate activities in the 
remaining villages during late 2009 (NTPC, 2008a); but it now appears that the 
programme will reach only about half of the riparian villages by the end of 2008. As 
of mid 2008, projects had been initiated in less than 20 per cent of the total villages 
in the Xe Bang Fai Basin that are likely to be affected when NT2’s operations begin 
(World Bank and ADB, 2008).
 The World Bank, the ADB and the PoE agree that the Downstream Programme 
is behind schedule, and that continued delays pose risks to affected villagers. The 
PoE February 2008 report states: 
While the formulation of the draft [Downstream Implementation] plan 
has gone on its leisurely way, the construction programme has forged 
ahead. As a result, many impacts felt below the powerhouse will 
occur before the remedial or compensatory measures are in place. 
(McDowell et al, 2008, p26; emphasis in original)
The PoE also points to the Downstream Programme’s short- and long-term funding 
gap, noting that the US$16 million budget ‘was never going to be suffi cient funds 
to complete the tasks envisaged’ (McDowell et al, 2008, p35). Consultant fees 
will absorb US$1 million, leaving approximately US$200 per affected person2 for 
mitigation and compensation measures. Although the budget is not being used 
to provide cash compensation to villagers, but rather to support infrastructure 
improvements and contributions to village savings funds, this fi gure highlights 
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how inadequate the funding is to at least restore the livelihoods of affected people, 
as required by the Concession Agreement.
While NTPC has provided no additional funding, the World Bank approved a 
US$9 million Khammouane Development Project in June 2008 that will support 
irrigation development along the NT2 downstream channel and Lower Xe Bang Fai 
River. The PoE has also urged the ADB and AFD to commit additional resources 
to support irrigation and fl ood management (McDowell et al, 2008, p42).
 Each of the affected Xe Bang Fai villages will receive approximately 2 million 
Lao kip per household (about US$200) from NTPC through a village savings 
fund. Villagers can borrow from these funds for various livelihood projects, ranging 
from fi sh ponds to pig-raising to tomato cultivation. However, villagers reported 
to International Rivers that they have to pay back the loans to the village savings 
fund, with monthly interest ranging from 1 to 3 per cent, whether or not the projects 
succeed or fail. Those people with unsuccessful projects have been forced to sell 
buffalo and other assets to repay debts to the village savings fund. Some villagers 
report that they have already stopped participating in the fund or will no longer 
borrow for livelihood projects. The reliance on a microcredit scheme to deliver 
compensation creates a cycle of debt if projects fail or if repayment terms are too 
demanding.
Flooding is another major concern for Xe Bang Fai villagers, some of whom 
lose rice crops and other assets every two to three years as a result. NT2 is expected 
to increase the frequency and the duration of fl oods in the Xe Bang Fai area, even 
if power production is stopped as promised when the river overfl ows its banks 
at Mahaxai town. At the nearby Theun-Hinboun Hydropower Project, recent 
research has shown that fl ooding along the Hinboun River has become increasingly 
severe over the past decade, leading to large-scale abandonment of rice paddy 
fi elds (FIVAS, 2007). While NT2 and Theun-Hinboun vary in some technical 
specifi cations, there are important lessons to be learned from the Theun-Hinboun 
experience. NTPC should prepare for a worst-case scenario where wet season rice 
production is no longer viable along sections of the Xe Bang Fai due to protracted 
annual fl ooding.
Most of the fl ood-prone villages visited by International Rivers in December 
2007 said that they had requested fl ood protection works (such as dikes, mini-
polders or water-gate rehabilitation) from NTPC, but in many cases were told 
that funding is not available. However, as of July 2008, 15 fl ood gates had been 
rehabilitated and work on an additional 4 gates was under consideration (World 
Bank and ADB, 2008). While it appears that the PoE’s recommendation to allocate 
more resources to fl ood-protection works before power production starts has been 
followed (McDowell et al, 2008; World Bank and ADB, 2008), the total funds 
available will probably still be insuffi cient to mitigate NT2’s fl ooding impacts.
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Nakai-Nam Theun Protected Area 
One of the selling points of the NT2 project was that NTPC would provide 
US$31.5 million to help protect one of the Mekong region’s richest areas of 
biodiversity, the Nakai-Nam Theun National Protected Area (NPA). The 4000km2 
Nakai-Nam Theun NPA is the largest protected area in mainland Southeast 
Asia (World Bank, 2008a) and forms the watershed of the NT2 project. The 
funding provided by NTPC helped to establish the NT2 Watershed Management 
Protection Authority (WMPA) tasked with implementing an ambitious Social and 
Environmental Framework and Operational Plan (SEMFOP) in the Nakai-Nam 
Theun NPA. According to the PoE: ‘without the NPA component, the NT2 
Project as such would not exist’ (McDowell et al, 2008, pp28–29).
The vision of the SEMFOP – and one of the key objectives of the WMPA – is 
to establish a balance between biodiversity conservation and development for the 
6000 villagers living in the NPA. The PoE questioned the WMPA’s progress on this 
challenging issue (McDowell et al, 2007b, pp27–28) and called for improvements 
in the WMPA’s organization and staffi ng to more effectively meet the SEMFOP 
goals (McDowell et al, 2008, pp28, 47). A new director and a new chief technical 
Figure 4.4 Woman fi shing on the Xe Bang Fai
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adviser were reportedly appointed in mid 2008 (World Bank and ADB, 2008, 
p16). 
Established as a biodiversity conversation area in 1993, the Nakai-Nam Theun 
NPA faces the threats of hunting and poaching, illegal logging and mining activities 
that are familiar to other protected areas in the region. In its February 2007 report, 
the PoE reported that the NPA was ‘bleeding rosewood’, referring to illegal logging 
of this valuable hardwood (McDowell et al, 2007a). One part of the problem was 
traced to the NANCY Company – tasked with clearing valuable timber from the 
NT2 reservoir area before it was fl ooded – for its alleged ‘laundering’ of illegal 
rosewood from the NPA during its salvage logging operation of the NT2 reservoir 
(McDowell et al, 2007a; EIA/Telepak, 2008, pp16–17). The PoE also exposed 
a signifi cant mining operation that was threatening the integrity of the area, 
although that operation has reportedly since been shut down by the GOL. While 
the WMPA’s efforts to control these threats have been commended, the PoE notes 
that ‘to date, the patrolling results are still inadequate’ (McDowell et al, 2008, p28). 
Once the NT2 reservoir is fi lled, it could increase access to the NPA and make 
illegal logging and poaching even more diffi cult to control. 
Environmental management during construction
The NT2 project was supposed to demonstrate best practice in terms of 
environmental management. However, the construction companies involved 
– which include NTPC shareholders Electricité de France as the head construction 
contractor and Ital-Thai Development as the principal civil works contractor – have 
repeatedly been cited for environmental infractions by the Lenders’ Engineers and 
the PoE (McDowell et al, 2006b; PB Power, 2007). These violations include road-
building negligence, leading to excessive deforestation, and a failure to control 
dust, erosion and sedimentation, leading to water quality problems and respiratory 
diffi culties for villagers. 
A leaked copy of a Lenders’ Engineer report summarizes NT2’s environmental 
management shortcomings:
As noted in our previous report, for a project which is intended to set a 
benchmark of world’s best practice against which future projects can be 
assessed, the environmental performance still falls signifi cantly short of 
this benchmark in many areas and, in some aspects, still barely meets 
‘business as usual’ levels. (PB Power, 2007, p9) 
The PoE, the World Bank and the ADB continued to report on problems with 
road-building, wastewater treatment and revegetation, in particular (McDowell et 
al, 2007b, p20; World Bank and ADB, 2008). It seems that no penalties or fi nes 
have been levied for these breaches despite the fact that the head construction 
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contractor’s compliance with the Environmental Mitigation and Management Plan 
‘in all material respects’ is a requirement of the World Bank’s agreement with NTPC 
and the GOL (World Bank, 2005d). 
Revenue management framework
NT2’s development justifi cation – and the justifi cation for its World Bank and 
ADB support  – hinges on the GOL using project revenues to help the poor. The 
establishment of the NT2 revenue management framework is being supported 
by a number of World Bank- and ADB-backed public expenditure and public 
fi nancial management programmes. The goal of these loans, grants and technical 
assistance initiatives is to support improvements in public fi nancial management, 
broadly speaking, and to ensure that NT2 revenues, once generated in early 2010, 
are directed to poverty reduction programmes as required.
The most recent Public Expenditure Review–Integrated Fiduciary Assessment 
for Laos points to a number of shortcomings. These include poor budget planning, 
‘weak authority and capacity of the Treasury and defi ciencies in the systems for 
fi nancial control, accounting and budget reporting’, and poor fi scal transparency 
(World Bank et al, 2007, p28). The same review acknowledges ‘potential issues’ 
Figure 4.5 Excessive road clearance
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with regard to NT2 revenues: ‘in the short term, NT2 revenues are likely to be 
used primarily to increase the timeliness of wage and salary payments to [Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry] staff and to increase the wages of personnel stationed 
in remote rural areas’ (World Bank et al, 2007, pp72–73). This would seem to 
run counter to the GOL’s commitments to direct NT2 revenues initially to health, 
education and rural infrastructure. The World Bank bemoans the fact that ‘despite 
sizeable donor contributions’, Laos still spends much less on health and education 
than other low-income countries (World Bank et al, 2007, p25). 
The implementation of NT2 revenue arrangements has reportedly progressed, 
with the identifi cation of NT2-eligible expenditures, such as health, education and 
rural roads expected to occur before the end of 2008 (World Bank and ADB, 2008, 
p2). Baseline allocations for these programmes will reportedly be assessed in the 
2008/2009 fi nancial year so that the ‘additionality’ of NT2 revenues in 2010 can 
be assessed (World Bank and ADB, 2008). But after more than a decade of World 
Bank and ADB support to improve public fi nancial management in Laos, it is clear 
that signifi cant weaknesses remain (World Bank et al, 2007; World Bank, 2008b). 
If the GOL loses interest in these reforms, there will be no external controls to 
ensure that NT2 revenues are not misdirected. 
LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR LAOS 
The fact that NT2’s social and environmental programmes have run into such 
major diffi culties raises concerns about the commitment of NTPC and the GOL to 
deliver on earlier promises, as well as the feasibility of the promises made to justify 
the project in the fi rst place. If the World Bank, ADB and other project lenders 
are unable to ensure compliance with key social and environmental obligations 
while the project is still under construction, it is diffi cult to see what leverage they 
will have once the project has been completed and electricity is being generated. 
At that stage, NTPC will have even fewer incentives to meet its commitments to 
affected communities and the environment. 
Furthermore, the World Bank’s promises that NT2 would provide a model 
for more sustainable hydropower development in Laos are largely ringing hollow. 
The GOL’s National Policy on the Environmental and Social Sustainability of the 
Hydropower Sector in Laos, enacted at the time of NT2 project approval with 
World Bank support, is still not being implemented (International Rivers Network 
2006b, 2007b). Even a basic provision of the policy, that environmental impact 
assessments for hydropower projects should be disclosed, is not being followed. 
Construction on new hydropower projects, such as Nam Theun 1, Nam Ngum 
5 and Xekaman 3, is proceeding before environmental licences have been granted. 
Resettlement guidelines are not being followed (Vattenfall et al, 2008). The GOL’s 
Water Resources and Environment Agency (WREA) lacks the capacity and the 
authority to assess, approve and monitor these new dam developments effectively. 
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There is also no discussion of earmarking revenue from proposed hydro projects 
for poverty reduction expenditures, as with NT2. 
Why have problems occurred with NT2?
The problems inherent in the planning and implementation of NT2 point to 
broader challenges with the process for deciding upon and implementing dam 
projects in Laos and, more broadly, the Mekong region. First, the preponderance of 
non-democratic regimes in the region makes it diffi cult for meaningful participatory 
processes to be undertaken due to the lack of true freedoms of speech and assembly 
in countries such as Laos, Vietnam and Myanmar/Burma. Because of the political 
situation, it is diffi cult for affected communities to access independent information 
about the risks of particular projects or to organize against projects if they feel that 
they will not benefi t from them. 
These countries also have rudimentary legal systems and few laws granting 
basic rights to citizens. This lack of the rule of law makes it impossible for affected 
communities to seek redress when their rights are violated, or to challenge decisions 
taken by the government on whether or not to proceed with a particular project. 
They also make it diffi cult to ensure that project agreements and commitments 
to villagers and the environment are upheld. This leaves affected communities 
vulnerable to exploitation, allows the government and the private developers to 
avoid covering the true social and environmental costs of their project, and leads to 
poor outcomes for both people and the environment. While NT2 has gone farther 
than most projects in terms of public reporting and participation, its efforts have 
inevitably been constrained by the political environment in Laos.
Second, although numerous studies were conducted for NT2, some of them 
were of poor quality, containing unrealistic assumptions and insuffi cient data 
(International Rivers Network, 2005; Lanza, 2005; Willing and Knoop, 2005; 
McDowell et al, 2007b). This illustrates a more fundamental problem inherent in 
hydropower planning around the world: it is up to dam developers to commission 
and endorse the environmental impact assessment and other studies, and to agree 
on the funding for compensation and mitigation measures. By the time the EIAs 
are submitted to the GOL’s environmental regulatory agency, for example, the dam 
has been designed, costs have been determined, and often the Project Development 
Agreement has been signed. Even if the GOL’s WREA had suffi cient capacity and 
resources to review these documents, their ability to stop or change a project at 
that stage is limited.
Additionally, environmental and social assessments are done by consultancy 
companies who often have vested interests in presenting all environmental impacts 
as ‘manageable’ and seeing that the hydropower project gets built by minimizing 
the social and environmental problems that it will pose. This is one way of ensuring 
that they receive more contracts from dam developers. The author is aware of a 
number of cases of a consultant’s work being replaced by that of another fi rm – or 
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strong indications that this would be the case – if the consultant’s predictions of 
likely impacts and mitigation costs are too high (International Rivers, 2008c). This 
situation is certainly not unique to Laos.
Third, NT2 has suffered from a lack of qualifi ed staff, resources and a high-
level commitment from NTPC to the project’s social and environmental objectives. 
The PoE highlights several examples of Concession Agreement violations that 
occurred because NTPC preferred to cut costs of provisions for irrigation and 
adequate compensation for fi sheries losses (McDowell et al, 2008, p19). The PoE 
also cites NTPC’s failure to adequately account for the staffi ng levels and budget 
that would be required to meet the obligations of the Concession Agreement 
(McDowell et al, 2008, p11), although that situation has reportedly improved as of 
mid 2008 (McDowell et al, 2008, p43; World Bank and ADB, 2008). To improve 
the implementation of resettlement and livelihood programmes, a more realistic 
assessment of local capacity and the resources and staffi ng level required to meet 
NT2’s social and environmental requirements should have been conducted before 
the project was initiated and acted upon.
Finally, NT2 points to the limited leverage that international institutions such 
as the World Bank and ADB have once a project is under construction. Short of 
withdrawing fi nancial assistance from the country or holding up project loans and 
guarantees, which they are notoriously reluctant to do, the MDBs have diffi culty 
in ensuring compliance once funds are disbursed and construction has begun, 
since their supervision of the project decreases. This issue, is, however, becoming 
increasingly irrelevant as the MDBs are displaced by other dam funders who may 
be less concerned with the environmental and social risks of their investments. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The problems outlined above highlight the diffi culties of managing the social and 
environmental impacts of large dams, particularly in a country with a repressive 
political climate and without a well-developed legal system through which affected 
communities’ rights can be defended and environmental laws upheld. They also 
show that time and money are needed to do these projects right. When developers 
cut corners, the GOL and the Lao people ultimately bear the high costs of damaged 
livelihoods, lost fi sheries and degraded agricultural land. On the other hand, the 
added costs of genuine mitigation and compensation measures may only be a 
fraction of the profi ts that dam developers stand to gain.  
Increasingly, though, the dam playing fi eld in Laos is not being shaped by the 
World Bank or Western hydropower developers, but by companies from Thailand, 
China, Vietnam, Russia and Malaysia. If the GOL does not quickly take the reins of 
the hydropower sector, these private developers and their regional backers will do it 
for them. It is time for the GOL to learn from NT2’s mistakes and build on some 
of the things that NT2 has done better. The fl ood of interest in the hydropower 
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sector in Laos means there is room for higher standards, especially if it involves 
weeding out the most irresponsible dam developers.
First, the GOL and donors should comprehensively assess, through a broad-
based participatory process, all the poverty reduction and revenue generation 
options for Laos in a way that honestly evaluates the trade-offs and costs of 
hydropower development. Laos needs a development strategy that does not destroy 
the rivers and resources upon which the majority of the population depends. 
Second, the GOL should recognize that the costs of some dams, including in 
economic, social, environmental and cultural terms, will be too high to merit 
proceeding. Projects proposed for the Mekong River mainstream would probably 
fall into this category. In particular, their non-fi nancial costs need to be more 
carefully studied and subject to independent review. 
Dam projects in Laos need to be selected based on strategic environmental 
assessments and basin-wide planning, not on an ad hoc basis driven by the interests 
of dam developers or select government offi cials. For dam projects that do go 
forward, social and environmental obligations must be considered a core part of 
the project, accompanied by adequate budgetary resources to both implement 
mitigation programmes and compensate affected people. The GOL should 
ensure that quality assessments are submitted which include viable mitigation and 
livelihood restoration plans. Then the GOL must hold developers accountable to 
these plans. Failure to meet social and environmental commitments should carry 
the same penalties as failure to meet engineering deadlines.
In order to evaluate and enforce developers’ environmental and social 
commitments, as well as ensure compliance with the laws and regulations of 
Laos, the GOL urgently needs to strengthen the capacity and authority of WREA 
and move its project review process upstream. Working with donors, the GOL 
should establish a well-resourced WREA unit that is responsible for conducting 
regular project monitoring during the construction and operation phases. The 
GOL’s ability to negotiate favourable agreements with power purchasers should 
also be strengthened. Until this capacity has been built, the GOL should consider 
a moratorium on the signing of new Concession Agreements and PPAs, as well 
as increasing the use of independent experts and external monitors to assess dam 
projects. 
Finally, transparency and accountability to affected people needs to be 
dramatically improved. The rural villagers who bear the costs of these dam projects 
should have more of a say in whether or not they are developed. They also need 
a better understanding of their rights and entitlements and the space to ask that 
those rights be respected. In addition to receiving full compensation for their 
losses, all communities affected by a hydropower project should be provided with 
a percentage of the dam’s revenues – for the life of the project – to support their 
own community development initiatives.
NT2 may have improved upon the performance of past dams in Laos, but it 
is still a long way away from ‘doing dams right’. Laos will have only one chance 
THE NAM THEUN 2 CONTROVERSY AND ITS LESSONS FOR LAOS 107
to manage this hydropower boom to minimize costs and maximize benefi ts for its 
people. Urgent action is needed to both address the problems with NT2 and avoid 
a repeat of past dam mistakes in Laos.
NOTES
1 According to the World Bank in June 2008, the numbers for signifi cantly affected 
households have been revised downward to approximately 200. Therefore, 2200 
households multiplied by the average household size in Laos (6) means that an 
estimated 13,200 villagers have been affected by construction activities.
2 Using NTPC’s numbers of only 75,000 affected people.
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Appendix
Nam Theun 2 and Its Impact upon 
Hydropower Development in Laos1
Patchamuthu Illangovan, World Bank country manager for Laos
Laos, a landlocked country in Southeast Asia, is one of the poorest countries in the 
region. During the early 2000s, the country was characterized by weak infrastructure, 
low capacity in its institutions, lack of industries, extremely low foreign investment, 
high poverty and few opportunities for growth. However, Laos had a goal: to exit from 
poverty and join the ranks of middle-income countries by 2020.
The development challenges of Laos were, and are, abundant; but the country 
is working hard to overcome them. More children need to attend school, healthcare 
facilities need signifi cant improvements, roads are needed to give access to communities, 
agriculture systems need to be upgraded and, crucially, the government needs revenues 
to invest in poverty reduction programmes. Moreover, these revenues must be well 
managed so that they can be utilized effectively.
THE CASE FOR HYDROPOWER
In order to tackle these challenges, the Government of Laos (GOL) and the international 
community have recognized a need to implement far-reaching reforms in the public 
fi nancial management sector. Moreover, the government has highlighted the imperative 
of developing what is becoming its regional comparative advantage: hydropower. 
Surrounded by neighbours in need of electricity, Laos is blessed with abundant 
water resources that it can tap and sell, thereby generating much needed revenues. But 
hydropower also brings social and environmental impacts that must be well assessed 
and managed. The sustainable management of the country’s natural resources has the 
potential to generate revenues, reduce poverty, improve people’s life and protect the 
environment. The key is to balance water resources and potential developments in 
Laos so that the country and its people benefi t.
Back in 2002, the Nam Theun 2 Hydroelectric Project (NT2) was an opportunity 
to undertake necessary reforms and to begin to strategically develop this important 
sector of the economy of Laos, ensuring that local communities benefi ted. The GOL 
reached out to the international community for support, including the World Bank, 
Asian Development Bank, Nordic Investment Bank, European Investment Bank and 
the French Development Agency (AFD). Together, the institutions, GOL and project 
developers designed the preparation for a project that would have impacts across the 
board.
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UNDERTAKING IMPORTANT REFORMS
The basic premise behind NT2 was that it would help to generate much needed 
revenues that the GOL could invest in poverty reduction projects. However, to do 
this, the GOL had to strengthen its public fi nancial management capabilities and its 
budgetary framework. 
With the support of the development community, including several World Bank 
projects, the GOL has been undertaking a considerable number of important reforms 
in the last four years that are helping to establish a more rational and consistent 
public fi nancial management system. From acquiring and storing data in a more 
comprehensive manner to implementing a strengthened and new budgetary law, the 
GOL has been upgrading and enhancing the way in which it manages the country’s 
fi nances.
These reforms, complementary to the NT2 project, are having far-reaching 
implications for the future of Laos. The reforms that are being undertaken, the 
institutions that are being put in place and the capacity that is being built, among 
others, will not only be useful to manage NT2 revenues, but all revenues in the country 
and their allocation. This is a very signifi cant impact that the project has had upon 
the country.
NAM THEUN 2
NT2 has brought with it the most rigorous social and environmental mitigation 
programmes that any project of its kind has had in Laos. These include detailed 
assessments of project impacts; a thorough consultation process with communities 
and national and international stakeholders; resettlement standards that led to the 
creation of a country-wide resettlement policy; the conservation of a 4000km2 
protection area that is helping to shape the country’s thinking about conservation 
initiatives; appropriate compensation policies for people losing land to project areas; 
and mitigation measures and a programme for those affected downstream. 
The social and environmental programmes in NT2 are helping to improve the 
lives of those affected by the project. In the case of the resettled villagers, the project is 
helping the communities to overcome poverty by raising their living standards above 
the country poverty line fi ve years after relocation. In the downstream, the livelihood 
restoration programme is working to ensure that people’s lives are not degraded as a 
result of the project and that they can maintain their living standards.
Moreover, the NT2 preparation process and its current implementation are raising 
the standard of hydropower development in Laos, as well as building signifi cant 
capacity across a range of ministries and the project area. NT2 is also a catalyst in 
framing the discussions about hydropower in the country.
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THINKING SUSTAINABLY ABOUT HYDROPOWER
The discussions on hydropower taking place in Laos today involve communities who 
are affected, national and international civil society, international donors, academia, 
developers and GOL offi cials. Many of these discussions centre on the aim of not only 
developing projects and generating revenues, but developing them sustainably, ensuring 
that communities benefi t and that the environment is protected. 
Discussions also centre on the need to attract investments from responsible 
private-sector partners, as exemplifi ed in discussions during late 2007 at the fi rst 
Lao–Thai Hydropower Forum, as well as at various other forums. Laos understands 
the importance of engaging with a private-sector partner who can help to improve the 
lives of affected people and the environment.
THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF HYDROPOWER 
IS AT THE TOP OF LAOS’S AGENDA
Moving forward
The preparation and implementation of the NT2 project in Laos has triggered a 
number of reforms of economic and social processes, which are slowly transforming 
various areas in Laos. The impact of the project goes beyond the actual development 
of the dam and its social and environmental mitigation programme to encompass 
the broader effects of the project on Laos’s public fi nancial management system and 
natural resource extraction.
Laos’s natural resources have the potential to help its people to overcome poverty 
and therefore need to be sustainably managed. This will require the involvement of 
all stakeholders to ensure that this potential is met and that the Lao people lead better 
lives.
Going forward, Laos needs to carefully consider and balance its abundant 
resources, evaluating the potential to develop them, and the impacts and benefi ts 
to all of its population and future generations. Laos, thus, will need to ensure that 
potential projects are well assessed, that they are carefully refl ected upon, that social and 
environmental programmes are well implemented, that local populations benefi t from 
the projects, that investments are sound, and that the country gene rates the revenues 
which it needs, allocating funds to poverty reduction projects.
NOTE
1 For more information about Laos, the World Bank’s programme in Laos and the Nam 
Theun 2 Project, visit www.worldbank.org/lao and www.worldbank.org/laont2.

5Damming the Salween River
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INTRODUCTION
The Nu-Salween River1 is one of Asia’s principal rivers, the source of livelihood for 
an estimated 6 million people in China, Myanmar/Burma and Thailand (IUCN 
et al, 2003). The mountains and valleys of the watershed are home to some of the 
most culturally and biologically diverse areas of the world. Over its 2800km course 
the river drops some 5000m, much of that in steep gorges, making the Nu-Salween 
extremely attractive from a hydropower development perspective (Magee, 2006b). 
Until recently, the remoteness and lack of basic infrastructure throughout much of 
its watershed made such development technically and economically infeasible. 
All of this has changed, though, as regional economies have grown and 
electric power shortages have become acute, especially since 2003. China’s plans 
to construct hydropower installations on the Yunnan portion of the Nu originally 
emerged during the early 1990s. Proponents of large hydropower development on 
the Nu argue that such development would ease the country’s energy crunch while 
providing revenues to areas highly dependent upon central government subsidies 
for local governmental operations. Yet, whereas the dams on the neighbouring 
Lancang seem largely unalterable, the Nu cascade has seen a much greater tide of 
international and domestic criticism, which doubtless played a role in the central 
government’s decision to suspend the projects in early 2004.
Further downstream, Thailand’s plans to build dams in neighbouring countries 
were fi rst proposed 30 years ago, but gained renewed momentum amid Thailand’s 
foreign investment and liquidity boom of the late 1980s, when the then government 
of Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhaven fi rst aired the idea to turn the Mekong 
region ‘battlefi elds into marketplaces’. As Thai capital moved abroad seeking 
opportunities in Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, opposition movements within 
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Thailand demanding greater accountability and transparency in infrastructure 
development became a serious force posing a nuisance for developers at home. By 
the late 1990s, demonstrators had successfully blocked the construction of various 
dams and other industrial projects across the country, even as Thailand’s neighbours 
were showing greater enthusiasm for foreign hydropower development.
Like their counterparts in Thailand, but only later, Chinese dam development 
companies are now poised to export not only electricity, but also dam-building 
expertise and capital throughout mainland Southeast Asia and even further afi eld to 
Africa and the Middle East. The most infl uential of these companies, once part of 
the Chinese government’s Ministry of Electric Power, now raise capital on foreign 
fi nancial markets and bring ‘made in China’ technologies to projects over which 
other lenders may bulk for technical, political or economic reasons. Myanmar, as 
we discuss below, is home to several of those projects, and Chinese companies are 
making inroads there and throughout the Lower Mekong watershed.
We begin with an overview of the Nu-Salween watershed and then provide 
details of the projects planned for the Chinese and Myanmar stretches of the 
river, as well as of the principal actors in the three countries involved in surveying, 
designing, fi nancing, constructing and operating the dams. We then sketch the 
decision-making contexts in which the dams are situated. Finally, we conclude 
with an assessment of leverage points in decision-making processes and modest 
recommendations for reducing ecological and socio-economic impacts while 
striving to meet regional energy needs.
OVERVIEW OF THE NU-SALWEEN WATERSHED
In China, where the river has its source, the Salween is known as the Nu Jiang, 
or the ‘Angry River’. From its headwaters on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau at an 
elevation of nearly 5000m, the river tumbles southward between steep gorges 
through Yunnan Province before entering Myanmar, where it forms the border 
with Thailand for some 800km and fi nally empties into the Andaman Sea. Having 
begun its journey as a trickle of glacial melt 2800km upstream, the Nu-Salween 
swells to a muddy brown river several kilometres wide at its mouth, discharging 
an annual average of 1650m3/s into the sea. Along the way, it drains a basin of 
approximately 271,914km2 in area (IUCN et al, 2003).
Given its remoteness and limited infrastructure, the socio-economic situation 
of much of the Nu-Salween Basin is rather poor. In China, both the Tibet 
Autonomous Region (TAR) and Yunnan Province have been targeted since 1999 
by the state’s Western Development Campaign, which seeks to address gaps in 
economic development between China’s western interior and its eastern seaboard. 
Many of the campaign’s initiatives involve basic infrastructure construction, so-
called ecological construction to re-engineer previously engineered environmental 
degradation, education and social development. All four counties of Nujiang 
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prefecture in north-western Yunnan are designated as national-level poverty 
counties, the governments of which derive the bulk of their revenues from central 
government subsidies. Aside from sporadic non-ferrous mining operations in the 
region, most economic activity is agricultural. Principal crops include maize, rice, 
wheat, buckwheat, sorghum and beans, as well as rapeseed (canola) and Tibetan 
barley.
The Nu Valley is one of the most ethnically diverse areas of China. Yunnan, as 
a whole, is home to signifi cant populations of Yi, Naxi, Bai, Zang (Tibetan), Dai 
and a number of other ethnic groups (Magee, 2006a; McDonald, 2007). In 2003, 
the United Nations Educational, Scientifi c and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
added the Three Parallel Rivers area (including portions of the Nu watershed) to 
its World Heritage list (UNESCO, 1992–2008). Within Yunnan, the watershed is 
home to approximately 5 million people, many of whom are subsistence farmers. 
The area is also extremely rich in biodiversity, with an estimated more than 
12,000 species of plants alone, some 3500 of which are endemic. Conservation 
International includes the entire Nu Valley as a part of its Mountains of Southwest 
China Biodiversity Hotspot (Conservation International, 2007). One study (Xu 
and Wilkes, 2004) identifi ed livelihood activities such as fuelwood collection, 
agriculture and livestock grazing as primary threats to biodiversity in the area.
For the fi rst 1400km of its journey, the shallow and braided Nu winds its way 
through high mountains and plateaus, with wide valleys in southern Qinghai and 
eastern Tibet, narrowing and deepening as it approaches north-western Yunnan. 
Over its 621km course in Yunnan, the Nu drops 1116m, making it extremely 
attractive for hydropower development.
Exiting Yunnan, the Nu (now Salween) enters the Shan State of Myanmar 
before continuing on through Karen (Kayan) and Mon. Here, as in China, the river 
traverses remote regions populated principally by ethnic minorities, many of whom 
are subsistence farmers who depend for a large portion of their livelihoods upon the 
Salween River and its related ecosystems. As detailed below, armed militias in many 
of these areas are openly hostile to Myanmar’s ruling military junta, a situation 
that further strengthens the junta’s resolve to pacify (at least partially) the region 
through large hydropower projects that will fl ood much of the bottomland areas 
and disrupt the lives and livelihoods of ethnic communities.
DEVELOPMENT PLANS
Upstream (China)
Construction of large hydropower in western China is a central component of 
national-scale discourses of development, most importantly the Great Western 
Development Campaign. Supportive policies such as Send Western Electricity 
East (xidian dongsong) and Send Yunnan Electricity Out (Yundian waisong), as well 
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as the creation of entirely new regional constructions such as the Pan Pearl River 
Delta (stretching from Shanghai to Yunnan) help to legitimize and even naturalize 
large-scale power generation and transmission infrastructure. Discourses of power 
– and the power of those discourses – resonate loudly internationally as well. The 
Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS), which did not exist as a geographic entity 
before the Asian Development Bank (ADB) created it in 1992, has now become the 
backdrop for Mekong region-wide infrastructure development, such as highways 
and power grids.
Initial calls for a hydropower cascade on the Nu came as early as 1995 (Wei, 
2005); yet serious planning and surveying did not begin until 2001. As plans began 
to coalesce, construction on a similar hydropower cascade on the neighbouring 
Lancang (Upper Mekong) was already under way. Hydrolancang, the Lancang 
developer, negotiated an agreement in 1998 for Thai co-fi nancing on the Jinghong 
Dam, at the time planned as a 1500MW project.2 In exchange for a 70 per cent 
stake, Thailand would receive all electricity produced for the fi rst two years of the 
dam’s operation, then projected to be 2013 to 2015. Interviews with offi cials in 
China in 2005, however, revealed that the dam is now being built without Thai 
fi nancing due to an accelerated development timeline; the fi rst turbine of Jinghong, 
now designed for a total 1750MW, came online in June 2008.
Thus far, the joint venture model has not been openly discussed as an option 
for the Nu dams within China. On the Lancang, the developer’s model of ‘rolling 
development’, where power and revenue generated by one dam are used to build 
the next, has been supplemented heavily by Chinese central bank loans, which 
provide up to 75 to 80 per cent of the capital. It is likely that the controversial 
nature of the Nu dams will make foreign investors, already deterred by long 
construction periods, high start-up costs and delayed returns on investment, even 
less interested in investing. Moreover, given the Nu’s distance from key load centres 
such as Guangdong, signifi cant start-up costs and delays will probably result from 
solidifying grid infrastructure to effi ciently and safely transmit power over such 
long distances. To this end, China has become a world leader in ultra-high voltage 
(800kV) direct current (DC) transmission lines.
Central authorities delegated survey and design work for the Nu cascade 
to the Beijing Institute of Hydropower Survey and Design and the East China 
Insti tute of Hydropower Survey and Design. Plans were submitted in July 2003 
as the Middle and Lower Nu River Hydropower Planning Report. Supporters cited 
practi cal advantages of developing large-scale hydropower on the Nu, including 
the river’s steepness and the relatively small number of people who would have to 
be resettled, estimated at some 50,000 (He and Feng, 2004). Development costs 
are also expected to be low relative to other large hydropower projects, which will 
presumably result in low prices for electricity sold to the grid and, in turn, to end 
users.
Environmentalists and cultural preservationists have criticized the dam plans as 
threatening to the cultural and biological diversity of the area, and have repeatedly 
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made appeals to save one of China’s last ‘undammed’ or ‘virgin’ rivers (even though 
there are already two completed dams and a third under way on the upper reaches in 
Tibet). Semantic questions notwithstanding, the most substantive critiques of the 
projects have questioned the decision-making processes leading to their apparent 
initial approval, as well as the gaps in those processes that seem to allow developers 
to skirt laws regarding environmental impact assessments and public input, and to 
avoid oversight from relevant watershed authorities.
In response to domestic and international outcry, the Nu projects were 
suspended by Premier Wen Jiabao in 2004, offi cially for failure to comply with 
environmental reporting requirements. Over two years later, then Minister of Water 
Resources Wang Shucheng referred to the 13-dam cascade as a case of ‘predatory 
development’3 in a speech in Hong Kong (Xiang Gang Shangbao, 2006). Due to 
their controversial nature, there is limited publicly available information regarding 
the Nu dams. We provide here only a preliminary sketch of the projects, based 
on close examination of Chinese and Western sources, recognizing that details 
such as capacity, location and timelines may change. Figure 5.1 indicates the 
approximate locations of the Nu-Salween hydropower projects; Table 5.1 provides 
basic information about each dam, including map abbreviations. The fi nal status 
of the cascade is still uncertain, so our grouping of certain dams as more or less 
likely may be inaccurate or premature.
The original two-reservoir, 13-step (liang ku shisan ji) plan called for two dams 
with major reservoirs in a cascade totalling 13 dams. Large reservoirs provide multi-
seasonal regulation (storage capacity), enabling more consistent power generation 
even in the dry season. Two of the Nu dams, Songta and Maji, were designed with 
reservoirs of 6.3 and 4.7 billion cubic metres in capacity, respectively. Preliminary 
work has already begun at the two sites. A report in late 2004 claimed that Songta 
would probably be one of the projects approved in a ‘slimmed-down version’ of 
the Nu development plan (Cheung, 2004). Once Songta and Maji are built, the 
economic logic of fi lling in the gaps by building the smaller projects downstream 
becomes more compelling.
Yabiluo (1800 MW) and Maji (4200 MW) made early headway toward central 
government approval. According to the 2003 plan, those projects, along with 
Bijiang, Lushui and Yangsangshu, were to be completed between 2015 and 2020 
(He and Feng, 2004). Such expectations were later scaled back; in 2005, Minister 
of Water Resources Wang Shucheng suggested one or two dams were likely to be 
approved in the short term (Ma, 2005). Most observers understood that to include 
the cascade’s smallest dam, Liuku, work on which has been under way in conditions 
of questionable legality since 2006. At 180MW of installed capacity, Liuku ranks 
as a medium-sized dam in China, and will almost certainly supply power locally. 
According to recent media reports, the resettlement sites for housing villages moved 
from near the dam site are already constructed. The same source reported that many 
villagers protested the terms of resettlement (Shi, 2008). Meanwhile, the Yunnan 
subsidiary charged with developing the Nu met in 2006 with the Beijing-based 
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Institute for Water Resources and Hydropower Research to discuss turbine design 
for the 1000MW Saige Dam (IWHR Offi ce, 2006). Saige and Liuku were both 
cited in the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010) for renewable energy development 
as key projects to be pushed forward by 2010 (Yundian Xinwen, 2008).
Given the controversy surrounding the original design, a smaller one-reservoir/
four-step design (yiku siji) has been suggested as a compromise. This would comprise 
Liuku, Yabiluo, Saige and Maji, with Maji the major upstream reservoir for the 
other three dams. Aside from the four projects that seem most likely to proceed 
in the near term, and with the possible exception of Songta on the Tibetan side of 
the Yunnan–Tibet border, nine dams remain on the drawing board. Of those, all 
but three have planned installed capacities greater than 1000MW, meaning they 
will play an important role in electricity transfers out of Yunnan over the coming 
Figure 5.1 Approximate locations of the Nu-Salween hydropower projects 
(including proposed and ongoing projects)
Source: chapter authors, based on Magee (2006b)
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decades. In an interview, one development executive noted that he expected a small 
number of dams would fi rst be approved, with the others probably following.
One of the principal arguments against Nu hydropower development is that 
a number of the dams lie adjacent to the Three Parallel Rivers UNESCO World 
Cultural Heritage preserve. Activists and academics are concerned that some of 
the reservoirs would threaten the preserve, suspected to be one of the greatest 
concentrations of biodiversity in the world (Fan, 2005). Others, however, counter 
that the elevation of the reservoirs lies below that of the preserve and therefore the 
impact will be limited (He and Feng, 2004).
Downstream (Myanmar, Thailand)
As early as 1981, the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) 
had studied potential hydropower development on the Salween (EGAT, 1981; 
TERRA, 2006), and Thailand’s economic boom that followed a few years later 
gave the idea stronger impetus. Preliminary studies commissioned by Thailand and 
Myanmar and conducted by Japan’s Electric Power Development Company during 
the early 1990s identifi ed about ten potential dam sites on the Salween. But the 
economic crisis in 1997 sidetracked those plans by bankrupting Thai developers 
Table 5.1 Basic information about the Nu-Salween projects 
(including map abbreviations)









Liuku LK  180
Shitouzhai STZ  440
Saige SG 1000
Yangsangshu YSS  100
Guangpo GP  600





Source: Nujiang Lisu Authonomous Prefecture Government (2005)
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and raising new questions about the viability of investing massive amounts of 
public and private funds in foreign megaprojects (Greacen and Palettu, 2007). 
At that time, Thailand’s relations with Myanmar’s State Peace and Development 
Council (SPDC) government were growing increasingly strained over a number of 
security issues: the SPDC’s alleged complicity in the production and distribution 
of the methamphetamines and heroin that enters Thailand, boundary disputes, the 
ethnic insurgencies and refugees. The resulting tensions led to occasional armed 
clashes on the border, and at least one Thai military offensive well inside Myanmar 
(Pathan, 2005).
While some Thai-built dams in Laos are already in operation, building on 
the Salween is proving more problematic. One reason is that the sites will be in 
outlying areas that the central Myanmar government has never fully controlled. 
Myanmar’s key load centres are concentrated in the central and lower parts of the 
country; thus, hydropower development has mainly been in these regions close to 
the national grid (Myanmar Department of Hydropower Planning, 2006). But an 
estimated 60 per cent of Myanmar’s hydropower potential, including the Salween 
dams, lies in the more remote central and eastern hills region, mostly in the Karen 
and Shan states (Bartle, 2005), home to an array of organized ethnic insurgents, 
pro-government militias and smaller private guerrilla units. As Myanmar’s army 
gradually asserts control over its hinterland and weakens its political opponents, 
however, and as its ambitious hydropower development programme gathers pace, 
plans to dam the Salween River look more realistic. Political stability remains a 
concern; but construction of the dams and the resulting fl ooding and dislocation 
of people around them would probably deliver a crushing blow to the ethnic 
insurgencies.
Myanmar’s limited fi nancial and technical capacity has also hampered progress 
and underlines the necessity of foreign assistance. Japanese war reparations fi nanced 
construction in 1960 of Myanmar’s fi rst major hydropower station in Karen 
State on the Baluchaung River, a tributary of the Salween (Japan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, 2002). Japanese loans and emergency assistance have since covered 
critical repairs and maintenance costs. During Myanmar’s socialist period and 
self-imposed isolation beginning in 1962, the government did not build another 
major dam until it completed the Kinda Dam in 1985, with Japanese public 
funding, and the Sedawgyi Dam, completed in 1989 with ADB loans (ADB, 
1989; Myanmar Department of Hydropower Planning 2006), both in Mandalay 
Division. According to one member of a survey team from MDX Group, a privately 
owned Thai developer, MDX was among the fi rst callers to explore potential large-
scale hydropower development opportunities in Myanmar following the Myanmar 
government’s decision to open its door to foreign investment in 1988.
Financing large dams, however, proved problematic. Thai fi rms lacked the 
funds and access to capital required for these big-ticket projects. And unlike in 
Laos, where the World Bank and ADB have backed various dam projects with 
grants, loans and technical assistance (ADB, 2008a), Myanmar is not eligible for 
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similar assistance (World Bank, 2008). The ADB has not extended loans to the 
country since 1986, and bilateral technical assistance ended in 1987 (ADB, 2008b). 
Similarly, the World Bank has approved no new lending for Myanmar since 1987, 
citing defaulted payments and lack of reforms (World Bank, 2008).
Moreover, as part of its economic sanctions package against Myanmar’s military 
rulers and their associates in response to the large-scale repression and violence 
directed against their political opponents, the US government is required to ‘vote 
against the extension of any fi nancial assistance to Burma by international fi nancial 
institutions’ (US Government, 2003; Niksch and Weiss, 2008). First imposed in 
1997 and tightened in subsequent years, restrictions also include a ban on imports 
from Myanmar and the prohibition of investment by US companies there, as well 
as a freeze on assets of companies and individuals linked to the junta. Fearful of 
a backlash from US equity markets, some banks in Singapore and China have 
recently ceased dealing with some fi rms and banks linked to the military (Lwin, 
2006; Levett, 2007). Additionally, the European Union has adopted similar, if 
weaker, restrictions against Myanmar (Council of the European Union, 2007).
Given these legal complexities and political sensitivities for Western fi rms 
and lending institutions, the entry of Thai and Chinese developers and fi nanciers 
has given Myanmar’s hydropower regime a needed boost. Thai energy planners, 
for instance, recently identifi ed the Salween as the ‘most favourable’ location for 
transboundary hydropower development, notwithstanding security and political 
concerns (EGAT, 2003). In August 2003, China approved a US$200 million loan 
for the 790MW Yeywa Dam project (Myanmar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003; 
Bosshard, 2004), currently Myanmar’s largest hydropower facility. Yeywa is being 
built by a consortium of Chinese companies that includes China’s Gezhouba, 
which also reportedly is contracted for part of the construction work at Tasang 
(International Water Power and Dam Construction, 2007a).
The Salween dams will generate electricity for export and for the domestic 
market, where the country’s notoriously unreliable power supply causes daily power 
outages even in its largest cities. The regime estimates that it has so far tapped only 
1 per cent of its total hydropower potential (Myanmar Department of Hydropower 
Planning, 2006), which currently produces roughly one third of the country’s 
entire electricity output.
In order to tap the country’s hydropower potential, the Myanmar regime, 
in 2002, restructured its Ministry of Electric Power and its Department of 
Hydropower (see ‘Principal actors’ section below), and also signed the Inter-
Government Agreement on Regional Power Trade in the Greater Mekong Sub-
Region Countries,4 which the regime hoped could allow it to export power 
generated from the Tasang Dam and other planned projects to other GMS countries 
through the Asia Power Grid (Bartle, 2005). National development strategies, 
meanwhile, have placed hydropower at their centre. The country’s fi rst two fi ve-year 
development plans (2001–2005 and 2006–2010) focus on hydropower growth to 
feed the domestic market. Its third fi ve-year plan (2011–2015) outlines strategies 
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to ramp up power trade with neighbouring GMS countries to the east and with 
India and Bangladesh (Myanmar Department of Hydropower Planning, 2006). 
Foreign companies are being invited in to form joint ventures with local partners 
to help fi nance and construct dams, typically with the condition that Myanmar 
is entitled to ‘10 to 15 per cent of annual electricity generation from the power 
stations free of charge’ (Myanmar Department of Hydropower Planning, 2006). 
In December 2007, the completion of 13 hydropower projects in Myanmar was 
given priority over all other projects, including those in the increasingly signifi cant 
oil and gas sector (Thu, 2007).
The Salween dams, however, were not included in that list as they are Chinese- 
and Thai-led projects, the output of which will be diverted abroad. But the dams 
are included in the roster of more than 40 projects that the regime hopes to 
commission in the coming years (Myanmar Department of Hydropower Planning, 
2006). Owing to their political sensitivity, the fi ve dams planned for the Salween 
have proceeded under a high degree of secrecy. The lack of a clear regulatory 
framework for hydropower development on the river, allegations of human rights 
violations conducted in preparation for the dams, and the potential environmental 
destruction that may result from their construction all raise further questions about 
the viability of the Salween projects.
Hutgyi
The first dam on the Salween targeted for construction is the Hutgyi Dam 
(sometimes also spelled Hatgyi, Hutgi or Hatkyi), a US$1 billion run-of-river 
power plant located in Karen State, some 33km downstream from the confl uence of 
the Moei River at the Thai border. It is a joint venture project between Myanmar’s 
Ministry of Electric Power No 1, the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
and China’s Sinohydro Corp (Thu, 2006). An initial feasibility study in 1999 
conducted by NEWJEC (formerly known as New Japan Engineering Consultants, 
Inc.), a Japanese development consultant, recommended a low-height, run-of-
river dam with a capacity of 300MW (Vatcharasinthu and Babel, 1999); but Thai 
offi cial fi gures list the dam at 1190 MW, with some 75 per cent of the output to 
be delivered to Thailand starting in 2019 (EGAT, 2008).
In December 2007, Russian manufacturer Power Machines Company, which 
makes equipment for thermal, nuclear, hydraulic and gas-turbine power plants 
(Power Machines Company, 2006), entered the picture when it announced that 
its joint venture with Chinese fi rm Zhejiang Fuchunjiang Hydropower Equipment 
would deliver eight turbine units  – seven at 170MW and one at 132MW – to the 
Hutgyi plant (International Water Power and Dam Construction, 2007b).
Thailand and Myanmar signed a memorandum of agreement in December 
2005, which stated that EGAT would begin construction of Hutgyi in late 2007, 
and Sinohydro signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with EGAT 
and Myanmar’s Hydropower Implementation Department (HPID) in 2006 for 
joint investment in the project (SHAN, 2006; Thu, 2006). But the parties hadn’t 
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worked out an investment model at that point and no other details were made 
public according to the terms of an earlier 2005 MoU, which states that ‘each party 
shall strictly keep confi dential any and all technical, legal and commercial data and 
information’. An environmental impact assessment (EIA) was conducted by the 
Environment Research Institute at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. The EIA, 
not required by Thai law, was criticized for downplaying the environmental and 
human impact and for making dubious claims about the extent of the opposition 
to the project by the local ethnic Karen. The institute was preparing a revised EIA 
before EGAT halted all work on the project in late 2007, after two of its staff were 
killed in just over a year. The deaths, allegedly by a landmine explosion and artillery 
ambush near the project site (Bangkok Post, 2007), prompted EGAT Governor 
Kraisi Karnasuta to shelve the project ‘indefi nitely’ and then Energy Minister 
Piyasavasti Amaranand to urge Thai offi cials to expedite power development 
plans in Laos instead (Energy for Environment Foundation, 2006). The Myanmar 
government blamed the Karen National Union (KNU) for the attack, which it 
denied, pointing out that the Hutgyi site is located in territory controlled by its 
rival, the pro-junta Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). In February 
2008, KNU Secretary-General Mahn Sha, a staunch opponent of the dam, was 
gunned down in his home by unidentifi ed assailants (Associated Press, 2008). 
The motives and the culprits behind these killings remain publicly unknown, 
while the episodes highlight the security concerns associated with the Salween 
projects.
Tasang
Tasang (sometimes spelled Tarhsan, or Tar-hsan) would be the largest dam in 
Southeast Asia, with a total capacity of 7000MW (EGAT, 2008) and annual 
generation of 35,446 million kilowatt hours (Xinhua News Agency, 2007). At a 
cost of US$6 billion, it would be the single largest investment ever in Myanmar. 
The dam site is located in southern Shan State some 130km northwest of the Thai 
border pass at Baan Arunothai/Nong Ook. Thailand is expected to purchase at 
least 85 per cent of the annual production generated by the plant; but no power 
purchasing agreement has been signed thus far.
Construction works on the project will include an 876m long, 230m high 
concrete dam, and two 8m diameter tunnels, the longest of which will stretch 
1.2km (Bartle, 2005). The project’s initial investors were Myanmar’s Department 
of Hydropower Planning (DHP) and MDX Group at 15 per cent and 85 per cent, 
respectively (MDX PCL, 2007b). Myanmar’s semi-offi cial state press reported 
recently that China Gezhouba Water and Power Group bought a controlling 51 
per cent stake in Tasang (Thu, 2007). But according to a senior executive of MDX 
Group and the company’s fi lings to the Thai Stock Exchange, MDX still holds an 
82.88 per cent stake, while DHP holds the remaining 17.12 per cent in the Tasang 
Hydropower Company Ltd, the operating company for the project.5
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After several early studies of Tasang in April 2006, the Myanmar Ministry of 
Electric Power signed a development agreement for the project with MDX, with 
completion scheduled around 2020. A year later the offi cial Myanmar media 
reported that implementation was under way for Tasang, now listed at 7110MW 
(Xinhua News Agency, 2007). Tasang was offi cially inaugurated on 30 March 
2007, when offi cials from MDX and other involved parties cut the ribbon at the 
groundbreaking ceremony (New Light of Myanmar, 2007b); but heavy rains halted 
construction soon thereafter (Thu, 2007).
Tasang has also been constantly surrounded by accusations of human rights 
abuses and widespread environmental damage. A Shan advocacy group has said that 
over the past ten years, the Myanmar army has relocated more than 60,000 villagers 
from areas adjoining the dam site and the projected fl ood zone (SSEO, 2006). 
Other human rights groups have said the project would displace tens of thousands 
more from their homes in the Shan, Karenni and Karen states in Myanmar, as well 
as from Mae Hong Son Province in Thailand, and that others have been press-
ganged into forced labour, raped and killed in preparations for construction of the 
dam. Preliminary feasibility studies required an increased military presence near 
the dam site (EarthRights International, 2005).
In 2002, the ADB studied the Tasang Dam as part of a master plan for a regional 
power grid, but backed away, citing ‘serious socio-environmental concerns’. Rajat 
Nag, who heads the ADB’s Mekong Department, told the Associated Press: 
It didn’t pass our fi rst fi lter. The dam would have a profound impact on 
the Salween River. The project would fragment a fragile river ecosystem, 
reduce the fl ow of nutrients and water downstream and reduce the 
biodiversity. Deforestation is likely and would lead to soil erosion in the 
rainy season, which would exacerbate fl ood damage. (Gray, 2006)
Upper Thanlwin
Myanmar’s Hydropower Implementation Department signed an MoU in 2007 with 
Farsighted Investment Group Co Ltd, now Hanergy Holdings Group Company 
Ltd, and Gold Water Resources Co Ltd of China to develop the Upper Thanlwin 
Dam in northern Shan State, which will reportedly have an installed capacity of 
between 2400MW and 3000MW (New light of Myanmar, 2007a; Siripol, 2007). 
Its precise location is undisclosed. Also signatory to the agreement was Tun Myint 
Naing, managing director of Asia World; both the company and Tun Myint Naing 
have been barred from doing business with individuals or business from the US 
(US Department of the Treasury, 2008).
Weigyi
The Weigyi Dam will be located on the border in Papun district in Karen State, 
on the Myanmar side, and in the Salween Wildlife Sanctuary on the Thai side, 
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with the access road cutting through the adjacent Salween National Park. The dam 
has a proposed height of 168m, an estimated power capacity of between 4540 
and 5600MW (KDRG, 2006) and a price tag of US$3 billion to US$6 billion 
(Foundation for Ecological Recovery, 2003). The dam could create a reservoir, 
mostly in Karenni State, of between 640km2 to 1000km2 of forest, river and 
farmland, roughly the size of Singapore, affecting an estimated 30,250 people 
living in fl ood zones (Foundation for Ecological Recovery, 2003; KDRG, 2006). 
The status of this dam is unknown; but it is likely to be the third construction 
project, after Tasang and Hutgyi.
Dagwin
The Dagwin Dam site is also located on the border, just south of the Weigyi site, 
near Tha Ta Fang village, Mae Hong Son Province. The dam’s projected capacity 
is variously given as 500, 792 or 900MW (Foundation for Ecological Recovery, 
2003); but its main purpose would be to trap and regulate large amounts of water 
released by the Weigyi Dam during peak hours. It would use off-peak power to 
pump water back up into the upper dam. The estimated US$900 million cost and 
the fact that it has no practical water diversion route make this dam exceptionally 
impractical. Both the Dagwin and Weigyi dams appeared in EGAT’s 2004 Power 
Development Plan (PDP) (EGAT, 2005) but not in its 2007 PDP (EGAT, 2008).
PRINCIPAL ACTORS
China
China’s principal developers and exporters of hydropower expertise, capital and 
technologies were carved off the former Ministry of Electric Power (MEP). Some 
have referred to the ‘privatization’ of the former ministry and its subsequent state-
owned enterprise; yet since most of the stock in these companies is still controlled by 
the central government’s State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, 
referring to the companies as ‘private’ seems premature. The power sector has seen 
extensive reforms since the mid 1990s, aimed at promoting better governance, 
increased competition, improved technologies and lowered tariffs (Xu, 2002; Yeh 
and Lewis; 2004; Magee, 2006a). One specifi c objective was the separation of 
generation and transmission facilities, all of which had, before 2002, been part 
of the State Power Corporation of China and its predecessor, the MEP. The 2002 
reforms divided the generation assets of the State Power Corporation among fi ve 
national-level generation companies. The National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) then apportioned development rights on the country’s rivers 
to those companies. Rights to the Nu went to Huadian. Yunnan Huadian Nujiang 
Hydropower Development Company Ltd, Huadian’s subsidiary responsible for the 
Nu cascade, was established in June 2003 through joint investment from China 
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Huadian (51 per cent), Yunnan Development Investment Corporation (20 per 
cent), Yunnan Electric Power Group (19 per cent) and Yunnan Nujiang Electric 
Power Group (10 per cent) (Zhou, 2003).
Sub-national grid infrastructure was divided between two national-level 
grid companies, State Grid Corporation of China and China Southern Grid 
Corporation. Finally, four other national-level companies devoted to design, 
technological development, consulting and construction were created out of the 
restructuring. Sinohydro, a construction company, traces its lineage to the China 
National Water Resources and Hydropower Development Authority, founded 
after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. The 
company has led the development and construction of some 80 per cent of the 
large- and medium-scale hydropower projects in China built since then, and is 
involved in an increasing number of international projects, including several in 
Myanmar. China Gezhouba Group, a design and construction company, derives 
its name and reputation from the fi rst dam on the Yangtze and plays a signifi cant 
role in building dams overseas. The corporation has spearheaded projects in over 
30 countries in Asia and Africa, including the Tekeze Dam in Ethiopia and the 
Yeywa Dam in central Burma.
Thailand
The Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) was established in 
1969 when three regional state-owned generating enterprises were consolidated as 
a single state enterprise under the Offi ce of the Prime Minister, and is now under 
the Ministry of Energy (EGAT, undated). Responsible for electricity generation 
and transmission, EGAT builds, owns and operates thermal, hydropower and 
alternative energy power plants and operates the national grid. It also purchases 
electricity from private power companies and from neighbouring countries (EGAT, 
2008), including two dams in Laos. Plans to privatize EGAT faltered in 2005; but 
some subsidiary companies have been spun off to the private sector, such as the 
Ratchaburi Electricity Generating Holding Company Ltd, although EGAT retains 
an approximately 45 per cent interest in the company (EGAT, undated). EGAT 
would be the main purchaser of electricity generated at Hutgyi and Tasang; but in 
the absence of power purchasing agreements for the two dams, its role in Myanmar 
is not clearly determined (EGAT, 2008).
Unlike at Hutgyi, where EGAT may act as the lead investor, the lead entity 
at Tasang is Thai developer MDX, established in 1988 ‘to invest in hydropower 
generating dam projects in the Greater Mekong Sub-Region’ (MDX PCL, 2007b). 
It also expanded into public infrastructure works, industrial development parks and 
extensive real estate holdings, and was listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
in March 1992.
The company is steered by its honorary adviser, Subin Pinkayan (pers comm, 
23 January 2007), former minister of foreign affairs and minister of commerce, 
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and a key architect of plans to open neighbouring markets to Thai companies. In 
1989, as commerce minister, he was part of the government that announced it 
wanted to turn the Southeast Asian mainland into Suwarnabhumi, or a ‘golden 
land’, with Thailand as the regional centre of trade and fi nance. In 1997, he was 
ordered by the Supreme Court to pay US$10 million in back taxes on income 
that the court deemed he earned unlawfully as a minister between 1988 and 1990 
(Boonlom, 1997). An engineer by training, he now promotes his regional vision as 
a private construction consultant and university lecturer. Other notable directors 
and shareholders of MDX-controlled companies include Subin’s relatives, the 
editor of a major Thai daily newspaper, the relatives of the former head of the 
Royal Thai Third Army, which is responsible for northern Thailand, including 
a large portion of its border with Myanmar, and the relatives of a former Thai 
ambassador to Myanmar (MDX PCL, 2007b). Some American and European 
banks and investment funds also hold shares.
The company’s troubled fi nancial past set back its Tasang plans several years 
and raised questions about its ability to raise the necessary capital for the project 
through debt or equity fi nancing. In 1996, the company defaulted in payment on 
US$100 million worth of dollar-denominated convertible debentures (MDX PCL, 
2007a). By the end of 1997, amid the economic slowdown, the Stock Exchange 
of Thailand suspended trading of MDX. In 2004, the Central Bankruptcy Court 
ordered the company into rehabilitation. MDX then restructured its capital and 
debt and resumed trading on the exchange in August 2007, with the explicit aim 
of building the Tasang Dam (MDX PCL, 2007a).6
Myanmar
Myanmar’s military regime established the Ministry of Electric Power in November 
1997 and in May 2006 split the agency into two parts: the Ministry of Electric 
Power No 1, responsible for generation of electricity and hydroelectric power 
implementation, and the Ministry of Electric Power No 2, responsible primarily 
for transmission and distribution and gas-fi red power implementation (Myanmar 
Department of Hydropower Planning, 2006). MEP No 2 is also tasked with 
restoring the national power grid and preparing it for the opening of the 790MW 
Yeywa plant, perhaps as early as 2010 (New Light of Myanmar, 2007a).
Under the MEP No 1, the former Department of Hydroelectric Power was 
renamed the Hydropower Implementation Department (HPID), and is tasked with 
planning, designing and constructing hydropower projects (Myanmar Department 
of Hydropower Planning, 2006). It also signs memoranda of understanding and 
of agreement, and joint venture agreements with foreign companies to develop 
new hydropower projects (New Light of Myanmar, 2007a). A second new unit, 
the Department of Hydropower Planning (DHP), manages the internal affairs of 
the ministry. A third unit, the Hydropower Generation Enterprise, has taken over 
operation of the existing network of larger hydro plants from the Myanmar Electric 
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Power Enterprise and is responsible for the installation and maintenance of power-
generating equipment at hydropower stations (New Light of Myanmar, 2007a).
It is the Electric Power Development Project Lead Committee (or the Leading 
Committee on National Electricity Development), however, which has the ultimate 
authority over hydropower development. Under the direction of junta chief 
General Than Shwe and staffed with other high-level authorities, the committee 
coordinates dam construction with the line agencies and, importantly, controls 
the allotment of state funds (IED, 2007; Myanmar Department of Hydropower 
Planning, 2006). Strong centralized control has been a hallmark of the military 
regime and government contracts are often awarded to fi rms close to the country’s 
ruling generals (Lintner, 2007; The Economist, 2008), including Asia World and 
Hongpang, which have both expressed interest in the Salween projects.
Myanmar’s largest construction company, Asia World Co, was founded in 
1992 by Lo Hsing Han, a Kokang Chinese from the opium-producing region of 
Myanmar’s Golden Triangle who controls one of the largest armed drug traffi cking 
gangs in Southeast Asia. The company has received numerous government 
construction concessions and was one of the two major contractors to build the 
new capital at Naypyidaw (Lintner, 2007). In April 2007, its managing director 
and Lo’s son, Tun Myint Naing, signed an MoU on the implementation of the 
2400 MW Upper Thanlwin Project with Farsighted Investment (now Hanergy 
Group), Gold Water Resources of China, and the HPID director general (New 
Light of Myanmar, 2007a). Washington has accused both Lo and Tun of ‘having a 
history of illicit activities that supported Myanmar’s junta’ and banned Americans 
from doing business with Asia World and ten Singapore-based companies owned 
by Tun’s wife (US Department of the Treasury, 2008).
Hongpang General Trading Co Ltd is similarly blacklisted by Washington for 
its close association with a United Wa State Army commander, Wei Hseuhkang, 
the reputed founder of the company, who was indicted, along with seven other 
Wa leaders, by a US court in 2005 on heroin and methamphetamine traffi cking 
charges (US Drug Enforcement Agency, 2005). Founded in 1998, Hongpang is 
involved in a range of activities, including manufacturing, agriculture, gem mining 
and highway construction (SHAN, 2005).
Civil society
In addition to state and business actors, a number of what might be called civil 
society actors within China and Thailand have also become involved in the Nu and 
Salween dams debates. These include several ‘civil society’ organizations, segments 
of the media, and a number of academics. Public discussion of the projects barely 
exists in Myanmar, so most civil society actors from there work on the Salween 
with local and international organizations in Thailand. Broadly speaking, these 
individuals and groups seek to raise public awareness of river conservation, cultural 
and biological diversity protection, and socially and environmentally responsible 
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energy development, aiming to affect the direction, magnitude and pace of energy 
resources development on the Nu-Salween.
Perhaps the greatest hurdle that these actors face lies in promoting their 
messages of conservation, preservation and socio-environmental responsibility 
without being seen as opposed to economic development in areas where conditions 
of extreme poverty frequently prevail. Hydropower developers in China have made 
a rock-solid connection, through media and governmental channels, between large 
dam development and poverty alleviation. For the Salween, the correlation has been 
less clearly or strenuously expressed. The river for most Thais invokes notions of 
a remote and dangerous frontier and few pay it any heed. Thus far, civil society 
organizations have failed to successfully (or convincingly) articulate compelling 
alternatives, with the exception, perhaps, of ecotourism, that would provide 
comparable economic development benefi ts without compromising environmental 
integrity or biological or cultural diversity. In a 2005 interview conducted by 
Magee, a Chinese hydropower development offi cial argued that the infrastructure 
improvement required for ecotourism development – namely, in roads, bridges, 
water, electricity, waste management and lodging – would be greater than those 
required for dam development, with fi nancial returns far lower.
GOVERNANCE
China
The history of hydropower development leaves little reason to believe that 
decision-making processes about dams are always (or even usually) rules based. 
Yet, understanding how decision-making processes have shaped the trajectory of 
hydropower development on the Nu River, in a context of enterprise restructuring, 
industry reforms, loosening of political controls, and increasing engagement 
of China with its neighbours on resource development projects, paves the way 
for identifying leverage points in those processes. In this section we outline the 
overall contours of decision processes, recognizing that we have surely overlooked 
numerous subtleties and cannot hope to capture all the nuances, personal relations 
and backdoor deals that help to move projects from the drawing board to the 
river.
The Nu case has been characterized by sustained debate, infl uenced by past 
experiences with the Three Gorges Dam and, more recently, the Lancang River 
hydropower cascade and the Dujiangyan–Zipingpu–Yangliuhu case in Sichuan (see 
Mertha and Lowry, 2006). Several dynamics have complicated decision-making 
processes. First, recent changes in the Chinese legal system have given greater 
voice to social organizations to challenge development projects. Such challenges 
increasingly rely on new Chinese laws regarding environmental impact assessments, 
pollution, resource extraction or resettlement compensation. At the same time, 
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these apparent gains in transparency and pluralism have been offset by the Chinese 
government’s sporadic tightening of restrictions for reasons of social stability and 
national security. Thus, despite new regulations in 2003 calling for public input 
on EIAs, authorities insist that the Nu’s status as a transboundary river means that 
detailed hydrological data on the river are a national security concern, and therefore 
that the EIA cannot be made public.
National security arguments notwithstanding, major river development 
projects in China should theoretically be subject to a fairly straightforward approval 
process that begins with one of seven river basin commissions and ends either with 
the same commission or, in the case of ‘major’ or transboundary rivers, with the 
NDRC and the State Council. In the case of the Nu, the Changjiang (Yangtze 
River) Water Resources Commission (CWRC), which holds authority over all 
rivers in south-western China, would fi rst develop a comprehensive plan for the 
basin, covering everything from shipping and transportation to hydropower and 
forestry. Next, the developer, in conjunction with design institutes, conducts a 
pre-feasibility study and submits the results to the basin commission to check for 
compliance with basin-wide priorities. The plan then proceeds to the design stage, 
with the resulting full feasibility study and detailed design report submitted to the 
basin commission. Final approval from other authorities, including the provincial 
government and even the NDRC and State Council, may be necessary in certain 
cases.
In interviews, CWRC officials lamented that for rivers such as the Nu, 
hydropower planning often leads comprehensive planning, rather than the 
opposite. Moreover, the commissions lack oversight on projects outside China, 
even those on rivers that have part of their watersheds in China. Instead, relevant 
foreign affairs bureaucracies (such as the Ministry of Commerce and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs) and the NDRC take the lead in approving or denying projects, 
based primarily on political and economic considerations. The practice by which 
Chinese companies form consortia expressly for bidding on specifi c foreign projects 
reinforces this since the transactions would have to be approved by a number of 
central government departments, especially since companies such as Sinohydro and 
Gezhouba still have a majority of their stock owned by the central government’s 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission.
Thailand
The Salween projects were planned during the period of Thailand’s rapid economic 
growth to meet EGAT’s forecasts of rising energy demand and to diversify energy 
sources away from imported natural gas. But given EGAT’s status as a self-
regulating monopoly utility, it has an incentive to overestimate demand, while 
its planning process is susceptible to political intervention and other confl icts of 
interest (Greacen and Palettu, 2007). Critics of EGAT’s decision processes also say 
that it is highly centralized and lacking public participation, and that it neglects 
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alternative energy investment in favour of unnecessary and ineffi cient mega-power 
plants (Greacen, 2006).
Thai energy offi cials have already signed various agreements with their Myanmar 
counterparts for the Salween projects, and have conducted feasibility studies and 
discussed transmission systems between the two countries. The dams are included 
in EGAT’s PDP for 2003–2016, which plans for Hutgyi to come online in 2012. 
But the dams continue to encounter fi nancial and political setbacks. Work sites 
and roads are being built at Tasang and Hutgyi, although further construction is 
unlikely in the absence of a power purchase agreement.
Adequate impact studies are also lacking. Although the Thai Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment requires environmental impact studies for 
domestic hydropower development, cross-border projects are subject to the laws of 
the host country. Environmental regulations in Myanmar are undefi ned, and the 
lead agency for impact studies, the National Commission for Environmental Affairs, 
lacks a clear institutional framework or the political muscle for environmental 
management (Habito and Antonio, 2007). Formal regulation of hydropower 
through the GMS initiatives is similarly absent.
Opponents of the dam say that Thailand’s laws require public disclosure of 
project details and stakeholder input at public hearings, and call for work on the 
Salween to cease until these conditions are met. Further development on the 
Salween, say military offi cials interviewed on the border, could infl ict insuperable 
ecological and population pressures on large swathes of northern Thailand. Until 
the questions surrounding the viability of the projects are addressed publicly, 
the Salween dams will continue to be dogged by harsh criticism and sustained 
debate.
CONCLUSION: LEVERAGE POINTS
Following the Asian fi nancial crisis during the late 1990s, and with increased 
public outcry about hydropower externalities and performance versus predictions, 
large hydropower came under intense international scrutiny. Major international 
investors and risk insurance providers such as the World Bank were accused of 
prioritizing macro-economic development goals over more targeted projects that 
were sensitive to local socio-economic, cultural and ecological conditions. The 
World Commission on Dams (WCD) report in 2000 provided a harsh indictment 
of many of the world’s large dams, indicating that most fell far short of their 
power and revenue generation targets, including the Pak Mun Dam in northeast 
Thailand (see Chapter 3). In Southeast Asia, the ADB openly refrained from 
investing in large hydropower projects due to their controversial nature (although 
ADB did provide funding for several related projects, such as transmission lines 
and feasibility studies). More recently, both multilateral banks have signalled their 
intention to re-engage in hydropower.
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Now, however, with demand for electric power in China and throughout 
the GMS on the rise, and increasing concern about fossil fuel-based generation 
systems, large hydropower is enjoying a comeback with or without the traditional 
lenders. This is partly eased by the perception of hydropower as a clean and 
renewable energy source that stands to be reinforced as global prices for fossil 
fuels rise. Chinese developers equipped with technology, expertise and growing 
clout within China and abroad are spearheading hydropower developments in 
Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Hydropower deals are often part and parcel of 
‘development packages’ that guarantee Chinese access to natural resources vital to 
China’s continued economic development. Much of this is similar to the zeal with 
which the United States promoted large dams around the world following World 
War II. To be sure, consultants, developers and funders from Europe and elsewhere 
in Asia are involved in hydropower development in the GMS region; but China 
is emerging as the major player.
Understanding processes is the fi rst step in infl uencing them. This is the 
primary motivation for our research into the Nu and Salween dams. While ours is 
but a preliminary sketch about the projects, major actors involved and processes 
through which the projects are designed, funded and approved, we conclude with 
several observations about potential leverage points in those processes.
Ironically, the greatest potential for exerting constructive influence may 
lie in China. The majority of the Nu projects are currently stalled, and while 
it is likely that some will go forward, there is also a chance that others will be 
shelved. Signifi cant efforts are currently under way to rethink development and 
operation of large dams on China’s major rivers, especially since many of the 
fl ood control objectives can be met through wetland preservation/rehabilitation 
and spillway management. Similarly, many of the power provision objectives may 
be alternatively met through end-use conservation. For those projects that do go 
forward, new laws (e.g. the EIA law and its public participation requirements, 
resettlement laws, etc.), greater sophistication in the legal profession, and gradually 
increasing transparency in decision processes, may help to maximize benefi ts and 
reduce the negative social and ecological impacts of the dams. Additionally, the 
past four years of debate have opened the door for increased consideration of 
scientifi cally informed development alternatives for western Yunnan, as well as for 
sustained public pressure for procedural justice (i.e. adherence to EIA processes 
and public participation requirements).
In our estimation, two things are crucial to the success of any alternative 
proposal for development in south-western China. First, the notions of ‘sustainable’ 
(kechixu de) and ‘scientific’ (kexue de) must be decoupled. These terms are 
frequently confl ated in China; yet the latter in no way implies the former. ‘Scientifi c 
development’ fi gures prominently in China’s 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010), 
and projects deemed ‘scientifi cally’ (technically) sound are frequently assumed to 
be sustainable as well; this is especially true given hydropower’s ‘green’ reputation. 
Second, evidence must be provided showing that alternative development projects 
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will match or exceed hydropower projects’ ability to achieve poverty alleviation 
goals. Admittedly, amassing such evidence from experience elsewhere is diffi cult. 
As noted above, though, the link between large hydropower development and 
poverty alleviation has been cemented in development discourse in China, and any 
alternative proposal must clearly demonstrate the frailty of that link.
In Thailand, civil society groups have long called on EGAT and other major 
power producers to improve standards of transparency and accountability, but 
with limited success. For instance, while public pressure forced EGAT to shelve its 
privatization efforts in 2006, it has failed to compel the company to decommission 
controversial dams and undertake other reforms. As for the Salween dams, Thai 
energy planners have been urged to reconsider large-scale hydropower development, 
in general, and to open the energy sector to more small and independent power 
producers. Decoupling generation from transmission and improving the regulatory 
environment would also help to depoliticize energy planning and encourage greater 
effi ciency and conservation, thus rendering the output from the Salween dams 
unnecessary. Improving standards of public disclosure and stakeholder input must 
fi rst be improved to foster informed dialogue among concerned parties. The Chinese 
government, for its part, has long been one of the few allies of the Myanmar junta, 
and arguably wields the greatest degree of infl uence with the reclusive military 
regime. Yet, trade and development practice, along with sovereignty concerns, make 
it unlikely that the Chinese government would require, or that Myanmar would 
accept, environmental impact assessments based on Chinese standards for projects 
on foreign soil. That said, most of the dams discussed here are in areas where even 
the Myanmar government lacks fi rm control; indeed, its hydropower pursuits are 
part of its broader nation-building programme. If the political and economic costs 
become too high, however, it is conceivable that the Chinese developers might pack 
their bags and head for friendlier sites in Africa or the Middle East.
NOTES
1 In the Burmese language, the river is known as the Thanlwin. Here we refer to the 
Chinese (including the Tibetan) portion of the river as the Nu, and the Myanmar/
Thai section as the Salween.
2 For more on the Lancang cascade, see Magee (2006a, 2006b).
3 Technically, Wang was speaking in his personal (not offi cial) capacity; but his comments 
probably evince some frustration about the Ministry of Water Resources’ relative lack 
of infl uence on the direction of large-scale hydropower development (vis-à-vis the 
National Development and Reform Commission and the development companies).
4 The GMS includes Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam.
5 Myanmar’s Hongpang General Trading Company Ltd has also expressed interest in 
participating in the project (Thu, 2007), presumably to build roads leading to the 
site.
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6 According to a company fi ling to the Stock Exchange of Thailand, MDX shall fi rst 
invest in ‘the Tasang Hydro-Power Project in the Union of Myanmar, which shall be 
run by a joint-venture company under establishing [sic] in the Union of Myanmar, 
with registered capital of US$250 million, comprising 2.5 million ordinary shares at 
the price of US$100 each.’ As of 23 June 2008, the Stock Exchange of Thailand listed 
MDX’s registered capital at US$44 million (1407 million baht) (Stock Exchange of 
Thailand, 2008).
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INTRODUCTION
The image of irrigation often confl icts with that of the Mekong River Basin – a 
monsoonal region with a wet climate and periodic fl oods. In the countries of the 
Lower Mekong Basin (LMB), however, the wet season that runs roughly from June 
to October is, in many places, followed by a dry season for the rest of the year. 
The rain-fed uplands in Laos and Cambodia receive the most rainfall (3000mm) 
and the Korat Plateau in northeast Thailand receives the least, between 1000mm 
and 1600mm (MRC, 2003a). In the LMB countries, irrigation is a key means of 
securing monsoon crops – shifting from a single crop (mainly rain-fed wet season 
rice) to multiple cropping systems – and increasing crop yields. It is estimated 
that water abstraction for agriculture accounts for around 90 per cent of all water 
diversions (Cambodia: 94 per cent; Laos: 82 per cent; Vietnam: 86 per cent; 
and Thailand: 91 per cent) in the region (MRC, 2003a). Thailand and Vietnam 
have extensively developed their irrigation infrastructure; while investments have 
declined in the last few years, hydropower development is going rapidly ahead 
(especially in Vietnam and Laos; see Chapter 2 in this volume). Laos, because 
of its sparse population, and Cambodia, due to the recent history of war and 
political turmoil, still have a low degree of infrastructure development; but more 
investments are expected in the coming years.
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The Government of Laos (GOL) is intent on developing irrigation in 
the highland valleys as well as along the Mekong River corridor, although the 
schemes installed during 1996 to 2000 have shown relatively poor performance. 
In Cambodia, the agricultural sector contributed 31 per cent of the national gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 2007 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_
Cambodia) and provides employment to nearly 80 per cent of the total labour force 
in the country (MAFF, 2007). Cambodia has set ambitious targets for irrigation 
development and institutional reforms, although experience in the past decade 
has been mixed. Vietnam’s agricultural policies must be seen in the context of the 
country’s ongoing transition to a market-based economy. Of particular relevance 
to the natural resources of the Mekong Basin are Vietnam’s plans to expand 
irrigation, improve existing schemes and expand the delta water management 
systems to deal with acid-sulphate soils and salt intrusion. Thailand is promoting 
basin-wide coordination of water resources management, the improvement of 
irrigation management effi ciency, and the strengthening of farmer groups and 
water user associations (WUAs) (MRC, 2003b). It has also repeatedly proposed 
massive irrigation and water diversion projects, notably in the northeast region or 
Isaan (see Chapter 10).
Despite these past investments, the expansion of irrigated areas in these 
countries has slowed down during the last few years. The question is whether this 
trend heralds the end of large-scale public irrigation or, in fact, whether a new 
irrigation era is expected? This chapter revisits the development of irrigation in 
the LMB countries in the past and analyses the possible trends of irrigation in the 
future by considering several drivers – in particular, the recent increase in food 
prices around the world that affects food security in many countries in the Mekong 
region. It addresses both the question of how to improve and reform existing 
schemes and the rationale and scope for further development.
REVISITING IRRIGATION IN THE LOWER MEKONG 
BASIN COUNTRIES
Agriculture and irrigation in the Lower Mekong Basin countries
Agriculture in the highlands is typically less productive than in the lowlands and 
the deltas, where the bulk of crop production takes place. Upland crops are usually 
rain fed, with relatively limited irrigation, and agriculture policies strongly support 
cash crops such as coffee, tea and rubber. The lowlands and deltas are relatively fl at 
and nutrient rich and are under intensive rice cultivation, with some exceptions in 
the fl oodplains due to soils or fl ooding conditions. Farming systems in these regions 
include wet season rice, dry season irrigated rice, fl ood recession rice, fl oating rice, 
and multi-crop production systems that have gradually incorporated fi sh, shrimps, 
vegetables and fruit trees.
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Rice production has increased rapidly during the past decade: by 81 per cent 
between 1993 and 2000 in Cambodia; by 38 per cent between 1990 and 1999 in 
Laos; by 33 per cent between 1994 and 2001 in northeast Thailand; and by 27 
per cent between 1995 and 1999 in the delta and central highlands of Vietnam. 
Although high-quality jasmine rice and glutinous rice with low yield is still grown 
in many places, particularly in northeast Thailand and Laos, this increase was 
mainly due to the use of high-yielding varieties, increased irrigation and cropping 
intensity, and expansion of the area under cultivation (MRC, 2003a).
Despite these large investments in irrigation, in 2003 the ratio of irrigated 
land to total arable land was only 26.8 per cent (see Table 6.1), lower than the 45 
per cent of Asia as a whole. And this rate has remained relatively stable during the 
past two decades.
Table 6.1 Irrigated area in the Lower Mekong Basin countries until 2003 















Laos  107  135  174  175 13.3 15.7 18.2 17.0
Cambodia  120  240  270  270  5.8  6.3  7.1  7.1
Thailand 3007 4248 4973 4986 16.4 20.6 25.8 28.2
Vietnam 1685 2867 3000 3000 25.6 44.8 36.4 33.4
All LMB countries 4919 7490 8417 8431 17.7 23.6 26.1 26.8
Annual growth rate* 
(as percentage)
 257
  (5.2) 
  93 
   (1.2)
   5 
   (0.1)  0.6  0.2  0.2
Note: * Compared with record in previous column. 
Source: FAO AQUASTAT (2004)
Out of the fi ve categories of the global irrigation system typology (Molden, 2007), 
four can be found in the LMB countries:
1 large-scale public paddy irrigation systems in humid areas;
2 small- to medium-scale community-managed (and built) systems;
3 commercial privately managed systems producing for local and export markets; 
and
4 farm-scale individually managed systems producing for local markets around 
towns or cities.
Large-scale public paddy irrigation systems in humid areas
These irrigation systems, such as the Lam Pao (50,000ha) in Thailand, the Stung 
Chinit (12,000ha) in Cambodia and the Quan Lo Phung Hiep (250,000ha) in 
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Vietnam, were developed to produce paddy. In some cases, they have gone through 
a process of incremental development by gradually increasing water control and 
cropping intensity; but they face some challenges in terms of economic and 
fi nancial viability, and technical and managerial upgrading.
Small- to medium-scale community-managed (and built) systems
Many of these systems are found in the highland areas of the LMB countries. 
They are characterized by their small size, and private or community investment 
and management. Often these systems divert water from small streams through 
temporary (or concrete) weirs. These systems form the basis of the economies of 
their communities and typically show a large variety of cropping patterns. Public-
sector involvement includes mostly the rehabilitation or improvement of weirs 
(often making them out of concrete).
Commercial privately managed systems producing for local 
and export markets
These systems do not yet represent a large share of irrigated areas in the LMB 
countries, but they are becoming more important to local economies, especially 
with non-rice crops such as rubber, palm trees, coffee and upland cash crops.
Farm-scale individually managed systems producing for local markets 
around towns or cities
These systems develop around towns or cities in the LMB countries to take 
advantage of local markets for high-value crops such as fruits and vegetables. They 
are highly dynamic and volatile, often characterized by large short-term returns on 
investment, and face environmental and health-related problems for both farmers 
and consumers when they use wastewater.
The size of an irrigation system in the Mekong countries is largely related to its 
funding sources that are either national or local budgets or international loans or 
grants. Table 6.2 gives details on the extent of irrigation across the LMB countries. 
The most basic systems provide only supplementary water during the wet season, 
while more intensive schemes provide water for two to three seasonal crops per 
year. 
In the LMB region, most of the irrigated areas are concentrated in northeast 
Thailand and the Mekong Delta in southern Vietnam. Figure 6.1 shows the 
distribution of irrigation schemes with different sizes in the Lower Mekong 
Basin.1
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Irrigation development and issues in the 
Lower Mekong Basin countries
In the LMB countries, irrigation development, especially the traditional irrigation 
systems in highland areas, began centuries ago. For example, in Cambodia, the 
history of irrigation development goes back as far as the 3rd century AD, with 
fur ther development during the Angkorian period between the 10th and 13th 
cen turies (Higham, 2001). In Thailand, traditional farmer-managed irrigation 
systems, mostly found in the northern part of the country, were established as 
early as 700 years ago during the period of King Mengrai (Surarerks and Chulasai, 
1982).
Large-scale irrigation development was initiated by the French in the Red River 
and Mekong deltas in Vietnam (see Chapter 8), and by the Thai monarchy in the 
Chao Phraya Delta at the end of the 19th century. During the Cold War (1946 to 
1989), large-scale state-built irrigation was seen as a response to concerns of food 
security and poverty reduction while serving US geopolitical interests (Barker and 
Table 6.2 Irrigated areas in the Lower Mekong Basin countries 
Location Number of 
schemes















Laos*  ,2532 , 224,232 , 151,940 0   ,224,232 b




,  788 – – 0 3,781,128 
RID (small) 11,567 – – –  , 90,963
Department of Energy 
Development Promotion 
(DEDP) (pumping)
 2129 – – – , 606,044
Royally initiated projects  ,2245 – – – , 291,883
Cambodia* , 1012 , 248,842  ,181,506 0 , 392,117
Vietnam Mekong Delta ,  120 1,964,223 1,358,669 281,497 1,964,223
Vietnam Mekong Highlands ,   76 ,  36,008 ,,   7290 –   ,36,008
Totalc 18,234 2,473,305 1,699,405 281,497 7,386,598
Notes: Dash (–) indicates information not available.
* Except for Vietnam, data given is for the whole country. 
a Where there is no comprehensive wet or dry season cropping data available, the irrigated area has 
been taken as the common measure of the irrigation area.
b The total irrigated area in Laos has been recorded at 280,000ha, the difference being many small 
schemes which have not been formally inventoried or mapped.
c This is the total of all schemes and areas where data is available (i.e. many small unrecorded 
schemes are omitted).
d The data refer to the potential area under irrigation if the schemes were operating to full capacity, 
which is not always the case.
Sources: MRC (2003b, 2005); RID (2007) for Thailand
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Figure 6.1 Irrigation projects by area in the Lower Mekong Basin 
Source: MRC (2005)
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Molle, 2004). Because of the Indochina wars, Thailand was the only country in 
the region that could continue to substantially develop its irrigation infrastructures 
at that time.
Irrigation is generally seen as a core part of rural development, with an 
important role in poverty reduction in the LMB countries, and food security 
in Cambodia and Laos. In Thailand and Vietnam, there is more focus on the 
intensifi cation of irrigated cropping. There is also a move to diversify away from 
rice and to alternatives with higher fi nancial returns such as aquaculture or cash 
crops. However, irrigation systems tend to be designed specifi cally to suit rice 
production, which makes it diffi cult for farmers to diversify into non-rice crops 
(MRC, 2003a).
Despite the great achievements in rice production in the LMB countries, there 
is a general consensus that irrigation systems have not lived up to expectations 
because of low performance in terms of control, water productivity, yields and 
quality of service delivery to farmers. The overall progress of the modernization 
agenda has remained relatively modest. The concepts of irrigation modernization 
are not fully understood and properly adopted (FAO, 2007). In some cases, 
modernization has been used to continue receiving funds for rehabilitation, 
operation and maintenance, or further capital-intensive interventions. In 
most countries, participatory irrigation management (PIM) and/or irrigation 
management transfer (IMT) has made very modest progress in improving system 
productivity and raising the cost recovery rate. Signifi cant underinvestment in 
operation and maintenance and poor management continue to be the norm rather 
than the exception.
The reduction in financial benefits from agriculture between 1980 and 
2000 has put governments under pressure to lessen irrigation management costs. 
Irrigation fees are being introduced with mixed success. Attempts to introduce an 
irrigation service fee in Thailand resulted in mass protests (MRC, 2003b). The 
alternative, and in some ways a reaction to excessive state control and bureaucratic 
government management, is to hand over schemes to farmers. But the effectiveness 
of this alternative needs to be investigated and questioned; huge investments in 
smaller schemes are at risk unless farmers have the incentives and capacity to ensure 
that they are adequately maintained. These institutional reforms do not capture the 
complexity of the hydrological cycle, the multiple functions of irrigation systems, 
and the relationships between different levels of management.
The situation among the individual LMB countries shows variations. Laos 
exhibits a low level of investment/infrastructure that contrasts with the fact that 
agriculture provides the largest share (40 per cent) of foreign currency income, 
52 per cent of the GDP, and 85.5 per cent of employment (Molle, 2007). The 
Water Vision of the country stresses that ‘The national economic development 
process is to be based on the wealth of natural resources, especially water and water 
resources’, which particularly includes irrigation and hydropower (Nonthaxay et 
al, 2002). Signifi cant improvements have been achieved in the agriculture sector, 
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with an increase in dry season rice area from 2700ha in 1976 to 110,000ha in 
2000, and irrigation has shifted the average rice yield from 3 tonnes per hectare 
(t/ha) in rain-fed wet season to 4t/ha to 4.5t/ha in the dry season. This increase 
in area refl ects the US$30 million to US$40 million investment in 7000 electric 
pumps installed along the Mekong and its major tributaries during the late 1990s 
(CES and AFD, 2007).
Irrigation coverage further increased from 19,170 irrigation schemes with a 
service area of about 295,000ha in the 1999/2000 wet season to 24,000 schemes 
serving 310,000ha in 2005 (Pheddara, 2007). This was mainly due to the large 
investment in the National Pump Installation Management Project (NPIMP), 
mostly along the Mekong River in the southern part of the country. However, 
most irrigation schemes are based on traditional weirs and are found in the 
northern and central regions. Medium-scale public schemes are largely confi ned 
to the Nam Ngum Valley near Vientiane. The government Strategic Vision for the 
Agriculture Sector (MAF, 1999) is to invest heavily in irrigation with a focus on 
small- and medium-scale schemes under farmers’ management, both along the 
Mekong Corridor (pumping) and in the highlands (valley bottoms). In 2001, the 
government set ambitious targets of increasing irrigation schemes from an actual 
coverage of 36 per cent of agricultural land to 50 per cent in 2005, and 80 per 
cent in 2020, with 50  per cent of the area cropped in the dry season (Nonthaxay 
et al, 2002). But until 2004 the irrigated area reported was only 20 per cent of the 
national paddy area (Anonymous, 2004) and dropped to 17 per cent in the three 
following years.
Problems found in the pumping schemes along the Mekong illustrate the 
variety of diffi culties faced by the irrigation sector. The area effectively cultivated 
in irrigation schemes, in general, totals only 70 per cent of the design command 
area. Dry season cropping intensity in pumping schemes was found to be around 
50 per cent of the wet season cropping area. Problems are technical (no on-farm 
distribution systems; deteriorated networks; damaged or out-of-order pumps), 
economic (rice is often less attractive than other on-farm activities in the dry 
season; the price of fuel became unbearable; operation and maintenance costs are 
not covered by water fees; schemes deteriorated) and institutional (lack of technical 
capacity in managing pumping stations; hasty turnover of technical and fi nancial 
responsibilities to farmer associations; weak water user groups or associations; 
top-down design and location of schemes), while full-cost repayment policies 
confl icted with a choice of community based on higher poverty index (CES and 
AFD, 2007).
New investments in irrigation as well as hydropower (often combined) are 
contingent upon loans by development banks and private-sector involvement, 
both explicitly welcomed by the government (Richardson, 2002).
In Cambodia, during the early 1990s the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
approved a Special Rehabilitation Assistance Loan (SRAL) for emergency 
rehabilitation of infrastructure, including some irrigation systems. The need and 
the scope for further investments in irrigation were emphasized, as agriculture 
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dominates the economy and rural infrastructure was destroyed by the war (ADB, 
2000). Irrigation in Cambodia is largely limited to the use of receding fl ood waters. 
Recession rice is gradually replacing lower-yielding traditional fl oating rice. Due to 
a limited ability in controlling water, the second irrigated rice crop in the dry season 
is grown only in approximately 10 per cent of the total wet season rice production 
area (MRC, 2003a). Renovation of irrigation schemes emerged as one of the most 
urgent rural development interventions for increasing agricultural productivity 
and for poverty alleviation (Öjendal, 2000).
The Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology (MOWRAM) Strategic 
Development Plan 2006–2010 targeted investments of over US$110 million for 
the irrigation reform programme. Objectives with the largest estimated costs 
generally involve signifi cant infrastructural work, while those with lesser estimated 
costs generally relate to human resources capacity, management systems and 
the ministry’s legal and regulatory basis (MOWRAM, 2007). In practice, the 
govern ment has allocated only US$10 million per year to this ministry for urgent 
rehabilitation and construction work, mostly the construction of reservoirs for 
irrigated areas. 
Large irrigation investment and irrigation modernization have been initiated 
with the support of external donors. The government aims to expand the irrigated 
area from 407,000ha (the actual area cultivated with rice is 2.5 million hectares) to 
1.8 million hectares or more in the future through various interventions (Sinath, 
2007), such as rehabilitation, reconstruction and development of gravity irrigation 
systems of various scales to provide supplementary irrigation in the wet season and 
full irrigation in the dry season. In addition, interventions include the provision of 
pumping stations (fi xed and mobile), pumping generators and fuel; implementing 
and strengthening participatory irrigation management and development (PIMD) 
through farmers’ water user communities (FWUCs) in order to ensure physical 
and fi nancial sustainability, and modernization of the irrigation systems and fl ood 
protection facilities. Cambodia’s policies on water reforms are strongly infl uenced 
by international fi nancial institutions and aim to reduce the fi nancial ‘burden’ to 
the state.
The recent master plan published by the Japan International Cooperation 
Agency (JICA, 2007) shows that the Tonle Sap and its catchments areas are 
the most important region for poverty alleviation, as well as overall economic 
development in the country. However, the study based on 320 existing irrigation 
systems on 4 out of the 12 tributaries fl owing into the Tonle Sap reported some 
major problems, including: 
• low ratio of farms under irrigation;
• lack of comprehensive rehabilitation work;
• deterioration of plot bunds;
• low ratio of establishment of FWUCs;
• insuffi cient canal capacity; and
• lack of irrigation structures.
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The management reforms have been shaped by power struggles between agencies 
and built without due consideration of fi eld experiences or local expertise (Molle, 
2005, 2007; Roux, 2005). Water resource management and development come 
under diverse institutions of MOWRAM and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fisheries (MAFF). Poor coordination among water-related institutions, together 
with unclear defi nition of their functions and responsibilities have often resulted 
in over lapping activities and fi nancial costs. Other problems faced in irrigation 
manage ment include rampant corruption, weak state administration capacity, 
ailing political legitimacy, under-educated civil servants, political factionalism, 
local-level confl icts, and a limited national budget (Öjendal, 2000). The problems 
in organizing local participation and the lack of project coordination at scheme 
level are still main constraints. This is one of the reasons why certain schemes in 
Cambodia resulted in cost overrun and why their benefi ts have been reduced (see 
Box 6.1).
BOX 6.1 ISSUES IN PARTICIPATION AND INTEGRATION: 
LESSONS FROM THE STUNG CHINIT IRRIGATION 
SCHEME (SCIP) IN CAMBODIA 
The Stung Chinit Irrigation Project (SCIP) provides a striking example of the mismatch 
between project planning and reality (Try, 2008). The scheme was built during the 
Pol Pot period in 1977 by using forced labour from Kampong Thom and Kampong 
Cham provinces. The planned total command area of SCIP was 12,000ha. The 
project was designed to increase agricultural productivity and farmers’ incomes and 
stimulate the rural economy of Kampong Thom Province by providing irrigation and 
drainage, agriculture extension, rural roads and markets. But due to some structural 
shortcomings, the scheme could not be operated up to its design capacity. In 1997, 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) fi nanced technical assistance to assess the 
feasibility of rehabilitating the SCIP. The consultants focused on the full development 
of the system, including an upstream dam and storage to provide wet and dry season 
irrigation over 12,000ha. In 2000, the full proposal for the Stung Chinit Irrigation and 
Rural Infrastructure Project was submitted to the ADB for approval. The revised plan 
decreased the proposed irrigated area to 7000 ha in the wet season and 2000 ha in 
dry season. The overall project implementation period was supposed to start in 2001; 
in practice, construction only started in 2006, and then was extended up to July 2008. 
However, by that time the scheme could only irrigate 2000ha in the wet season and 
about 300ha in the dry season.
 The delay in construction resulted in higher construction costs and ultimately 
affected the expected benefi ts to farmers in the SCIP. The revised design was not fully 
fi tted to local conditions, such as drainage requirements, fi sh migration, etc. Moreover, 
the rehabilitation plan could not secure the active involvement of all actors associated 
with the project; therefore the participation of the water users could not be achieved 
as expected; for example, some farmers were not willing to join the project because 
it would result in a loss of grazing and agricultural land. In the dry season, farmers in 
the project area show limited interest in rice cultivation as it is often affected by insects 
and they also fi nd alternative sources of livelihood by going upstream for logging or 
engaging in farming activities that provide more benefi t than rice cultivation.
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Since 1961, the strategies defi ned by comprehensive National Economic and Social 
Development Plans (NESDP) have guided irrigation development in Thailand. In 
the beginning, emphasis was put on the construction of large- and medium-scale 
irrigation projects to expand irrigable areas as much as possible in order to prevent 
drought (Budhaka et al, 2002). During the 1960s and up to the mid 1970s, external 
development ideas, loans and grants infl uenced irrigation development. Many of 
the irrigation systems are underutilized, with low benefi ts, and continued fi nancial 
support of government was necessary to maintain the systems. During the late 
1970s and the 1980s, the focus of the water policy of successive Thai governments 
was directed towards the completion and upgrading of distribution systems and on 
the rapid development of small-scale irrigation infrastructure. Irrigation, however, 
fell short of its promise regarding cropping intensity and diversifi cation towards 
cash crops. While contract farming has occasionally been successful (Dolinski, 
1995), experience from the Lam Pao schemes (Burt and Styles, 1999) or Nam Oon 
(World Bank and NESDB, 2005) in northeast Thailand have provided the same 
lessons about dry season cropping areas remaining at low levels because of lack 
of tertiary canal service, unreliable water supply, limited market organization and 
opportunities, labour constraints, and unwillingness of farmers to face the health 
hazards brought about by pesticide use. During the 1990s a river basin approach 
was adopted, while irrigation systems had to operate under growing pressure of 
commercial agriculture (especially dry season farming), as well as competition for 
water from other non-agricultural sectors (Bastakoti and Shivakoti, 2008).
The direction of irrigation development is refl ected in Thailand’s National 
Water Policy and Vision (Budhaka et al, 2002). After the adoption of participatory 
irrigation management policy, more emphasis has been given to participation of 
users in system management, especially water allocation, operation and maintenance 
at tertiary levels (FAO, 2007). A national strategy has been formulated to improve 
irrigation effi ciency and water management in existing systems, while expanding 
new small and medium systems. The government emphasized the Common 
Irrigators’ Organization framework to integrate local people (benefi ciaries) within 
the irrigation systems (Shivakoti, 2000, 2003). Although there are examples of 
involvement of local communities in the management of irrigation systems (Molle 
et al, 2001; Shivakoti and Bastakoti, 2006; Bastakoti et al, 2008), participation has 
remained limited. In many cases, water user groups were organized at the tertiary 
level and had no infl uence on the allocation of water at higher levels or on the 
quality of the supply of water to their canal; they were thus quickly undermined 
(Molle et al, 2002).
The government is currently implementing an initiative from the King of 
Thailand to encourage farmers to diversify out of rice to produce an intensive mix 
of crops, fi sh and livestock. No large-scale projects have been developed recently 
due to lack of economically viable suitable storage sites, as well as environmental 
concerns. Improving the effi ciency of existing water management projects and 
promoting basin-wide coordination of water resources are key priorities of Thai 
agricultural policy (RID, 2007).
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Although approximately 4 million hectares are irrigated during the wet season, 
in 2003 the government launched the idea of a national ‘water grid’ that would 
triple the area of irrigated land, and in July 2003 announced that it would target 
200 billion baht (equivalent to US$5 billion in July 2003) to solve the problem 
of water scarcity in Thailand, mainly in the poor north east region (see Chapter 
10). With the fall of the Thaksin administration, the project was put on the back 
burner; but, recently, an underground pipeline that would divert water from the 
Mekong River to Isaan (Bangkok Post, 2008) was included by the government in 
the ‘top-priority’ megaprojects, with a total value of at least 500 billion baht (about 
US$15 billion). The new project aims to divert water from the Mekong through 
underground tunnels to Loei and Udon Thani provinces, where reservoirs will act 
as distribution centres to send the water through small pipelines to farms in other 
provinces during the dry season. In April 2008, Thailand’s cabinet approved a 
budget of 10 billion baht (about US$334 million) to build irrigation infrastructures 
within seven years, from 2008 to 2015 (Agroinfo, 2008).
Vietnam, in line with the proverb Nhat nuoc, nhi phan, tam can, tu giong 
(‘Water is the fi rst determining factor, then fertilizer, hard work and crop variety’), 
is still involved in massive investments for rural and water infrastructures. Vietnam 
started to invest massively in modern irrigation development in 1975, and between 
1988 and 1994 the annual expansion rate of irrigation reached 4.6  per cent. 
Particularly in the Mekong Delta, improved water control permitted a shift from 
a single crop to two or three crops annually (see Chapter 8). This concerned, in 
particular, the fl ood-prone area of the upper delta and the coastal zone where 
salinity intrusion has been controlled by constructing dikes and by gating streams. 
Pump irrigation plays an important role in Vietnam and accounts for 26 per cent 
of its total irrigation area (FAO, 2007). Rapid adoption of small private pumps, 
particularly in the Mekong Delta, has greatly facilitated crop diversifi cation. But 
extraction of more fresh river water for irrigation will facilitate further intrusion of 
salinity in the main branches of the river. Salinity control in coastal areas also leads 
to other problems such as pollution being retained inland and poor drainage, and 
confl icts between rice farmers who require fresh water and shrimp farmers who 
prefer brackish water for their shrimps.
The government, with World Bank support, is focusing on fi ve sub-projects 
in the Mekong Delta covering 535,000ha, which includes irrigation, salinity 
control, fl ood protection and institutional development. Irrigation in the Vietnam 
Highlands is less developed, with rice and coffee as the main crops. Since 1995, 
coffee irrigated with groundwater has yielded some of the best fi nancial returns in 
Vietnam’s agriculture.
The national authorities have recognized the challenges faced by the water 
sector under the ‘doi moi’ economic reforms and initiated a series of reforms in 
the country’s water sector. These included the enactment of the Vietnamese Water 
Law in 1999, the Decision on the Establishment of a National Water Resources 
Council in June 2000, the establishment of basin-level committees to oversee the 
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management and allocation of water in the Red River Basin, Mekong Delta and 
Dong Nai Basin (Molle and Hoanh, 2008), and the creation, in November 2002, 
of the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment (MoNRE). In 2006, the 
total budget of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) was 
about US$200 million, ranked second behind the Ministry of Transport. Planning 
and management of small- and medium-scale irrigation have been decentralized, 
with the provincial authorities now autonomous and self-fi nancing many of the 
irrigation activities. 
Based on many surveys of the whole country, Tiep (2002) reported that, on 
average, existing irrigation systems supply water to only 50 to 60 per cent of the 
design command area.2 Less than 5 per cent of expenditure for irrigation and 
drainage has been devoted to operation and maintenance (O&M). Inadequate cost 
recovery and deteriorating infrastructure are major concerns, and ways are being 
sought to involve greater water-user participation in operation and maintenance 
(Barker et al, 2004). Although water-fee charges are higher than in most other 
Asian countries, fee collection covers only half of O&M costs. However, in October 
2007, the government issued a new policy that exempted farmers of irrigation fees 
at the national level.
THE BEGINNING OF A NEW IRRIGATION ERA?
The wider economic context of rice production and irrigation
The last 50 years have seen massive investments in large-scale public surface 
irrigation infrastructure as part of a global effort to increase the production 
of staple food, ensure food self-sufficiency and avoid famine. Investment in 
irrigation accelerated rapidly during the 1960s and 1970s, with irrigated areas in 
developing countries expanding at 2.2 per cent a year and reaching 155 million 
hectares in 1982 (see Figure 6.2). The private and community-based investments 
in developing countries grew rapidly since the 1980s, propelled by cheap drilling 
technology, rural electrifi cation and low-cost small pumps (Molden, 2007). Global 
irrigated areas increased from 168 million hectares in 1970 to about 300 million 
hectares at the end of the 1990s. The food price index fell from around 310 in 
1974 to around 90 in 2000 to 2002.
As areas best suited to irrigation had already been developed fi rst, the costs 
of further development increased, while prices of staple cereals declined, in part 
because of the very success of irrigation (Barker and Molle, 2004). These two 
factors made irrigated agriculture economically less attractive than in the past. 
The underperformance of large-scale irrigation also reduced donors’ interest. 
Declining cereal prices at the end of the last century slowed growth in input use, 
investment in crop research and irrigation infrastructure (Sanmuganathan, 2000). 
More competition for water from other sectors also reduced the scope for further 
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development of irrigation. At the global level, irrigation is predicted to expand at 
lower rates compared with that from 1960 to 1990; but its contribution to total 
agricultural production is expected to exceed 45 per cent by 2030 as yields continue 
to increase and cropping patterns shift to higher-value crops (FAO, 2003). This 
means more water withdrawals for irrigation.
The situation in the world food market has recently witnessed a radical turn. 
Rice prices have gradually increased from US$200 per tonne (Thai white rice, 100 
per cent B second grade) in 2003 to US$376 per tonne at the end of 2007, and 
peaked in May 2008 to at US$963 per tonne (FAO, 2008). The food price index 
soared up to over 210 in 2008, then dropped to 146 in January 2009 (see Figure 
6.2). The low annual growth rate of irrigation area during the last ten years (only 
0.1 per cent during 2000 to 2003) is not considered to be the main reason of this 
upsurge, but refl ects the lack of attention to, and investment in, the agriculture 
sector at a global level.
Although both the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) 
(OECD–FAO, 2008) project that high food prices will not last long and will 
gradually come down because of the transitory nature of some of the factors that 
are behind the recent hikes, they also conclude that, after falling from their current 
Figure 6.2 Food price index and irrigation expansion during 1960 to 2009
Source: Molden (2007) with updated FAO data for 2009
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peaks, prices will remain at higher average levels over the medium term than during 
the past decade. 
With the recent soaring prices of food (particularly rice), more farmers in 
the LMB countries have reverted to rice because of their advantages – of which 
irrigation is a major factor – in rice production compared with other countries. 
The governments of Thailand and Vietnam have encouraged farmers to increase 
paddy crop production to take advantage of the rising rice prices in the world 
market in 2008; triple cropping has increased (e.g. in some parts of central 
Thailand and in Hau Giang and An Giang provinces in the Mekong Delta) and 
others have switched back to rice farming (like shrimp farmers in the Ca Mau 
Province, reversing a trend that began over fi ve years ago (VietnamNet, 2008). In 
Cambodia, MAFF and the FAO are launching an emergency project under the 
FAO-led Initiative on Soaring Food Prices (ISFP) to help farmers boost agricultural 
production, in particular through the provision of seeds and fertilizers (which are 
petroleum-based and thus out of reach of poor farmers as oil prices increased) 
(China View, 2008). In Laos, almost 75 per cent of households that have adopted 
modern rice varieties now have a surplus or are self-suffi cient in rice (ADB and 
OED, 2008). However, even though the government reported that the country 
produced more than 2.7 million tonnes of rice in 2007, the lack of infrastructure 
and high fuel price make transportation diffi cult, and shortages persist in remote 
mountainous areas (especially those occupied by the Lao-Soung and Lao-Theung 
tribes) (Vorachak, 2008).
Under the ISFP, many countries have indicated that they would accelerate 
or strengthen their irrigation rehabilitation, construction and water management 
programmes, while major donors have emphasized the importance of public 
investment in irrigation infrastructure and policy reform. The investment fl ow 
into the irrigation sector is thus expected to increase signifi cantly in coming 
years.
Reinventing irrigation in the Lower Mekong Basin countries
The question of whether, where and how to invest in irrigation is much more 
intricate than it may seem. A broader defi nition of investment includes public 
investment in irrigation and drainage development, modernization, institutional 
reform, improved governance, capacity-building, management improvement, 
creation of farmer organizations and regulatory oversight, as well as farmers’ 
investment in joint facilities, wells, and on-farm water storage and irrigation 
equipment (Molden, 2007).
National, local and environmental contexts
The context of irrigation varies from one country to another depending upon 
factors such as the degree of food security, actual infrastructures and potential, 
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percentage of the population working in the agricultural sector, or the existence of 
employment opportunities in other sectors. Strategies underpinning the evolution 
and future development of irrigation in the socio-economic context of the LMB 
countries are presented in Table 6.3 (FAO, 2007), which distinguishes between 
different types of irrigation and three main socio-economic contexts. These 
contexts can be found simultaneously in different areas of the LMB countries, while 
the general trend is that areas move from A to B and, in some cases, C.3
Challenges for the irrigation sector
The irrigation sector faces two main challenges: strengthening both the hardware 
(hydraulic infrastructures) and software (institutions) of existing schemes, and 
fi nding ways of improving decision-making with regard to new investments. These 
challenges are examined in this section.
Scheme rehabilitation and modernization 
As discussed earlier, the debate between rehabilitation of irrigation systems and 
modernization seems to have been resolved ten years ago in favour of modernization, 
understood as the transition from supply-driven to demand-driven management, 
or the adoption of service-oriented management, with supportive re-engineering 
of management set-up and infrastructure. In practice, very little modernization 
has happened on the ground, with, on the one hand, a persistence of traditional 
design standards and processes (both for rehabilitation and new projects), and, 
on the other hand, rather weak institutional reforms that have not signifi cantly 
altered the relationship between the irrigation service providers and the farmers, as 
well as the management and operation practices of irrigation agencies. Irrigation 
investment costs in Southeast Asia were estimated to be almost the lowest in 
the world (Inocencio et al, cited in Molden, 2007), refl ecting a combination of 
expected standards and economic performance. 
Meanwhile, the concept of modernization has been revisited to take into account 
a new understanding of the complexity of the rice irrigation systems prevalent in the 
LMB characterized by multiple roles related to fl oods and groundwater recharge, 
a recognition of the importance of fi sh and aquatic resources for local livelihoods, 
an acceleration of the transformation of rural economies, and increased attention 
to supplying water for energy, growing cities and industries. With the soaring food 
prices, the integration of LMB farmers within the global market will continue. It 
has been reaffi rmed that:
… in the present context and under future perspectives, modernization 
of the irrigation systems and their management to increase their 
fl exibility and insert them in river basin management, taking into 
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more required than ever. A fast pace of change is the one certainty, the 
other certainty being that unless management adapts, the discrepancy 
between stated and actual policies will widen. (FAO, 2007)
In addition to the rising prices of agricultural commodities, which may change the 
economic and fi nancial equation of investment in modernization, rising energy 
prices may provide additional incentives to attempt to improve water delivery 
service by irrigation canal systems and decrease the farmers’ needs to pump water 
from available water bodies or from groundwater.
The question then is: will modernization plans continue to remain mostly on 
the shelves or will the LMB countries see an effective change of investment and 
management strategies, away from rehabilitation with classic PIM (with maybe 
the token addition of IMT), to deliberate modernization? This obviously requires 
proper policy and suitable institutional arrangements that cannot be determined 
within the irrigation or agriculture sectors only, but should be considered within 
the socio-economic conditions of each irrigation system.
The answer then is: cautious optimism. The region should start seeing a broader 
implementation of modernization concepts and practices, more internalized 
by irrigation agencies and management than dictated by international agencies 
and donors. A pragmatic approach to professionalization of management and 
improvement of service should pave the way in the longer term to more substantial 
service orientation:
• There is a greater awareness of the present defi ciencies of the irrigation systems as 
knowledge does exist, efforts to develop tools have been substantial and effective, 
and efforts to develop capacities have been effective where implemented.
• Substantial capacity-building programmes are under way (Vietnam) or are 
being planned (Thailand) in the context of innovative investment programmes 
(Vietnam) or agencies’ own resources (Thailand), focusing on details of design 
and operation.
• More importantly, perhaps, assessment and performance evaluation indicators 
and methodologies are being introduced or revised to be consistent with service 
orienta tion and modern management concepts, and their results are being 
used to review current strategies and to shape investment. They include rapid 
appraisal of performance, Mapping System and Service for Canal Operation 
Tech niques (MASSCOTE) (Renault et al, 2007), benchmarking, service-
oriented irri gation management, balance sheets, and improved data collection 
and processing. This has led to the recognition of the need to change design 
standards.
Institutional reforms
To improve irrigation system performance governments and multilateral lending 
agencies continue to implement reforms in the LMB countries, including water 
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pricing and cost recovery policies, setting up of water user associations, and 
institutional/legal reforms and policies.
Cost recovery and associated water charges have been the subject of intense 
debate and controversy (Molle and Berkoff, 2007). A reduction of government 
funding was expected for irrigation programmes in LMB through the application 
of cost recovery principles. However, implementation is slow because farmers are 
not willing to accept cost recovery measures when service delivery is poor and 
results in an overall reduction in benefi ts. Vietnam, however, notably in the pump-
irrigation schemes of the Red River Delta, where pumping costs are diffi cult to 
compress, shows reasonable rates of recovery. Allocating the costs resulting from the 
maintenance of the Mekong ‘delta machine’ is also a huge and growing challenge 
(as shown in Chapter 8). Yet, the decree recently issued by the government 
that cancelled irrigation fees across the country shows the political nature of 
taxation/subsidies schemes and also suggests a measure of the social volatility 
of the countryside and, possibly, a perception of increased independence of the 
governments in the region on the policy prescriptions associated with funding from 
international fi nancial institutions.
Under such conditions, a sensible option for reducing public funding 
in irrigation would be a progressive rise in water charges, corresponding to 
increased accountability and transparency on the part of service providers and 
progressive transfer of authority to users, matched by increased profi tability of 
irrigated agriculture (Molden, 2007). However, this option can probably only 
be implemented widely in the LMB countries for the systems at stage C of the 
evolution pattern, as presented in Table 6.3. The issue is, therefore, for irrigation 
agencies that have adopted or declared an intention to move towards service-
oriented management (RID of Thailand, MARD of Vietnam) to do so without the 
incentives and accountability generated when farmers pay irrigation service fees. 
The demand for improved service will need to come, in this case, initially from the 
agencies themselves, while in the mid term, improved service delivery to farmers 
and deliberate efforts to reduce farmers’ pumping costs, and the setting up of new 
institutional arrangements associating farmers to main decisions on management 
objectives or service agreements, might set the stage for a renewed dialogue on 
service fees. Meanwhile, costs do need to be recovered from the irrigation agencies 
themselves, by shifting their budgetary allocations from new system development 
to better provisioning of O&M for existing projects; from local governments to 
which responsibility has been shifted through decentralization; from other water 
users; and from farmers themselves for the levels of system devolved to them.  
PIM has also featured prominently in the region, notably in Thailand and 
Cambodia. A recent survey in Cambodia and an assessment of nine of the FWUCs 
piloted by MOWRAM as part of the PIMD programme has clearly shown 
that these organizations are at different stages of development, maturity and 
overall functionality. These differences are brought about by internal factors, 
including the degree of organizational management, leadership and decision-
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making, understanding of fi nancial aspects, resources for system operation and 
maintenance, and external drivers of functionality, such as physical infrastructure, 
capacity of agencies to assist in the implementation of PIMD, availability of 
markets for products, and inputs. While the overall picture is somewhat bleak, 
there has been positive improvements in the overall operation of the systems, in 
increased cultivated areas and cropping intensity, and in the number of farmers 
receiving water (Perera, 2007).
Based on a study by the FAO, Table 6.4 provides a list of conditions for 
successful institutional reforms, as well as reasons for failure; the latter are currently 
more prominent in the region than the former.
Table 6.4 Main conditions for success and reasons for failure 
of institutional reforms
Conditions for success Reasons for failure
Strong political backing Lack of political support
A clear role for the different stakeholders Resistance of public agencies and water 
users
Support for the empowerment of institutions 
at all levels (including water user associations 
and local governments)
Insuffi cient resources
The autonomy of the water user associations Poor quality and predictability of water 
supply undermining local organizations
The legal framework needed to accom-
modate the proposed changes in authority
Lack of legal support for the proper 
involvement of water users
Capacity-building of the people governing 
the transferred system
Lack of coordination among stakeholders 
involved with project implementation
Functioning infrastructure Transfer of dilapidated or badly designed 
infrastructure that is dysfunctional and does 
not fi t within local culture and context
Success in recovering operation and 
maintenance costs
Cost overrun and reduced benefi ts 
Source: adapted from Molden (2007) based on an FAO study
While some issues can be addressed satisfactorily through successful modernization 
of the systems, allocation of suffi cient resources for support and capacity-building, 
and legal support, a key question for the future of PIM in the region is whether 
this would be suffi cient and whether the PIM models adopted by the countries 
should not be revisited altogether. The PIM models of small resource-poor WUAs, 
progressively federated into resource-poor organizations conceived as instruments 
for conducting operation and maintenance activities without having a real say in 
water management introduced to the region, have largely been copied from other 
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countries where, after more than 30 years, they have not proven any more successful 
than in the LMB countries. It is time for the region to explore new and more 
diverse options, which may be based on larger organizations with a critical mass, 
and on the characteristics of traditional water management organizations, or build 
on the strength of existing institutions (such as irrigation teams in Vietnam) or on 
processes that allow fl exibility in designing farmer institutions to suit particular 
management objectives and circumstances, rather than follow an overly prescriptive 
model. They should be able to meet the changing characteristics of farming – more 
part time, more commercial, more woman oriented and gender sensitive – and to 
integrate other water users (including fi shing and aquatic resources), and roles and 
functions of the irrigation systems.
The separation of regulatory and management functions to avoid confl icts of 
interest in the water sector has been a key reform promoted by the ADB in the 
region. The Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MoNRE) has been 
established in both Vietnam and Thailand, for example (Molle and Hoanh, 2008). 
The MoNRE is supposed to be the manager of water resources, while the MARD 
(in Vietnam) and the RID (in Thailand) are supposed to concentrate on building 
and operating the irrigation systems. Management of water resources is supposed 
to be done at the level of river basins; but river basin organizations have not been 
empowered at a level where they could be infl uential in decision-making, in general, 
and the defi nition of basin plans and water allocation, in particular.
They have faced the power of traditional line agencies (MARD, RID) and 
have lacked legal and political backing (especially in Thailand) to challenge 
the established positions of these agencies. Environmental regulation remains 
incipient and the decision-making power with regard to new dams or inter-basin 
transfer projects remains entrenched in political and line agencies circles. Yet, 
experiences in some pilot river basins in Thailand suggests that long-term processes 
have a potential to incrementally shift governance in the direction of a greater 
participation of concerned stakeholders.
Other ‘soft’ reforms concern the agronomic and economic environment of 
irrigation and refer to the necessity of providing adequate agricultural extension 
services and enhanced access to markets (TWGAW, 2006).
Development of new irrigation areas
At a very general level there are, of course, good reasons to invest in irrigation over 
the next decades. A growing and more urbanized population means that more food 
must be produced at a time when competition for water grows and environmental 
impacts must be reduced. Irrigation can be a path out of poverty for the rural poor 
and more investments will probably be needed to respond to global warming as 
more climate variability and sudden and extreme climate events are expected in the 
future. In the LMB, the projected range of temperature change is 1°C to 2°C. The 
hot period of the year will extend longer, rainfall intensity will increase (Snidvongs, 
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2006), and so will the extreme rainfall and winds associated with tropical cyclones 
in Southeast Asia (Christensen et al, 2007), including the LMB.
However, the rationale underpinning the ‘re-engagement’ in the fi nancing 
of water projects frequently draws heavily on general arguments of food security, 
poverty alleviation and economic development. As illustrated by the case of the 
Thai Water Grid (see Chapter 10), benefi ts are presented in terms of area served, 
putative drought-proofi ng of agriculture, and increased cropping intensity and 
incomes. The huge costs incurred (with US$10,000 per hectare as a good basis), 
the necessity to shoulder operation and maintenance costs (including costly 
pumping operations), and, above all, the question of potentially better alternative 
investments, both in the water sector and outside of it, are glossed over. Estimates 
by the Thai Water Resource Department that 19,000 villages are facing a ‘chronic 
shortage of water’ or estimates of ‘coming water shortages’ in Thailand and 
the alarm sounded by the National Economic and Social Development Board 
(Bangkok Post, 2004) sound like ad hoc justifi cations. The justifi cations for large-
scale investments are usually raised by repeatedly stressing the impact of droughts 
and fl oods and by looking at the benefi ts of the projects alone, disregarding costs. 
Debates are also frequently ‘securitized’ by government leaders who conjure up 
ominous threats to national or food security. 
The principal challenge in the region is thus the risk of present circumstances 
related to food and energy security being exploited to promote projects, irrespective 
of their intrinsic quality or lack thereof, that are pushed by politicians willing to 
please their constituencies, and government agencies and private companies in 
search of business opportunities. This occurs in lieu of giving renewed attention to 
the sector at the highest levels, as well as mobilizing resources, in order to engage 
in substantial and meaningful reform and to promote ambitious but rational 
and balanced approaches, exploring the best options and addressing the poor 
performance of existing systems and their causes.
In Cambodia, the expansion of irrigation within provinces surrounding 
the Tonle Sap Lake has been the top priority of existing and new donors. For 
instance, the joint European Union–Royal Government of Cambodia ECOSORN 
project (Economic and Social Re-Launch of Northwest Provinces in Cambodia), 
established in 2006, injected 26 million Euros in integrated rural development, 
with irrigation renovation as a priority activity. The Northwest Irrigation Sector 
Project is jointly funded by the ADB and Agence Française de Développement 
(AFD): more than 50 irrigation schemes in four provinces (Pursat, Battambang, 
Batteay Meanchey and Siem Reap) are being reviewed for rehabilitation and 
development (ADB, 2003). The ADB and AFD are still working on selection 
criteria for irrigation scheme rehabilitation in order to avoid a repetition of the 
problems faced in Stung Chinit (see Box 6.1).
However, the defi nition of such criteria is seen as a constraint by the govern-
ment, which tends to seek new donors or fund new schemes on its own budget. 
MOWRAM, under joint projects with Qatar and Kuwait, is planning to spend 
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US$400 million to build two large dams in the Vaico and Stung Sen rivers to 
irrigate 400,000ha (The Mekong Times, 2008). The ministry aims to build four 
dams in Pursat Province that would supply irrigation to more than 35,000ha of 
land and generate 300MW of power. Other proposed dam sites include locations 
in Battambang, Kampong Chnang and Banteay Meanchey provinces, and the 
ministry is consulting with engineers from China and South Korea. To achieve 
these giant plans, the ministry will need more than US$4 billion (The Phnom 
Penh Post, 2008).
In sum, the situation in the irrigation sector is evolving towards a scenario that 
is similar to the hydropower sector: 
• Social and environmental standards associated with ‘traditional’ lending are 
seen by governments as a burden and a constraint to large-scale development 
projects.
• This encourages them to deal with funding institutions and construction 
companies that have not adopted similar safeguards.
• Projects are capital intensive and are promoted by ‘iron triangles’ and other 
forms of fi nancial or political interest groups linked to the completion of these 
projects.
• Governance, as a result, is weak and secretive regarding planning; purported 
benefi ts are highlighted, while impacts and costs are downplayed or ignored. 
While irrigation projects (e.g. Stung Chinit in Cambodia, the Mekong pumping 
schemes in Laos, or many schemes in northeast Thailand), even those heavily 
funded and studied by external financing partners, are showing deficiencies 
that are diffi cult to address, new projects to irrigate hundreds of thousands, or 
even millions (in Thailand) of hectares are being proposed. The involvement 
of intended ‘benefi ciaries’, as well as consideration of environmental impacts, 
required labour force and market availability will need to be addressed when these 
projects face public consultation. Environmental and social impact assessments 
have now become mandatory – as embodied, for instance, in Thailand’s previous 
constitution. Unsuccessful rehabilitation or construction projects generate huge 
costs, as well as recurring expenditures that may come to be a disproportionate 
burden to the benefi ts generated.
The regional community has recently developed recommendations for the 
development of new large-scale irrigation projects (FAO, 2007). Before committing 
to new large-scale irrigation developments, a comprehensive assessment of options 
for land and water use should be made. If a new large-scale irrigation development is 
proposed, it should be examined by a wide-ranging feasibility analysis to determine 
whether it is ecologically, physically, economically, politically, socially and culturally 
sound. This should take place before progressing into the formal legal, often 
rigid and relatively narrow, ‘impact assessment’ process. The Commonwealth 
Scientifi c and Industrial Research Organization’s (CSIRO’s) 5-Way methodology 
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and the World Commission on Dams’ (WCD’s) guidelines, where relevant, are 
international references. Irrigation scheme design should also be fl exible enough 
to take account of the inevitability of future demand changes, include credible 
input from different stakeholder groups, make sure funds to meet full operation 
and maintenance costs will be available, and include future monitoring of impacts 
upon ecosystems and livelihoods.
CONCLUSIONS
Agriculture provides the livelihood of 75 per cent of the population of the LMB 
countries and is a key driver of national development in each of the riparian 
countries. Irrigation has expanded and intensifi ed across the four countries; but 
irrigation systems have not lived up to their expectations and have faced a number 
of problems. The differences between stated policies and actual practices are 
generally large, while policy changes have little impact; institutional reforms do not 
capture the complexity of basin-wide water management, the multiple functions 
of irrigation systems, and relationships between different levels of management. 
PIM/IMT initiatives, furthermore, have made very modest progress, while there is 
signifi cant underinvestment in operation and maintenance, and poor management 
remains pervasive.
However, the recent soaring prices of food in the global market has alarmed 
regional governments and fuelled calls for further reinvestments in irrigation. 
In a broader sense, these include public investment in new schemes, scheme 
modernization, institutional reforms, improved governance and the creation of 
farmer organizations. Changes in governance, however, only emerge slowly and 
will remain dependent upon the democratization of society and the evolution of 
the relationships between the state and the various forms of civil society.
Recent announcements of large investments in new irrigation schemes in 
Cambodia or Thailand seem to have surfaced with no reference to the diffi culties 
and the limitations faced by existing schemes. In Cambodia, the fi nancial capacity 
to shoulder operation and maintenance costs, the access to markets, the managerial 
capacity of farmers, and the problematic relationship between the state and villagers 
preclude the enthusiasm conveyed by big numbers labelled in dollars or area to 
be equipped. In Thailand, notably its northeast region, the high investment costs 
per hectare and environmental constraints such as soil salinity, not to mention 
the actual low interest in dry season cropping, suggest that massive investments 
will face severe setbacks. In both settings, the existence of more attractive off-farm 
activities or market constraints remain important limitations, even if increased 
output prices have made agriculture temporarily fi nancially more attractive. In the 
Mekong Delta, large increases in the abstraction of fresh water in the dry season 
combined with rising sea level are likely to worsen salinity intrusion in the main 
river channels.
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The question posed in the title of this chapter thus has to remain for the 
moment. The coming years will tell us whether the current opportunities to address 
the real challenges of poverty and food security of the LMR have been used wisely. 
The risk remains that the large sectoral and private interests that benefi t from 
massive capital investments will prevail over more carefully targeted investments in 
irrigation or agriculture, more decisive reform and a necessary focus on improving 
the performance of existing assets. 
The large-scale transformation of waterscapes through irrigation comes with 
risks and costs that are often downplayed, but which must be constantly reassessed 
and remembered by those with responsibility for decision-making, as well as those 
directly benefi ted or affected by these transformations. New systems may still be 
developed in predominantly agrarian economies, in ecosystems with comparative 
advantages; but their planning and appraisal process should be reformed in order 
to include improved water governance.
NOTES
1 The density of spots in northeast Thailand is partly misleading because most of the 
irrigation shown is local and effected through mere diversion of small streams to 
bunded plots.
2 But in many cases part of the remaining area is irrigated through local village-based 
pumping stations.
3 These evolution scenarios were developed at the end of 2005; so some conclusions 
made at that time may need to be revisited due to, on the one hand, rising food prices 
and, on the other, rising energy prices.
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7Landscape Transformations and 
New Approaches to Wetlands 
Management in the Nam 
Songkhram River Basin in 
Northeast Thailand
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INTRODUCTION
The Nam Songkhram Basin in northeast Thailand in many ways represents a 
classic case study in failed developmentalism. A keenly contested ecological and 
political land and waterscape that is undergoing rapid change, the Nam Songkhram 
Basin brings out the contradictions implicit in human–nature tensions that 
have been an infl uential feature in recent development discourse and practices 
throughout the wider Mekong region (see Sneddon and Fox, 2008). Similar to 
other parts of Thailand, state agencies portray the Nam Songkhram Basin as both 
a fl ood disaster zone and a drought zone necessitating state-managed intervention 
and infrastructure development for intensifying agricultural productivity. Not 
surprisingly, the Nam Songkhram River Basin has been the subject of a number of 
large-scale water resources management projects over the last half century. Yet only 
a few of these large schemes have realized full implementation, while many other 
smaller stand-alone irrigation projects and heavily state-subsidized agribusiness 
ventures have been subsequently abandoned. Some of these abandoned projects 
rise out of, or indelibly mark, the Songkhram land–waterscape as vivid reminders 
of the consequences of narrow sectoral and non-participatory governance. 
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The Nam Songkhram River has also attained a special status in the eyes of 
some environmental-based organizations that have portrayed it in terms of its local 
livelihoods and conservation signifi cance. The basin’s most distinctive feature is its 
biologically rich and ecologically diverse wetlands ecosystem, partly resulting from 
extensive annual fl ooding and its interdependence with the mainstream Mekong 
hydrology. This relatively predictable pattern of fl ood and recession is the main 
driver of natural productivity, including the rich capture fi sheries and harvest of 
wetlands products (Blake, 2006). Rather than being victims of, or vulnerable to, 
natural patterns of fl ooding, a recent study found local people to be resilient and 
adaptable to the annual inundation and dry period, traditionally basing their 
livelihood strategies around its seasonal cycles (Friend et al, 2006)
This chapter considers some of the conflicting representations of the 
Nam Songkhram Basin and how state policies have, to a great extent, guided 
development planning that is based on fl imsy assumptions and misconceptions 
about what constitutes ‘the problem’ (Breukers, 1998). It examines the main 
actors and stakeholders involved and how the present socio-political and bio-
physical landscapes have been shaped by tensions surrounding the dominant 
state development paradigm that views the fl oods as an obstacle to agricultural 
development and a natural disaster in need of an engineering solution, rather than 
recognizing the wetland’s benefi ts of natural aquatic biomass production, aquifer 
renewal and soil fertility maintenance for dry season livestock grazing and small-
scale crop cultivation.
It also examines recent participatory initiatives that have been fi eld tested 
in the Nam Songkhram Basin, precipitated by a growing realization concerning 
the socio-economic and ecological value of riverine ecosystems in the Lower 
Mekong Basin and a sense of inadequacy about past methodological approaches. 
In particular, this chapter contrasts the contributions of an environmental fl ows 
(E-Flows) approach and a participatory local action-research (Tai Baan Research) 
approach to the knowledge base and considers to what extent they have the 
potential to inform more relevant development practice. The chapter attempts to 
critically analyse the main lessons drawn from recent novel approaches tested in 
situ, set against fi ve decades of state-led development plans and a background of 
sustained environmental degradation and social dislocation evident at local and 
basin-wide levels.
THE NAM SONGKHRAM BASIN
The 13,128km2 Nam Songkhram Basin in upper northeast Thailand (see Figure 
7.1), although encompassing a mere 1.7 per cent of the entire Mekong Basin surface 
area, is nevertheless regarded as an important Mekong tributary both domestically 
for Thailand and as an integral ecological component of the wider Lower Mekong 
Basin (Blake, 2006). The lower part of the Nam Songkhram Basin forms a large 
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seasonally inundated riverine fl oodplain wetland complex that is closely linked 
to the hydrology and ecology of the mainstream Mekong River (Blake and 
Pitakthepsombut, 2006a; Kummu et al, 2006). This interconnectivity between the 
two rivers has ensured that there is high aquatic biodiversity and bio-productivity 
found in the Nam Songkhram River and associated wetlands, which in turn has 
allowed the establishment of important fi sheries,1 primarily based on migratory fi sh 
species (Blake, 2006; Hortle and Suntornratana, 2008). A distinctive feature of the 
fl oodplain strip bordering the Nam Songkhram River are the seasonally fl ooded 
forests (paa boong paa thaam),2 formerly extensive but now much reduced in area 
and quality. Recent estimates by a Khon Kaen University team analysing satellite 
data suggest that only 73.17km2 of seasonally fl ooded forest remained in 2005, an 
18.3 per cent decrease from 2001 data (Suwanwerakamtorn et al, 2007).
The Lower Nam Songkhram Basin wetlands form a distinctive geographical 
area extending to over 3000km2, of which approximately 960km2 may be 
temporarily fl ooded in the average wet season and as much 1850km2 in a 1-in- 
Figure 7.1 Hydrological map of the Nam Songkhram Basin showing areas of 
fl oodplain (darker shading) and relative regional location (inset) 
Source: adapted from Kummu et al (2006)
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50-year fl ood (Khon Kaen University, 1999). River levels rise and fall by up to 12m 
inter-seasonally, refl ecting the region’s annual extremes in rainfall and hydrology. 
This annual ‘fl ood pulse’ phenomenon3 both underpins and is considered the 
‘driver’ of the river fl oodplain ecosystem’s productivity and biodiversity (Blake, 
2006; Lamberts, 2008). Some observers have likened the seasonal fl ood event and 
associated backwater effect with occasional backfl ow infl uence from the Mekong 
River in the Lower Nam Songkhram Basin wetlands to a lesser version of the well-
known Tonle Sap Lake fl ood pulse phenomenon (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 
2006b; Kummu et al, 2006). Empirical evidence and modelling has shown that 
the level of the Mekong mainstream is pivotal in determining the level of the lower 
Nam Songkhram River and, thus, the height, duration and extent of inundation 
on the fl oodplain (Sarkkula et al, 2006; Blake, 2009).
The richness and diversity of the aquatic resource base is refl ected in Nam 
Songkhram fishers’ catches and capture gear, which attest to a high level of 
specialization and technological ingenuity by local people adapting to the constantly 
changing surrounding environment (Kohanantakul, 2004). While almost 190 
species of fi sh have been identifi ed by fi shery researchers in the Nam Songkhram 
Basin through scientific approaches, local people have recorded 79 separate 
fi shing gears used to harvest them, although not all are in use today (Blake and 
Pitakthepsombut, 2006b). A Mekong River Commission (MRC)-funded study 
found that between 80 and 93 per cent of all households fi sh, with the average 
household catch estimated at 207kg per year (Hortle and Suntornratana, 2008). 
The same study found that despite extensive habitat modifi cation and the spread 
of markets for other food sources, the wild capture fi shery continues to contribute 
most to household intake of animal protein. The importance of fi sheries and 
wetlands resources to local livelihoods is also evident in the local language, culture 
and belief systems (Tai Baan Research Network of Lower Songkhram Basin, 2005a, 
2005b).
Population estimates of the Nam Songkhram Basin vary between about 
1.45 million (Blake, 2006) and 1.94 million people (Hortle and Suntornratana, 
2008). It is a complex river basin not only ecologically, but also politically 
and administratively, spanning parts of four provinces with numerous state 
agencies involved in different aspects of natural resources management, often 
with contradictory priorities, objectives and goals. Some of these multifarious 
agencies’ confl icting roles and activities are examined in Breukers (1998) and 
Blake and Pitakthepsombut, (2006a). At the same time, there are diverse non-
state actors drawn from civil society and local people’s movements concerned with 
development and resources management issues in the Nam Songkhram Basin and 
regionally. This plurality of stakeholders has infl uenced the way in which the river 
basin as a concept is regarded and multiple worldviews are constructed by different 
actors (Lohmann, 1998).
In addition to fi sh, the wetlands4 are important sites for harvesting many 
other categories of natural resources, both aquatic and terrestrial, which have 
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traditionally formed the basis of local livelihoods prior to the advent of the modern 
‘development’ era (approximately 1961 onwards) and are still important for tens 
of thousands of households. These non-fi sh natural wetlands products include 
numerous species of edible plants, fungi, insects, birds, mammals, amphibians 
and reptiles. Additionally, the wetlands are a source of medicinal plants, honey, 
earthworms (for export to Taiwan), leeches, fuelwood, fencing, reeds for mats and 
handicrafts, tool- and implement-making materials, plant-based dyes, construction 
timber, spiritual and ceremonial-associated plants, etc. Apart from direct-use value 
wild products such as these, there are agricultural crops and products that are 
wholly or partly dependent upon a wetlands ecosystem, including paddy rice and 
a variety of livestock (mostly buffalo and cattle). Local communities have been 
able to benefi t and, in many cases, prosper from the aquatic resource abundance 
that has defi ned the Lower Nam Songkhram Basin and been described by one Thai 
anthropologist and historian as forming a distinctive local culture.5 
Despite the presence of this rich biodiversity, which has long been both 
intensively and extensively utilized and traded by local communities, its value and 
role in the local economy has not been recognized by external actors until relatively 
recently (Choowaew et al, 1994). Wetlands biodiversity forms an important part 
of what has been termed the ‘hidden harvest’ (IIED, 1997) that has consistently 
been ignored and undervalued during conventional cost-benefit analyses of 
water management infrastructure projects in the Mekong Basin. Even then, this 
recognition has been confi ned to a limited narrow constituency at a time when 
the natural resource base has been moderately to severely degraded and further 
rapid change is occurring as a result of policy and planning decisions set in motion 
decades ago (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006a). Outside of the state development 
discourse, the Nam Songkhram River has frequently been portrayed as a naturally 
fl owing river, free of dams and other large water management infrastructure (‘The 
last undammed Mekong tributary in Thailand’, e.g. Saskaki et al, 2007). While 
this image is no longer valid since several dams and weirs have been built across the 
upper and middle river in the past decade (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006a), 
the Nam Songkhram Basin may contain relatively less fl ow control infrastructure 
than other north-eastern river basins and is without a mainstream dam structure 
on the lower 300km or so (see Figure 7.1 for dam locations). However, this is more 
likely to be a result of its inherent unsuitability for damming along most of its 
course, rather than a shortage of plans by various state agencies to dam it. Many 
have never come to fruition; but Nong Gaa ‘weir’ and its upstream neighbour Ban 
Muang ‘weir’6 were planned as irrigation dams by the now-defunct Accelerated 
Rural Development Offi ce and executed as combined irrigation and fl ood control 
structures by the Department of Water Resources (DWR) under the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and the Environment (MoNRE) on the middle reaches of the 
river between Udon Thani and Sakhon Nakhon provinces. Built between 2000 and 
2004, neither dam required an environmental impact assessment (EIA) and neither 
has had post-completion studies conducted to ascertain its impacts or effi ciency. 
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On completion, the DWR handed over the dams to ‘the people’ (prachachon), 
although no one locally claims any ownership and the dams have effectively been 
abandoned by the state, serving neither an irrigation nor fl ood control role (nor any 
other apparent useful purpose), but checking the fl ow of the river especially during 
the dry season, while causing multiple environmental impacts, including increased 
erosion and elevated salinity levels (fi rst author’s observations in 2005, 2006 and 
2007). It should be noted that above Nong Gaa ‘weir’, the lowest mainstream dam 
at present, the river is engineered and modifi ed over considerable lengths right up 
to the headwaters below Phu Phan hills (Blake, 2007).
OF GRAND VISIONS AND FAILED EXPERIMENTS
Central to an understanding of the Nam Songkhram Basin’s current situation is 
an appreciation of past state-led visions, plans and projects that have helped to 
transform the physical, political and social landscape of the region (e.g. Bello et 
al, 1998; Sneddon, 2003; Pye, 2005). In this respect, the Nam Songkhram Basin 
is little different from other parts of northeast Thailand, which have been subject 
to grand water resources visions and master plans for over fi ve decades, some of 
which have never progressed beyond the drawing board, while others have reached 
advanced stages of implementation before partial or total abandonment by users 
(Sneddon, 2003; Floch et al, 2007; Molle and Floch, 2007). Molle and Floch 
(2008), with reference to Thai bureaucrats’ and politicians’ visions of transforming 
the northeast into an irrigated and agriculturally fertile region (‘Green Isaan’), have 
termed the phenomenon as the ‘Desert Bloom Syndrome’ and compared it to 
similar schemes on the African and North American continents. Indeed, despite 
its somewhat distinct climate (signifi cantly higher precipitation) and hydrology 
(greater relative fl ows and notable infl uence of Mekong hydrology) compared to 
other basins in the northeast (Blake, 2006), the Nam Songkhram Basin has long 
been incorporated as an integral target of the large trans-basin regional irrigation 
megaprojects foisted on Isaan by the state (Breukers, 1998; Floch et al, 2007), 
which inherently assumes the entire region as an area of water shortage. While plans 
for diverting Mekong waters into the Nam Songkhram Basin stayed on the drawing 
board, the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) with US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) fi nancial support (from 1977 to 1991) constructed a large 
storage reservoir and irrigation project on the Nam Oon tributary (see Figure 7.1) 
during the late 1970s (USAID, 1995). This major project required the relocation 
of 1639 households (Floch et al, 2007) to create a reservoir with a storage capacity 
of 520 million cubic metres. 
The developmental discourse until relatively recently has been dominated 
by modernization models and thinking, loosely based on notions of prosperity 
through market liberalization, adoption of science, technology and progress 
(Bello et al, 1998). These development aims of a modern nation state partly arose 
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out of the 1950s Cold War and ideologically led American presence, providing 
signifi cant funding for the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Far East (ECAFE) and the subsequent Mekong Committee, forerunner to the 
MRC (Floch et al, 2007). However, the Lower Songkhram River Basin (LSRB) 
presented an additional ‘problem’ for the state planners and hired domestic and 
international consultants charged with ‘developing the arid northeast’ – namely, 
prolonged and reliable fl oods that annually inundated vast tracts of low-lying land 
on either side of the river channel (i.e. the fl oodplain). Rather than recognize the 
benefi ts and opportunities that this phenomenon presents (e.g. in terms of natural 
aquatic biomass production, aquifer renewal and soil fertility maintenance for dry 
season livestock grazing, and small-scale crop cultivation during fl ood recession), 
the fl oods were viewed by the state as an obstacle to agricultural development and 
a ‘natural disaster’ (‘utokapai’) in need of an engineering solution (Friend et al, 
2006). This dominant paradigm still holds sway in key state water management 
agencies and was repeated by offi cials during the Mekong fl oods of August 2008 
(The Nation, 2008).
Thus, naturally occurring dry season conditions and the wet season fl oodplain 
inundation in the Nam Songkhram Basin became recurring ‘natural disasters’. 
This view entered into the standard lexicon of state planners and their contracted 
experts and technocrats as the principle problems begging solutions to free the 
region of poverty and deliver ‘development’ to the ‘backward region’ (Breukers, 
1998; Blake, 2006). Essentially, this dogma has remained unchallenged until 
the present time in the unending so-called ‘drama of development’ (Lohmann, 
1998). This over-simplistic, but ubiquitous, development tenet was articulated 
in a summary commissioned by the Interim Committee for Coordination of 
Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin7 (1983) to justify a massive project 
entitled The Nam Songkhram Basin Irrigation and Flood Control Development 
as: ‘The Nam Songkhram Basin … includes large areas of fertile land that are not 
being used due to fl ooding, while other areas lie fallow during the dry season due to 
lack of water.’ The empirical observation that local residents might be utilizing the 
diverse terrestrial and aquatic resources year round in non-agricultural uses (both 
intensively and extensively) apparently did not occur to the authors of the report, 
or if it did, was dismissed as being counter to predominant notions of central Thai 
agrarian society and the basis of ‘development’ itself. 
Instead, this study called for the construction of a large dam (curiously termed 
as a ‘regulator’) at the mouth of the Nam Songkhram and extensive poldering using 
raised embankments and pumps (along Dutch lines) of vast areas of fl oodplain to 
create fl ood-free areas for intensive crop cultivation. Tributaries and the upper Nam 
Songkhram River were to be dammed to create several large shallow reservoirs with 
surrounding (higher elevation) areas being served by pump irrigation systems that 
could ‘ultimately irrigate all irrigable land in the basin’ (NEDECO/TEAM, 1983). 
This project’s lofty aims became a standard point of reference for all subsequent 
state plans to tame the ‘unruly’ Nam Songkhram River.8 Although progress in 
180 LIVELIHOODS AND DEVELOPMENT
turning the vision to reality over the next decade was largely governed by frequent 
changes in political fortune, traditional bureaucratic lethargy and interdepartmental 
competition, by the early 1990s a new impetus was growing to construct a large 
irrigation project in the Nam Songkhram Basin (see Box 7.1) as part of the Khong-
Chi-Mun Project (see Chapter 10). At the same time, rapid economic growth based 
on industrial exports and easy credit for newly created agribusiness ventures had 
allowed a politically well-connected company based in Bangkok (SunTech Group 
Ltd and associated businesses)9 to acquire signifi cant tracts of fl oodplain land in 
the Lower Nam Songkhram Basin, much of it former public land (tee satarana 
prayote) accessed by village communities (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006a) 
that had been utilized by several surrounding communities under a common 
property regime (Blake, 2008). One source estimated that this company and its 
subsidiaries had gained possession of approximately 60,000 rai (9600ha) of low-
lying fl ood-prone land that was progressively converted from primarily fl ooded 
forest ecosystem to intensive agricultural crop cultivation (Watershed, 1999).
BOX 7.1 THE NAM SONGKHRAM PROJECT
In 1983, the Nam Songkhram Project, building on earlier proposals made by the Interim 
Mekong Committee, proposed constructing a low dam with liftable water gates (termed 
a ‘regulator’) near the mouth of the Nam Songkhram River that would create an upstream 
reservoir extending to 255km2. This new water source would then be used to irrigate 
a planned 90,400ha of farmland using a series of electric pumping stations around 
the perimeter for growing ‘high-value crops’. The project was to be implemented by 
the Department of Energy Development and Promotion (DEDP), under the Ministry of 
Science, Technology and Environment that was also responsible for the controversial 
Khong-Chi-Mun Project. Numerous studies were conducted during the late 1980s and 
1990s in order to justify the Nam Songkhram Project, some of which were never fully 
made public. The estimated cost of the project was at least US$400 million in 1995. 
The DEDP started purchasing land for the headworks at the dam site before cabinet 
permission to proceed with the project had been granted. The project ignited strong 
local and national resistance, with opponents fearful of the damage a dam might do to 
the river’s ecology, productive fi sheries and local livelihoods. It precipitated a villager-led 
and non-governmental organization (NGO)-supported opposition group to be formed in 
1996 called the Nam Songkhram Conservation and Rehabilitation Club (partly inspired 
by the Pak Mun Dam resistance movement), which also campaigned for the land rights 
of communities affected by agribusiness company activities, especially loss of land to 
eucalyptus plantations. Despite the strong opposition to the dam and apparent outright 
rejection by the Thai Council of Ministers in 2002, it has remained on the agenda of 
the Royal Irrigation Department’s plans for water development in the region up to the 
present day. 
Source: Breukers (1998); Blake and Pitakthepsombut (2006a, 2006b)
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The promotion and subsidization of export-focused agribusiness was an 
integral component of the state vision for north-eastern regional development, 
both as a part of the modernization thrust and as a way of utilizing the rich 
natural and human resources close to their source, encompassed in successive fi ve-
year national development plans through the 1970s and 1980s. This vision was 
encouraged by signifi cant sums of foreign aid being channelled into promoting 
agribusiness and contract farming models by donors such as USAID at Lam Nam 
Oon Irrigation Project (USAID, 1995). While large sums were made available 
to agribusiness companies that benefi ted from direct fi nancial subsidies and tax 
breaks for industrial-type agriculture projects, relatively little state funds were made 
available for promoting more bottom-up, participatory or sustainable models of 
rural development (Bello et al, 1998). At the same time, there was a fundamental 
shift in the labour market as rural people left the land in ever greater numbers; 
according to Baker and Phongpaichit (2005), by the mid 1990s almost four-fi fths 
of total cash income of rural households was earned off-farm, including 43 per 
cent from wage work. Despite physically living in the city, these migrants were 
still technically considered as rural ‘farmers’ by the state, virtually located by house 
registration documents in their home villages (Rigg, 2003). Through exploiting 
a power nexus that included military, political and bureaucratic connections and 
weaknesses in Thai land laws and local institutions, the SunTech Group was able 
to systematically purchase large amounts of common property fl oodplain land at 
very low prices (Blake, 2008). In line with state policy for the region to promote 
agribusiness, SunTech also constructed a state-subsidized modern vegetable 
canning factory (see Figure 7.3) in 1988 with an adjacent dam on a wetland 
site in Sri Songkhram District near its own tomato and sweet corn plantations, 
which at the time were reportedly the largest of their kind in Thailand (Blake 
and Pitakthepsombut, 2006a). Previously, the same company grouping had also 
been involved in setting up an intensively reared dairy herd and milk-processing 
plant and cultivating fast-growing pulpwood plantations10 on fl oodplain common 
lands that were extensively utilized by local people for fi shing, livestock grazing 
and harvesting non-timber forest products (NTFPs) (Guayjaroen, 2001; Blake, 
2008). 
Signifi cantly, despite the state assistance, tax breaks and low capital cost of 
(supposedly fertile) land, all of these agribusiness projects have subsequently 
failed and are now idle assets dominating the landscape (see Figures 7.2 and 7.3). 
One argument offered as to why SunTech’s management failed to achieve success 
from its agribusiness model on the Nam Songkhram fl oodplain is that it failed to 
appreciate the challenging biophysical conditions that accompany an environment 
naturally under water for two to four months a year and the need to adapt the 
agronomic approach to the environment, not vice versa (see Watershed, 1996). 
However, this reality has not stopped a state-business elite and certain politicians 
from continuing to push for long-dormant irrigation projects to be resurrected, 
perhaps as an effective way of recapitalizing their idle land assets and recovering 
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Figure 7.2 Dry season 2005 satellite image of Tung Mon and the Lower 
Songkhram Basin fl oodplain area west of Sri Songkhram district town, 
Nakhon Phanom province
Source: David J. H. Blake
bad debts through the provision of compensation for land fl ooded, or of providing 
an outlet for the RID to justify and spend its vast annual budget, which in 2001 
totalled 33.5 billion baht, or about US$1 billion.11 
ALTERNATIVE VISIONS, NEW APPROACHES 
By the early 1990s, large-scale infrastructure development projects in Thailand 
were in the early stages of being obliged to consider rudimentary environmental 
issues following the enactment of the 1992 Environment Law, which required such 
projects to undertake an environmental impact assessment (EIA) before permission 
to proceed could be granted. In 1994 the National Environmental Board (NEB) 
rejected the EIA for the proposed Nam Songkhram Project (which had basically 
been fashioned from the earlier large-scale Dutch-inspired irrigation plans for 
the basin) after it was found that they were carbon copies of EIAs conducted for 
the Khong-Chi-Mun Project (Breukers, 1998). New studies were called for to 
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satisfy the NEB requirements, which were subsequently conducted by a Khon 
Kaen University team of academics and, in due course, were also rejected as 
being inadequate because of persistent doubts about project benefi ts (Blake and 
Pitakthepsombut, 2006a). 
As the state-led model of ‘development’ encroached ever further into sensitive 
ecosystems and north-eastern rural dwellers’ everyday lives, so a counter-discourse 
emerged (Breukers, 1998; Lohmann, 1998). This alternative discourse matched 
a growing national environmental NGO movement with local communities and 
activists witnessing the destructive tendencies of large infrastructure projects 
on local livelihoods. Initially only a handful of concerned Thai academics and 
domestic NGOs were involved in opposition to the Nam Songkhram Project, 
such as the Project for Ecological Recovery (PER) and its sister organization, 
Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA). These organizations 
were instrumental in spearheading primary information-gathering from local 
people, setting up community resistance networks and wider dissemination of 
Figure 7.3 SunTech Group vegetable processing factory complex 
in Sri Songkhram district12
Source: David J. H. Blake
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an alternative viewpoint that ran counter to the offi cial techno-centric purported 
benefi ts from the project. Nationally, in the previous decade there had been several 
high-profi le cases of combined villager and NGO resistance to large infrastructure 
projects, the most well known being the infamous Pak Mun Dam case (see Chapter 
3). Nam Songkhram riparian communities living in the reservoir fl ood zone, 
concerned about the possible loss of homes, forests, rice fi elds and capture fi sheries 
in the name of ‘development’, started to ask fundamental questions from state 
offi cials and to organize intercommunity fl ooded forest conservation networks. 
As word spread of the Nam Songkhram Basin’s value as a wetlands ecosystem, 
so outside organizations (signifi cantly, both state and non-state) began to take 
a greater interest in the Nam Songkhram Basin. Following the 1995 Agreement 
on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin 
signed by Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam, more decisive natural resources 
management projects emerged regionally, including the four-nation Mekong 
Wetlands Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Use Programme (MWBP), 
which established a so-called ‘demonstration site’ on the Lower Songkhram River 
Basin (LSRB) wetlands in 2003.13
After the recognition of the LSRB as a ‘wetlands of international signifi cance’14 
by the Offi ce of Environmental Policy and Planning (1999), further studies on 
fisheries (e.g. Boonyaratpalin et al, 2002; Suntornratana et al, 2002), socio-
economics and culture (e.g. Brenner, 2003) emerged. The later studies by Thai 
and foreign researchers articulated a more nuanced and rounded view of the 
complexity of the wetlands and multi-component livelihoods of the local people 
(e.g. Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006a, 2006b) than seen in the earlier, rather 
sectoralized, EIA and environmental mitigation and management reports produced 
(e.g. NEDECO/TEAM, 1983; Khon Kaen University, 1999). However, the studies 
were still mostly being conducted by outsiders for outsiders according to individual 
and institutional agendas and worldviews, with the information obtained being 
extracted and not shared or validated back at the community level where it was 
fi rst generated. 
It should be recognized that through certain important statutes enshrined in 
the 1997 Thai Constitution that encouraged greater local participation in natural 
resource management (sections 46, 56 and 79), decentralization initiatives, 
new national environmental legislation and ratifi cation of various international 
conventions (e.g. the Ramsar Convention15 in 1998), an environmental conserva-
tion discourse began to develop amongst various sectors of Thai society. Of 
particular relevance was the reorganization of local government to allow elected 
representatives to work at sub-district level (tambon) as a move towards bureaucratic 
devolution. While greater social and political pluralism were increasingly evident, 
the state-led approach still emphasized control over people, spaces and resources, 
where local people were considered ‘threats’ to conservation goals, and main 
strategies proposed were to raise environmental awareness, education to overcome 
local ignorance, and ring-fence ‘protected areas’ against encroachment. With 
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broad, seasonal fl oodplain wetland sites, such as the LSRB, and their complex local 
livelihood mix, cultural heterogeneity, power relations, ill-defi ned boundaries, etc., 
uni-sectoral state agencies were presented particular challenges that the state-centric 
model found hard to appreciate or accommodate. Even within a supposedly cross-
disciplinary agency like the Offi ce of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy 
and Planning (ONEP), there was a defi nite tendency to push MWBP towards 
compiling a Lower Songkhram River Basin management ‘master plan’ from an 
early stage of the project before empirical fi eldwork had been allowed to articulate 
the complexity of the situation or explore local visions and realities. 
The generation and ownership of knowledge has long been a contested issue 
in the traditionally hierarchical Thai society with its strong nation-state ethos 
(Rigg, 2003; Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005). Thus, local ownership and input 
into research processes initiated by external agencies (including universities) was 
consistently low or non-existent. This was an implicit barrier for meaningful 
engagement with the local society to generate a deeper understanding of the 
opportunities and constraints that communities faced. This reality was recognized 
by the MWBP Lower Songkhram Basin Demonstration Site staff and partners 
during the set-up phase, allowing initiation of activities to specifi cally address the 
defi ciency. While the overarching aim of all MWBP activities was capacity-building 
for better wetlands management at all levels, the demonstration site was also keen 
to fi eld test and adapt promising new approaches to research that seemed locally 
appropriate for gaining knowledge of the wetland resources and engendering co-
management practices. 
FIELD TESTING OF NEW PARTICIPATORY APPROACHES 
Taking the lead from the apparently successful implementation of a so-called ‘Tai 
Baan Research’ approach in communities situated along the dam-impacted Lower 
Mun River in southern Isaan, MWBP facilitated the same Thai NGO that had 
developed the concept to adapt the methodology to the Nam Songkhram River. 
Four communities in Sri Songkhram District were selected to take part in the initial 
Tai Baan Research effort, with about 240 villagers volunteering to participate as 
co-researchers alongside a handful of young project-employed facilitators. In close 
cooperation, the facilitators and villagers planned and carried out extensive fi eld-
based empirical research on local culture and national resource utilization under 
six sub-theme headings – namely, fi sh; fi shing gear; fl ooded forest vegetation; 
fl oodplain agricultural systems; livestock-raising; and local ecosystems. 
The Tai Baan Research methodology, as applied in the LSRB, can essentially 
be distilled down to 13 practical steps, according to Blake and Pitakthepsombut 
(2006b). However, they stress that the list of steps is not prescriptive but should be 
adapted according to specifi c local situations and varying socio-political contexts. 
The authors also point out that the approach requires adequate time, patience, 
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perseverance and adaptability on the part of the researchers (resource users) and 
external facilitators to succeed. The research methodology required the facilitators 
to virtually live in the villages, thus getting to know the communities intimately 
and to gain the trust of the people involved. At the same time, village participants 
were able to conduct research in their chosen sub-theme as they went about their 
normal livelihood activities; over time, a detailed picture was constructed linking 
the various components of their livelihood systems. 
Periodically, the villages and sub-theme groups held inter- and intra-village 
meetings to exchange and validate their fi ndings and observations, making the 
research similar to conventional scientifi c knowledge methodologies, but with the 
added benefi ts of context and holism. For example, with regard to the fl oodplain 
ecosystem, the Tai Baan researchers were able to categorize 28 distinct habitats 
or ‘sub-ecosystems’, which they recognized as being important components of 
the whole fl oodplain system. This is a more detailed and complex ecosystem 
classifi cation system than any existing offi cial wetlands classifi cation has achieved. 
After over two years of fi eld research, results analysis and peer review, the fi ndings 
were published in Thai language and disseminated, including distributing copies 
to all of the local researchers (Tai Baan Research Network of Lower Songkhram 
Basin, 2005a, 2005b). The recognized success of the Tai Baan Research process in 
Thailand was a signifi cant factor in its later adaptation to Mekong communities 
in the Stung Treng area of northern Cambodia (also a MWBP demonstration 
site), and there was an active exchange of villagers and facilitators from the Nam 
Songkhram to Stung Treng during 2005 to 2006 as a Cambodian equivalent 
– Sala Phoum Research – was developed in line with the local context (see Figure 
7.4). A crucial part of the Tai Baan Research process was the close involvement 
of related government staff at sub-district, district, provincial and, in some cases, 
national levels, which not only helped to inform external stakeholders about the 
research fi ndings, but also helped to raise the legitimacy of the process to a level not 
previously recognized at other sites of Tai Baan Research (e.g. Mun Basin, Salween 
and Upper Mekong in Chiang Rai Province), where the process was perceived as 
being more antagonistic to state development goals (Scurrah, in preparation). As 
a result, several senior ranking government offi cials in Sri Songkhram District 
and Nakhon Phanom Province became vocal proponents of Tai Baan Research in 
government circles, while Tai Baan Network leaders were invited to sit on state-led 
committees and attended wider forums previously inaccessible to local resource 
users. Thus, local people engaged in the Tai Baan process were able to articulate a 
different local reality and alternative aspirations through new channels and media,16 
often for the fi rst time. 
Like any research approach that is relatively new and untested across a range 
of situations, there were certain inherent weaknesses and question marks that 
could be identifi ed about the methodology employed and results obtained. First, 
because the research explored locally situated knowledge, the fi ndings from the 
four communities involved cannot necessarily be extrapolated across the lower 
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basin, although the basic methodology is readily transferable elsewhere. There are 
also issues of linguistic, ethnic and cultural diversity to consider and adequately 
refl ect in the process and research outputs, which can pose challenges in culturally 
hegemonic societies. In the Lower Nam Songkhram Basin, for example, there are 
at least six ethnic minorities represented locally (Lao, Phu Thai, Tai-So, Nyaw, 
Galeung and Chinese), as well as the dominant central Thai infl uence, each of 
whom have their own cultural and linguistic identities. When documents are 
published or audio-visual material prepared, a balance has to be struck between 
a full and accurate representation of this local diversity and a compromise for the 
intended audience, which could be regarded as a dilution of complex local reality 
and a potential source of contention. There is also the issue of sustainability to 
be considered (i.e. to what degree is the process dependent upon external sources 
of funding for its momentum and what measures are available to ensure self-
perpetuation following initial assistance?).
Figure 7.4 Plant specimens from beside the Mekong in Stung Treng Province, 
Cambodia, during an exchange visit for members of the Tai Baan Research Network 
in Nam Songkhram with the Sala Phoum researchers in Cambodia 
Source: David J. H. Blake
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Infl uenced by the Water and Nature Initiative’s (WANI’s, under IUCN) stated 
goal of contributing to ‘improved river basin management by mainstreaming 
a livelihoods-ecosystem approach to water resources management’ and a fi rst 
Mekong region application in the Huong River Basin of central Vietnam (IUCN, 
2005), it was decided to trial an Environmental Flows, or E-Flows, approach (refer 
to Box 7.2) in the Nam Songkhram Basin during 2006 to 2007. This decision 
was the result of an extensive dialogue amongst various basin stakeholders from 
state and non-state institutions, including representatives from the Thai National 
Mekong Committee (TNMC) and the Mekong River Commission (MRC), who 
recognized the need for improved tools for water management decision-making 
in northeast Thailand. It was also seen as being complementary to the ongoing 
much larger, fi nancially costly and spatially disparate Mekong Integrated Basin 
Flow Management (IBFM) Project,17 (and involved some of the same partners), 
and Thai National Water Policy objectives of encouraging greater decentralization, 
local participation in planning and application of integrated water resources 
management (IWRM) principles. Thus, the Department of Water Resources 
(DWR) Region 3 Offi ce in Udon Thani responsible for water resources planning 
in the Nam Songkhram Basin took an active interest in the E-Flows study and 
dispatched a team of hydrologists to assist with fl ow measurements during fi eldwork 
(see Figure 7.5)
A key point regarding the Nam Songkhram Basin is that it encompasses 
parts of four provinces, (each with its own natural resources development plans 
and priorities), and has a plethora of government departments and agencies 
working on water resources-related issues (frequently with confl icting goals and 
priorities). With bureaucratic reforms and new discourses raising the importance 
of civil society, decentralization and local participation in governance seemingly 
BOX 7.2 ENVIRONMENTAL FLOWS
Environmental Flows (E-Flows) is a rapidly growing area of interest amongst certain 
sectors of environmental and water resources management institutions and is still a 
young discipline. There are various conceptions about what E-Flows is and what are 
the most appropriate methodologies to employ from amongst the over 200 identifi ed 
(e.g. Tharme, 2003), which becomes evident in the discourse between actors and 
locations. One concept of E-Flows contends that it has strong ecosystems and 
livelihoods dimensions; thus, any modifi cation of river fl ows is explicitly considered 
in terms of ecological, economic, social and cultural issues. Hence, E-Flows requires 
the integration of a range of worldviews and disciplines, making it inherently holistic 
in approach but liable to misunderstanding due to complexity. A useful guidebook 
for understanding E-Flows has been produced by the IUCN (Flow: The Essentials of 
Environmental Flows) and has recently been translated into the riparian languages of 
the Mekong Basin (see Dyson et al, 2003). 
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spelled an era of more representative decision-making over natural resources 
during the early years of the 21st century (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005). 
The reality on the ground, however, has proven to be somewhat more complex. 
Nominally, water resources planning is managed by the DWR under a nascent 
‘River Basin Organization’ system, which in the case of the Nam Songkhram 
Basin is split into six arbitrary sub-basin committees (which do not meet together 
as a matter of course), rather than as one complete and distinct basin-wide entity 
(Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006a). This situation, unsurprisingly, has led to 
much agency overlap, competition and confusion over areas of responsibility, 
supposed benefi ciaries, articulating a coordinated future development model, 
or visualizing a coherent basin overview. The process of compiling a river basin 
development plan was tendered to fi ve consultancy companies, some with names 
similar to transnational companies (DWR, 2004), thus raising suspicions about 
their impartiality. It is not uncommon to fi nd DWR plans for irrigation projects 
overlapping with Royal Irrigation Department (RID) plans for irrigation projects, 
which in turn may eclipse or overlap with Tambon Administration Organization 
Figure 7.5 Members of the multidisciplinary E-Flows study team prepare to take 
to the water in the Lower Songkhram River Basin with fl ow measuring equipment 
during the August 2006 fl ood 
Source: David J. H. Blake
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(TAO) plans for more localized irrigation projects as they vie for different budget 
sources. The two common factors to all these projects is a simple belief that the 
primary problems of the area are drought and fl oods (see Breukers, 1998) and all 
offer a prescriptive solution involving river engineering, landscape change and 
radical fl ow alteration. 
As a means of addressing the institutional malaise and confusion described 
above, an E-Flows (see Box 7.2) study was proposed to offer a potential alternative 
approach that fi tted in with a growing IWRM rhetoric at national level. It was 
anticipated that some of the complexity of the basin that had eluded earlier grand 
project plans could be captured and communicated through a multidisciplinary 
approach, using river fl ows as the basis of a common understanding between the 
relevant sectors and disciplines. After reviewing existing literature and knowledge 
on the subject, the E-Flows study team prioritized the following main objectives 
for the study:
• Improve understanding of E-Flows concepts and the importance of managing 
fl ows to ensure downstream ecological, economic and socio-cultural benefi ts.
• Build local technical and institutional capacity to apply concepts and integrate 
E-Flows principles into basin management plans.
• Initiate stakeholder dialogue across the four provinces of the Nam Songkhram 
Basin to consider implications of possible future development scenarios for the 
basin (and beyond) on the environment and society.
• Understand ecosystem roles in people’s livelihoods, especially seasonally fl ooded 
forests, by establishing the present-day relationships between fl ow regime, 
ecology and human-level dependencies.
• Develop an appropriate set of tools and methodologies that can potentially 
be applied to other Thai river basins for those interested in applying E-Flows 
approaches at a later date.
The fi eldwork was carefully planned to coincide with the peak fl ooding period 
(early September) and period of minimum fl ows (March), so the river system could 
be assessed at its two hydrological extremes and related to the wider ecosystem 
and fl oodplain resource usage by local people. Local and international specialists 
in the fi elds of freshwater wetlands ecology, fi sheries, socio-economics, hydrology/
geomorphology, land use/agriculture and wetlands vegetation were gathered 
together to create a cross-disciplinary synergy and learning environment that would 
not have been possible in a traditional type of EIA or mono-disciplinary expert 
input study. Following the fi eld surveys, the specialists met on several occasions 
to discuss their observations and provide an ‘expert judgement’ (King et al, 2000) 
or opinion on the present-day ecological health and degree of human-induced 
degradation of the three representative sites studied, validated internally within 
the group initially and then disseminated to a range of basin stakeholders at a 
seminar. In this manner, the Intermediate E-Flows Assessment Process (Tharme, 
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2003) was able to provide an approximate ‘health check’ of the riverine ecosystem 
in 2006/2007 and make predictive statements based on reasoned arguments 
about potential future condition under three development scenarios. The fi rst 
scenario assumed the construction of the Nam Songkhram Dam and smaller Nam 
Oon ‘Watergate Project’ (see Figure 7.2 for project location) inundating much 
of the fl oodplain; the second scenario assumed the implementation of the pan-
regional Water Grid irrigation project with inter-basin water transfer and intensive 
agriculture dominating; while the third scenario assumed a continuation of the 
existing ‘business-as-usual’ approach, with many more small irrigation and ‘fl ood 
protection’ projects constructed alongside promotion of agricultural intensifi cation, 
but no major irrigation infrastructure built. These scenarios were considered and 
assessed by the E-Flow team at a scenarios workshop held in May 2007, prior to 
the multi-stakeholder meeting a few weeks later (Blake, 2009). 
An Intermediate E-Flows Assessment, by defi nition, allows only a relatively 
narrow timeframe for fi eld surveys and direct empirical research, which necessarily 
limits some of the more detailed observations that might be made from a temporally 
and spatially more extensive study. A considerable portion of research time was 
devoted to a literature review and the gathering of secondary data sources. While 
these were useful for providing background knowledge and context for both 
individuals and the group, as a whole, the gaps in understanding and knowledge of 
the Nam Songkhram Basin became more apparent to the team in each discipline, 
although some (e.g. fi sheries) can draw on a wider research literature than others 
(e.g. fl oodplain wetland botany). Integrating local knowledge terms and concepts, 
such as that derived from the Tai Baan Research approach, within the more techno-
scientifi c approach and language of the E-Flows Assessment scenario workshop 
presented a number of challenges to the team. The resolution of this challenge needs 
to come from an open dialogue about best methods and approaches to employ 
at each step of the E-Flows process, where no one discipline should dominate 
over the rest, and taking into account methodological and conceptual diversity. 
Thus, it must be implicitly recognized that the interpretation and application of 
E-Flows methods will, to a large extent, depend upon the agenda and goals of the 
institution, or even the individuals applying them, the resources available, as well 
as the circumstances of the river’s fl ow regime. 
OLD PLANS, NEW DISGUISE?
It is frequently observed in Thailand that large-scale irrigation projects proposed 
by the state are rarely abandoned entirely, but tend to periodically reappear, 
sometimes dressed in new guises. A good case in point is the resurrection (ironically, 
on World Environment Day) of the controversial Kaeng Sua Ten Dam Project in 
Phrae Province (Bangkok Post, 2008). The Nam Songkhram Project has proven 
no exception. Despite a decision in March 2002 by the Thai Council of Ministers 
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to respect the fi ndings of the NEB and to reject the DEDP plan to develop the 
Nam Songkhram Project, the project has subsequently reappeared after a period of 
several years’ slumber, pushed by infl uential actors. While the DEDP was formally 
dissolved in 2002, the unfulfi lled plans for the Nam Songkhram Project were passed 
on to the RID in the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. Meanwhile, the 
newly created Department of Water Resources (DWR) was given the mandate 
to plan, manage and conserve water resources nationwide under the provisions 
of the National Water Policy of October 2000 (see Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 
2006a). The RID retained the option to develop the Nam Songkhram Project 
and included it in long-term basin plans of the Basin Development Committee, 
while senior politicians and even the then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, 
making a fl ying visit to Sri Songkhram District in August 2005 during a period of 
natural fl ooding, called for its rapid construction in order to combat ‘disastrous’ 
fl ooding and to provide dry season irrigation (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006b). 
Smaller versions of the Nam Songkhram Project, designed to provide dry season 
irrigation by permanently inundating signifi cant areas of fl oodplain land for 
storage reservoirs, were also inserted into provincial and basin development plans 
by the RID, including a 300 million baht (approximately US$8.5 million) plan to 
impound the largest Songkhram tributary, the Nam Oon, at the point just above 
its confl uence with the Nam Songkhram (see Figure 7.2). The reservoir area also 
happened to coincide with some of the richest remaining areas of paa boong paa 
thaam and abandoned plantation land belonging to SunTech Group Ltd, now 
largely colonized by the invasive noxious weed Mimosa pigra. 
Not to be outdone, the DWR has formulated ambitious water infrastructure 
plans of its own to rival the Nam Songkhram Project, also drawing on the legacy 
remaining from DEDP’s Khong-Chi-Mun Project to create a national Water Grid 
Project (Molle and Floch, 2007; see Chapter 10). While the supposed problems and 
solutions essentially remained identical to those of the Khong-Chi-Mun Project 
(with the exception of transferring ‘surplus’ water transboundary from rivers in 
Laos, as opposed to pumping it from the Mekong mainstream), the ambitious 
scope and budget required to implement the project had considerably increased 
from earlier estimates to US$5 billion (Molle, 2007). 
Sneddon (2003) refers to the ‘manipulation of water’ and ‘reconfi guration’ of 
river basins that these grandiose projects inevitably entail and how they ‘constantly 
rework the politics of scale through the extension and contraction of networks 
of humans and non-humans’. Under the proposed Water Grid Project, although 
details are still sketchy, a favoured model calls for the promotion of intensive 
cultivation of cash crops (including for biofuels and plantation forestry) by private 
farmers and agribusiness interests (Anonymous, 2005), apparently in a manner 
not dissimilar to failed past attempts such as that attempted on Tung Mon and 
other floodplain wetlands of the Nam Songkhram Basin over the past three 
decades. It is instructive that even the abundant free water provided by the RID’s 
Nam Oon Project and agribusiness model courtesy of USAID does not seem to 
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have convinced local people to remain on the land and farm, with much land left 
vacant during the 2006 to 2007 dry season (fi rst author’s personal observations). 
Despite political turbulence and changes in government over the last two years, 
there have been repeated attempts to kick-start the vote-catching Water Grid 
Project by some leading politicians and senior bureaucrats, expressed most recently 
by Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej, describing it as ‘a high-priority project’, an 
announcement that attracted opposition from a range of civil society organizations 
(The Nation, 2008). 
The spectre of renewed attempts to implement large-scale irrigation projects 
in the Nam Songkhram Basin has taken on added resonance since the Offi ce of 
Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning announced in 2006 
that it would like to consider submitting the Lower Songkhram River Basin as a 
possible candidate site for the Ramsar List of Wetlands of International Importance 
(Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006b), and as the signifi cance of the LSRB wetlands 
becomes progressively better understood by wider external actors. This potential 
extra dimension as an internationally recognized wetland with high biodiversity 
conservation signifi cance, weighed against the alternative state-sponsored vision 
as a site of intensive irrigated agriculture using ex-basin water resources and 
extreme landscape transformation (as seen at heavily degraded sites such as the 
Tung Mon fl oodplain shown in Figure 7.2), raises fundamental questions about 
the nature of these competing visions. For example, can wetland biodiversity and 
current livelihood values be maintained if a massive inter-basin irrigation project, 
accompanied by inevitable native forest destruction and conversion to agricultural 
land, is allowed to run its course to completion? 
As a site of competing stakeholders, discourses and visions of ‘development’, 
especially with regard to water management, it is a diffi cult (perhaps impossible) 
task to succinctly encompass the entire spectrum of actors and voices that exist and 
vie for attention on the multiple scalar (spatial and temporal) levels of the Nam 
Songkhram Basin. To learn more about the roles, authority and responsibilities 
of the various state agencies and other non-state actors involved in the basin, the 
reader is encouraged to refer to Blake and Pitakthepsombut (2006a, Chapter 6, 
p70) for a fairly comprehensive listing. While the Nam Songkhram Basin has 
largely avoided the outright confl ict and violence seen in the Mun Basin, largely 
concerning competing visions over state infrastructure development projects, 
nevertheless, fault lines and confl icts exist between and amongst actors at every 
scalar level, from national state agencies and ministries, right down to the local 
level. Tensions at the national level between competing agencies are apparent in 
tussles over control of generous national budgets allotted to water management and 
political manoeuvrings to promote particular megaproject visions. Also apparent 
and relatively well documented are struggles between state and non-state actors 
(e.g. Breukers, 1998; Lohmann, 1998) over the Nam Songkhram Project, land 
disputes and issues of participation in decision-making. Less apparent are confl icts 
at sub-district and community level, which may be equally divisive, hard to solve 
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and may detract from goals of integrated natural resources management. At the 
heart of these disputes are usually issues of unequal power distribution between 
actors, sometimes coupled with unsatisfactory methods of confl ict resolution. One 
such protracted dispute over land use and water management split the community 
of Ban Pak Yam, which had formerly been a site of Tai Baan Research and nearly 
led to violence between the parties on several occasions.
At the same time as Thailand grapples with the complexity of multi-stakeholder 
management opportunities, new external threats start to loom over the contested 
waterscape of the LSRB. It is not only upstream hydropower developments on the 
Lancang-Mekong in China’s Yunnan that have the potential to signifi cantly alter 
the hydrological characteristics of the Nam Songkhram’s fl ood pulse; hydropower 
developments closer to hand, such as the series of dams being built or planned 
for the Nam Ngum and Nam Theun-Kading river basins in Laos, could seriously 
deplete capture fi sheries production for communities dependent upon the Nam 
Songkhram fl oodplain for their livelihood. The proposed Nam Theun 1 Hydropower 
Project alone is predicted to cause an 8 per cent reduction in Mekong wet season 
fl ows downstream of the confl uence of the Nam Theun-Kading river (Norplan 
and EcoLao, 2007), which will inevitably reduce the extent and magnitude of the 
critical fl ooding on the LSRB fl oodplain wetlands and diminish living aquatic 
resources production. Cumulatively, the scale of hydropower development planned 
for Mekong tributaries in Laos could be devastating for fi shery production for 
Mekong-linked fl oodplain fi sheries in Thailand, as well as in Laos, Cambodia and 
Vietnam. Yet, ironically, Thailand is a major investor in the same projects that could 
further impoverish vulnerable parts of its rural population and degrade critical 
wetlands habitats. Any attempts to objectively defi ne and measure losses and gains 
of various sectors of the economy through the alluring terminology of ‘trade-offs’ 
are fraught with diffi culty and risks of major oversight (Friend and Blake, 2007).
CONCLUSIONS
The Nam Songkhram Basin has been an arena of externally imposed ‘develop-
mentalism’ and associated contestation amongst and between actors, accompanied 
by sustained natural resource commercialization and degradation, for the past 
fi ve decades. The LSRB’s extensive fl oodplain viewed as a relatively remote and 
ecologically resilient wetland, subject to climatological and hydrological extremes, 
has helped to maintain it as an agricultural frontier for longer than other nominally 
protected forest zones in upland areas of northeast Thailand. This apparent irony, 
the inherently rich natural resource base, and cheap and plentiful land available 
on the fl oodplain helped attract a steady stream of migrants to the area from other 
northeastern provinces up until a few years ago (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 
2006a). By the same token, a lack of legally secure land tenure rights and policy 
opportunities also attracted the attention of national politicians and business 
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entrepreneurs, who were able to systematically turn vast common property regimes 
into private land assets and new monocultural agricultural regimes. However, despite 
strong state support and large investments of technology and capital, these ventures 
still managed to fail, leaving behind a socio-ecologically transformed landscape with 
an uncertain future. Similarly, grand visions and plans put forward by politicians, 
bureaucrats and technocrats to turn the basin into one large irrigation scheme 
have so far come to little, despite decades of external ‘expert’ studies, hundreds of 
closed meetings and strong central government encouragement at various times. 
This chapter has argued that it is a past failure of government to engage with the 
local, the grassroots and the complex ecosystem–livelihoods relationships that has 
led to the present confused situation, where state agencies appear to be working 
towards incompatible development outcomes. At the same time, it is recognized 
that villagers themselves are not homogeneous actors and also display complex 
patterns of contestation at the local level.
Over the past decade or so, new and alternative representations of the values 
and potential of the Nam Songkhram Basin have emerged, partly as a result of 
local resistance struggles over key resource management issues, particularly land, 
forests and fi sheries. External institutions have engaged with diverse local actors 
to pilot novel participatory approaches to wetlands and river basin management 
and ecosystem understanding. Tai Baan Research and an Intermediate E-Flows 
Assessment have both thrown considerable light on the complex human–nature 
and ecosystem–hydrology–livelihoods relationships that exist in a tropical riverine 
fl oodplain wetlands system. They approach the ‘problem’ from different angles 
than conventional research methodologies and, as such, are complementary rather 
than contradictory. 
This increased awareness of complexity through participation in the process 
could reduce the tendency to make simplistic conclusions about the best ways in 
which to solve assumed problems and impose exogenous ‘development’ solutions. 
Tai Baan Research and E-Flows both provide practical and logical alternatives to the 
state-favoured ‘master plan’ approach and traditional view that naturally high and 
low seasonal river fl ows are problems seeking a solution. On the socio-economic 
side, traditional stereotyped images of rural livelihoods were challenged in both 
approaches – for instance, the dominant notion that villagers should be regarded 
as primarily ‘rice farmers who fi sh’, as opposed to, say, ‘fi shers who farm rice’ or 
‘wetlands product harvesters who occasionally practice agriculture’, or other more 
nuanced overviews of multi-component livelihoods, deriving income from on- and 
off-farm sources. 
Essentially, both Tai Baan Research and E-Flows approaches are holistic 
approaches to building knowledge of complex wetlands systems that allow more 
enlightened planning and management of these valuable resources in the Lower 
Mekong Basin. As such they could be regarded as potentially useful tools that 
invite use and adaptation to individual cases by river basin or wetland managers, 
whether they are local community networks, state agencies or NGOs seeking to 
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better understand complex environmental and social linkages. Neither approach 
should be regarded as a panacea for solving rising environmental-based confl icts 
in the Mekong region, but used in conjunction with other multi-stakeholder 
approaches can help to reduce the risk of these confl icts escalating at the local 
and wider basin levels. It remains to be seen, however, if the incredibly productive 
Nam Songkhram fl oodplain wetlands ecosystem will be able to withstand the 
growing external infl uences on land and water resources brought about by regional 
development projects, especially hydropower, agribusiness and the growing pulp 
and paper industry.
NOTES
1 ‘Fisheries’ in this chapter is used to denote all living aquatic resources that are commonly 
harvested in wetlands, including fi sh, plus species of amphibians, reptiles, insect larvae, 
molluscs, crustaceans, birds and aquatic plants (macrophytes and algae). 
2 Paa boong paa thaam is the local Lao term for the distinctive, but poorly recognized, 
seasonally fl ooded freshwater swamp forest that was until relatively recently a common 
natural habitat found along Mekong tributary rivers in northeast Thailand and parts 
of Laos. It is known to harbour a wide plant biodiversity, with at least 191 species 
being utilized by local people, according to the fi ndings from Tai Baan Research (Tai 
Baan Research Network of the Lower Songkhram Basin, 2005a)  
3 The ‘fl ood pulse’ concept fi rst coined by Junk et al (1989) is now a widely accepted 
scientifi c term and ecological concept understood to occur in lowland river-fl oodplain 
systems in tropical regions with highly seasonal rainfall patterns, helping to create 
massive bursts of aquatic and terrestrial bio-productivity following episodic fl ooding 
events.
4 This chapter refers regularly to the term ‘wetlands’ as a commonly used term amongst 
development professionals, especially those from an environmental background, but 
recognizes that it is a relatively unfamiliar term in the context of the Mekong Basin 
and does not translate easily into local languages. Therefore, it has been the subject 
of some debate and confusion as to the term’s exact defi nition and correct application 
across the basin.
5 Srisakara Vallibhotama, a prominent Thai historian, has described the local culture 
found in riparian communities such as Ban Pak Yam as being ‘wattanatam pla 
daek’, translated literally as ‘fermented fi sh culture’. This distinction arises from 
the observation that this humble processed product, somewhat disdained in central 
Thailand as being an ‘uncivilized’ element of Lao culture, is at the heart of the local 
socio-economy and has been used as a staple trading item for centuries (Petchkam, 
1997).
6 Both of these structures, although described as ‘weirs’ by the Department of Water 
Resources (DWR), are, in fact, ‘dams’ by any normal defi nition as they provide a 
complete barrier to fl ow for several months of the year. They incorporate liftable 
metal water gates that were not functioning within a year of completion, having been 
apparently vandalized by local people for scrap metal. Upstream, the river has been 
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 dredged, widened and earth embankments built, supposedly to protect the fl oodplain 
against fl ooding, although, in practice, this function is not fulfi lled. 
 7 This institution was the temporary name for what was later to become the Mekong 
River Commission, following the 1995 Mekong Agreement between the governments 
of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam.
 8 Interestingly, the NEDECO/TEAM (1983) study concluded that neither upstream 
reservoir nor the ‘regulator’ structure at the mouth of the Nam Songkhram would be 
economically feasible in controlling fl oods.
 9 SunTech Group Company Ltd is part of a conglomerate of interconnected agribusiness 
companies that have been operating in the fl oodplain of the Nam Songkhram Basin 
since 1978 and later expanded their business operations to Laos and Vietnam 
under the name Asia Tech Group Ltd. A recent report suggests that the company 
has now changed its name to Apex Development Public Company Limited (http://
wrightreports.ecnext.com/coms2/reportdesc_COMPANY_C764H6820).
10 During the early 1990s, SunTech and its allied companies had a plan to construct a 
large pulp and paper mill in the LSRB to utilize the eucalyptus and acacia plantations 
that it had established and promoted with local communities as a way of overcoming 
the fl ooding problem with a fl ood-tolerant tree species and for creating local prosperity 
(Watershed, 1996).
11 RID, which reportedly accounts for around 50 per cent of the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Cooperatives annual budget (Budhaka et al, 2002), spends the majority of its 
income on infrastructure development and is committed to expanding the irrigation 
area throughout the Kingdom of Thailand by ensuring greater water storage capacity. 
In lowland fl ood-prone areas, such as the LSRB, this aim is challenging without either 
sacrifi cing large areas of land to reservoirs or using small-scale pumped irrigation 
projects from permanent water bodies.
12 The factory was closed and remaining staff were laid off in 2007.
13 MWBP was a joint programme of the four riparian governments of the Lower 
Mekong Basin – Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam – implemented by the 
World Conservation Union (IUCN), the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and the Mekong River Commission (MRC), in collaboration with other key 
national and international stakeholders. With core funding provided by the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF), the programme aimed to address the most critical 
issues for the conservation and sustainable management of wetlands natural resources 
throughout the Lower Mekong Basin during two phases. The programme was closed 
down by donors at the end of phase A in December 2006 despite considerable 
progress towards its aims over the fi rst two and a half years.
14 It is noteworthy that despite recognizing the international importance of the Nam 
Songkhram wetlands, apart from one discrete freshwater lake wetland called Bung 
Khong Long non-hunting area in the north-eastern sector of the Nam Songkhram 
Basin being declared a Ramsar site in June 2001, no part of the wetland is included 
in any formal or state protected area, with much of the most valuable habitat 
offi cially classed as degraded forest or a wasteland awaiting conversion to agricultural 
production land. 
15 The Convention on Wetlands, signed in Ramsar, Iran, in 1971, is an intergovernmental 
treaty that provides the framework for national action and international cooperation 
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for the conservation and wise use of wetlands and their resources. There are currently 
158 contracting parties to the convention, with 1758 wetland sites, totalling 
161 million hectares, designated for inclusion in the Ramsar List of Wetlands of 
International Importance.
16 In addition to the research fi ndings being published in an illustrated book format, 
they were also widely disseminated through other media such as posters, postcards, 
bookmarks, local radio, video and displays at various events.
17 This project apparently aims ‘to provide information and knowledge to decision-
makers on the predicted costs and benefi ts of water resources development in the 
Mekong Basin in relation to changes in river fl ow regimes’ (MRC, 2006).
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8The Delta Machine: 
Water Management in the 
Vietnamese Mekong Delta in 
Historical and Contemporary 
Perspectives
David Biggs, Fiona Miller, Chu Thai Hoanh and François Molle
INTRODUCTION
Since ancient times, a combination of natural and social forces has produced the 
Mekong Delta. The delta’s unique waterscape – with its dense maze of canals, 
extensive horizons of rice fi elds, village orchards and aquaculture farms – is the 
result of natural forces such as rain, fl oods, sedimentation and tides, and of human 
constructions such as canals and dikes. This made landscape, defi ned by ongoing 
canal-building enterprises and other works associated with a rapidly urbanizing 
human landscape, remains at constant risk of being unmade by the destructive 
and sediment-spreading natural effects of seasonal fl oods, erosion from daily tidal 
fl uxes, storms and also the man-made effects from poorly placed dikes and other 
works. Enormous investments are required to keep the waterways free of sediment 
for irrigation, fl ood control and transportation. Yet, the same sediment, associated 
nutrients contained in it, and water fl ow are crucially important to agricultural 
productivity, ecological biodiversity and efforts to avoid coastal erosion.
Many present-day challenges facing society in the delta are partly the result 
of past actions that have tended towards more mechanistic approaches to the 
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water environment premised on ideologies of centralized state control rather 
than support for local adaptation to change and variability. The clearly delineated 
physical geography of the delta bounded by coastlines and waterways has inspired 
grand plans of ambitious engineering. The predictability of this natural and 
social environment, assumed by such master planning, has been contradicted 
by periods of intense social confl ict and continuing occurrences of catastrophic 
fl oods and variations in freshwater availability. The threats posed by these social 
upheavals and natural hazards have both interrupted and justifi ed certain water 
resource development programmes. Contemporary confl icts over resources are 
an expression of agricultural intensifi cation, urbanization, and corresponding 
demands for irrigation and fl ood protection that tend to foster dependency upon 
older technological approaches. In recent times, interest in more adaptive and 
decentralized approaches to water management has returned, although large-
scale ‘command-and-control’ approaches continue to dominate; yet, modern era 
institutional, political and technological legacies prevent the easy adoption of new 
policy alternatives.
This chapter traces the historical and contemporary tensions between adaptive 
and control-oriented approaches to water in the Vietnamese delta region, considering 
the causes behind the historical shift from traditional approaches oriented to fl exible 
adaptation, towards modernist policies of centralized governmental control. As 
with many regions of the world, this shift occurred in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. To what extent are future development choices constrained by the weight 
of a history of past choices supporting the state’s technological domination over 
water environments? In an era where uncertainty and risk is of growing concern to 
policy-makers and inhabitants, a critical historical perspective on water resources 
management may reveal more clearly how past decisions have closed off present-
day opportunities to pursue new approaches or to identify where opportunities 
for alternatives to contested policies might still exist.
Using historical examples that illustrate connections between contemporary 
problems and past decision-making in water control, this chapter focuses on three 
issues that are central to water resources development in the delta: total management 
schemes, mechanical approaches to water management, and trends in adaptation and 
disaster response. After giving a brief overview of past and contemporary issues in the 
delta waterscape, this chapter considers how an ideology of modern technocratic 
control came to dominate decision-making processes. This ideology has changed 
over the decades from its often violent implementation in the colonial era to the 
imported approaches favoured by state engineers under the advice of foreign 
consultants with experience in other river basins and deltas. Given the role that 
war and natural catastrophe played in limiting water resource development in these 
decades, the third section considers how such social and natural disasters not only 
disrupted attempts for centralized water management, but also presented some 
interesting alternatives in methods of individual adaptation and disaster response. 
By focusing on these three issues, the chapter examines the evolution of a unique 
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waterscape that has resulted in the creation of one of the most intensively populated 
and cultivated regions in the world, one that is now strongly embedded in national 
and global food economies. The chapter concludes by returning to its main premise 
that a historically informed analysis of present-day challenges may be employed 
not only to critique the assumptions of large-scale water management schemes, 
but to suggest more effective alternatives.
Figure 8.1 The Vietnamese Mekong Delta 
Source: David Biggs
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HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL OVERVIEW
The Mekong Delta covers an area of roughly 5.9 million hectares and spans the 
southernmost border between present-day Vietnam and Cambodia, with roughly 
4 million hectares in Vietnam. As indicated in Figure 8.1, the Vietnamese Mekong 
Delta can be divided into a number of regions defi ned by hydrology and soil 
chemistry. The most fertile and oldest cultivated regions are the naturally drained 
freshwater alluvial regions bordering the major channels of the Mekong River. 
Stretching across the river’s two major branches, this area includes most of the 
delta’s largest cities, including My Tho, Can Tho, Vinh Long and Long Xuyen. 
East of this region is an area subject to year-round or seasonal saltwater inundation 
referred to as the coastal zone. Especially since 1986, this area has been targeted 
both for construction of sea dikes and expansion of shrimp aquaculture. There are 
four major basins subjected to annual monsoon fl oods from August to December: 
the Plain of Reeds, the Long Xuyen Quadrangle, the Trans-Bassac Depression and 
the Ca Mau Peninsula. All of these areas are characterized by acid sulphate soils and 
are extremely vulnerable to both fl ooding and, in many areas, saltwater intrusion. 
Given the environmental hazards in this region, these areas have generally been 
more politically and economically vulnerable than the alluvial and coastal regions. 
Two smaller geologic features in the delta include areas of peat soil and a group of 
granitic mountains that spans across the modern border with Cambodia.
Although the region’s population today exceeds 18 million, for most of the 
delta’s history it was relatively sparsely inhabited, estimated to be close to 1 million 
at the beginning of the 20th century. Archaeological excavations undertaken with 
the aid of aerial photography during the 1930s revealed canals and settlements 
in the Long Xuyen Quadrangle, in the upper part of the delta, that were built 
sometime between 300 BCE and 700 CE.1 The fact that this society disappeared 
rather suddenly after 700 CE suggests the precarious nature of this building 
process, where early society in the delta was vulnerable to fl ood damage, silted 
waterways and bays, diseases, piracy and competition from other trading ports in 
the region. For the next 1000 years, the delta was a sparsely settled coastal frontier 
of the Khmer Empire with its capitals upstream at Angkor Wat and later Phnom 
Penh. Early modern water management accompanied the expansion of Vietnamese 
and ethnic-Chinese groups into the delta region, with a consequent contraction 
of Khmer interests as the region by 1800 had fallen under Vietnamese political 
authority. Especially after 1800, waves of settlers and trading interests helped to 
bring about a ‘water frontier’ in the Lower Mekong Basin where Thai, Khmer, Viet, 
Lao, Chinese, Malay and European groups intermixed (Cooke and Li, 2004). In 
this pre-colonial period, major canal projects such as the Vinh Te Canal (1820 
to 1825) both expanded the reach of the Vietnamese state and further separated 
historic Khmer settlements downstream from a weakened kingdom at Phnom 
Penh. After several decades of continuing unrest into the 1850s, the French navy 
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then commenced a campaign to conquer the delta and achieved control over the 
Vietnamese portion of the delta in 1867.
Under French colonial rule and with the introduction of steam-powered 
dredging in the 1880s, the delta’s population quickly rose from some 500,000 
in 1860 to over 4 million in 1930. From 1890 to 1930, more than 165 million 
cubic metres of earth were dredged and the total area put under cultivation rose 
fourfold to over 2 million hectares (Inspection des Travaux Publics, 1930, p20). 
From 1930, combined economic, political and environmental troubles stalled 
further colonial reclamation projects; the escalation of military confl icts in the 
region after 1945 continued off and on for three decades, so for over 40 years 
very few new canal projects were undertaken. Nevertheless, as we will see, the war 
period (1945 to 1975) was important for incubating new strategies of water use 
that often involved reverting to relying on local resource management, especially 
in resistance zones controlled by Vietnamese revolutionaries. This period also saw 
the emergence of internationally supported delta-wide master-planning by the US 
(Development and Resources Corporation and Republic of Vietnam, 1969) and 
The Netherlands under the auspices of the Mekong Committee (The Netherlands 
Delta Development Team, 1974).
Following the end of the Second Indochina War in 1975, the reunifi ed Viet-
namese government immediately embarked upon a number of new reclamation 
projects in war-torn areas, but with little overall effect on raising productivity. 
It was not until the relaxation of collectivization strategies and the privatization 
of agriculture in 1986 that production levels and industrial intensifi cation of 
agriculture began to increase rapidly. Since then, the Mekong Delta has become one 
of the most productive zones for rice and aquaculture in the world, supplying more 
than 70 and 50 per cent, respectively, of Vietnam’s foreign export amounts of these 
staples. However, this increased productivity has come at great environmental and 
social costs as water resources are often degraded and many farmers cannot keep 
up with the costs of living. Since 1986, the Vietnamese government has moved to 
shift the cost of maintaining canals and other infrastructure away from the central 
government to provincial governments and private landowners as part of a broader 
strategy of (fi scal) decentralization. Such decisions have challenged sub-national 
and local authorities to fi nd new cooperation models that can sustain and improve 
their systems. Second, in an attempt to widen the consideration of water resources 
management from the historical focus on irrigation development, control over the 
development of waterways and irrigation has shifted from the single domain of a 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) to shared responsibility 
with the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment (MoNRE) (Molle 
and Hoanh, 2008).
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TOTAL MANAGEMENT SCHEMES
The fi rst issue that has played a major role in the development of water-use policy 
in the delta is a long history of delta-wide and basin-wide ‘total’ water management 
plans. While increasing communication between the riparian states in such 
organizations as the Mekong River Commission is generally viewed as a positive 
step towards encouraging international cooperation towards sustainable water use, 
the ways in which delta master plans and basin management schemes have been 
established in the past have produced trends towards technocratic management 
and solutions that favour major modifi cations to the river’s hydrology. It is these 
modifi cations that continue to remain problematic. The Mekong Committee, 
formed in 1957, initially focused on building a cascade of mainstream dams on 
the Mekong River south of the Chinese border. The conceptual division of the 
basin into upper/Chinese and lower/Southeast Asian regions in the 1950s especially 
refl ected US concerns in containing Chinese economic and political infl uence by 
focusing development initiatives solely on the lower part of the Mekong Basin 
located outside Chinese territory. The changing relationship of the US with China 
after 1949 played a major role in the type of support given to Mekong projects and 
the Mekong Committee. Before the Communist Chinese military victory over the 
Nationalists in 1949, US and Chinese engineers worked extensively on projects 
such as a proposed dam at Three Gorges on the Yangtze (Biggs, 2006). Only after 
the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) did US agencies pay 
closer attention to the Lower Mekong Basin. While no mainstream dams have been 
built in the lower valley,2 this period of intense international involvement in the 
development of water resources in the Mekong has had an enduring infl uence on 
development planning, as the surveys and feasibility studies produced continue to 
attract the interest of individual states and private fi rms lured by the promise of 
electricity generation and water control. The idea of such developments continues 
to infl uence development discourse and negotiations between riparian countries 
and underpins the recent groundswell of water projects in the basin (see Chapters 
1 and 2).
In the Mekong Delta, historically, the pivotal form of water control and 
management has been the ‘Dutch dike’ strategy, which involves construction of 
encircling dikes for settlement, fl ood control or prevention of seawater intrusion 
to provide the favourable freshwater conditions for agriculture. The fi rst projects 
to build such dikes and saltwater dams began under colonial rule in the 1930s as 
hydraulic engineers and agricultural development cadres sought to clear new lands 
to raise the colony’s production of rice, as well as to defuse mounting social tensions 
by resettling many thousands of poor tenants to the new lands. French colonial 
offi cials, infl uenced largely by the dike-enclosed landscapes encountered in the Red 
River Delta – a landscape of distinctly different historical, geophysical, climatic 
and demographic features – drew up massive plans to relocate farmers from the 
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Red River Delta into the broad depressions such as the Long Xuyen Quadrangle 
and Plain of Reeds, as well as the coastal region (see Figure 8.1).
One of several tests to the soundness of the colonial hydraulic infrastructure 
came in 1937 when higher than normal fl oods destroyed much of the rice planted 
in the fl ood depressions. In an aftermath punctuated by frequent acts of peasant 
violence aimed at plantation owners, colonial engineers and planners debated 
development strategies. Rather than reconsider plans to build in fl ood zones, 
they instead decided upon greater fl ood control structures and, simultaneously, 
the elimination of areas that had grown a fl ood-tolerant variety of ‘fl oating rice’ 
in favour of faster-growing short-stem varieties. In 1943, during the Japanese 
military occupation, Vichy Governor-General Decoux created a new budget 
category entitled ‘Aid to rice farmers’ that called for 5 million piaster to send entire 
villages of peasants down the recently completed Trans-Indochinese Railway to 
populate the fi rst enclosed settlements called ‘casiers’ and effectively ended the 
hydraulic conditions necessary to grow ‘fl oating rice’ (Decoux to the Governor 
of Cochinchina, 1942; Service du Génie Rural, 1943); but these works did not 
concern the deeply fl ooded areas of the northern part of the delta and were soon 
discontinued by warfare.
After the 1954 Geneva Accords brought an end to the First Indochina War, 
the Republic of Vietnam with US technical and fi nancial support continued this 
settlement and ‘Dutch dike’ strategy, especially in politically contested areas such 
as Long Xuyen and the Plain of Reeds. From 1968 to the war’s end in 1975, 
Vietnamese and many foreign advisory teams continued conducting feasibility 
studies, developing regional management schemes, and publishing many reports 
for large-scale settlement and agricultural development initiatives in the delta. 
As part of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s initiative to ‘win hearts and minds’, 
David Lilienthal, known during the 1960s as the architect of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority and in the press as ‘Mr TVA’, accepted a contract in 1966 to 
organize with Vietnamese offi cials a Mekong Delta Development Programme 
(Development and Resources Corporation and Republic of Vietnam, 1969), as 
part of the larger Lower Mekong Scheme (Jenkins, 1968). As a ‘true believer’ 
in the promise of high technology and regional planning and development to 
empower grassroots participation, Lilienthal quickly grew sceptical upon seeing 
the apparent disconnects between the US ‘pacifi cation’ mission, the violence of the 
counter-insurgency experiments, and the military conduct of the war. Upon seeing 
Vietnamese farmers passing his boat travelling on canoes with a modifi ed ‘long-
tailed’ outboard engine, he refl ects in his journals that ‘even on many technical 
matters it is we who have a lot to learn’ (Lilienthal, 1976). With the increasing 
levels of military violence, however, this proliferation of international consulting 
fi rms and management planning initiatives did not coalesce into major effective 
projects.
Two US moves, the creation of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and 
President Nixon’s policy of ‘Asian regionalism’ that involved contracting with 
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local Asian companies instead of US ones to carry out development projects, had 
a lasting effect on the international nature of water and land-use planning in the 
Mekong Delta. One Asian fi rm, in particular, Nippon Koei, exemplifi ed the return 
of Japanese technicians and investors after the Japanese military had evacuated 
from the region in 1945. Formed in 1946 during the US occupation of Tokyo, 
Nippon Koei took some of the more dangerous projects in the Mekong Delta 
that typically required fi eld surveys and the placement of construction teams in 
non-secure areas.
Beginning with surveys conducted in 1957, the company sent its engineers to 
a series of salt intrusion barriers abandoned by the French in 1946. Intermittently 
into the 1970s, Nippon Koei then fulfi lled contracts to redevelop the works, and 
in 1972 actually completed construction of anti-salinity dikes and barriers through 
the Tiep Nhut Project, southeast of Soc Trang Province. Funded by the World 
Bank, the project aimed to protect some 50,000ha of farmland from salt intrusion 
in the dry season in order to allow the double-cropping of rice. The Go Cong 
‘pioneer agricultural project’, similarly focused on salinity intrusion control, was 
funded by the ADB. Both projects faced numerous technical, environmental and 
socio-institutional challenges. For example, Nippon Koei’s engineers continued 
visits to the Tiep Nhut site as late as 1974, when they noticed almost immediately 
that the new project had stopped saltwater from intruding but had created other 
problems due to stagnating water inside the dikes in parts of the project.
Not only were such ‘Dutch dike’ schemes (and the advice of Dutch engineers) 
employed by the colonial and Saigon governments, but after 1975, the reunifi ed 
Vietnamese government commenced a ‘rice everywhere’ campaign due to severe 
food shortages in the country, especially in the north (The Netherlands Delta 
Development Team, 1974). Saline water was, in the state’s point of view, a 
constraint to agriculture rather than a resource for aquaculture, as farmers view it 
today, and fl ood a threat and constraint to intensifi cation. This ‘all rice strategy’ was 
intensifi ed following the severe fl ood of 1978, when more than 700 people lost their 
lives in the delta and fl oating rice crops were devastated, which served to justify 
investment in fl ood-protection dikes, canals and pumping stations. This strategy 
was further strengthened in the 1980s, as the country continued to experience food 
shortages (Hoanh et al, 2003b; Tuong et al, 2003). Such schemes to manage water 
across vast territories were fi rst realized slowly, with mainly earthworks and small 
sluices dug by hand, and it was only after the doi moi (renovation) period with 
market liberalization starting in 1986 that the government was fi nancially able to 
invest in large-scale plans again. Local authorities determined that people would 
need to adopt dry season double-cropping across the region. While the relatively 
easy ‘closing off ’ of the coastal areas continued, huge investments in the diking of 
polders in the traditional fl oating rice area of the Long Xuyen Quadrangle were 
initiated as a means of providing homesteads for the growing population and water 
control schemes that would allow a shift to high-yielding varieties and multiple 
cropping.
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During the fi rst few years of market-oriented policy after 1986, rice farmers in 
the Mekong Delta were at fi rst happy with surplus rice production that improved 
their livelihoods compared with farmers elsewhere. However, since the mid 1990s, 
the limited income of rice farmers, especially small landholders, has not helped 
them to keep up with the high speed of economic growth; hence, they have become 
one of the poorest groups in their communities. Even with the soaring rice price, 
increasing by 76 per cent between December 2007 and April 2008, several analyses 
indicate that the high price may not necessarily improve the income of rice farmers 
– only that of rice-related trading companies.
With doi moi policies that stopped the use of quotas in rice production and 
allowed diversifi cation, some farmers have switched to more high-income crops 
such as fruit trees and aquaculture. This has only been possible, however, in areas 
where agro-hydrological conditions allow diversifi cation away from rice and where 
people have access to necessary credit, knowledge, expertise and markets for non-
rice products. Except in the intermediate zone under tidal management, where 
the expansion of orchards on raised beds has been spectacular, the current water 
management system through dikes was primarily designed for rice irrigation. 
Diversifi cation to non-rice crops requires signifi cant modifi cations – full protection 
for trees and pumping to highlands for vegetables or fruit. The state faces the 
increasingly diffi cult challenge of continuing another cycle of investment into new 
infrastructure at the same time that it attempts to maintain older works.
While these works were carried out quite independently from events unfolding 
at the level of the Mekong Basin, this wider scale has recently regained relevance 
as ideas of harnessing the river’s water resources at a large scale have resurfaced 
(see Chapter 2). The high demand for energy for economic development in the 
Mekong countries, together with increased concern over climate change and rising 
fuel costs have fuelled a renewed emphasis on infrastructural solutions that aim to 
‘climate proof ’ local economies by ensuring the security of water and energy supply. 
Mainstream and tributary dams in the lower basin are now back on the planning 
board after a period when increased awareness of the environmental and social 
implications of such dams led to limited international multilateral investment in 
such projects.
China, in particular, is steadily and determinedly pursuing the construction of 
eight dams on the upper length of the Mekong (Lancang) River (two completed, 
two under construction), while Laos has 77 dam projects in its pipeline. From the 
formation of the Mekong Committee until the 1990s, Vietnam was an advocate 
of Mekong mainstream dams, seeing the potential fl ood control and dry season 
fl ow augmentation function of dams as benefi cial to agricultural production in the 
delta. Environmental impacts such as changes in water fl ow and quality were of 
less concern than possible benefi ts from fl ood mitigation and regulated supply of 
water during the dry season. During the mid 1990s, Vietnam turned to opposing 
Mekong mainstream dams, fearing the impact of projects such as the Thai Khong-
Chi-Mun on dry season salinity intrusion in the delta (Hori, 2000). This attitude 
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has, in recent years, shifted again, as the delta’s coastal areas are increasingly 
protected and energy generation has become a priority over food production.
With estimates that as much as 50 per cent of the Mekong River’s sediment 
originates in the upper basin, however, the impending decline in sediment loads 
in the lower basin is likely to have severe implications for bank erosion, and stream 
and fl oodplain morphology throughout the basin, notably in the delta where the 
river deposits much of its sediments (Chapter 9). Many farmers in the Mekong 
Delta are dependent upon the sediment and nutrients brought by the seasonal 
fl ood waters to maintain soil fertility and, thus, crop productivity.
Even more important is the role of sedimentation in protecting the delta from 
coastal erosion, as can be seen by retreating deltas, from the Nile to the Yellow Sea. 
On top of that, the spectre of climate change is likely to put ecological and social 
systems under increased stress: the predicted impacts on the delta include a rise 
in sea level that will compound problems of coastal erosion, worsening salinity 
intrusion in the river’s main arms, as well as increases in the incidence of severe 
fl oods, droughts, storms, tropical cyclones and heat waves, including unknown 
ecological changes (Hoanh et al, 2003a; Wassmann et al, 2004). Experts estimate 
that with a sea-level rise of 1m, Vietnam will suffer a loss of 12.3 per cent of its 
cultivated land, including 170,000ha of coastal land in the Mekong Delta region 
(Vietnam News Briefs, 2008). They conclude that the country must ‘upgrade its sea 
dyke system, which is deteriorating and unable to combat the sea level rise’, with 
US$606 million needed from now until 2020. One expert stated that building sea 
dikes was part of an economic and ‘national defence security strategy’, and that 
the minimum width of each dike should be 5m to 6m to cope with the Force 9 
to 10 storms.
At a conference on 24 March 2008, MARD revealed its continued preference 
for ‘engineered solutions’ with a proposal for new plans to raise around 10.7 
trillion Vietnamese dong (US$676 million) to further extend and upgrade dikes 
in 15 vulnerable provinces along the Vietnamese coast, including seven in the 
Mekong Delta. Moreover, after Cyclone Nargis devastated the Irrawaddy Delta in 
Myanmar/Burma during early May 2008, some Vietnamese offi cials proposed to 
strengthen the infrastructure in the Mekong Delta, concerned about the possible 
damages of a similar cyclone, although cyclones of such intensity are very rare in the 
Mekong Delta. These new developments represent the latest step in a long history 
of state efforts to further human control over the natural fl ow of water between 
the delta and the sea. The costs of all these infrastructural solutions, however, may 
also become unbearable.
THE DELTA AS MACHINE: A WORK WITHOUT END
From very early in the colonial period, hydrographers and engineers were confronted 
by the physical and ecological complexity of the water environment in the Mekong 
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Delta. The extreme fl atness of the delta, combined with high sediment content in 
the rivers, produced hog’s-back ridges (lung tom, dos d’âne) in newly constructed 
canals that soon interrupted most water traffi c when the tide was low. French 
observers generally saw such areas as ‘dead zones’ because here the water stilled, and 
most deeper-hulled boats were forced to wait for the high tide to pass (Direction 
Générale des Travaux Publics, 1911, p34). In local society, however, such places 
were traditionally known as ‘meeting points’ (giap nuoc, or water interface). 
Inhabitants frequently built markets at these intersections of opposing currents 
because of low fl ow velocity.3 The village of Thu Thua, located on a cut between 
the two branches of the Vam Co River, or the Phung Hiep fl oating market at a 
junction of seven canals were such places where people travelling from different 
places with different goods met to trade (Nguyen Hien Le, 1989, pp23–28).
This tidal ebb and fl ow of water in the delta was also an important source of 
clean water and fertile sedimentation. Especially in the four depressions shown in 
Figure 8.1, if water in the fi elds was not routinely exchanged, high levels of acid 
sulphate would soon dissolve aluminium and iron ions and stunt plant growth. 
This condition was especially severe in newly established fi elds and along newly 
dredged canals, only relenting after three to fi ve years of irrigation (Phong et al, 
2007). To prevent the build-up of ‘alum’, farmers frequently exchanged water 
by draining water from the paddy, opening their bunds and letting water escape 
while the tide was out. When the tide rose again, fresh water from the river fi lled 
the ditches and returned clean water to the paddy. Nature provided a system of 
irrigation that required almost no extra labour and little organized cooperation 
between individuals and communities on shared waterways. Engineers, standing in 
one of the fl attest deltas in the world, were sometimes blind to these local functions 
of terrain and micro-topography and confused by a tropical hydrology that was, 
to them, exotic; and those who did pay attention to the natural regulation of the 
river system were often forced to implement water control projects under political 
pressures (Nguyen Huu Chiem, 1994; Vo Tong Xuan and Matsui, 1998).
Why have local and state governments over the years continued to favour 
mechanical approaches to water management over projects that work off the natural 
ebb and fl ow of the rivers (seasonally) and tides (daily)? In part, the answer stems 
from the modern global experience of a population explosion and agricultural 
intensifi cation; however, a signifi cant factor in the ways in which new technology 
became embedded in the Mekong Delta was the region’s unique political ecology. 
The introduction of steam-powered dredging machines to the Mekong Delta in the 
late 1880s fi tted the political and technical needs of the colonial state by replacing 
thousands of labourers needed for traditional canal or dike projects. Through the 
monopoly enterprise that operated these machines, the colonial state also ensured 
that most of the money spent on this work benefi ted French interests rather than 
local ones.
This colonial pattern of funding and organization of infrastructure projects 
continued into the 1960s as the US Agency for International Development 
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(USAID) replaced colonial agencies and continued support for big-ticket purchases 
of US-made equipment, such as a fl eet of new diesel-powered dredgers eventually 
operated by US construction fi rms undertaking no-bid development contracts. 
During the late 1950s, the US Operations Mission in Saigon even hired the old 
French dredging enterprise to operate its dredgers and train new crews. Amidst 
frequent scepticism both in Saigon and Washington that such aid was merely 
enriching US and French interests at the expense of the waterway system, the US 
advisory mission in Saigon continued to call for more expensive equipment as the 
war intensifi ed (Biggs, 2008). After 1960, US construction fi rms such as DMJM 
(now AECOM) and RMK-BRJ (now part of Halliburton) entered Vietnam to 
fulfi l these development contracts to build highways, dredge canals and (after 
1965) military bases. For reasons of security and politics in Washington, these 
fi rms typically worked with heavy diesel-powered equipment and they tended 
to propose projects that made use of these machines (Department of the Army, 
1972, p133).
Again in the present era of rapid economic growth, concerns about the 
powerful infl uence of politically connected contractors over that of local water 
users have resurfaced, although the politics and technologies of construction 
have changed considerably. Their interest in capital-intensive methods is shared 
by hydraulic bureaucracies that seek to expand their budget and power and fulfi l 
professional inclinations towards infrastructures. Infrastructure development plans 
in ecologically sensitive areas such as the Ca Mau Peninsula (Tuong et al, 2003) 
are often driven by planning and engineering departments in Hanoi and Ho 
Chi Minh City, with the sole goal of increasing export rice production; however, 
construction at different levels is often shared between national, provincial and 
local fi rms. State companies typically build principle and primary canals, while 
secondary and tertiary canals are allocated to provincial fi rms, and on-farm systems 
to local fi rms and farmers themselves.
The following case study (Miller, forthcoming) on dredging politics in 
Luong Hoa Commune, Tra Vinh, illustrates that operation and maintenance 
of this ‘mechanical’ hydrologic system remains a deeply political issue involving 
complex negotiations between local government, outside construction fi rms and 
local water users. Irrigation infrastructure in the commune was initially developed 
under the Tam Phuong Project, with the assistance of Australian aid in 1985. Yet, 
from the late 1980s onwards (as the aid dried up), secondary and tertiary canals 
gradually deteriorated as a result of neglect of essential operation and maintenance 
(O&M) by the district irrigation enterprise and local farmers, respectively. Farmers 
were annoyed that the government did not properly fulfi l its responsibility in 
maintaining the secondary canals, so they neglected the maintenance of tertiary 
canals. This made water access diffi cult for poor farmers who tended to have land 
far from canals or on higher land. Recently, ‘public service labour’ contributions 
(lao dong cong ich) have been phased out in favour of charging a fee and replacing 
manual dredging with the hire of mechanical dredgers to keep secondary canals 
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clear. Concerns continue with regard to the quality of work undertaken by different 
dredging companies, as well as (uncompensated) loss of individual farmers’ land 
due to the placement of the dredged material on paddy fi elds. While most people 
preferred mechanical dredging to those dug by hand, many poor farmers could not 
afford the cash fee for canal dredging and wished to contribute labour instead.
This cash fee is just one of the many rising costs associated with water, which 
has increased considerably with the rise in oil prices due to people’s reliance on 
diesel-powered pumps for irrigation. While these tensions were temporarily 
resolved by a recent large cash injection into development of irrigation by a 
Japanese aid project, they indicate continuing challenges between state and local 
authorities to fi nd a long-term solution to high water costs and maintenance of 
irrigation infrastructure that ensures fair and effi cient water access for small rice 
farmers reliant on timely water availability (Miller, forthcoming).
Looking at the fl ows of funding – especially the unusual infusion of cash 
from Japan in this case – and the actors involved, one issue not yet resolved is 
what safeguards exist to ensure that contractors respond to the needs of water 
users. Again, examining the past, historical records reveal that even 100 years 
ago, determining state and contractor liability to water users was a complicated 
subject for courts and administrative bodies. During construction of one of the 
fi rst major colonial projects, Xa No Canal, a group of native landowners in 1901 
brought a law suit against the government seeking indemnities for damages to 
land after a dredger cut the village off from the existing waterways. The matter, 
pitting a group of relatively wealthy and legally recognized Vietnamese landowners 
against the colonial Department of Public Works, eventually reached the desk of 
the Governor General in Hanoi in 1901, who decided the value gained in having 
property bordering the new canal outweighed the damages done through the 
destruction of existing irrigation structures (Nguyen Ngoc Chan, 1901). Since 
then, especially with Vietnamese independence and reunifi cation, government 
accountability and response to local complaints have improved considerably; 
however, administrative mechanisms for resolving local grievances continue to lag 
behind local expectations.
One crucial reason why both resource managers and water users continue 
resorting to mechanical rather than adaptive ‘fi xes’ to their problems is the endless 
need to maintain them once established, after settlements and activities have 
attuned to the changes induced by past constructions. A French inspector studying 
the colony’s early plan to build new infrastructure in the delta in 1881 called such 
projects ‘oeuvres de Penelope’ (works without end). Visiting the colony on a fact-
fi nding mission in 1880 to 1881, Charles Combier assessed the colony’s proposal 
to build canals and elevated railways throughout the delta and criticized the plans 
on numerous grounds, fi rst on the ethical basis that funding for the projects was to 
come partly from state-controlled sales of opium and then on technical grounds as 
engineers had not yet solved the problem of hog’s-back ridges – dredgers would thus 
be constantly returning to clean silt out of the new canals (Combier, 1881). When 
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economic and political events after 1930 prevented the dredgers from keeping up 
with their routine schedule of clearing channels, large portions of the irrigation 
infrastructure became degraded and many people abandoned such newly opened 
areas as the Ca Mau Peninsula, the Plain of Reeds and the Long Xuyen Quadrangle. 
Considering the story in Tra Vinh described above, replacing public service labour 
with mechanical dredging will probably require mechanical dredging in the future 
to maintain deeper channels; thus, by shifting the method of maintaining the 
waterways to construction equipment, the state and local authorities increase 
their dependence upon such fi rms in the future, making them vulnerable to the 
availability of heavy equipment, spare parts and changing fuel prices.
More crucially, the constant dredging of canals and drains, construction 
and maintenance of dikes and sluice/control structures, and consolidation or 
raising of embankments to face higher levels of risks or coastal erosion translate 
into ever-increasing and non-ending fi nancial costs. The nature of waterscape 
transformations is such that the state eventually has to cope with the maintenance 
of this hydro-agricultural ‘machine’ as people withdraw from earlier works and do 
their best to adapt to the new conditions that have been created. Thus, what has 
continued in the Mekong Delta is something French engineers such as Combier 
(see above) over a century ago worried would become an ‘oeuvre de Penelope’: a 
work without end.
Efforts have been made to decentralize fi nancial responsibility for O&M of 
irrigation systems; but many provincial and district agencies are barely able to 
cover the most basic maintenance works from local fees and taxes. Underpinning 
the entire irrigation system, its construction and maintenance is also a larger 
dependence upon aid from international agencies: aid which entails the imposition 
of agencies’ own contingencies and requirements (such as the purchase of donor 
country equipment and software). As access to soft aid monies becomes increasingly 
diffi cult for Vietnam, funds for maintaining system effi ciency are likely to be 
sourced increasingly from international loans, which transfers the debt burden to 
future generations. A crucial implication of past choices is the recurring costs for 
maintaining an ever-more complicated array of hydraulic works: from colonial 
power to (partly) people, then the state, then, more recently, to provinces, foreign 
aid and future generations. The challenge with increasing costs is to allocate this 
cost and the ‘political game’ is to shift it to other parties.
LOCAL ADAPTIVITY AND RESPONSES TO DISASTERS
While most of this chapter has considered state responses to issues of development 
and disaster response, this fi nal section addresses the very important ways in 
which individuals have responded to adversity – social and natural – and to the 
constraints/opportunities brought about by large-scale state interventions, as 
well as the problems that this poses in a place governed by top-down policies. 
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Especially in the current era of market liberalization, historical disconnects between 
individual action and state projects continue to inform present-day confl icts. Those 
disgruntled by the government’s inability to provide suitable water infrastructure 
can refer back to a long history of negative experiences with state authorities that 
did little to support farmers’ needs and, instead, encouraged settlers to clear forests 
and drain swamps. French historian Pierre Brocheux describes how colonial land 
policies and the all-consuming demand for wood to supply the need for steam 
engines produced what he terms a colonial frontier society in the delta. Individuals 
followed in the wake of the steam dredgers, their sampans (ghe tam ban) loaded with 
tools, supplies and basic building materials. They built huts, burned down sections 
of the forest beyond, and began the back-breaking work of clearing stumps and 
forming fi elds. Once land was cleared and agriculturally productive, however, they 
often found that landlords had already claimed rights to the land. They then either 
left to clear new unclaimed lands or else worked out some tenancy arrangement 
(Brocheux, 1985, p123). As economic and social conditions for farmers worsened 
with the Great Depression after 1930, many living in marginally productive, fl ood-
prone areas joined the nationalist campaigns of the Indochinese Communist Party, 
forming protests that called for lower interest rates, food for the starving and land 
to the tiller.
Dissatisfaction with state action continued after independence, with many 
of the policies followed during 1975 to 1986, notably attempts to collectivize 
production and redistribute land, causing considerable hardship on the population. 
State authorities confi scated much of the privately held machinery for ownership 
by collectives and sent many thousands of people to dig new canals and build 
dikes by hand. Both collectivization and required labour were met with widespread 
resistance as many farmers refused to put the requisite care into water management 
and growing crops. Since the doi moi reforms in 1986, much of this resistance 
has subsided as the state government now tends to side more with large private 
development interests. The relationships between the state and the citizenry have 
therefore had a signifi cant impact upon the way in which large-scale transformations 
of the landscape and local adaptation by rural populations have been interrelated and 
mediated. As this section shows, farmers have responded to economic pressure and 
waterscape transformations by counter-strategies, coping behaviours, opportunistic 
adjustments and innovations.
Past responses to social disasters, such as the destruction caused by the 
Indochina Wars, and natural disasters such as fl oods have had far-reaching effects 
on water management. Life in marginally productive acid-sulphate soil and fl ood-
prone areas such as the Ca Mau Peninsula and the Plain of Reeds, held as ‘cradles 
of the revolution’, illustrate people’s capacity to adapt to extreme conditions. 
U Minh’s forests, for example, served for decades as an important base area for 
revolutionaries and guerrillas, which resisted repeated efforts by French, US and 
South Vietnamese military forces to drain and penetrate the swampy terrain using 
armoured dredgers, napalm, Agent Orange (a powerful herbicide and defoliant 
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used by the US military in its Herbicidal Warfare Programme during the war), and 
B52 aerial bombing strikes. They built submerged barriers in the canals and creeks, 
and waited at key bottlenecks to ambush French vessels. French forces, in turn, used 
fl ame-throwers and incendiary bombs to burn away the forest and French aircraft 
repeatedly bombed the earthen dams that the Viet Minh militias built in efforts 
to maintain the swamp forests. In his history of one base in U Minh Forest, Bui 
Van Thanh (1997) recognizes the role that such barriers played in protecting the 
base; the larger dams required hundreds of labourers working in often dangerous 
conditions to repair them.
Throughout most of the Second Indochina War (1959 to 1975), the fl oodplains 
and wetlands remained under the control of the National Liberation Front. Farmers 
living in these ‘free fi re zones’ were routinely subjected to aerial bombardment 
and strafi ng; but they managed to develop a kind of extreme survivor mentality 
that required almost constant adaptation to changing environmental and social 
conditions. In 1971, after three years of intense US and Vietnamese bombing 
campaigns and operations in the base areas, one US survey estimated that roughly 
63,000 people living in the U Minh Forest had fled their homes to request 
government assistance and relocation. Travelling in the Ca Mau Peninsula, the 
American provincial adviser to the survey described the waterways as ‘wall-to-
wall boats’ where families had brought on their sampans stores of food, house 
frames and all personal belongings to re-establish homesteads elsewhere. Perhaps 
most interesting in the report was the general observation that the overwhelming 
majority reported that living conditions under the National Liberation Front (NLF) 
in the fl ooded lands were ‘reasonably good’. It was only the intensifi ed combat and 
bombing that forced them to move (Pacifi cation Studies Group, 1971).
The same individuals who, in their support for the Vietnamese Revolution, 
performed heroic measures to maintain fl ooded wetlands and swamps could not, 
however, as civilians or leaders in the post-war era control the actions of park 
managers or thousands of settlers hungry for land (Biggs, 2005). People in such 
severely fl ooded areas as Tam Nong District in the Plain of Reeds had traditionally 
practised fl ood season cropping of fl oating or deep-water rice in combination 
with wild-capture fi sheries. While such systems accommodated often volatile 
environmental fluctuations in flood cycles, they became increasingly unable 
to support the growing population densities in the post-war period as tens of 
thousands of new migrants settled into these areas despite their susceptibility to 
fl ooding and marginal productivity. In the spring dry season of 2002, over 8000ha 
(roughly half ) of one of the last remnants of cajuput mangrove and peat swamp in 
the U Minh Forest area burned out of control (Sanders, 2002, p113). This points 
to the intense pressures of economic growth on the whole country where people 
had to fi nd every way possible of increasing their immediate income to survive lest 
they become the ‘poor’ in society.
Although invasion and reclamation of marginal land is a response to economic 
needs, innovation has also provided a way out through intensifi cation. Perhaps 
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one of the most important technological changes to occur in this period with 
long-standing effects on water management was the introduction of portable 
motors used for water pumping after 1960. Robert L. Sansom in The Economics 
of Insurgency (Sansom, 1970) describes how Pham Van Thanh, a former employee 
of the French dredging company in Saigon, accompanied a Republic of Vietnam 
(RVN) military engineer to watch a dredging project in progress nearby. Studying 
the old German and Japanese diesel engines powering the French dredgers and the 
centrifugal pumps powering the newer US equipment, Thanh began experimenting 
with German-made impellers (reversed propellers to create suction, not propulsion) 
attached to the shaft of US-built engines sold as a ‘shrimp-tail’ boat motor. After 
developing a successful water pump, he sold, on average, 600 motors a month 
through Sansom’s period of research in 1967. Sansom’s interviews with farmers 
suggested a rapid farmer-motivated diffusion of the labour-saving devices even 
against the wishes of US, RVN and NLF authorities (Sansom, 1970).
Other innovations have included the spread of mobile pumping operators 
(large pump sets on boats) offering collective pumping services to groups of farmers 
in the upper part of the delta (Lienhard et al, 2001), the acclimation of shrimps to 
fresh/low salinity water, and the development of raised-bed techniques to cultivate 
vegetable or fruit trees on lands with clay soils and poor drainage. This technique is 
best developed in the intermediate zone that takes advantage of tidal management. 
It has allowed diversifi cation out of rice and much higher land productivity in a 
context of declining per capita endowments. More generally, Figure 8.2 shows 
how these areas, close to the city of Can Tho, have historically shifted from one 
fl ood-adapted traditional varieties to triple rice-cropping and orchards (for further 
insight on historical changes, see Nguyen Huu Chiem, 1994; Tanaka, 1995; Vo 
Tong Xuan and Matsui, 1998; Le Coq, 2001). This evolution is the combined fruit 
of landscape transformations, external innovations (e.g. high-yield rice varieties), 
and farmers’ innovation. Similar changes unfolded in other agro-ecological parts of 
the delta, including the fl ood-prone areas of An Giang Province, where fl oating rice 
gradually disappeared in the 1990s due to works in dredging, diking, excavation 
of secondary canals and land levelling (Lienhard et al, 2001).
In other cases, farmers have worked to revert negative effects from state 
projects. Coastal polders built by Nippon Koei Co (1966) during the 1960s 
resulted in severe drainage problems that were mitigated by farmers inside the 
area using an estimated 1000 portable water pumps to individually move water in 
or out of their fi elds. More recently, larger-scale water control schemes funded by 
national funds and World Bank loans (in O Mon-Xa No, Quan Lo Phung Hiep and 
South Mang Thit) built during 1994 to 2001 for similar water control objectives 
have faced identical problems of stagnant water, insuffi cient through-fl ow of fresh 
water into the system during the dry season, and infl exibility to multiple water 
uses, underlining the continuity of historical problems in contemporary settings 
(World Bank, 1999).
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Figure 8.2 Changes in cropping patterns in the tidal management zone of the delta 
Source: Adapted from Le Coq (2001)
In still other cases, farmers have fi ercely resisted environmental changes resulting 
from state projects. For example, in February 2001, farmers in Bac Lieu Province 
broke the new Lang Tram salinity-control sluice dam that was planned to close 
off an area for rice production, while many farmers had already opted to take 
advantage of salinity and shifted to raising more profi table shrimp instead (Hoanh 
et al, 2003b). The state was not suffi ciently fl exible to respond to changing market 
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demands and local desires, thus illustrating the main confl ict between adapting 
to natural resources versus resisting and controlling natural forces to achieve ends 
conceived by state offi cials.
What these historical events suggest is, first and foremost, the intense 
determination of farmers to adapt to local environmental adversities independent 
of local or state authorities. The reasons for this common resistance to state-
initiated projects, such as coastal dikes in the present, are complex; but in many 
cases they appear to be informed by a deep historical distrust between farmers 
and state authorities over the best ways in which to ‘improve’ land, and high 
ingenuity and capacity of responding quickly to adversity. While such individualist 
approaches were key to survival during the wars and in times of natural disaster, 
they nevertheless pose new problems in post-war water management strategies. 
What appears to be lacking most in the present are the means for farmers and 
others directly involved in managing the delta’s water resources to be involved in 
contemporary decision-making processes typically dominated by the state. So long 
as large projects such as coastal dikes or enclosed irrigation districts are conceived 
without this participation, it is likely that farmers will continue to act independently 
to realize higher levels of productivity regardless of the environmental consequences 
or implications for other resource users.
CONCLUSIONS
Returning to this chapter’s objective to establish the usefulness of employing a 
critical historical perspective to better understand challenges to contemporary 
water management issues, there are two main ways in which historical events 
continue to infl uence contemporary decision-making processes in the Mekong 
Delta. First, there is a phenomenon of what might be called institutional inertia, 
where past institutional arrangements such as the reliance on private contractors to 
carry out public works since the 1880s have continued to shape the form of state 
decisions ever since. This fi rst happened immediately following the formal end of 
colonial rule in 1954 when old French enterprises continued to carry out public 
works construction to 1960. Besides the political motivations for continuing this 
mode of public works with the lobbying interests of entrepreneurs and the large 
sums of money involved in securing foreign development loans, the bureaucracy 
formed around hydraulic works also became an entrenched power vying for its 
reproduction. Second, there is also a corresponding physical inertia in terms of the 
historical built landscape and aging technology that works against propositions to 
make major changes in water resource strategies. As the colonial inspector noted 
in 1880, past works such as canals and coastal dikes have become ‘works without 
end’ that require continuing attention to maintain them against rising sea levels, 
changing river conditions and fl uctuating fuel prices. Entire communities have 
become dependent upon artifi cially maintained water levels, and it would be 
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technically and politically diffi cult, if not unfeasible, for state leaders to require 
people living in such areas to become ‘friends with the fl ood’,4 particularly now 
that with more valuable assets they are physically much more vulnerable to their 
impacts. In sum, institutional and infrastructural path-dependency makes it close 
to impossible to remedy the past transformations of the waterscape.
However, in the more environmentally hazardous zones such as the Plain 
of Reeds and the Ca Mau Peninsula, where communities have always lived 
more on the edge separating prosperity from any number of natural and man-
made disasters, perhaps there are more opportunities for state authorities to 
experiment with alternative small-scale and adaptive strategies for coping with 
fl uctuating environmental conditions and, at the same time, maintaining more 
stable economic and social conditions. The willingness of many to switch from 
rice cultivation to aquaculture and the historical ingenuity of local people to 
evolve suitable and affordable technologies suggest that there may, in the future, 
be new economic and environmental opportunities to be gained from promoting 
rather than resisting such actions. Especially in these areas, there are numerous 
opportunities for developing new models of co-management. Sansom’s (1970) 
story above of one inventor highlights both the rapidity with which delta farmers 
adopt a technology once proven and the enormous sums of money to be made, 
with no government subsidies involved, through the creation of new small-scale 
technologies. As the constant buzzing of gasoline- and diesel-powered boat engines 
and the crowded rivers of road traffi c today attest, the Mekong Delta today is 
already a richly productive, vibrant zone increasingly shaped by local entrepreneurs 
and increasing access to foreign capital.
Although living conditions have improved dramatically in the Mekong Delta 
as in other river deltas, the growing threats of climate change, closing agricultural 
frontiers and urbanization require new efforts to maintain standards of living and 
to avoid future catastrophes. Yet, the fi nancial implications of the need to maintain 
and protect the ‘delta machine’ are awesome and the distribution of attendant costs 
has become a central issue of current politics, in general, and of the decentralization 
process, in particular. Given the physical and institutional inertia of the past, it 
may not be possible to completely escape the problems associated with aging 
infrastructure and old ways of doing things. New methods for democratizing 
water resources policy-making through state–local co-management are needed. 
These contemporary issues are not unique to Vietnam and the Mekong Delta, 
but may be found in other river deltas around the world. In the Mississippi Delta, 
for example, the US government is faced with similar problems in its efforts to 
rebuild the protective levee infrastructure around the city of New Orleans and 
to prevent further subsidence of the delta into the sea. The devastation wreaked 
by Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 in the Irrawaddy Delta in Myanmar is also a 
further reminder of the deeply political and social nature of disasters and their 
aftermath. By employing a more critical historical perspective on such issues, 
it may be possible to gain a clearer sense of both the institutional cum physical 
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inertia that informs such decisions and possibilities that may exist for tapping 
into the incredible resourcefulness and ingenuity of people who have for decades 
had to adapt with little government support. By fi nding ways to incorporate local 
water users into water resource management and, at the same time, to respond to 
changing environmental conditions, it may be possible for Vietnam – which relies 
so heavily on the Mekong Delta for food and commerce – to achieve more stable 
economic and environmental security. 
NOTES
1 One of the most comprehensive descriptions of the ancient material culture in the 
delta is provided by Malleret (1959, vol 1, pp27–33) who gives an excellent discussion 
of ancient hydraulic infrastructure and pre-Angkor settlements near present-day Chau 
Doc and the Vinh Te Canal.
2 Efforts have, instead, focused on dam construction and water diversions on major 
tributaries in southern Laos, northern and north-eastern Thailand, central Vietnam 
and, more recently, Cambodia.
3 Since the conversion of domestic boat traffi c from sail- and oar-powered to motorized 
vessels in the mid 1900s, the largest markets today are now located at the junctions of 
large canals and major rivers.
4 During the past years the government has adopted a strategy called Living with Floods 
(Thanh Lam and Tran Dinh, 2008). However it is apparent that the strategy merely 
emphasizes better preparedness and early warning, not a change in philosophy.
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Region: What Are the Likely 
Impacts upon Fisheries? 
Juha Sarkkula, Marko Keskinen, Jorma Koponen, Matti Kummu, 
Jeff E. Richey and Olli Varis 
INTRODUCTION
The human impact upon water resources has increased dramatically all over the 
world during the last several decades (Vörösmarty, 2000). The Mekong River 
is one of the few large river basins yet to be irreversibly modifi ed by large-scale 
infrastructure. While the fi rst dams in a planned cascade have been built in the 
upper-middle reaches in China, fl ow regimes in the lower reaches of the mainstream 
are still, essentially, natural (MRC, 2005). These conditions may not last much 
longer. The Mekong River Basin is facing the prospects of a major growth in 
infrastructure projects as surrounding economies continue to expand. Huge 
hydropower dams as well as diversions for irrigation are planned throughout the 
basin, some on tributaries and others on the mainstream (e.g. King et al, 2007). 
A body of recent research concludes that development in the river and the 
basin will alter fl ows and fl oods in the basin (Adamson, 2001; ADB, 2004; World 
Bank, 2004). The alterations to flow may have significant impacts upon the 
river ecosystem, wetlands, fl oodplains and well-being of people, especially those 
dependent upon natural resources in the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB). 
Potential impacts upon fi sh form a particularly important issue: fi sh is a 
central social, economic and cultural resource in the basin, and forms, together 
with rice, the foundation of food security in practically all riparian countries. 
Mekong fi sheries are also globally exceptional for their diversity and size, and the 
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Mekong Basin is considered to have the world’s largest inland fi sheries (Poulsen et 
al, 2004; Dugan 2008). Due to the diversity of fi sheries and fi shers in the region, 
it is diffi cult to estimate the actual amount and value of Mekong fi sheries; the most 
recent estimates for the annual value range from US$2 billion up to US$3 billion, 
with catch estimates as high as 2.5 million tonnes a year (Dugan, 2008).
When discussing the potential impacts of hydropower development, fi sh is 
usually considered to be a resource particularly vulnerable to negative impacts. 
The impacts upon fi sheries due to hydropower development can be divided into 
two main categories: 
1 the so-called barrier effect of dams on fi sh migration; and 
2 the impact that hydropower development has upon water quantity and quality, 
and, consequently, upon fi sh habitats, for example.
Overall, the fi sheries of the Mekong are dependent upon migration over both long 
and short distances, with many of the commercial species having highly developed 
migratory patterns (Barlow, 2008). The migratory fi sh species generally move 
upstream to spawn, while juvenile fi sh then move back downstream to feed and 
grow on the fl oodplains and wetlands (Poulsen et al, 2002). Dams act as barriers 
for fi sh migrating upstream, while the fi sh migrating downstream must usually 
pass through hydropower turbines, resulting in mortalities with very low survival 
rates (Barlow, 2008). Dugan (2008) estimates that over 70 per cent of the total 
fi sh catch in the Lower Mekong Basin is dependent upon long-distance migrant 
species. Dugan (2008) also points out that existing fi sh passage facilities simply 
cannot cope with such a large fi sh migrations and high species diversity that is 
present in the Mekong, indicating that effective mitigation measures for the barrier 
effect are not easy – or cheap – to achieve in the Mekong context. 
Hydropower dams also affect river fl ows, causing different kinds of changes 
in both water quantity and quality. These include, for example, changes in the 
extent, duration and timing of annual fl oods, as well as reduction in suspended 
sediment concentrations due to sediment trapping of the reservoirs (Kummu 
and Varis, 2007). Reduced fl oods with shorter duration reduce the available fi sh 
habitats in the fl oodplains, resulting in lower fi sh production (Barlow 2008; Halls 
et al, 2008). Changes in the timing of the fl oods can also disrupt the crucial 
spawning and migration cues of fi shes (Baran, 2006). Overall, this chapter seeks to 
synthesize what is known about the magnitude and nature of the expected changes 
– particularly as a consequence of dam-building – to fl ow regimes, and their 
consequent potential impacts upon fi sh, fi sheries and livelihoods. Related to this, 
the chapter discusses the challenges connected to models and impact assessments, 
as well as the problems in addressing the real value of diverse small-scale use of 
different water-related resources – most importantly, fi sh. The geographical focus 
of the chapter is on the Tonle Sap Lake in Cambodia that is one of the most 
productive freshwater ecosystems in the world.
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MODELLERS AND MODELLING
The chapter draws largely on the fi ndings of the Finnish component of the Water 
Utilization Programme (WUP-FIN) project, funded by the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs of Finland and implemented during 2001 to 2006 as a complementary 
project to the MRC Water Utilization Programme (MRCS/WUP-FIN, 2007b). 
The focus of WUP-FIN was on hydrological and hydrodynamic modelling, scenario 
simulations, socio-economic and policy analyses, and integrated assessment of 
ecosystem and socio-economic impacts. Several case studies were carried out in 
different parts of the Lower Mekong Basin, with emphasis being on the Tonle Sap 
Lake and the Mekong fl oodplains in Cambodia.
Although essentially a modelling project, WUP-FIN also included strong 
socio-economic and policy analysis components. The socio-economic analyses 
carried out in WUP-FIN aimed to increase understanding of social, economic and 
political factors in water resources management at intermediate and local levels. 
This increased understanding was used to support other project components – in 
particular, model development, case study design and impact assessment, both 
locally and at the basin-wide scale. While the socio-economic and policy analyses 
ultimately aimed to also address regional basin-wide challenges, this was done by 
fi rst studying the challenges at the local level, and then putting these into the larger 
regional context. As it turned out, many of the regional concerns emerged from 
impacts felt or foreseen at the local level.
The chapter is a follow-up to a review we made (Sarkkula et al, 2007) about 
the use of mathematical modelling in integrated management of water resources 
in a previous volume on improving water governance in the Mekong region (Lebel 
et al, 2007) that carried three important conclusions.
First, modelling projects must link better with the other dimensions of water 
management, most importantly with social dimensions where its linkages have 
traditionally been the weakest. This linkage should preferably be created from the 
very beginning of any modelling exercise, and enough time and resources should 
be allocated to this multiple and, essentially, interdisciplinary task.
Second, and related to the above, much deeper integration with social sciences 
is needed. Some progress in integration of research teams connecting natural and 
engineering sciences has been made, but integration with the social sciences is still 
only emerging. To date, the approach adopted by modellers to address these more 
multidisciplinary connections has typically been merely ‘to add some social stuff ’ 
to their models (Nancarrow, 2005). This is clearly insuffi cient and can easily just 
increase the misunderstandings and even prejudice between modellers and non-
modellers.
Third, modellers need to focus more on cooperation and communication. 
This will require more two-way dialogue with decision-makers, planners and other 
stakeholders on the models as well as on their results and uncertainties. The aim and 
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outcome of these engagements should be increased transparency and intelligibility 
of the models and their results. In some instances, joint interpretation and 
assessment of the modelling and analysis results is also desirable and valuable.
The real change is therefore likely to come through the establishment of teams 
for integrated assessment and modelling with balanced and equal participation 
by modellers, social scientists, policy experts and other non-modellers. A spirit 
of mutual appreciation and respect has to be cultivated between the involved 
individuals, teams, stakeholders and interest groups, requiring good communication 
skills (Janssen and Goldsworthy, 1996) and genuine aspiration towards truly 
interdisciplinary work.
MODELLED FLOW CHANGE AND METHODOLOGICAL 
DEVELOPMENT NEEDS
Credible and accurate basin-wide hydrological and fl ow modelling is a task of primary 
importance in assessing the changes in fl ow caused by water resources developments 
in the basin. Relatively small fl ow alterations tend to have proportionally much 
greater impacts upon the river ecosystem and particularly upon the fl oodplains. 
Therefore, basin-wide hydrological modelling alone is not enough for proper fl ow 
assessment, but needs to be coupled with a sub-basin-scale fl oodplain model to 
understand the consequences of the fl ow alteration on the fl ood characteristics, and 
furthermore, on the ecosystem productivity in the river and its fl oodplains.
This chapter discusses some of the current challenges in basin-wide modelling 
in the Mekong Basin, and then provides an example from the WUP-FIN Project 
on simulated impacts of Mekong development upon the Tonle Sap fl oodplain 
system and its productivity, and consequently, upon fi sheries.
Basin-wide modelling and its challenges
The Water Utilization Programme (WUP) was set up at the Mekong River Com-
mission (MRC) to build up a knowledge and model base for the Mekong Basin.
The WUP Project Implementation Plan (PIP) states:
… The broad aim of Component A is to provide enhanced knowledge 
base and analytical tools to support the WUP, and the BDP [Basin 
Development Plan of the MRC], that are based on improved under-
standing of the interaction between the physical and biological features 
of the basin and their functions with respect to water resources, and the 
changes in these that may occur due to human activities.
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It is clear from this statement that a comprehensive basin-modelling package is 
necessary for the Mekong River Commission Secretariat (MRCS) core activities 
and implementation of the Mekong Agreement. It implies the need for primary 
data collection and ecosystem process studies, as well as an understanding of the 
socio-economic functions and impacts in the basin, on top of building an advanced 
model system to respond to the complexity of the Mekong Basin environment. This 
concept was included in the terms of reference (ToR) of the WUP-FIN phase 1 
(Tonle Sap modelling project; see MRCS/WUP-FIN, 2003) and has been a guiding 
principle throughout the WUP-FIN work.
Furthermore, the specific objectives of the WUP modelling component 
were to:
• develop an integrated and comprehensive basin modelling package that provides 
analytical support needed by the MRC and the riparian countries to implement 
the Mekong Agreement, prepare the Basin Development Plan, and carry out 
basin and sub-basin planning for sustainable water resources development;
• develop additional model components to analyse and predict transboundary 
impacts of proposed actions on the aquatic ecosystem and other water uses and 
functions of social, economic, regional and global importance.
Although WUP plans set the objective of modelling and integrating water quantity 
and quality with biological, ecological and socio-economic issues, the actual 
WUP-A work, in practice, focused on water quantities only. The possibility 
of including water quality and the Tonle Sap lake and fl oodplain model in the 
Decision Support Framework (DSF) was lost when the original consultancy work 
for water quality and lake/fl oodplain modelling were eliminated during the project 
inception phase. Consequently, in the DSF there is only a limited ‘set of impact 
analysis tools that enable the prediction of environmental and socio-economic 
impacts in response to changes in condition of the river system’ (MRC, 2004). The 
set consists of fl ood properties and a rather schematic saline intrusion description. 
All of this has led to critical limitations in implementing the DSF and assessing 
the impacts of development scenarios.
The Model and Knowledge Base (i.e. Decision Support Framework of the 
MRC) was developed under an approximately US$5 million contract with Halcrow 
Group during the period of 2001 to 2003. The contract outputs consist of a basin 
knowledge base and hydrological/hydrodynamic models and impact assessment 
tools. Model components include catchment hydrology (SWAT), water use 
(IQQM) and 1D river hydrodynamics (ISIS). The ability of the DSF to simulate 
hydropower development impacts was critically studied by Adamson (2006), and 
reported at the Mekong Region Waters Dialogue meeting in Vientiane in July 
2006. Adamson found the DSF hydrological model unsatisfactory for this purpose, 
stating the following: 
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The hydrological model IQQM selected for the DSF by the Halcrow 
Consultants was principally developed for the Murray Darling Basin in 
New South Wales in Australia, with major focus on identifying water 
allocations in a highly managed and regulated river system. The hydro-
power element had to be added to the Mekong version of IQQM in order 
to enable simulation of hydropower storage and power plants. However, 
this is fairly rudimentary and the DSF would not be the modelling 
system of choice on which to base an assessment of the consequences 
for the regional hydrological regimes of hydropower expansion in the 
Mekong Basin. Output would be coarsely indicative of the cumulative 
impacts of any regulatory storage. Meaningful hydropower simulation 
needs dedicated simulation models that are much more sophisticated 
than the relevant modules within the DSF. (Adamson, 2006)
Consequently, it is clear that the current DSF system needs to be strengthened 
to meet the requirements set in the WUP Project Implementation Plan, most 
importantly to ensure that analytical tools are based on improved interaction 
between the physical and biological features of the basin; model components 
for analysis and prediction of transboundary impacts of proposed actions on the 
aquatic ecosystem are being developed and actively used; and modelling of water 
quantity and quality and its linkages with important environmental, social and 
economic issues, such as wetlands and fi sheries, form the core of the system.
The recently established Information and Knowledge Management Programme 
(IKMP) of the MRC, which continues the work of the Water Utilization Programme, 
needs to address the existing gaps in the DSF – in particular, to focus on providing 
more comprehensive views on social and economic impacts that the changes in the 
fl ow and water quality of the Mekong system are likely to cause.
Improving the accuracy of change estimates
Plans for large-scale hydropower dams are mushrooming in the Mekong Basin; yet 
there are no appropriate and commonly agreed tools to make good estimates of 
their potential impacts. Credible, validated and transparent models are necessary 
for good decision-making and public acceptance of those decisions. Further work 
is needed, especially in improving the reliability of the estimates of hydrological, 
environmental, social and economic impacts, including:
• modelling the basin-wide hydrological impacts of the developments (e.g. by 
model studies comparative and complementary to the DSF in order to reduce 
the current uncertainties in the fl ow change estimates);1
• developing further the integrated indicator of the productivity of the Tonle 
Sap ecosystem (based on Junk, 1997; Lamberts, 2006), and the Lamberts and 
Koponen (2008) productivity model;
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• continuing work on social impact assessment with particular focus on the 
inclusion of broader social issues, such as vulnerability and poverty; and
• continuing the work of defi ning the acceptable reverse fl ow to the Tonle Sap 
(as stated in the 1995 Mekong Agreement) as part of the national consultations 
and in dialogue with the stakeholders.
Changes in Tonle Sap fl ooding and productivity potential
Changes in the fl ow and water quality regime of the Mekong River have impacts 
upon fl ooding, erosion, sedimentation, navigation, fi sheries and agriculture, as 
well as upon consequent social and economic issues. The objectives of the WUP-
FIN phase 2 (MRCS/WUP-FIN, 2007b) were set to provide complementary 
tools and information to approach these questions. In addition to direct impacts 
upon the river system, Mekong developments have impacts upon the hydrology 
and ecosystems of the wetlands connected to the river as their behaviour is largely 
affected and controlled by the mainstream Mekong River. This is the case with 
some of the important tributaries’ fl oodplains, the Tonle Sap system in Cambodia 
being the most highlighted example. The Tonle Sap River is, in some defi nitions, 
taken as part of the mainstream due to the dominant role that the river has in the 
functioning of the Tonle Sap Lake ecosystem. Around 60 per cent of the Tonle 
Sap fl ood water originates from the Mekong, and the water level in the lake is 
controlled by the water level in the Mekong mainstream (Kummu and Sarkkula, 
2008). Therefore, the possible fl ow alterations in the Mekong mainstream will 
directly affect the fl ood pulse of the Tonle Sap Lake.
The Tonle Sap system and its remarkable levels of aquatic production are clearly 
of crucial importance for Cambodia and, indeed, for the entire Mekong Basin (e.g. 
Keskinen, 2006; Kummu and Sarkkula, 2008). The productivity of the Tonle Sap 
lake-and-fl oodplain system is driven by the fl ood pulse of the Mekong and by the 
rich fl oodplain biodiversity. The fl ood pulse transfers terrestrial primary products 
into the aquatic phase during fl ooding and creates an extremely rich ecosystem 
for aquatic life (Junk, 1997). Primary production (phytoplankton, periphyton and 
plants) fuels the food webs, resulting in one of the world’s most productive fi sheries 
grounds. The fl oodplain of the lake offers ample opportunities and conditions for 
fi sh to breed and grow (Lamberts, 2006; Lamberts and Koponen, 2008).
Hydropower development may change the natural flood pulse, directly 
undermining the productivity of the system by reducing the inundated habitats, 
delaying the onset of fl ooding, and shortening its duration (growth period for 
aquatic organisms). All of these changes are estimated to have a negative impact 
upon the fi sheries productivity of the Tonle Sap system. Hydropower development 
would probably also reduce the supply of sediments and nutrients to the downstream 
ecosystems because of sediment trapping in the reservoirs. Fisheries productivity 
is further likely to be affected by worsening conditions for fi sh reproduction due 
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to slowly rising fl ood waters and the associated poor water quality. Lower fl ow 
velocities will limit the drift of eggs, larvae and juveniles to the fl oodplain habitats, 
while dams will obstruct fi sh migrations.
A number of models have been used for fl ow regime simulations with the 
foreseen hydropower developments (e.g. the high development option with 
Chinese mainstream dams and Lower Mekong Basin tributaries dams). The 
DSF fl ow values were input into the WUP-FIN Tonle Sap model to simulate the 
fl ooding change of the Tonle Sap system, such as the change in the extent of the 
fl ooded habitat and the change in the dry season water level (two more simulations 
on the cumulative impact of the hydropower developments that were available 
in addition to the DSF are referred to below). The results from the different 
simulations are quite different, especially the dry season water levels. This is mainly 
due to the different development scenarios and assumptions, as well as the models 
themselves used in the analysis. An actual analysis and comparison of the models 
has not been possible due to their different contractual setting. The results require 
higher confi dence levels and this question should be re-examined, with additional 
models brought into the ensemble (e.g. the Variable Infi ltration Capacity (VIC) 
model and WUP-FIN).
The dry season water-level rise due to Mekong upstream development was, in 
different assessments, estimated as:
• 0.15m (by DSF, data prepared for IBFM);2
• 0.30m (by Henrik Garsdal of the Danish Hydraulic Institute (2004), based on 
Adamson’s (2001) analysis on the mainstream Mekong Basin); and
• 0.60m (by ADB, 2004, using MIKE Basin).
The impact of the water-level rise upon the dry season lake area is presented in 
Figure 9.1. The 30-day minimum water level during the analysis period of 1997 
to 2006 for May was 1.44m above mean sea level (amsl), which was used as a 
reference level. The bottom of the lake lies at 0.6m amsl; thus, during the low 
water level the average depth of the lake is only around 0.8m, with a lake area of 
around 2300km2. The estimated rise of 0.60m in the dry season water level, as 
simulated by ADB (2004), would result in the fl ooding of an area of 3200 km2, 
indicating that the permanent lake area would increase by nearly 1000 km2 or 40 
per cent (Kummu and Sarkkula, 2008).
The rise in the dry season water level of the lake would mean an extension of 
the permanent lake and signifi cant destruction of the fl ooded gallery forest where 
it becomes permanently inundated and, consequently, loss of important habitats 
(Kummu and Sarkkula, 2008). The different cumulative impact assessments (CIAs) 
also predict that the peak water level would decrease and thus reduce the inundated 
area of the lake, as presented in Figure 9.2. Thus, the area of the fl oodplain would 
decrease, depending upon the CIA, by 7 to 16 per cent. For example, in the case 
of a CIA carried out by ADB (2004), the total fl oodplain area would decrease from 
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the current 10,750km2 to 9060km2 by the year 2025, resulting in around a 15 per 
cent decrease in both cumulative fl ooded area and volume.
Figure 9.3 shows the change in fl ood duration over the fl oodplain during 1997 
conditions based on the EIA 3D model results and input of the MRC fl ow regimes 
developed for the IBFM project. The period of inundation decreases in most parts 
of the fl oodplain by one to two weeks (5 to 10 per cent), while in the lowest parts 
of the fl oodplain the inundation is prolonged due to the increase of the dry season 
lake level. Due to permanent inundation, these areas would be transferred from 
fl oodplain habitats to become part of the lake proper.
The tall gallery forest strips around the lake make an important physical barrier 
between the lake and the fl oodplain. The strips create favourable conditions for 
sedimentation within the forested zone where nutrients bound with the sediment, 
mainly from the Mekong, fuelling primary production. The lake extension would 
cause permanent submersion – in essence, destruction – of considerable strips of 
gallery forest surrounding the lake (Kummu and Sarkkula, 2008). The reduction 
of the fl ooded forest area could therefore have a signifi cant impact upon the whole 
Tonle Sap ecosystem, and probably also upon fl oodplain dynamics. The evolution 
of the fl oodplain to its present state and biological functioning has taken several 
Figure 9.1 Inundated areas due to the increased dry season water level 
Source: adapted from Kummu and Sarkkula (2008)
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Figure 9.2 Schematic presentation of the possible impacts on the fl oodplain extent 
due to changes in fl ow regime 
Source: adapted from Kummu and Sarkkula (2008)
Figure 9.3 Flood duration difference based on simulation results 
Source: adapted from MRCS/WUP-FIN (2007b)
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thousands of years (Tsukawaki, 1997), which means that what is lost in its structure 
and productivity can hardly be mitigated in any way.
Scenario work carried out under the WUP-FIN project, aiming to estimate 
the cumulative impact of the changing fl oodplain conditions in the Tonle Sap, 
focused on comparing the fl ow changes between Flow Regime FR33 (MRCS/
IBFM, 2006a) and the baseline in 1997 and 1998 on a number of fl ood and water 
quality indicators of the lake and the fl oodplain. The comparison of the simulation 
results gave the following results:
• The inundated fl oodplain habitat would be reduced by 15 to 20 per cent.
• The period of inundation would be shortened by one to two weeks.
• The increased dry season water level would permanently inundate a major part 
of the fl ooded forest around the lake (extending the permanent lake).
• Dissolved oxygen conditions would worsen by extending the strongly hypoxic/
anoxic period in the fl oodplain during early fl ooding due to slowly rising 
fl oods.
Figure 9.4 Flooded and remaining tall gallery forest in the case of 
0.6m dry season water-level rise
Source: adapted from Kummu and Sarkkula (2008)
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• Sediment and nutrient input to the lake with the flood waters would be 
reduced.
A fi rst estimate of the impact of the changing fl oodplain conditions was made by 
introducing a cumulative indicator for fl oodplain productivity potential by giving 
an estimate for the minimum and maximum value for each individual indicator. 
The calculation of the cumulative impact of the physical and water quality factors 
gave a value in the order of 25 per cent reduction in the fl oodplain productivity 
potential, even with rather conservative estimates for individual indicator changes. 
This estimate is well in line with the assessment made by the expert panel within 
the IBFM phase 2, where it was estimated that Flow Regime 3 would result in an 
overall 20 to 30 per cent or more reduction in the productivity potential of the 
Tonle Sap Lake and its fl oodplain (MRCS/IBFM, 2006a).
Developing a Tonle Sap productivity model
The Tonle Sap fl ood pulse is largely (60 per cent) driven by the water that is pushed 
up into the lake by the reversed fl ow of the Tonle Sap River during the rise of the 
fl ooded Mekong River. The remainder is runoff from Tonle Sap’s own catchment 
as well as direct open-water precipitation. The Mekong fl ood waters not only bring 
water and fl oods, but also nutrient-laden sediments that are largely deposited in the 
fl oodplain. The fl ood water integrates the terrestrial vegetation within the aquatic 
phase of the ecosystem, and this interaction between the terrestrial and aquatic 
phases is the driving force of ecosystem productivity. Knowledge of the relation 
between ecosystem productivity and the fl ood pulse, as ultimately determined by 
the fl ows in the Mekong River, is still very limited.
Lamberts and Koponen (2008) have developed a quantitative model of the 
ecosystem productivity of the Tonle Sap Lake and fl oodplain, with a particular focus 
on its response in the function of altered fl ow regimes in the Mekong River.
The underlying assumption is that the Tonle Sap secondary production 
(including fi sh production) is mostly endogenous (i.e. based on primary products 
generated within the ecosystem rather than imported with the fl ood waters). While 
there are no specifi c data to support this, the assumption is reasonable based on 
the low organic matter contents of the infl owing rain and Mekong waters and 
the known migration of fi sh between the Tonle Sap and the Mekong. This is 
believed to be largely a net export of fi sh biomass from the river, with mostly fi sh 
juveniles, larvae and eggs drifting into the Tonle Sap ecosystem with the fl ood 
waters. Furthermore, the assumption is made that most of the organic matter in the 
Tonle Sap ecosystem is produced locally by four categories of primary producers: 
periphyton, phytoplankton, rooted macrophytes and fl oating macrophytes.
The main result from this research is a spatially explicit model of Tonle 
Sap ecosystem primary production, which is the basis of the secondary food 
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webs and determines, to a large extent, the overall productivity of the system. 
The modelled production is based on environmental factors, most of which are 
directly or indirectly dependent upon the hydrological cycle. The model allows 
quantitative assessments of the environmental impact (relative or absolute) upon 
ecosystem primary production. It uses the few data specifi c to the Tonle Sap and 
depends upon the hydrodynamic model for making the results spatially explicit. 
It has demonstrated where the main data and knowledge gaps are, and the model 
has been developed so that its accuracy can be improved by relatively few fi eld 
measurements. In this way, it can be constantly refi ned while already providing 
the best available quantitative assessments of the impact of fl ow alterations in the 
Mekong River upon the primary production of the Tonle Sap ecosystem.
The link between primary production of the ecosystem, its fi sh production 
and the fi sh catches is very complex, and there is no specifi c information on these 
links, nor are there suffi cient data on fi sh catches. However, with the reasonable 
assumption that most of the productivity of the Tonle Sap is located within the 
ecosystem rather than imported, taking into consideration the high fi sh production, 
and given the dynamic character of the ecosystem, it can be assumed that any loss 
of primary production will directly result in loss of secondary production and, 
hence, fi sh catches. The precise nature of this relationship is unclear and may be 
impossible to establish.
THE ECOSYSTEM AND ECONOMIC VALUES OF RESOURCES
The Mekong and its fl oodplain are rich in natural resources, particularly in fi sh, 
supporting local livelihoods in a variety of ways. This was also evident in the socio-
economic surveys carried out during the WUP-FIN Project in different parts of the 
basin (MRCS/WUP-FIN, 2007b). Although the study areas in the Lower Mekong 
Basin were diverse and, therefore, different in many ways, there were also fi ndings 
– related, for example, to the value of and the dependency upon resources – that 
were similar in all studied areas; these are discussed next in more detail.
Estimating the real value
Measuring poverty and the value of resource use in the widely varied conditions 
present in the Mekong Basin is not simple. For example, the fi ndings from the 
Tonle Sap, as well as from Nam Songkhram Basin in northeast Thailand, indicate 
that both of the areas are considered poor in monetary terms, but rich in natural 
resources. In both areas local people rely on diverse natural resources that provide 
both food and income, although not necessarily in cash. In Nam Songkhram, 
the area’s wetlands are considered to be ‘nature’s supermarket’ where you need 
no money to ‘shop’ for the large variety of different resources provided (MRCS/
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WUP-FIN, 2007b). This coexistence of economic poverty and resource wealth 
raises questions about the validity of current poverty measures, and suggests that 
macro-economic analyses measuring poverty in pure monetary terms are not able 
to properly measure the wide and diverse use of natural resources. This leads to 
an underestimation of the real values of different natural resources for the people 
living in the Mekong Basin.
Consequently, the close linkage between the viability of river ecosystems 
and people’s livelihoods is often not taken seriously into account in social and, 
particularly, economic analyses at national and regional levels (see Chapter 12). 
Everyone agrees that the health of the river ecosystem feeds directly back into 
supporting the welfare of the people in the basin, particularly those amongst the 
poorest sections of society. However, the importance of maintaining the river 
ecosystems – and, consequently, the diverse set of resources and services that they 
provide – is still neglected in most policy discussions about the development of 
the basin.
The dependence of poor people upon aquatic resources
The fi ndings from the WUP-FIN case study areas indicate that the poorest villagers 
are those most directly dependent upon fi sheries and related aquatic resources for 
their livelihoods. At the same time, the poorest have usually less capabilities and 
resources to adapt and make use of the changes that take place in the availability of 
these resources due to changes in water fl ows – for instance, irrigation development 
or dam construction. When coupled with prevalent governance challenges and 
problems of unequal access to different resources, this is likely to lead to growing 
disparities between villagers: while those who are better off are likely to gain, 
those who are already poorer will lose (e.g. Fox and Sneddon, 2005; Keskinen et 
al, 2007; Sneddon, 2007).
This fi nding was particularly evident from the results of the participatory 
village surveys in the Tonle Sap area (see Keskinen, 2006; MRCS/WUP-FIN, 
2003), which concluded that the people living in the villages closest to the lake 
were in many ways most vulnerable to the changes in natural resources. They 
are generally poorer, less educated, have fewer livelihood options, do not own 
agricultural land, and depend strongly upon common-pool resources such as fi sh 
and fl ooded forests for their livelihood. Differences also seemed to emerge within 
the villages between the capabilities of the poor and the better-off to respond 
to the changes in natural resources.4 Similar fi ndings were also apparent in the 
Cambodian fl oodplains (MRCS/WUP-FIN, 2006a, 2006b), in Nam Songkhram 
(MRCS/WUP-FIN, 2007a; MWBP, 2005), as well as in the Mekong Delta 
(MRCS/WUP-FIN, 2006c), where livelihood developments focusing on intensive 
agriculture and aquaculture do not seem to take the poor’s dependence upon, for 
example, wild-capture fi sheries properly into account.
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Small-scale utilization and distributing the benefi ts 
of development
Small-scale utilization of Mekong’s water resources offers a more sustainable 
basis for poverty reduction than large-scale projects. As discussed above, we 
believe that many of the current economic assessments in the Mekong Basin are 
underestimating the actual value of natural resources for local people. Following on 
from this, the common justifi cation for water development is the ‘underutilization’ 
and ‘underdevelopment’ of the basin’s resources. However, the Mekong basin is 
– through small-scale fi shing, farming, use of wetlands and fl oodplain resources 
– already extensively utilized in a variety of ways at the local level. Consequently, 
most future development options in the basin are focusing on the development 
of modern sectors such as irrigated agriculture, while a majority of the population 
in the basin actually depends upon more traditional livelihood sources (MRCS/
IBFM, 2006b; Keskinen et al, 2008). As noted by Phillips et al (2006): 
The key development paradox of the region is that economic growth 
is neces sary to bring many of the populations out of poverty, but the 
‘classical’ route involving the subsidized construction of massive infra-
structure is most unlikely to provide the optimal result in this respect for 
the poorer sections of the populations.
Indeed, we see that ‘classic’ large-scale development interventions such as irrigation 
and hydropower projects are, despite their objectives of poverty reduction, actually 
often undermining the foundations of the livelihoods of the poorest groups 
by impacting negatively upon the different common pool resources – most 
importantly, fi sheries.
Consequently, the management and development of Mekong’s water resources 
– if aiming at poverty reduction – should be based much more upon already 
existing ‘decentralized’ utilization of the Mekong’s resources. In addition to the 
actual value of this diffuse utilization, its distributional benefi ts should also be 
considered. Compared, for example, with the distribution of the benefi ts from 
hydropower dams, small-scale utilization usually allows for more equal distribution 
of the benefi ts derived from the Mekong’s resources, reaching the poorest more 
easily.5 Hence, if, for example, the value of hydropower development and of 
sustaining river fi sheries were of the same order of magnitude, in terms of poverty 
reduction, fi sheries would provide a more favourable basis due to its more equitable 
– and already existing – distribution of benefi ts.
It is important to emphasize that our fi ndings do not imply that infrastructure 
should not be built when it is needed for national economic development. What 
we are highlighting, however, is that in terms of poverty reduction, we believe that 
much more emphasis should be put on sustaining and developing existing small-
scale and local livelihood resources. Overall, small-scale infrastructure reduces risks 
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of unintended impact, better involves local stakeholders, and the distribution of 
benefi ts and costs from the project are much easier to monitor and address. This 
fi nding is also supported by the results from the ADB-funded Built Structures 
Project for the Tonle Sap Lake (CNMC and WorldFish Centre, 2007).
The recognition of the actual value of the traditional livelihood sources and 
their distributional benefi ts will most probably lead to more balanced discussion 
about the possible trade-offs required in developing the Mekong’s resources. 
When considering the huge number of different plans for Mekong’s development, 
it is worrying to notice a complete absence of well-informed and transparent 
discussion about the different trade-offs that are unavoidably required – both 
within and between the riparian countries – due to changes caused by water 
resources development. We see that there is an urgent need to acknowledge that 
water development requires trade-offs, and that the discussion about trade-offs 
is always highly political. Achieving the best compromises (where possible) on 
different trade-offs requires open and transparent discussion, access to relevant 
information by all concerned parties, as well as research focused on socio-economic 
and livelihood issues (such as small-scale fi sheries) that are most likely to experience 
radical changes.
PEOPLES’ WELL-BEING UNDER THREAT
Up until 2006, only China was actively building and pursuing mainstream dams 
in the Mekong region. Since then, there has been a sudden surge in mainstream 
dam plans within the Lower Mekong Basin in Laos, Thailand and Cambodia (see 
Chapter 2). These intentions further increase the potential for destructive impacts 
upon fi sheries in the Lower Mekong Basin. Apart from alteration of the fl ood 
pulse, changes in timing and duration of fl ooding and water levels, sedimentation 
in reservoirs, and other fl ow-related impacts such as changes in larvae and juvenile 
drift, the dams will block essential fi sh migration routes and disconnect spawning 
and living habitats. The impacts will very likely be signifi cantly bigger than in the 
so-called high-development scenario (Chinese dams and Laos tributary dams) 
that was discussed in the section on ‘Modelled fl ow change and methodological 
development needs’. The risk to people’s well-being in the basin is consequently 
magnifi ed.
This chapter has considered several issues related to living conditions in 
the Mekong region, often focusing on groups of rural poor who are particularly 
vulnerable to changes in fl oodplains. A critical question is about their life and future 
in relation to basin developments. The rural poor are defi ned as poor as a result of 
their low cash income, an indicator unable to describe their living circumstances 
and well-being. A much more important source of livelihood, however, originates 
from the rich natural resources in the basin, especially the enormously productive 
fisheries. Fisheries do not only benefit the people living next to the river or 
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the fl oodplains, but all of the Lower Mekong Basin countries, providing their 
populations with the main portion of their animal protein needs.6
It is paradoxical to talk about the poverty of the population without properly 
taking into account this enormous natural resource. Basin developments are 
repeatedly and without critical views being justifi ed by the statement that large-
scale infrastructure construction is the solution to reducing poverty, although 
there is no evidence this will lead to the claimed result. The dams are expected to 
generate income; but how will the benefi ts and costs be shared?
Chapter 12 in this volume discusses the hydropower and fi sheries trade-off 
and the storylines that are embedded within it. Friend et al identify the inherent 
assumption in the approach that society can afford to trade off fi sheries for the 
economic benefi ts of hydropower. They claim that the notion that fi sheries can 
be traded off rests on the highly questionable hypothesis that what is lost can be 
replaced. They conclude that an empirically based counter-narrative is required 
that can provide a counter-scenario where fi sheries are not merely a resource of 
conservation value, but a resource whose management is central to meeting the 
development challenges of the basin.
The destructive effects of the dams at different timescales must be included 
in the development equations, as well. The lifetime of the dams is very short 
compared to the evolution needed for the ecosystem to develop its services. The 
richest ecosystem in the Mekong Basin, the Tonle Sap fl oodplain, was created 
about 6000 years ago when the Mekong and the Tonle Sap rivers were connected 
as a consequence of an elevated sea level (Tsukawaki, 1997). Since then, part of 
the Mekong fl ood waters have entered into the lake and the surrounding terrain 
through an annual reversal of the fl ow of the Tonle Sap River, resulting in the 
ecosystem’s high biodiversity and productivity, particularly in the aquatic–terrestrial 
transition zone.
As discussed in this chapter, the modifi cation of the Tonle Sap fl ood pulse due 
to construction of hydropower dams will negatively affect fl oodplain productivity. 
Already, the cumulative effects of the Chinese dams and the Lower Mekong Basin 
tributaries dams7 have been estimated to have a signifi cant negative effect upon the 
Tonle Sap ecosystem’s productivity. It is important also to realize that permanent 
reduction in the fl ood extent and duration is not only likely to reduce fi sh catch 
and, thus, threaten livelihoods and food security, but can also threaten the long-
term sustainability of the fi sh populations by reducing their reproductive potential 
(mean size) and by making fi sh more vulnerable to capture (Halls et al, 2008). In 
addition, while the latest plans of building a number of mainstream dams in the 
Lower Mekong Basin may have a limited impact upon the fl ood pulse, they will 
critically block fi sh migration routes and disconnect spawning grounds and living 
habitats. Most of the total fi sh catch in the Lower Mekong Basin is dependent 
upon long-distance migrant species (Dugan, 2008). There is little doubt that the 
impacts upon fi sheries would be dramatically destructive.
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In terms of trade-offs, the distribution of hydropower’s benefi ts and costs 
is obviously between upstream and downstream, and between different social 
groups. It would be fair and reasonable to take these concerns as one elementary 
starting point in the development plans discussion, and to see whether the 
countries involved and their people are able to bear the consequences of losing an 
essential part of their ecosystem productivity and services. This also means taking 
social responsibility of the most affected, and being strict in assessing the impacts 
regarding general social conditions and food security risks in riparian countries.
The valuation of the fi sheries resource has been largely pending and has often 
been excluded from the basin development equations. For example, Cowx et al 
(2004) state how poorly the true value of this sector is refl ected in offi cial statistics 
and discussions of food security and livelihoods; as a consequence, fi sheries suffer in 
the face of relatively higher economical priorities such as hydropower. As highlighted 
by Sokhem and Sunada (2006), one of the key problems in the Mekong Basin is 
that the value of the fi sheries resource is usually ill defi ned, severely undervalued 
and poorly represented from both an economic and social perspective.
Recent efforts to truly value the Mekong fi sheries (e.g. by the MRC Fisheries 
Programme) are expected to give a more valid starting point to assess the well-
being of people and give improved means to compare development impacts and 
prices.8 It is necessary to try to estimate the real value of fi sh and fi sheries: fi rst, 
to highlight their importance for livelihoods, as well as to draw a more realistic 
picture of people’s well-being and their vulnerability to change. There are many 
indicators and indices developed and available for assessing people’s well-being and 
life quality that can be used as starting points to make such an evaluation in the 
Mekong (Henderson, 1996; Prescott-Allen, 2001).
Molle (2006) pointed out several risks in large water infrastructure projects. 
The challenges, he argues, are how to ensure that:
• projects are not primarily moved by bureaucracies seeking to perpetuate them-
selves or by the fi nancial and political interests of decision-makers; 
• displaced people are fairly compensated (the lack of a voice from poor rural 
people in many countries suggests that attention to their fate will remain 
limited); 
• benefi ts are not captured by, and concentrated upon, a few well-off elites, and 
costs and risks are not borne by poorer people; and 
• development alternatives are fairly assessed.
In the case of the Mekong region, the worst scenario – made more likely with 
the recent boom of dam projects – is that hydropower development will be given 
priority, with nil or insuffi cient consideration of, or compensation to, the diverse 
groups of people undergoing the negative impacts of that development. It is hard 
to see how the costs and benefi ts of this development will be fairly balanced – both 
within and between the riparian countries. Unfortunately, the MRC has so far, 
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despite its mandate and constitution (the 1995 Mekong Agreement), done very 
little to ensure that a worst-case scenario does not unfold (see Chapter 14).
The conventional economic development path currently pursued in the 
Mekong is fraught with risks. It is necessary to step back to properly see and assess 
the plausible alternatives and their implications. We propose a radical strengthening 
of development dialogues that places emphasis on broad multi-stakeholder 
participation. We anticipate that this would bring to the fore the uneven sharing 
of burdens, costs, benefi ts and risks between upstream and downstream, as well 
as between different social groups. This kind of fi nding will most probably draw 
more attention to the potential of alternative, smaller-scale, development options. 
In addition, it will demand vastly improved dissemination of information relating 
to development projects with the result that the public will be better engaged in 
scrutinizing proposals, promises and potential impacts. 
This radical change needs to be supported by research and continuing 
improvement of the methods for assessing development project impacts, improving 
their accuracy, transparency and credibility. In this process, the MRC still has an 
unfulfi lled potential. Through credible and comprehensive assessment tools and 
constructive dialogue with different partners, it can still become a key organization 
in helping to fi nd an appropriate balance between acceptable levels of hydropower 
development and the maintenance of fi sheries as a vital environmental and social 
resource in the basin.
NOTES
1 The Mekong basin-wide distributed hydrological Variable Infi ltration Capacity (VIC) 
model provides an existing tool and opportunity to improve the hydrological basin 
development simulations (Costa-Cabral et al, 2007). Connected with the WUP-FIN 
Lower Mekong Basin river and fl oodplain model (MRCS/WUP-FIN, 2007b), the 
coupled system largely responds to the needs and complexity of the Mekong Basin and 
its ecosystem. Both the VIC and WUP-FIN models have water quality and ecosystem 
productivity simulation capability.
2 This refers to the integrated basin fl ow management process of the MRC.
3 FR3 represents the potential high developments in the basin, as foreseen in 2003 
(including the Chinese mainstream and Laos tributaries hydropower dams).
4 This conclusion is also supported by the fi ndings of the ADB-supported Built 
Structures Project (CNMC and WorldFish Centre, 2007)
5 Distribution of the benefi ts from different common pool resources (such as fi sheries) 
is naturally not without problems either: the poorest groups, in particular, often have 
problems getting equal access to these resources. 
6 Hortle (2007) summarizes the available information on consumption and yields of 
inland fi sh and other aquatic animals (OAA) in the Lower Mekong Basin, reaching 
an estimate of the total consumption of fi sh and OAA at about 2.1 million tonnes 
per year and 0.5 million tonnes per year, respectively. Annual consumption of inland 
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fi sh plus OAAs as country averages is in the range of 40kg to 50kg per capita, and its 
portion of all animal protein consumption values is high across the LMB (as high as 
82 per cent in Cambodia).
7 So-called high-development scenario, designed during BDP phase 1.
8 The current estimates for the economic values (fi rst-sale value) of freshwater fi sh and 
aquatic products range between US$1 billion and US$1.5 billion (Ahmed et al, 1998; 
MRC, 2002; Baran, 2005; MRCS/IBFM, 2006a). Including all multiplier effects, the 
fi shery is worth several times more than this fi gure and its replacement value is far 
higher (Baran, 2005).
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The ‘Greening of Isaan’: 
Politics, Ideology and 
Irrigation Development 
in the Northeast of Thailand
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INTRODUCTION
Large-scale and comprehensive development of river basins is a child of colonialism. 
Massive irrigation development in India, Egypt and Sudan by the British, emulated 
by the French or the Dutch, heralded a new area of the colonial economy. Large 
swathes of arid lands were brought under cultivation for the production of 
industrial crops such as cotton, sugarcane or rice. After gaining independence, 
national governments took over the colonial model in an attempt to deliver the 
promises of ‘development’ and foster economic growth in rural areas, and were 
infl uenced by the full basin development model of the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(Molle, 2006). The worldwide development of water regulation infrastructures and 
irrigated areas in the period of 1950 to 1980 achieved many benefi ts, including 
increased incomes, yields and production, and a global food suffi ciency refl ected 
until recent days in long-term declining grain prices (Molden et al, 2007). In the 
absence of opportunity costs for labour, such rural development projects had large 
multiplier effects and their economic justifi cation was quite strong.
With time, because of the opposition to dams, declining cost-benefi t ratios 
and – perhaps – the very successes achieved in terms of food production, such 
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projects have lost their economic appeal and funding by leading development banks 
dramatically dropped during the late 1990s. In the last fi ve years or so, however, 
a fresh rhetoric of justifi cation for large-scale water projects was observed1 and 
calls for renewed investments in agriculture have been made after the recent food 
crisis. A number of countries have implemented or fl oated proposals for massive 
interbasin diversion projects (e.g. China, India, Jordan, Brazil). Whether they are 
justifi ed by hydropower generation, fl ood control, urban supply or irrigation, dams 
and canals and many megaprojects still feature prominently on the agenda of many 
governments (see Chapter 11).
Planners and politicians in dry countries have frequently been captivated by the 
‘desert bloom’ syndrome, whether this led them to embracing small-scale irrigation 
or large-scale river engineering. Irrigation is still often seen as a redemptive 
solution and politicians have long seized the promise of water and the pledge to 
‘green the desert’ as an electoral trump card. It has also been the favoured option 
of governments seeking to ensure national food security, alleviate poverty and 
control potential social unrest (Sampath, 1992; Abu Zeid, 2001). The northeast 
of Thailand although not arid by any standard, is considered the driest and poorest 
region of Thailand. If rice cultivation, supplied by derivation of small streams, 
has been practised in valley bottoms for centuries, the expansion of cultivation on 
higher lands has made irrigation a crucial instrument of control of both climatic 
and social uncertainty.
This chapter fi rst recounts the chronology of river basin development in 
northeast Thailand, reviewing the different projects that have been planned, 
designed, dreamed of, and sometimes implemented during the last 60 years.2 
The ensuing section focuses on the rationale and justifi cations, the ideological 
underpinning, and the political and strategic dimensions of these successive 
projects. We are concerned here with the governance of large-scale project planning 
and with the justifi cations brought up by the national and foreign proponents (or 
opponents) of these projects. We hold that ideology and politics are overarching 
drivers of water resource development and that the way in which dominant players 
are able to cast their agenda largely determines outcome. Yet, there is evidence that 
the political arena where development trajectories are shaped is also conditioned by 
both supranational evolutions and the growing clout of players from civil society 
at large.
THE ‘GREENING OF ISAAN’: A RECURRING SYNDROME
Isaan, or the northeast of Thailand, makes up 85 per cent of the Thai territory that 
drains to the Mekong River (Koontanakulvong, 2006). The main river systems in 
the northeast are the Mun, the Chi (the main tributary of the Mun) and the Nam 
Songkhram. The largest sub-basin by far is the Chi-Mun Basin, which roughly 
covers 120,000km2 and empties into the Mekong River at Khong Chiam. Rainfall 
THE ‘GREENING OF ISAAN’ 255
in the northeast is seasonally distributed, with around 85 per cent of the total 
annual precipitation concentrated in the months from May to October, making 
irrigation a necessity if year-round cultivation is contemplated. Soils are generally 
considered of poor quality for agricultural production and yields are much lower 
than the national averages. The 0.9 million hectares of irrigated land only amounts 
to 10 per cent of the region’s cultivated land.
Northeast Thailand is often identifi ed with underdevelopment and stands out 
as the poorest region of the country. Although the percentage of the population 
living below the poverty line has fallen dramatically (from 57 per cent in 1962 to 
38.5 per cent in 1976 and 12.7 per cent in 1996), poverty remains higher in rural 
areas, in general (16 per cent), and the northeast, in particular (26 per cent), where 
this diminution has been slower (Fan et al, 2004). The region distinguishes itself 
by a higher degree of specialization in rice farming, a higher rate of subsistence 
farmers, a lower use of agrochemicals, indebtedness of two farmers out of fi ve, 
and a low density of industrial units that produce only 4 per cent of the national 
manufacturing added value (World Bank and NESDB, 2005). As a result of this 
situation, the development of water resources, in general, and of irrigation, in 
particular, has always been a top priority of planners and politicians since World 
War II (e.g. Sneddon, 2000, 2002).
Early development and piecemeal projects
Securing, expanding, intensifying and irrigating agriculture in Isaan has been taken 
as a mission by most decision-makers during the last 60 years. This section briefl y 
recounts the chronology of water resources planning and development in Isaan. 
The ensuing one focuses on justifi cations and motivations.
Traditionally, irrigation in the northeast was confi ned to the alluvial soils of 
the valley bottoms of the secondary rivers, where earthen weirs, locally referred to 
as thamnop, were used to divert streams to the paddy fi elds (Neawchampa, 1999). 
Fukui and Hoshikawa (2003) reported that in 1920 as many as 503 earthen bunds 
could be found in the province of Nakhon Ratchasima alone. They also argue that 
irrigation of paddy fi elds around the Chi-Mun Basin was the norm rather than the 
exception, with cultivated fi elds located in the alluvial plains and valley bottoms. 
Additional storage was limited to natural or small village ponds, which catered for 
a variety of domestic water uses and provided water security in the dry season.
State-sponsored irrigation started in northeast Thailand in 1939, when the 
Royal Irrigation Department (RID) experimented with pilot tank irrigation 
projects and river diversion weirs. C. Kambhu, the charismatic head of the RID 
in the 1950s, was an early advocate of small-scale solutions and vigorously argued 
for small- and medium-scale reservoirs as the best option for Isaan (Kambhu, 
1956). Further to these early efforts, small-scale development intensified in 
1951 with the ‘tank programme’, initiated with US assistance (USBR, 1965). In 
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1963, a total storage capacity of 250,000m3 had been attained, with 40,000ha 
of potentially irrigable land that added to 100,000ha potentially served by river 
diversion schemes.
The hydraulic mission: Large- and medium-scale developments
The diffi culty of managing diversions of unregulated fl ows and the somewhat slow 
and tedious implementation of the Tank Programme during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s led the RID to look into possibilities of large-scale storage projects 
(Floch et al, 2007). Based on a Japanese reconnaissance survey of Mekong major 
tributaries (EPDC, 1960), the newly formed Mekong Committee proposed to 
submit two irrigation and fi ve multipurpose dam projects to lending agencies 
‘after thorough feasibility studies’, and listed a total of 16 large-scale projects, 
which together would potentially store 9.2 billion cubic metres and serve an 
irrigable area of 278,720ha. In 1965, the United States Bureau of Reclamation 
(USBR) conducted the fi rst river basin development planning study for the Chi-
Mun Basin with the principle objective of recommending a ‘programme for the 
orderly economic development of the Chi-Mun Basin, and to establish an order 
of priority for undertaking feasibility grade surveys on the potential projects in the 
basin’ (USBR, 1965). Though slightly differing, all of these planning documents 
pointed to the importance of large-scale irrigation and multipurpose development, 
and identifi ed the few topographically suitable sites that later would guide planners 
and decision-makers time and again during the following 50 years.
The fi rst implemented large-scale storage project in northeast Thailand was 
the Nam Pung hydropower project, which was fi nalized in 1965, followed by the 
Ubol Ratana Dam in 1966, the Lam Pao Reservoir in 1968, the Lam Takhong 
Reservoir in 1969, the Lam Pra Plerng in 1970, the Sirindhorn Reservoir in 
1971, and the Chulabhorn Dam in 1972 (see Figure 10.1). The most favourable 
sites for large-scale construction were developed within a timeframe of only ten 
years, leaving only the Upper Chi, the Nam Yang and the Lam Dom Yai rivers 
unharnessed by large-scale infrastructure. At the same time, medium-scale water 
resources development was also increasingly pursued and totalled close to 400 
million cubic metres) of storage by 1978.
Small is beautiful?
In 1975 the government of then Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj made funding 
available (through sub-district or tambon funds) for small-scale water infrastructure, 
notably several thousand village ponds and weirs in Isaan (Bruns, 1991). In 1978, 
the Thai government established an Accelerated Water Resource Development 
Committee and the sub-district funds were transformed by military governments 
into the Rural Economy Rehabilitation Programme and, in 1980, the Job Creation 
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Programme, both of which primarily included water resources development 
projects. Implementation was, more often than not, problematic, with reportedly 
up to 80 to 90 per cent of the weirs constructed under this programme said to 
have faced technical problems and to have failed (Bruns, 1991).
In 1978, in the wake of a few years marked by a communist insurgency, politi-
cal turmoil and farmers’ protests, the government adopted a two-pronged water 
policy with a focus on:
• the development of distribution systems from reservoirs and rivers; and 
• the development of small-scale resource projects in every village as a means of 
meeting basic domestic water needs and allowing for minimal supplementary 
irrigation and for minimal dry season irrigation of backyard gardens (AIT, 
1978).3 
The 1978 study by the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT) found that a maximum 
of 115,200ha were potentially irrigable in northeast Thailand (i.e. roughly 12 
Figure 10.1 Major infrastructure in the Chi-Mun Basin and the 1965 US Bureau 
of Reclamation (USBR) vision of full development
Source: Adapted from USBR (1965)
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per cent of the arable land suitable for agricultural production). The survey 
predicted problems of shortages during the dry season and the experience with 
small-scale projects was deemed ‘discouraging’. The Royal Irrigation Department’s 
own efforts to continue the development of the remaining sites that had been 
identifi ed earlier as suitable for large-scale water resources development were now 
considered inappropriate by the National Economic and Social Development 
Board (NESDB), which made it considerably harder to implement them. The 
Lam Dom Yai and Upper Chi projects had been repeatedly studied; but both 
were eventually dropped by decision-makers because resettlement diffi culties were 
considered insurmountable. And it was only the relatively smaller Lam Nang Rong 
Project (1991), the Upper Mun Reservoir (1996) and the Lam Chae Dam (1998) 
that the RID could implement during this period of time, none of which matched 
the earlier projects in scale.
Because of these difficulties, the RID increasingly developed small- and 
medium-scale irrigation projects on basically all tributaries and watersheds in 
Isaan, with over 4000 small-scale irrigation projects, storing over 800 million 
cubic metres (Boonlue, 2005), built between 1978 and the present day. These 
projects were paralleled by 600 small-scale projects implemented by the Offi ce of 
Accelerated Rural Development and numerous additional programmes, including 
the Thai–New Zealand Project (Hafner, 1987), during the early 1980s, and the 
German-funded Small Irrigation Projects (SIP).
In parallel with the Royal Irrigation Department’s construction efforts in 
northeast Thailand, a new and increasingly powerful actor – the National Energy 
Authority (NEA) – emerged during the late 1970s. The NEA started to implement 
electric pumping stations along the main rivers of the country, each station 
typically serving an area of 500ha located within 1km of the stream. The NEA 
had constructed the fi rst hydropower project in northeast Thailand, the Nam 
Pung, and was now looking for means of promoting the utilization of the energy 
generated. It is estimated that some 1000 pumping stations have been implemented 
in northeast Thailand between the late 1970s and the present day (Boonlue, 2005). 
Considered together, all of these investments make northeast Thailand a region 
with a diversifi ed and diffuse irrigation infrastructure that started to reshape the 
land and waterscape of the region.
Water imports and regional water resource developments
It was recognized, early into the reconnaissance surveys of northeast Thailand, that 
internal water resources were ill suited for the development scenarios envisioned by 
planners and decision-makers. A low runoff-to-rainfall ratio and a mostly fl at and 
undulating topography (which puts considerable limits on surface water storage 
and gravity diversions) made planners look into ways to import water from the 
Mekong River from the onset. In the Mekong dam cascade – a series of dams 
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planned to be built on the mainstream Mekong River considered in early plans – 
import into, and distribution throughout, the region hinged on the Pa Mong Dam 
that was to be constructed 20km upstream of Vientiane. As the implementation of 
the Pa Mong began to appear increasingly distant, Thai authorities and planning 
partners explored other options to augment water supply in northeast Thailand 
in the continued effort to ‘Green Isaan’.
The ‘Green Isaan’ Project
The fi rst regional study that looked into ways to make northeast Thailand bloom 
was aptly called ‘Isaan Khiew’, or ‘Green Isaan’. The fi fth national economic and 
social development plan (1981 to 1986) had (for the fi rst time and on the grounds 
of ‘national security’) included greater social and economic equity as an objective: 
a poverty alleviation programme identifi ed the 12,652 poorest villages (60 per 
cent of which were located in Isaan) and showered them with water supply, roads, 
schools, irrigation, electrifi cation and soil improvement (Baker and Phongpaichit, 
2005). In 1987, Thai Army Commander-in-Chief General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh 
was aiming to become prime minister and, in an attempt to build political support 
in Isaan, undertook to present His Majesty the King with a master plan for the 
development of the north-eastern region. A severe drought had just hit northeast 
Thailand, and the project was presented as a response to it (Bruns, 1991). The 
report, prepared by British Biwater Company, was presented to General Chavalit in 
late 1987 and was geared towards the accelerated development of water resources, 
ensuring water supply, increasing reforestation and improving rural incomes 
(Biwater, 1987). The project met with ‘considerable criticism and scepticism’ from 
politicians and academics (Bruns, 1991).
With irrigation seen as an essential input for regional development, the study to 
detailed strategies for water resources development. Numerous projects of all sizes 
were identifi ed and it was thought possible to store almost 5 billion cubic metres 
of additional water (basically the sum of all technically feasible storage sites at full 
development, regardless of costs), serving an additional 288,000ha. Additionally, 
Biwater looked into inter-basin transfer options (some of them studied earlier) 
worth an additional 448,000ha. Even though Chavalit tried to negotiate a loan 
agreement with the World Bank, the proposed project did not materialize beyond 
a few eucalyptus or cashew nut plantations and a few failed agricultural projects.
The Khong-Chi-Mun Project
After the failure to implement the ‘Green Isaan’ plans, a new grand project 
was elaborated upon by the NEA under the banner of the Khong-Chi-Mun 
Project (KCM). The project largely drew from earlier planning documents that 
had accumulated over the years and integrated them within one large planning 
framework. The Rasi Salai Dam, for example, had already been studied in 1982 
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by Dutch consultant NEDECO (1982), who had earlier assisted the Mekong 
Secretariat in studying pump irrigation in Isaan and the use of fl oodplains for 
storage,4 and became a trademark of the KCM project (RID, 1988).
In 1989, the proposed Khong-Chi-Mun Project received a boost from the 
government of then Prime Minister General Chatichai Choonhavan (1988 to 
1991), whose declared intention ‘to turn the battlefi elds [of Indochina] into 
marketplaces’ soon became the semi-offi cial policy for development plans in north-
eastern Thailand (Pednekar, 1997; Kamkongsak and Law, 2001). The feasibility 
studies completed in 1992 by the NEA (which later became the Department for 
Energy Development and Promotion, or DEDP) claimed that it was technically 
feasible to irrigate an area of 796,800ha in 15 provinces, with construction being 
envisioned in three successive stages over a period of 42 years (ASEAN et al, 
1992; see also Figure 10.2 for a general layout of the project at the proposed full 
development).
Unlike the earlier Green Isaan Project, however, the KCM project infrastructure 
was (only partly) implemented. Some weirs in the Chi and Mun fl oodplains were 
constructed and new and larger pumping stations complemented the already 
impressive number of small-scale electric pumping stations constructed in earlier 
years by the NEA. Construction of the Rasi Salai Weir/Dam on the Lower Mun 
River was completed in 1994, followed by the Huana Dam, the largest dam 
structure within the overall scheme. Both projects triggered land disputes and 
salinization impacts, sustained protest from the local population whose livelihoods 
depended upon the services so far provided by the fl oodplains, and drew heavy 
criticism from civil society and academics, which pointed to the lack of research, 
transparency and participation (Sretthachau et al, 2000; Rasi Salai Declaration, 
2003; Shannon, 2005).
Despite the outcry, in 1997, then Prime Minister General Chavalit gave full 
support to the KCM project as the only way to ensure suffi cient water supply to 
the ‘long-suffering farmers of the northeast’ and waved the long-held promise of 
‘turning the northeast green’ in front of an assembly of village and district chiefs 
gathered in a fi ve-star hotel in the city of Khon Kaen (Sneddon, 2003). With the 
advent of the fi nancial crisis in 1997, large-scale capital-intensive projects were once 
again shelved. The KCM remained incomplete, with its cascade of weirs along the 
Chi and Mun lower reaches challenged on social and environmental grounds, few 
of the planned pumping stations effectively implemented, and with no additional 
water imported from the Mekong River.
The Water Grid
It was not until 2003 that the next avatar of the ‘greening’ syndrome materialized, 
when the Thaksin government launched the idea of investing US$5 billion in a 
project supposed to do away with water problems in the country (see full details 
in Molle and Floch, 2008). Despite the alleged priority given to water demand 
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management (i.e. improving effi ciency and reducing demand) proclaimed in the 
Ninth National Plan (2002 to 2006), it was announced that the irrigated land of 
29.46 million rai would be incremented by an additional 103 million rai within fi ve 
years, with the expected benefi t of enabling farmers to cultivate and access water 
all year round. Although project targets announced in the newspapers proved to 
be fuzzy and contradictory, they all pointed to a dramatic increase in irrigated land 
(Molle and Floch, 2008). Borrowing from the power-generation sector, the project 
was dubbed ‘Water Grid’, to describe a set of interconnected reservoirs and basins 
allowing for the movement of water from sources to water-defi cient areas.5
The north-eastern region was to be the major benefi ciary of the development 
project, with projects including the Nam Ngum-Chi-Mun Project, which would 
transfer over 4 billion cubic metres of water from the Mae Ngum Dam in Laos 
through a siphon under the Mekong River, with pumping stations allowing transfer 
to the Chi Basin. Figure 10.3 sketches out this project, as well as other companion 
projects for the northeast region.
Figure 10.2 The Khong-Chi-Mun Project: General layout 
and typical infrastructure 
Source: ASEAN et al (1992)
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In early 2004, the project came under fire from several quarters, including 
academics doubting its economic profi tability (Bangkok Post, 2004a), as well as 
environmentalists predicting salinity problems or recalling that earlier pilot projects 
had failed (Bangkok Post, 2004b, 2004c). Water experts such as Senator Pramote 
Maiklad opined that the ‘project is neither cost effective nor feasible in terms of 
engineering techniques’ (Bangkok Post, 2004c) and its timetable unrealistic (The 
Straits Times, 2003). In late 2005, the government also planned to spend up to 1.7 
trillion baht (US$43 billion) over fi ve years on megaprojects aimed at boosting 
activity and reducing poverty, including investments in the irrigation sector 
(MOAC, 2006). All of these plans were largely temporarily set aside following the 
2006 coup that ended the administration of Prime Minister Thaksin.
Transfers from Laos and other recent alternatives
Although the grand projects of the Thaksin era seemed to have faded into oblivion, 
the idea of tapping water from Laos tributaries of the Mekong River, siphoning 
it under the river and using it in Isaan, reappeared in 2007. This idea, also part 
of the Water Grid, was fi rst tested in 1998 by Sanyu Consultants, who envisaged 
building two dams on the Xe Banghiang River in Laos, close to the confl uence with 
Figure 10.3 Water Grid in northeast Thailand
Source: Floch et al (2007)
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the Mekong, from which 3.3 billion cubic metres of water could also be abstracted 
and siphoned under the Mekong into Isaan (RiversWatch, 2002). Another plan 
studied by Sanyu in 2004 considered siphoning water off the Nam Ngum Dam 
in Laos to the Huay Luang stream. While this option is technically feasible, the 
expected cost of 0.5 baht for 1 cubic metre of water raises serious doubts about 
the economic relevance of the project. In 2008, a study fi nanced by the World 
Bank and the French Agence Française de Développement (AFD) was carried out 
to examine the possibility of diverting water from the Nam Ngum and Xe Bangfai 
rivers (in Laos), but did not lend support to further investigation on that matter.
In 2006, a trade journal announced that a newly formed Thai agency, the 
Department of Alternative Energy Development and Effi ciency,6 was reviewing 
plans at Pa Mong and Sambor (on the mainstream of the Mekong), and that 
a private Thai engineering fi rm (Panya Consultants) would conduct a US$2.4 
million study revisiting a total of seven sites fi rst identifi ed by bureau staff in 1952 
(Biggs, 2006).
In June 2008, the newly elected Prime Minister Samak announced his 
intention to spend US$15 billion in megaprojects, with US$5 billion targeted 
for water diversions (Ekachai, 2008). One plan was a 600 million cubic metre 
diversion from Huay Luang to Lam Pao Dam, with a second phase expected to 
bring water from the Nam Ngum River in Laos (a revival of earlier discredited 
studies). Another plan is linked to the study of three run-of-the-river dams on 
the Mekong mainstream, with one located in Pak Chom (upstream of Vientiane, 
close to the site of the Pa Mong Dam) targeted to divert water by gravity to the 
Lam Pao Reservoir ‘through underground tunnels to Loei and Udon Thani, where 
reservoirs will act as distribution centres to send the water on to farms in other 
provinces during the dry season. The water will be transported through small 
pipelines’ (Charoenpo, 2008). Most recently, the project to siphon water from the 
Nam Ngum River won cabinet approval (Wipatayotin, 2008). The desert bloom 
syndrome is, thus, alive and well.
ASPECTS AND CROSS-CUTTING THEMES
The storyline of the development of water resources in the Chi-Mun River basins 
presents a number of recurring themes that are analysed in this section. They 
include the justifi cations given and the politics of water resource development, 
the engineering ethos and lopsided governance patterns.
Meta-discourses and the rhetoric of justifi cation
Stigmatizing Isaan as ‘poor and dry’, Thailand’s development agencies saw water 
resources development as the key solution to the problems of the region as early 
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as the 1950s (Sneddon, 2002). Development was the post-war magic wand that 
would partly come from joint regional development of the Mekong River Basin 
(see Molle and Floch, 2008). Investment in dams, pumps and tube-wells, but also 
roads, electrifi cation or eucalyptus plantations, would bring prosperity. In the 
Green Isaan Project, for example, the establishment of agro-industry was the focal 
point of development and would:
… produce the processed goods for regional export, create employment 
opportunity in the urban areas and create the demand for agricultural 
products. … Irrigation, required to produce raw materials for the agro-
processing industry, will create wealth and job opportunities in the 
rural areas. (Biwater, 1987)
The standard description of Isaan ascribes its lack of development to natural causes: 
unpredictable climate, ‘dryness’, poor soils, lack of storage, population pressure, 
or ‘traditional’, if not backward, farming practices: all putative reasons why ‘the 
Northeast has historically lagged behind other regions’ (World Bank, 1975). 
These perceived defi ciencies inevitably lead to calls for increased water storage and 
irrigation infrastructure, and, secondarily, roads and better links to markets, as well 
as, occasionally, improved social services. Irrigation is generally justifi ed by positive 
(desert bloom) or negative (cracked soils during water shortages) images and by 
the mere observation that farmers in irrigated areas are better off than in rain-fed 
areas. Then Prime Minister Thaksin, for example, reportedly said that ‘it would 
not be a problem if the [Water Grid] project required a lot of money because it 
would be worthwhile eventually’; likewise, the deputy prime minister in charge of 
the project saw the project as ‘a worthwhile investment because it will benefi t 30 
to 40 million people nationwide’ (The Nation, 2003).7 Prime Minister Samak’s 
recent proposal is also ‘an ambitious water project aimed at helping farmers in the 
Northeast, the country’s poorest region’ (Charoenpo, 2008). That ‘every farmer, 
especially those from the 19 provinces in the Northeast, should have access to water’ 
(The Nation, 2004) seemed to be taken as an uncontroversial and desirable future, 
with no reference whatsoever to costs or alternative options.
Another classical means of furthering projects is to propose them under the 
umbrella of politically charged and overriding meta-justifi cations (Molle, 2008). 
Such meta-justifi cations typically include national goals or priorities such as food 
self-suffi ciency, national security, ‘modernization’, or the fi ght against poverty. 
Justifi cations for developing the Water Grid, in general, and irrigation, in particular, 
were based on arguments that merely emphasized expected benefi ts and were 
shrouded in a pro-poor rhetoric that magnifi ed the assumed power of the state 
and attendant benefi ts. Thaksin ‘vowed to eradicate all water-related problems 
plaguing the country, which he said were major hurdles in the government’s war 
on poverty’, and the study, to be completed within a year, would design ‘projects 
to control levels of water in 25 river basins, to help rehabilitate forest and soil 
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resources’, helping him to meet his goal of eradicating poverty by 2009 (The Straits 
Times, 2003). The ‘war on poverty’ was clearly branded as an overriding meta-
justifi cation that offered a means to silence opposition since, obviously, nobody is 
against poverty reduction.
A major meta-justifi cation of water resource development in Isaan, well until 
the mid 1970s, was the threat of communism, used by both the US and the Thai 
military to justify their objectives (Bell, 1969). The scare of communism was used 
to legitimate foreign aid, military build-up and suppression of opposition to the 
regime (Darling, 1965). Such meta-justifi cations present projects as the result 
of ‘pressing needs’ that bear no contestation. In 1988, the then Armed Forces 
Chief General Sunthorn Kongsompong, for example, was reported to say that it 
is ‘necessary for us to launch a campaign like the Green Northeast project. It is 
a matter of national security and the Northeast is of much strategic importance’ 
(Labournet, 2004). 
The politics of water resource development also often include manipulation 
of symbolic power. The July 2003 workshop on Sustainable Water Resource 
Management organized for the launching of the Water Grid was opened with a 
quote from His Majesty the King:
The main point is the need of water for consumption, water for agri-
culture because water is life. People can’t live without water. People can 
live without electricity. If there is electricity but no water, people can’t 
live. 
Symbolic support from the king is frequently marshalled by recalling his fondness 
for irrigation and rural development and his support of dams for fl ood protection. 
The Green Isaan Project was thus aptly billed Nam Pratan Nai Luang – that is, 
Water from the King – while opposition to projects such as the Pasak Cholasit Dam 
were effi ciently silenced by stressing the king’s patronage of the dam.
An interview with C. Roongrueng (1999), a former director general of the 
Royal Irrigation Department, provides a textbook illustration of the range of 
discursive devices that are mobilized to justify more infrastructure:
At present, the quantity of water is not suffi cient because of an increase 
in the population which has led to more demand for water. … And 
because many forests have been destroyed, water cannot be retained. So 
it became necessary that we build a big reservoir to retain water for the 
dry season. … The increased population has led to more agriculture and 
more demand for water. It would be good if people were not born. But 
since the population has increased, everything has been affected.
However, water is a necessity. When there is a water shortage, it 
is the RID who is responsible for it. We have tried to propose every 
solution to solve the problems. … Nowadays, in the IMF [International 
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Monetary Fund] time, the population in Bangkok has decreased because 
some people have gone back to agriculture. But they would not have 
water if the RID did not provide them with water sources. How could 
we survive? Luckily, the RID has prepared for this.
I think we are ‘lost’. Many people have imitated foreigners. They 
want to preserve resources without them being fully developed. It is 
necessary to develop everything to its full capacity before preserving it. If 
we preserved our natural resources, what could we use? Would you want 
to buy them from elsewhere? ... Many people ask why we want to do it 
[inter-basin diversion project]. It is because it is a duty we have been 
assigned. We have learned to fi nd water for you, not for ourselves. You 
live well right now because of what we have done in the past.
The statement borrows from faulty hydrological knowledge, glosses over the fact 
that urban needs hardly total 15 per cent of water diversions, does not discuss how 
farmers’ ‘needs’ are themselves related to past irrigation overdevelopment, stresses 
the ills of population and urban growth that leave no choice to dutiful engineers, 
contrasts their disinterested mission with the irresponsibility of dissenters and 
with the foolishness of foreigners, and concludes by closing the debate (‘there is 
no alternative’).
Whether out of good intentions or as channels of offi cial statements, the media 
also often contributes to turning unavoidability into common wisdom. Recently, 
for example, the Bangkok Post (2007) discussed the hypothesis that at some 
time in the future Thailand would not be able to feed its own people and would 
depend upon food imports, having ‘to fork over a hard-earned foreign exchange 
advantage to buy ever more expensive food’, pointing to the imperative to ‘never 
abandon its determination to maintain food security’. Alarmist discourses are 
also commonplace, as illustrated by a high offi cial justifying a project because the 
[Phetchaburi] province ran the risk of ‘becoming a ‘desert’ because the province 
received less rainfall than the amount of water evaporating from its soil (Bangkok 
Post, 2004b). Clichés of the region as ‘the water-starved Northeast’ (Bangkok Post, 
2008), widely resorted to by the KCM and other project proponents (see Figure 
10.4), implicitly legitimize supply augmentation projects.
The stigma of drought and fl ood and the ‘naturalization’ of poverty in Isaan 
divert attention from other structural aspects of regional development. Extension 
of upland and fi bre crops in the 1960s, or of eucalyptus in the 1980s, has benefi ted 
large urban-based entrepreneurs. The region’s agricultural surpluses have been 
tapped for export, the benefi ts of which are appropriated by the metropolis, with 
only marginal changes in technology or living standards in the producing areas 
(Bell, 1969).
THE ‘GREENING OF ISAAN’ 267
Geopolitics and politics
Post-war Mekong geopolitics has been a central determinant of government 
interventions in Isaan until the mid 1970s. The political situation dictated that 
Thailand would be the only country to be able to benefit from US/Western 
willingness to help develop water resources in the region – a country that would 
fully embrace the objective of combating the spread of communism by investing 
in rural infrastructures. Indeed, a major objective of small-scale investment pro-
grammes, as well as major efforts to open up so-called ‘pink areas’ by expanding 
road networks, was countering insurgency.
Security considerations have been paramount in the composition of the 
US aid programme in Thailand (which started with the communist takeover in 
China in 1949, and the spread of internal communist insurrection in Myanmar/
Burma, Malaya and the Philippines).8 As Steinberg (1986) pointed out, US 
Figure 10.4 Cover of promotional material for the Khong-Chi-Mun Project
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interventions ‘at their most naive … have been justifi ed by the “domino theory”, 
[and] at a sophisticated level they have attempted to help the Thai authorities 
establish productive sovereignty over their periphery’. By 1973, the US Agency 
for International Development (USAID) director in Thailand characterized the 
programme in Thailand as consisting of two types: security with development 
aspects; and development with security aspects (Hill, 1973).
As mentioned earlier, one of the major security-related programmes, funded 
by the US and the World Bank (World Bank, 1975), was the Accelerated Rural 
Development Programme (ARD), which constructed rural feeder roads, potable 
water systems and small-scale irrigation systems in security-sensitive areas in north 
and northeast Thailand. It was designed in such a way as to integrate remote and 
ethically diverse regions and to allow the central government to exert control over 
these areas (Steinberg, 1986). Jacobs (1971) described it as ‘an ambitious direct 
action, paternalistic, government-service programme, frankly aimed at winning 
friends for the existing political order’, and one that would deliver to the villagers 
what the central government thought they would need. Later on, the then director 
of the United States Overseas Mission (USOM) would comment that ‘it is a known 
fact, disputed only in degree because of the inadequacy of the information available, 
that during those 23 years [of US assistance to Thailand] the poorest segment of 
the population has benefi ted least from all those expenditures’ (Hill, 1973).
Although concerned by these geopolitical considerations, Thai politicians 
also saw massive public investments as a means of procuring private political and 
fi nancial gains. By associating themselves with a large water project and conjuring 
up images of water abundance in order to dispel precariousness and poverty, 
politicians expect to establish political support and constituencies. This explains 
the ever-returning grand development projects reviewed earlier. Announcements 
of non-credible targets reveal the political motivations of these projects. The Green 
Isaan Project, for example, promised to make the northeast ‘green’ within fi ve years 
by improving water resources and raising the percentage of forest areas (Bruns, 
1991), while the 1991 regional development plan for the lower northeast region 
foresaw industrial development in the region, with Korat destined to become the 
‘Detroit of Thailand’ (Bruns, 1991). Likewise, in 1997, General Chavalit reiterated 
the promise to ‘turn the Northeast green’, while Thaksin’s Water Grid was to 
triple Thailand’s irrigated area in fi ve years with ‘a nationwide tap water system … 
installed by 2005 so that villagers and farmers throughout the country can enjoy 
running water all year round’ (Bangkok Post, 2004c).
Notwithstanding the infl uence of external factors and the political gains 
sought by politicians, the Thai administration also pursued its own version of the 
hydraulic mission enmeshed in local and national politics (Floch et al, 2007). As 
elsewhere, water resource development stood at the confl uence of interest groups 
motivated by professional, fi nancial or political gains (Molle, 2008). As explained 
by Bruns (1991):
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Irrigation projects are large and visible rewards that politicians can 
offer in exchange for support. Members of Parliament are active in 
lobbying RID for projects at the request of their constituencies. MPs and 
representatives in provincial assemblies may be contractors themselves or 
have links to them and stand to gain from building projects funded by 
the Job Creation Programme or the provincial administration. At the 
national level there has been strong political pressure for construction of 
water resources projects.
With Isaan remaining both the poorest region and the largest ‘reservoir’ of voters 
(40 per cent of the population), it is no wonder that, as recalled sympathetically 
by the Bangkok Post (2003):
The idea of transforming the Northeast into a ‘promised land’ where 
poor farmers can grow rice and other crops and raise livestock to make 
enough money to sustain a traditional livelihood without having to 
travel to the city to make a living every dry season has never faded from 
the minds of some caring north-eastern politicians. 
This vision is shared and promoted by consulting and construction companies 
more than willing to contribute to greening Isaan. As summarized by Samudavanija 
(1995): ‘in the name of “economic development” the military and bureaucratic 
complex acquired additional fi nancial sustenance through sponsoring infrastructure 
construction in rural areas. The corruption associated with these projects helped 
the various patron–client networks maintain their political authority over the rest 
of the country’s population.’
Financing, however, whether from state coffers or through bilateral/
international funding, is not always forthcoming. Although Chavalit tried to 
negotiate a loan with the World Bank for his Green Isaan Project (Hewison, 
1994), and although the project was bundled into a major arms deal purchase 
with the British government (The Nation, 1994; LabourNet, 2004), the project 
did not materialize. Thatcher’s government was ready to grant US$100 million 
and provide a loan of US$500 million for the project if agreement was found on 
a major package of military equipment purchase. Although the Thai government 
allocated money for the programme in the 1989 budget plan, the joint project 
foundered, partly because the Americans succeeded in reasserting themselves as the 
main arms supplier (LabourNet, 2004). Likewise, when the Mun River Basin Water 
Resource Development Plan (Binnie and Partners, 1995) was completed in 1995, 
with European Union (EU) funding under the auspices of the RID, the NESDB 
eventually denied funding to RID, although proposals for further development 
of water resources and irrigation had been dramatically downsized. Promotion of 
the KCM project was also allegedly embroiled in corruption linked to the military 
regime during the early 1990s (Samudavanija, 1995).
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Within the administration, the prospect of massive projects and attendant 
funding also awoke professional and fi nancial interest. The KCM project was 
developed by the NEA/DEDP, an agency under the Ministry of Science and 
Technology which succeeded in challenging RID’s monopoly on water/irrigation 
infrastructure. The Water Grid also demonstrated the fi nancial and political 
attractiveness of such projects for both line agencies and politicians. The project 
remained delayed as a ‘result of a row between Natural Resources Minister Suvit 
Khunkitti and Agriculture Minister Somsak Thepsuthin over who should oversee 
the project’ as ‘both ministers want[ed] to supervise the project because it could 
be promoted in their election campaigns’ (Bangkok Post, 2004d).
Corruption in Thailand and its links with politics has been well documented 
(Ockey, 1994; Phongpaichit and Piriyarangsan, 1996; Phongpaichit and Baker, 
1998). Corruption in large projects mainly involves three categories of actors: 
the state bureaucracy and high-rank offi cials, politicians, and the business sector 
(Phongpaichit et al, undated). Politicians intervene in the reshuffl e of high-ranking 
offi cials in order to ensure that their men hold strategic positions and offi ces. High-
ranking offi cials, in turn, nominate and assign their subordinates key positions and 
functions in state agencies in order to ensure their control over projects. If these 
offi cials are moved away from their department, control will remain through their 
subordinates. Third, the business sector seeks high rents, offers bribes or other 
forms of benefi ts, and teams up with the other two parties in order to obtain 
contracts or minimize their costs of operating projects. Imbalance of power between 
the three parties can create tensions and may cause change in the Thai political 
regime (Phongpaichit et al, undated).9
Much of the water investments in Isaan during the military regimes involved 
high-ranking offi cers, as shown by the relationships between General Chavalit 
and Sia Leng, a jao pho (godfather) from Khon Kaen who assisted his Green Isaan 
Project (Phongpaichit and Piriyarangsan, 1996). Programmes such as the ARD 
were also known to be associated with corrupt practices. Contracts for road design 
and construction supervision were cancelled in 1979 ‘due to alleged irregularities 
on the part of some ARD staff and consultants. Charges of inadequate work 
performance also led to several court actions against contractors’ (World Bank, 
1985).
This situation is in no way peculiar to Thailand. In post-war Japan, a system of 
collusion between politicians, businessmen and bureaucrats evolved. They formed 
a so-called ‘iron triangle’ of shared benefi t and infl uence which made public works 
projects the centre of a system of vested interests that encouraged bribery and bid-
rigging (Woodall, 1993; Feldhoff, 2002). In the US, too, much of the construction 
drive of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers has been 
fuelled by, and linked to, a triangle of shared interests (Reisner, 1986; McCool, 
1987). Collusion between business, politics and bureaucrats in the water sector is 
a commonality shared by virtually all countries (Repetto, 1986).
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The development industry: A fi xed discourse 
in a changing world?
Beyond general justifi cations of development and the pervasiveness of political 
interests, analysis of the last 50 years shows a remarkable regularity in the promotion 
of large-scale water resources development in northeast Thailand. Although this 
vision has gradually been challenged and has somehow evolved with regard to 
which projects are pushed forward, it has largely adhered to the ethos of the 
‘hydraulic mission’, where the development of water infrastructure is seen as 
obvious and other considerations – whether economic, social or environmental 
– are at best treated as externalities to be mitigated.
Although a common feature of the four post-war decades that saw 
‘modernization’ and technology as central to economic development, this ethos 
has also been linked to, and nurtured by, the wider debate around water resources 
development in the Mekong Basin (Jacobs, 1995; Friesen, 1999; Nguyen, 1999; 
Molle et Floch, 2008). Grand plans, modelled after the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA), to achieve a ‘comprehensive development’ of the basin, including several 
major dams on the mainstream, ensured the prominence of the engineering mindset. 
The engineers of the US Bureau of Reclamation, in particular, transplanted their 
‘culture of irrigation’ to Asia, particularly to Thailand where American infl uence 
was greater: a dozen Thais visited the bureau in the US as early as 1946 (Biggs, 
2006) and intense exchanges lasted at least two decades. The concept of river 
basin full development promoted by the TVA informed the reconnaissance report 
carried out by the bureau in 1965 at the request of USAID, where almost every 
single tributary to the Chi and the Mun rivers was dammed in its upper course 
(see Floch et al, 2007).
The Royal Irrigation Department created a culture where fl oods and drought 
automatically translated into proposals for more dams and more irrigation 
schemes (see Chapter 7). This was predicated, as shown above, on the self-defi ned 
engineering mission of RID, but also on a disregard for indirect costs and on the 
argument that ‘water fl ows to the Mekong unused’ (Roongrueng, 1999) – a typical 
argument insensitive to wider ecosystemic functions of the water regime, as well 
as to pre-existing people’s livelihoods, echoed in 1995 by the Foreign Minister of 
Thailand: ‘It has been a pity to let the Mekong River, with its abundance of water 
resources, just fl ow to the sea’ (cited in Friesen, 1999).
In addition, while the rhetoric of participation and local- and small-scale 
developments featured prominently in basically all water planning documents 
after the 1978 AIT report, the underlying understanding of the uses of water and 
the discourses surrounding the utilization of basin resources have merely been 
readjusted to comply with the overall policy, with no substantial rethinking of the 
benefi ts and costs associated with water resources developments at large.
In retrospect, the above review of water resources development plans in Isaan 
reveals an impressive insistence and ingenuity in fi nding ways of mobilizing water 
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for the region. We can at least identify six main options that have been explored 
and/or implemented at different points in times (see Figure 10.5): 
1 Small-scale storage or diversion structures (ponds, tanks and weirs) have been 
an early solution that resurfaced during the late 1970s.
2 Damming the various tributaries of the Chi and Mun rivers has been the 
hallmark of the 1965 USBR survey and several of these dams have been 
constructed.
3 The Pa Mong Dam was, for long, the cornerstone of irrigation development 
based on diversion of the Mekong waters (and gave way to several variants in 
the KCM project, where water would be pumped from the rivers).
4 Pumping stations along the main rivers were disseminated by the NEA/DEDP, 
starting in the 1970s up to the mid 1990s.
5 Storing water in the fl oodplain itself, through a succession of weirs, was fi rst 
introduced in the 1980s (NEDECO, 1982) and was later incorporated within 
the KCM project.
6 Last, frustrated efforts to import water directly from the Mekong led to creative 
plans to siphon water from dams located in Laos under the Mekong into 
Isaan.
This engineering drive and the fi xed discourse stressing the ‘urgent need to bring 
water from the Mekong to alleviate the region’s water needs’ (Interim Committee, 
1988) have been gradually challenged on economic, environmental and social 
grounds. Economic considerations have never featured prominently in Isaan 
project planning. The 1988 Revised Indicative Plan of the Mekong Committee 
reveals that the:
… economic returns [of the fi ve Isaan projects] are not very attractive. 
This is due to forecasted low rice prices. … Nevertheless, the economics 
of the projects may improve considerably if a greater proportion of 
upland crops is introduced. … A major consideration with respect to 
irrigation projects in north-eastern Thailand is that economic merits 
of a project do not capture other critical strategic and political aspects, 
such as employment generation and risk reduction. … under the ‘Green 
E-sarn Scheme’ and for socio-political reasons, irrigation in north-
eastern Thailand is likely to be acceptable at somewhat lower economic 
returns than elsewhere in the country. (Interim Committee, 1988)
The cost-effectiveness of small-scale projects has also been, at best, dubious, with ‘a 
consensus among government engineers building small reservoirs and other small 
projects that such projects cannot be justifi ed in economic terms, but are necessary 
for political reasons or for their social benefi ts’ (AIT, 1978). Some academics have 
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also disputed the economic relevance of the later KCM and Water Grid projects; 
but these arguments have had relatively little effect on offi cial discourse.
Environmental issues have been somehow more prominent. The salinization 
problems and the confl icts on fl oodplain management around the Rasi Salai and 
Huana dams on the Mun River have generated debates about environmental impact 
assessments (EIAs) and critiques about the ways in which shoddy assessments are 
used to ‘green wash’ projects. For example, the fi rst EIA done for the Songkhram 
Irrigation Project in 1992 by consultants AEC et al was rejected by the National 
Environmental Board (NEB) after fi nding that these were exact copies of EIAs 
that had been done earlier for another large-scale water diversion project, the 
Khong-Chi-Mun (Breukers, 1999). In 1991, Mark Rentschler of the US Treasury 
Department advised the US government that ‘The environmental impact 
assessment prepared for the Pak Mun Project did not appear adequate to allow 
the [World Bank’s] board of directors to evaluate the environmental soundness of 
the project’ (Wangpattana, 1996). Nevertheless, the World Bank and the Electricity 
Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) never commissioned a new EIA and 
continued to state that the Pak Mun Dam would only have minimal impact upon 
the surrounding natural and human environments (Friesen, 1999). Likewise, in 
2002, in the middle of confl icts related to the Rasi Salai and Pak Mun dams, the 
DEDP submitted a proposal and an EIA for the second phase of the KCM project; 
but the expert panel which analysed the EIA rejected the proposal on the ground 
that the comprehensive groundwater study carried out by KKU had not yet been 
completed (Wiszniewski, 2003).
Figure 10.5 Main options for the mobilization of water resources in Isaan
Small-scale storage USBR dams Pa Mong
Pumping stations Floodplain storage Lao diversions
274 INSTITUTIONS, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER
The Minister of Natural Resources and Environment, Praphat Panyachartrak, 
attempted to upgrade EIA procedures in order ‘to catch up with the rapid economic 
growth’ and to promote participation from the public, who – according to him 
– should ‘be allowed a much bigger say in state development projects, which will 
also face tougher scrutiny from a new agency’ (Bangkok Post, 2004e). His efforts 
were not rewarded and perhaps not unrelated to his removal and replacement by 
Suvit Khunkitti, the main proponent of the Water Grid. In sum, EIAs are seen as a 
‘bureaucratic hoop’ to be jumped through in order to start construction, not as an 
authentic mechanism to decide whether or not the dam should be built (Friesen, 
1999). This has led local groups to engage in grassroots research in order to mobilize 
local knowledge, empower local communities, build resource user networks, and 
produce alternative assessments such as a ‘people’s EIA’ (Manorom, 2007).
The confl icts around the Pak Mun and Rasi Salai dams, let alone earlier 
occurrences of displacement because of dam construction, have shown abundantly 
that social impacts have been equally neglected, belittled in the name of national 
development. Unfortunately, the debate between the state and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) is now polarized. The government distinguishes between 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ NGOs, and generally either attempts to keep planning secretive10 
or envisions debates in terms of confrontation, as suggested by Prime Minister 
Samak’s recent declaration that ‘he did not care about opposition from non-
governmental organizations’ (Charoenpo, 2008).
The fi xity of the development discourse is also demonstrated by the obsessive 
focus on water resource and irrigation development (see above) and a disregard 
for alternatives, although reservations surfaced – at times – in offi cial reports. For 
example, a World Bank report in 1969 noted that ‘the northeast is merely the more 
striking example of the widespread predisposition to disregard the potential for 
rain-fed agriculture – at least at the offi cial level’. Even if irrigation development 
was, arguably, a sound public investment option during the 1970s, the lack of 
re-evaluation is striking. At a time when neighbouring countries such as Malaysia 
have resolutely moved out of an agrarian economy to higher-value economic 
activities, the option of reducing the farming population through ‘the introduction 
of substitute job opportunities’, as put forth by Apichart Anukularmphai (cited 
in Le-Huu and Nguyen-Duc, 2003), is little debated. Billions of dollars worth of 
investment plans in irrigation infrastructure still make the headlines in Thailand 
despite the long-term decline in rice prices and the fact that agricultural labour 
is already in short supply and many remaining soils are salinity-prone (in Isaan) 
(Molle and Floch, 2008). This is besides the very low rate of land under dry-
season rice cultivation, which remains at about 14 per cent of the total irrigated 
area (Kamkongsak and Law, 2001), an offi cial fi gure that is disputed or seen by 
many as being optimistic. No doubt, the recent food crisis and hikes in price will 
probably lend support to continued investments.
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CONCLUSIONS
After decades with the environment considered as a mere physical support to 
conventional economic growth, international institutions such as the World Bank 
or the ADB are supposed to now rest with a resource management paradigm, which 
should be refl ected in their practices and, perhaps, might have somehow percolated 
down to borrowing countries (Colby, 1989). In the case of Isaan, or Thailand, 
in general, evidence of such a shift is suggested by several facts: the greening of 
legislation; the advent of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment; the 
requirement of EIAs (under certain conditions); the strengthening and maturing 
of environmental, human rights and/or livelihood-oriented NGOs of different 
stripes; the organization of civil society around struggles on the Huana or the Pak 
Mun dams; etc.
At the same time, it is debatable whether the mindsets of engineers and 
bureaucrats, or politicians’ views of water resources, or the core business of consultant 
companies have really evolved in parallel. The above account suggests that most 
of the worldviews and interests that underpinned the ideologies of the hydraulic 
mission or the ‘frontier economics’ are alive and well. Avoidance, distortion or 
manipulation of EIAs, attempts to denigrate social movements, continued use 
of overriding objectives (food security, national security, poverty alleviation, etc.) 
to close debates, token participation of stakeholders to build legitimacy, and 
other political devices all show that practice has only been superfi cially modifi ed. 
According to Chomchai (2001): ‘national environmental policy seems to have been 
overshadowed and, indeed, supplanted by a development strategy that favours the 
industrial and commercial sectors and vested interests at the expense of natural 
ecological balance and overall national interest’.
Although the grand projects of the Cold War era may have refl ected both the 
ideology of full river-basin development and the geopolitical interest of the US, the 
logic and bundle of political and fi nancial interests underpinning large-scale water 
projects have not signifi cantly subsided since that time. In developing countries, 
classic ‘iron triangles’ give way to infl uential and lasting ‘iron rectangles’ that 
combine politicians, state bureaucracies, private consulting and construction fi rms, 
and development banks and cooperation agencies, which all have vested interests 
in maximizing disbursement of funds (Molle, 2008). Relationships between these 
four apexes are very fl uid and vary with time; but the confl uence and coincidence 
of their interests are extremely strong.
This does not mean that these four groups of organizations are homogeneous. 
Other segments of the administration (typically the Ministry of Finance or the 
NESDB) may disagree and successfully oppose projects; development banks may 
also strengthen their social and environmental criteria and not support particular 
projects. Yet, the declaration of Prime Minister Samak – less than a week after being 
appointed – about a megaproject to bring water to Isaan provides a fascinating and 
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remarkable continuity to 60 years of water policy centred on the ‘desert bloom’ 
promise. Whose dreams and visions are being fulfi lled by the river development 
schemes? ‘Who benefi ts from the projects and who determines what projects are 
carried out in the name of “progress and development”’ (Hudson-Rodd and Shaw, 
2003)?
One of the main (unanswered) questions is why, after all, governance shifts 
are so hard to bring about. Why would it not be possible to do ‘good projects’, 
with adequate safeguards, compensations, detailed assessments of future impacts 
and strict screening of projects? For Grey and Sadoff (2006), who acknowledge 
the need for improved project governance, ‘the world is a different place in the 
21st century, and there is no doubt that the costly mistakes of the past can and 
must be avoided in the future’; investment in hardware should be paralleled by 
‘investment in institutions’, with capacity-building, participation and goodwill 
supposed to make a difference. The above account of decision-making in water 
resource development in Isaan suggests that this view includes a good dose of 
wishful thinking and that institutions are not easily swayed by the injection of 
money or rhetorical calls for ‘responsible growth’. Governance shifts are slow and 
result from the complex interplay of local, national and global dynamics, with 
democratization more likely to result from hard-fought battles than from the mere 
desirability of social and environmental sustainability.
NOTES
1 Notably at the World Bank; see Briscoe (2003); World Bank (2005).
2 A more detailed account of the history of water resources development is given 
elsewhere (Floch et al, 2007).
3 The report estimated that only 20 per cent of the population could benefi t from large-
scale together with river-pumping schemes and that small projects could go a long way 
in serving the water needs of the remaining 80 per cent.
4 In 1989, the Mekong Committee reported that it had introduced a new concept 
in the design of fl ood control and storage projects by constructing reservoirs in the 
areas affected by annual fl ooding (Mekong Secretariat, 1989). Beset by resettlement 
problems and constrained by the depletion of attractive dam sites in northeast Thailand, 
the intergovernmental body recommended that the Government of Thailand should 
adopt a strategy in a consolidated way so that each step would be taken with the fi rm 
knowledge that in the event that each project is demonstrated to be economically and 
technically feasible, the government would wish to pursue further implementation of 
such a scheme (Mekong Secretariat, 1989).
5 Of course, because of its bulky nature, moving water is a much more expensive venture 
than moving electricity. Some examples of such pressurized grids, or ‘carriers’, exist in 
small arid countries such as Israel, Cyprus or Tunisia; but their costs have generally 
prevented expanding the concept at a very large scale.
6 This department originated from the earlier DEDP and is now under the Ministry of 
Energy.
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 7 The project would also be justifi ed because farmers in irrigated areas earn three 
times more than those forced to fi nd their own water supplies, said Mr Thaksin, 
and because ‘if the irrigation system was extended, both farmers and the government 
would reap higher revenues’ (The Straits Times, 2003).
 8 US interventions in the region have been prompted by fears such as the invasion 
from the People’s Republic of China, regional security after the French defeat in 
Dien Bien Fu, deterioration of conditions in Laos, the inception and the active 
communist insurgency in Thailand, Thailand as a base for action in the Vietnamese 
War, the international trade in narcotics, and the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia 
(Steinberg, 1986).
 9 For instance, the domination of business in Chatchai’s ‘buffet cabinet’ led to a 
coup d’état and greater scrutiny of business interests through political participation 
(election), resulting in the 1997 Constitutional Law. More recently, the presence of 
Thaksin in Thai politics characterized the alliance between business interests and 
politicians who control voters in rural constituencies. This has led to the latest coup 
in September 2006. The coup leaders gained political support not only from the 
middle class, averse to ‘corrupt politicians’, but also from high-rank offi cials who were 
manipulated by the Thaksin regime. Such shifts in power illustrate the competition 
between the three parties (Phongpaichit et al, undated).
10 An article in the Bangkok Post (2004) referred to military units conducting 
‘psychological operations’ in order to convince local people to accept the construction 
of the Kaeng Sua Teng Dam.
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The Promise of Flood Protection: 
Dikes and Dams, 
Drains and Diversions
Louis Lebel, Bach Tan Sinh, Po Garden, Suong Seng, 
Le Anh Tuan and Duong Van Truc
INTRODUCTION
Governments frequently make promises to their citizens; few promises are as 
powerful as that of safety and security. The promise of fl ood protection is often 
absolute and in concrete. Dikes and dams, drains and diversions are widely seen as 
key to fl ood protection. Flood management is portrayed as a technical and apolitical 
exercise of fl ood prevention. Issues of why some groups are more vulnerable than 
others and how risks may be reallocated by interventions are ignored (e.g. Lebel 
and Sinh, 2007).
Many urbanizing areas in the Mekong region face increasingly difficult 
flood management challenges as cities expand into drained-out wetlands or 
inundation-prone areas. As valuable property is placed at risk, costs of protection 
and damages typically rise together (Takeuchi, 2001). Instances where fl ood 
protection interventions have made things worse are multiplying. More and more 
people are becoming aware of the unanticipated side-effects of urban fl ood protec-
tion measures for wetlands, river ecosystems and the livelihoods of people who 
depend upon them. Across the region people are asking questions about who really 
benefi ts, who is paying for protection, and whether there are alternative ways of 
managing risks from fl oods (Lebel and Sinh, 2007). This chapter focuses on the 
origins and consequences of fl ood protection promises made to urbanizing regions 
in the Mekong region.
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PROMISES OF PROTECTION
Promises of protection from fl oods are a subset of the different ways in which society 
can respond to risks from fl ood waters. The protection approach usually implies 
prevention through regulation of fl ows. Promises of protection are often made in 
earth or concrete: dams built far upstream will regulate river fl ows; diversions will 
take the water around and past the city; dikes higher and longer will hold back the 
fl ood waters; drains, pumps and tunnels will move water out faster.
Regulating dams
Promises of protection by dams are perhaps the most common. A recent example 
is when Thailand’s former Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej refl oated the idea 
of building the controversial Kaeng Sua Ten Dam on the Yom River ‘to protect 
Bangkok from fl ooding’ (Bangkok Post, 2008a). In doing so, Samak was repeating 
promises of construction made by successive Thai governments since 1981. An 
offi cial from the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) we interviewed summarized 
the logic neatly: ‘A dam is a long-term project. It may take decades to overcome 
obstacles [to its building], but it will happen one day.’ Promises shift with time 
and purpose. The Kaeng Sua Ten Dam was fi rst proposed for electricity generation 
by the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT); but later, in 1989, 
it became an ‘irrigation’ project with the RID. In 2008, it was to protect Bangkok 
from fl oods.
But in monsoonal Asia, storage dams rarely provide as much fl ood protection 
to cities as the promises made about them. There are several reasons.
First, major reservoirs are often located far upstream from the cities that 
they are said to protect. In Bangkok, the fi rst line of fl ood protection is often 
described in terms of regulating water fl owing from the northern region through 
regulating the Chao Phraya River’s main tributaries: the Ping, Wang, Yom and 
Nan rivers. Construction of the Bhumipol Dam in 1964 and the Sirikit Dam in 
1972 enhanced the capacities to store about 12 billion cubic metres of runoff each 
year and thus regulate fl ows to the lower Chao Phraya Delta and Bangkok (Molle, 
2007). The storage capacity of both dams has declined as a result of sedimentation. 
For Bangkok, the early wet season risks of fl oods are less than later in the year 
because monsoon rainfall is further north; by October, rain tends to fall further 
south and, thus, downstream of the Bhumiphol and Sirikit dams. Recent analysis 
of pre- and post-construction discharges suggest that effects on peak fl ows far 
downstream in Bangkok have actually been fairly modest (Tebakari et al, 2005) 
relative to the widely held perceptions of their crucial role in preventing serious 
fl ooding of Bangkok.
Second, many dams are conceived as multipurpose; in practice, this implies 
important trade-offs in operations to maintain levels and regular releases for 
hydropower and maximizing fl ood protection. Vietnam’s Hoa Binh (Da River 
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tributary) and Thac Ba (Lo River tributary) multipurpose reservoirs upstream 
from Hanoi are normally used to produce electricity; but in the fl ood season (June 
to September), they are operated to prioritize fl ood management in downstream 
areas. The two objectives are in confl ict with each other at the operational level 
(Ngo et al, 2008). Similar dilemmas apply to the management of Bhumipol and 
Sirikit dams (Hangsapruek, 2007). In the series of high fl oods which threatened 
Bangkok during October to November 2006, the Bhumipol and Sirikit dams were 
already full and could not help to retain more water; instead, agricultural areas in 
the central region had to be sacrifi ced as fl ood retention areas. Above the Bhumipol 
Dam, operators of the smaller Mae Ngad and Mae Kuang dams upstream from 
Chiang Mai City face a related dilemma. At the end of the wet season they must 
balance the risks of another depression bringing high rainfall against the benefi ts 
of as high as possible storage at the beginning of the dry season (Lebel and Garden, 
2006).
Third, the benefi ts of dams for fl ood protection are often exaggerated and 
burdens are ignored. Benefits are frequently overstated and much less well 
understood than promises of protection seem to imply. Independent studies have 
challenged claims of fl ood protection benefi ts of the Kaeng Sua Ten Dam and 
noted other burdens and risks (Sathirathai and Kittiprapas, 2000; The Nation, 
2007). A Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI) study suggests 
that fl ood protection benefi ts to farms downstream in the Phrae fl oodplain and 
further into Sukhothai Province were exaggerated in earlier project documents 
(Grachangnetara, 2005). Even senior staff of RID have grown more cautious: ‘We 
still need to address the issue of whether it will be benefi cial in fl ood mitigation 
in the lower Chao Phraya River Basin’ (Thanopanuwat, 2007). Conversely, the 
burdens caused by fl oods are not always as large as claimed. A characteristic of 
urbanizing regions and their rural hinterlands in the Mekong region is that they 
include many people still engaged in agriculture. The soils in their fi elds may 
benefi t from slow seasonal inundation. Others benefi t from fi sheries products 
that may still be available from seasonal wetlands and streams (Fox and Sneddon, 
2005; Sokhem and Sunada, 2006). In these landscapes, slow-rising, slow-moving 
and modest peak fl ood heights are not necessarily a major disaster for households 
adapted to life along riverbanks and fl oodplains in monsoon Asia (Manuta et al, 
2006; Tuan et al, 2008). 
Finally, infrastructure is widely perceived to be fail proof. In reality, dams are 
also a source of risks: their operations can lead to catastrophes when releases for 
dam safety add fl ows to natural ones, as has been the case several times with the Yali 
Falls Dam in Vietnam (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004). Moreover, ‘once a dam is built, 
most of the people living downstream of the dam tend to believe that they will be 
completely safe from fl oods’ (Maiklad, 1999, p107) and build in the fl oodplains. 
The rising costs of fl ood damages and, consequently, costs of protection are largely 
a result of the increased value of infrastructure being put at risk by current patterns 
of land development. 
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The problem, therefore, is largely to whom and how promises of flood 
protection are made. Details about risks are not shared or well understood by 
those at risk. As a consequence, people feel safer than they should, investments 
in preparedness are less than needed, and other ways of reducing vulnerabilities 
are ignored.
Diversions elsewhere
Promises of protection through diversion bring out these points. Diverting water 
also redistributes burdens and risks. In 1999, under increasing political pressure 
to protect Hanoi as a result of concerns about unpredictable fl ood heights, the 
Government of Vietnam issued important regulations that include, as a last resort, 
emergency response actions for when the fl ood level of the Red River in Hanoi 
reaches 13.4m (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1999b). These would involve 
upstream diversion of fl ood discharges primarily to the provinces of Ha Tay, 
Vinh Phuc, Phu Tho, Ha Nam and Nam Dinh. Diversions into the Day River 
(which runs parallel to Hanoi and also collects its drainage waters) are decided 
by the prime minister. It is estimated that as many as 675,000 people would be 
affected by such diversions (Xuan, 2006). A regulation was also issued about 
compensation policies (Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1999a), which, apart from 
relief, also includes tax exemptions and job creation support in a recovery and 
rehabilitation phase. Negotiations of compensation are not well documented, but 
appear to be largely a technical and closed exercise involving scientists in the fi eld 
and the Provincial People’s Committee (PPC) of the potentially affected provinces 
(DDMFSC, 1999).
Unfortunately, Thailand has been without a clear system of compensation 
when diversions to protect Bangkok result in crop or property losses. There has also 
been very little in the way of clear policy or guidelines for RID on exactly which 
areas should be fl ooded and which kept dry in choosing potential receiving places 
of diverted fl ood waters. The result has been substantial hardship for farmers.
In October 2006, for example, the Thai government diverted fl ood waters 
to agricultural fi elds in order to protect key parts of Bangkok. Sena District in 
Ayutthaya Province took some of the initial diversions after His Majesty the King 
allowed the RID to fl ood a small area of his own land (The Nation, 2006a). The 
RID looked for others to ‘volunteer’ to do the same, causing some perplexity 
among many residents: ‘What kind of request to be a volunteer was this? We 
were informed in the evening, and when we got up the next morning we were 
surrounded by water’ (Hongthong, 2006). Many other areas were subsequently 
fl ooded with promises of compensation provided that farmers followed the RID’s 
planting and harvesting instructions (The Nation, 2006b). Some farmers threatened 
to sue the RID for damaging their property (Bangkok Post, 2006a). The RID argued 
that they needed a law giving them authority to designate fl ood water-receiving 
areas during high-water periods (The Nation, 2006b). Offi cials from the RID also 
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argued that a collapsed dike caused the most serious fl ood problems, not their 
intentional diversions.
The promise of protection by diversions repeatedly appeals to a discourse of 
sacrifi ce: 
Bangkok has been saved once again by the heroes of our time, as com-
munities in Ayutthaya, Ang Thong and more than a handful of other 
provinces in the countryside paid the price for its security. People in 
these provinces are the ones crying. Losing one’s shelter for the good of 
the country is patriotic, yet painful. (Bangkok Post, 2006b) 
A local non-governmental organization (NGO) told us that Nakhon Pathom was 
‘being drowned to protect Bangkok’.
Higher and longer dikes
In some ways, dikes are the flip side of diversions, but often with even less 
consideration for receiving areas. Several of the larger cities in fl ood-prone areas 
of the Mekong region have resorted to dikes or walls. The promises, as for dams, 
often turn out to be hard to keep as land uses and river modifi cation alter fl ood 
regimes in new ways, and, as for diversion, there are often signifi cant side-effects 
of interventions. Finally, like all the other promises in concrete, there are also the 
direct benefi ts of construction itself.
The Vietnam government has a challenging task of protecting the rapidly 
urbanizing region around Hanoi given the huge seasonal differences in the water 
levels of the Red River. A series of major dikes, some as high as 15m, have been 
developed in the region over many centuries to protect fi elds and homes in one 
of the most densely settled delta regions in the world. Water levels in many places 
are now regularly much higher than where people live and farm. Some dikes are 
equipped with sluices and others are designed to allow overfl ow. Altogether, there 
are over 3000km of river walls in the delta region, of which about one fi fth are 
to directly protect Hanoi City (FLOCODS, 2003). Dike failures have occurred 
and caused substantial damage and loss of life – for example, following the major 
fl oods in 1971. The promise of fl ood protection in the Red River Delta region 
is long standing, supported by myths and social norms, which largely remain 
fi xed despite massive political and economic changes (see the section on ‘Social-
ecological legacies’).
To reduce fl ooding in Bangkok from the Rangsit irrigation area to the east and 
from the Chao Phraya River, a polder system was developed with assistance from 
Japan and The Netherlands. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 
project was completed around 1986 (Vongvisessomjai, 2006). After major fl oods 
in 1983, a 72km long, 2.5m high dike was built running from the east bank of the 
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Chao Phraya from Pathum Thani to major built-up areas of Bangkok. The result, 
evident in the 2006 fl oods, was better protection for inner Bangkok, but worse 
conditions for those outside of the dike, such as along the Sam Wa Canal, Nong 
Jok, Minburi and parts of Lad Krabang. Moreover, much of these outer parts of 
the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority (BMA) were now largely urban. The BMA 
then negotiated with the RID to build the ‘King’s dike’ on or close to the BMA 
boundary and link with an inner dike to form a polder. Phnom Penh has faced a 
similar trajectory of problems following construction of a second dike that creates 
stagnant fl ooding within the ‘fl ood protection’ area.
In order to protect the east bank of Bangkok from river inundation, walls were 
initially built to protect major roads leaving a narrow strip between roads and the 
riverbank. This left some 80,000 homes within the BMA highly vulnerable to 
fl ooding. Public pressure from these affected groups has led to river walls along 
80km of the river at a high cost of 0.1 million to 0.3 million baht per metre.1 BMA 
offi cials told us that the project would negatively impact upon the Nonthaburi 
area; but noted that it is outside their jurisdiction. Bangkok fl ood protection is 
planned to handle a 1-in-100-year fl ood. Offi cials said, however, that if upstream 
provinces were also to use walls, the resulting rises in river levels would reduce the 
effectiveness of current walls to only a fi ve-year fl ood.
Races like this benefi t everyone and turn promises of protection into promises 
of construction contracts. The fi rst dikes to protect Vientiane against fl oods were 
built after major fl oods in 1940. But in 1960, these were demolished to make 
way for the growth of the city. Serious fl oods in 1966 led to the rehabilitation 
and expansion of the dike system (Oudomchit, 2006). Various donors have since 
provided loans or aid for restoration works, including the Republic of South 
Korea (Thu, 2008). In 2001, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) approved a 
loan that included funds for several major drainage projects around Vientiane 
totalling a length of 14km (ADB, 2008). The most recent fl ooding in August 
2008 (Samabuddhi, 2008) can be expected to lead to further promises of urban 
protection. Phnom Penh, located in the central lowland close to the conjunction of 
four rivers, is also affected by regular monsoonal fl ooding of the Mekong River. To 
protect urban residents and infrastructure of the capital, the Boung Tompun Dike 
was built early in the city’s history. Expansion of the city has led to construction 
of a second dike. But availability of funds appears to drive dike construction more 
than requirements or priorities suggested by urban planning.
Faster drains
Rain that falls in and near urbanizing regions represents a distinct set of fl ood 
manage ment challenges and, thus, fl ood protection promises compared to that 
brought in by rivers from farther upstream or from nearby coasts as tidal surges. 
Urbanization in the larger cities of the Mekong region has transformed land 
surfaces, making large areas virtually impermeable to rainfall.
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Within a decade (1986 to 1996), the original four districts of Hanoi lost 65 per 
cent of their water areas, including ponds, streams and reservoirs as they were fi lled 
for the construction of buildings. Almost all of the land cover became concrete, 
while grassland areas were also reduced by 12 per cent (Pham, 2006). These sorts 
of changes often increase runoff yield and concentration and, thus, heighten fl ood 
peaks. At the same time, road networks have often been expanded without much 
attention to drainage needs. Coordination with other water works, such as the Hao 
Nam Project, which turns drains into irrigation canals, has also been limited (Viet 
Nam News, 2008b). The result is that many inner city areas have major problems 
with drainage even as the sewerage system expands. Several drainage, sewerage 
and lake projects were under way in 2008. Nguyen Le, director-general of the 
private company Hanoi Water Drainage, promised that ‘when these projects are 
completed, the fl ooding will be totally sorted out’ (Viet Nam News, 2008b).
Ho Chi Minh City is located in an estuarine area of the Dong Nai River 
system. The Dong Nai River is adjacent to the Mekong Delta, where the fl ood 
season normally starts in the middle of July, peaks in October and starts to decline 
in November. Floods in Ho Chi Minh City are caused by combinations of high 
tides, rainfall storm events and riverbank overfl ow. Incomplete and poor sewerage 
and drainage systems exacerbate risks. Some streets and residential areas with no 
storm drains at all quickly become small rivers after even fairly modest rainfall 
(SGGP, 2007). Houses are often built in place of drainage culverts and sluice gates 
(SGGP, 2007). The frequency and duration of fl ooding appears to be increasing. 
Rainfall in Ho Chi Minh City over the past 52 years has increased approximately 
0.8mm per year, and since 1988, about 2.5mm per year. Almost US$1 billion has 
been invested in urban fl ooding control projects since 1998 (Phi, 2007). Flood 
control in Ho Chi Minh City has been based on the logic of draining storm water 
as quickly as possible. ‘Although Ho Chi Minh City offi cials have poured billions 
of dong into projects to combat fl ooding, people in whole sections of the city are 
left wading in knee-deep waters after downpours’ (Viet Nam News, 2007).
Changes to land surfaces and maintaining drains are also a major challenge 
within Bangkok. The most cost-effective way is through city planning regulation 
that sets aside green belt areas and makes developers set aside water retention 
areas and better manage their canals; but these soft measures have largely failed, 
so they resort to increasing pumping capacity and building expensive tunnels. Re-
widening the network of historical canals is often not an option because people 
have encroached on them, creating slower drains that need to be compensated for 
with new faster drains.
Achieving fl ood protection with more or faster drainage, whether it is through 
canals, tunnels or pumps, is not as straightforward as it fi rst appears. Urban drain-
age is often complex and full of agents that respond to problems in their own areas 
of jurisdiction. Water gets shunted around, and operations adapt to introductions 
of new infrastructure interventions. Promises of protection have a way of going 
around in circles like water around a clogged drain.
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ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES
Promises of fl ood protection are made and infrastructure is built with reference to 
those promises. Across the different kinds of infrastructure (from dams to drains), 
locations (inland to deltas) and national contexts, are there common mechanisms 
at play? Are origins and consequences of fl ood protection promises intelligible in 
a more generalized sense?
To guide our analysis, we developed a simple initial conceptual model (see 
Figure 11.1). In this model promises are seen as arising from perceptions about 
risks, but often infl uenced by triggering events. Five mechanisms are proposed as 
key to understanding the origins and consequences of fl ood protection promises 
(see Figure 11.1). The rest of this section is organized around each of these in 
turn.
Knowledge of experts
Society often turns expectantly towards experts following disasters and ‘close calls’. 
Experts are widely perceived as having a major role in identifying options for fl ood 
and disaster management (see Figure 11.1). In response to demands about why it 
fl ooded, an experienced fl ood manager responded laconically: ‘It rained a lot.’ But 
what experts have to say is not necessarily what leaders want to hear.
Figure 11.1 The promise of fl ood protection: An initial conceptual model
Source: Louis Lebel
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The kinds of experts invited to task forces or to submit project proposals are 
usually from a relatively narrow set of water management backgrounds. Physical 
engineers are mostly involved in how to build infrastructure after political decisions 
have been made. Social and environmental scientists are rare, and are usually 
only there to meet peripheral requirements in an impact assessment process. As 
a result, other contributions, apart from infrastructure to reducing fl ood disaster 
risks, have been neglected. Countries in the Mekong region still draw on experts 
from outside their own countries, although their views do not go unchallenged 
or unqualifi ed.
The new urban development plan of Hanoi City along the Red River, for 
example, was prepared by Korean urban planning experts, following a model 
based on Han River in Seoul City. The plan has been criticized by a number of 
Vietnamese scientists as the plan does not adequately take into account the very 
different nature of the fl ood regimes of the Red River and Han River. Hanoi 
needs dikes. With high sediment fl ows, any construction preventing river fl ows, 
especially during monsoon season, could potentially create a serious fl ood disaster 
(Van, 2008).
The development of the scientifi c knowledge for policy-making around fl ood 
protection for Bangkok is founded on past intergovernmental cooperation with 
Japan and The Netherlands. The Dike System (Vongvisessomjai, 2006), for example, 
was largely designed by JICA. Much of the expert knowledge is now domestic. The 
Offi ce of the Royal Development Project Board (ORDPB) increasingly coordinates 
knowledge inputs and policy links for Bangkok’s fl ood management. As an agency 
outside and above the RID and the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority, it is able 
to drive cooperation among different ministries and agencies without resorting to 
negotiating cabinet resolutions. The RDPD is headed by the prime minister and 
advised by a member of the Royal Privy Council. The board is joined by permanent 
secretaries of the ministries, the budget bureau, as well as the armed forces.
Experts in bureaucracy may be starting to accept that the full fl ood protection 
promise is implausible. Suwit Thanopanuwat (2007), at the height of the 2006 
fl oods, concluded his assessment for Bangkok as follows: 
Floods will continue to occur, and the people and property in the 
fl ood plains will be at risk. The situation will not improve because 
the cost of a physical solution is unaffordable. Consequently, although 
it is challenging, an effective fl oodplain management needs to be 
implemented and an integrated fl ood management programme needs 
to be prepared.
Some experts in Vietnamese agencies are drawing similar conclusions. In 1999, 
Hue City and large parts of Thua Thien Hue Province and surrounding coastal 
areas in central Vietnam suffered two serious fl ooding events, fi rst in October and 
then again in December. The second event struck just as there was major relief 
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from the fi rst event. At least 780 people were killed; about half were in Thua Thien 
Hue. The total cost of the disaster was estimated at US$364 million (CCFSC, 
2006). In its early response to events, the Central Committee for Flood and Storm 
Control submitted a report to the National Assembly on 22 November 1999 in 
which it argued for a set of measures, including disaster preparedness, reforestation, 
strengthening key reservoir and canal infrastructure, as well as building capacities 
for self-help (Ti, 1999). The promise was nuanced. There is a growing appreciation 
within Vietnam that a purely structural approach to fl ood control will not work 
(CCFSC, 2006) and that vulnerabilities are not a simple function of natural hazard 
but also of social factors (Tran and Shaw, 2007).
Organizational interests
Ultimately, experts are a diverse group, varying in how closely their interests are 
steered by the organizational and power structures to which they belong and 
how broadly they are allowed to frame the problem of fl ood management – as 
‘protection’ or ‘preparation’. Exaggeration of fl ood damages in past events or 
assessments of future threats create opportunities to make promises of bigger 
infrastructure. Fulfi lling protection promises is good business. The views of external 
experts may be supported because they fi t interests neatly. Thus, the new urban 
development plan for the Red River, mentioned above, was strongly supported by 
the Hanoi Department of Urban Plan and Architecture. Bui Van, deputy editor 
of the Vietnam Net newspaper and others argued that large projects such as this 
are supported because well-connected individuals can profi t from land speculation 
(Van, 2008).
In Vietnam, there is signifi cant competition with respect to fl ood protection 
(and other issues in the water sector) between the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development (MARD) and the Ministry of Natural Resources and the 
Environment (MoNRE). MARD has pursued engineering-oriented approaches, 
while the more recently created, and substantially less infl uential, MoNRE has 
promoted more integrated methods (Molle and Hoanh, 2007).
In Thailand, the Department of Water Drainage of the BMA and RID have 
fundamentally different fl ood management objectives (Kamolvej, 2006). Capital 
city administrations are powerful and can shape fl ood management policies of 
national departments and agencies. The BMA essentially pursues a zero-tolerance 
fl ood policy despite the implausibility of such a strategy and the diffi culties this 
creates for upstream and surrounding areas managed by the RID. The BMA has 
an interest in aligning its dike infrastructure with BMA boundaries as it doesn’t 
have to worry about what happens beyond those boundaries. 
The BMA infrastructure for preventing fl ooding includes protecting the new 
Suvarnabhumi Airport; but the airport has its own hydrological aspiration. It was 
built on a wetland, although it cannot be fl ooded at any cost. The airport location 
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is just outside the King’s Dike south of the fl ooded area. It is surrounded by its own 
polder-blocking canals that could drain fl ood-prone areas. BMA offi cials talked 
about meetings with airport offi cials with frustration and disappointment. The 
government policy is to keep Bangkok dry at any cost, and to keep the airport drier. 
This negatively affects people outside the polder system, particularly the people 
close to Suvarnabhumi Airport. 
The key formal policy tool of the Bangkok governor is the four-year BMA 
management plan, which becomes effective at the beginning of the governor’s 
term. This plan is negotiated and allocates budgets to BMA agencies and specifi es 
verifi able indicators of success. In fl ood protection, the harder the objective, the 
more the investment. The objective is set very specifi cally – for example, the 
number of major roads that are fl ooded in rain events of less than 60mm per hour 
and the number of times that it could drain fl ood areas in less than two hours. The 
Department of Drainage and Sewerage was allocated approximately 5.5 billion 
baht over the four years to achieve this task and will plan its future investment 
accordingly. The department is one of the major infrastructure builders in the city, 
benefi ting from fl ood prevention policies.
The construction of dikes around Phnom Penh has been led by the municipality 
and its technical working group. Work on the dikes began under a centrally 
planned economy in which all land belonged to the government. People still have 
few avenues in which to complain about the impacts of construction upon their 
livelihoods; if they do, they are forced to move. Instead, they have to take individual 
action, where they can afford to do so – for instance, raising their houses and plots. 
Otherwise they are condemned to living in stagnant fl ood waters. High-ranking 
offi cials, military offi cers and wealthy individuals are able to access planning 
documents and infl uence plans so that their land ends up protected by dikes. With 
good connections and infl uence, they can also buy land and resell for profi ts.
Capacities to control fi nancial resources
Floods create political opportunities: new budget lines are allocated for rehabilitation 
and recovery that can be captured or directed; crises open windows to transfer 
control of existing resources. Identifying and securing, or otherwise controlling, 
opportunities to pour concrete, construct walls and roads, or move earth are the 
fundamentals of project-making. Not surprisingly, allegations of corruption are 
not unusual around fl ood protection infrastructure projects (e.g. The Nation, 
2008; Wongpreedee, 2008). Current leaders use fl ood events to defend their hold 
on power and make fi nancial gains; would-be leaders use fl ood events to garner 
support for themselves by promising alternative solutions.
In 2005, Chiang Mai experienced a series of major fl ood events that acted as 
‘focusing events’ for policy change (Garden, 2007). Several project proposals for 
protecting Chiang Mai from fl oods included in consultant or RID reports years 
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earlier – ranging from notions of making more space for water upstream of the 
city, stronger enforcement of river encroachment regulations, through to fl ood 
walls and removal of traditional weirs – resurfaced as the fl ood waters receded 
(Garden, 2007).
The crisis created opportunities to implement projects. By February 2006, then 
Deputy Prime Minister Suwat Liptapanlop, who had been put in charge of fl ood 
prevention, had received approval for funding of projects worth approximately 
13 billion baht. Other projects were led by then Minister Newin Chidchob of 
the Prime Minister’s Offi ce. Almost immediately, local communities organized 
opposition to the larger dike and weir-levelling projects (Phanayanggoor, 2006). 
The opposition was largely not against more infrastructure of any sort per se, but 
on the way in which such decisions were being made: which options, who should 
manage and how they will be maintained (Garden, 2007).
The politics of fl oods changed direction but did not lose momentum following 
a military coup. Campaign images for the mid 2007 municipal elections for 
Chiang Mai pictured most candidates standing waste deep in fl ood waters. Debate 
continues over whether or not to remove several traditional weirs from near the 
centre of the city, as these also raise water levels and distribute fl ood waters, whether 
high walls should be built to protect the city from peak fl ows, or whether efforts 
should focus on restoring river channel width, banks and fl oodplains (Garden, 
2007). Removal of traditional weirs and replacement with upstream dams and 
gates operated by the RID would transfer control of water resources back to a 
state agency.
Advocacy coalitions
Advocacy coalitions emerge around fl ood protection promises. On the one hand, 
there is a group of core agencies and a coalition of associated consultants, fi rms and 
banks whose primary interest is in capital-intensive construction works. Projects 
that make something tangible and create work will also be subsequently owned and 
controlled by an organization. Systematic patterns of corruption may reinforce the 
alignment of interests. On the other hand, there is also a range of actors ready to 
mobilize against many forms of modifying rivers – in particular, the construction 
of dams. Coalitions are rarely a neat separation of state and non-state, but bring 
diverse elements of local and international, public, civil and private interests.
The kinds of actors coalescing around particular promises depend to some 
extent upon the types of infrastructure involved. Groups opposing dams, for 
instance, are large and well organized in the Mekong region. But those that 
scrutinize more ‘within-city’ issues related to riverbank walls and dikes or drains, 
tunnels and pumping systems are much more locally organized and, consequently, 
less visible to the mass media. A good example of the latter was the formation of 
opposing coalitions in Chiang Mai: one in favour of removing old irrigation weirs 
and the other in favour of their retention as part of the city’s cultural heritage.
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Municipal and local interests are not always aligned when it comes to the 
purpose of new infrastructure and, thus, rationale for fl ood protection. This is 
well illustrated by the recurrent (and understandable) opposition to projects 
that require resettlement and compensation of people to make way for new or 
expanded canals, dikes or fl ood walls. A recent example is the controversy within 
Ho Chi Minh City over a US$18.5 million plan to expand the Ba Bo Canal in 
Binh Chieu ward for water quality and volume reasons. Local opposition has been 
strong (Trieu, 2008).
Advocacy coalitions in the Mekong region have been quick to challenge the 
protection benefi ts of dams. The higher-than-usual fl ood levels that occurred in 
the Mekong River in August 2008 triggered a rapid response from a coalition of 
local and international organizations that are typically opposed to mainstream 
dams. The Thai People’s Network on Mekong, including the NGOs Foundation 
for Ecological Recovery and Living River Siam, were quick to assert that the serious 
fl ood conditions were, in part, a result of operations of dams in China’s Yunnan 
Province. Dams, they argued, were a cause of fl ooding, not a source of protection, as 
has been frequently claimed. The Mekong River Commission was quick to defend 
China, stating that there was no evidence that dam operations had any impact 
upon the severity of the fl ood (Wipatayotin, 2008). The print media in the region 
closely followed the debates, continuing to give substantial space to dam critics. 
Many other related articles appeared in the media in the following days, reporting 
on the perceptions of people along the banks about river-level change and its likely 
causes (Samabuddhi, 2008), as well as the performance of early warning systems 
(Charoenpo, 2008). By 1 September, the MRC had followed up with a detailed 
situational report backing its initial claims of no signifi cant effect of dams in China 
on fl ood conditions (MRC, 2008). 
Social-ecological legacies
Social-ecological legacies constrain and infl uence perceptions of risk, how fl oods 
are talked about, and how and why promises of protection are made and pursued. 
The fl oodplains around several major cities in the Mekong region have been 
transformed by human actions over centuries. Hanoi has perhaps the most obvious 
legacy in its extensive system of dikes.
When promises are largely kept, and no major floods have occurred to 
remind people of risks, those living under the protection of dikes and dams easily 
misjudge risks. Current perceptions of low fl ood disaster risk appear to be creating a 
dangerous situation around Hanoi (Hung et al, 2007). Rapid urbanization around 
Hanoi has led to settlements in riverside fl oodplain areas outside the protective 
system of dikes, fi rst by poor people and migrants, and, more recently, by wealthier 
people (Hung et al, 2007). Riverside settlements have reduced fl oodplain widths 
and, consequently, may also be increasing fl ood vulnerability for the entire city 
(Hung et al, 2007).
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The legacies of successful dike control of fl ood waters in the north have also 
affected fl ood protection promises and practices in the entirely different fl ood 
regimes of southern Vietnam (see Chapter 8). On the other hand, the fl ood 
protection promises made for urban residential areas such as Ho Chi Minh City 
have been diffi cult to keep for other reasons – in particular, diffi culties with runoff, 
infi ltration and drainage. Natural legacies might be better incorporated within 
fl ood protection plans rather than, as is typical, contested. Doan Canh from the 
Tropical Biology Institute believes that in order to solve Ho Chi Minh City’s 
ongoing fl ood problems, ‘any solution for fl ood prevention should give priority 
to protecting the natural ecology. This would help to decrease pollution, control 
fl oods and improve the urban landscape’ (Kinh, 2006).
Across the monsoon region, major cities and city states were ringed by 
agricultural fields that supported them with food and taxable harvests. This 
social-ecological legacy has meant further expansion of cities, which, in turn, has 
resulted in the conversion of frequently prime agricultural land into residences 
and streets. The traditional muang-fai irrigation system using canals and weirs is 
a legacy that the Chiang Mai municipality is struggling with. On the one hand, 
there is a nostalgic interest in preserving aspects of local culture; on the other 
hand, some of the weirs and canals contribute to fl ooding parts of the city. While, 
formerly, diversion of abundant wet season fl ows in the Ping River through these 
local irrigation systems for growing rice made sense, it no longer fi ts with new 
suburban housing and lifestyles. In Bangkok, the struggles between the BMA and 
RID are legendary; with the involvement of the ORDPB, negotiations have sped 
up and coordination has improved. Even so, controversies over fl ood management 
in eastern Bangkok remain serious.
Bangkok, more than any other city, has acquired its fl ood protection system 
largely by fragmented accumulation. After major events, different parts of the city 
take action, acquiring pumps and building canals, river walls or dikes. Adding 
new measures in such a complex system invariably creates side-effects for others 
on the wrong side of the wall, end of the tunnel or receiving end of a drain. Each 
new intervention triggers a series of compensatory responses, both operational 
and infrastructural. Some are undertaken by state agencies over larger areas, while 
others are done piecemeal as individual properties lift themselves higher above 
the fl oodplain.
Current approaches to fl ood protection inadvertently introduce new vulnera-
bilities. The BMA system, for example, is electricity intensive because of high 
dependence upon pumps. If there is a problem with electricity during a fl ood 
episode, the Department of Drainage and Sewerage’s drainage power is drastically 
reduced. Other aspects of land development further reduce resilience. Canals 
and rivers that were once used for transport are now walled storm drains. The 
canal system, which had supported a lifestyle that fi tted the monsoonal pulse, has 
been partially converted to allow for road expansion (Ross et al, 2000). Loss of 
resilience to seaward fl ooding, as a result of high tides and sea-level change, as well 
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as to upstream and runoff fl ooding, has been compounded by land subsidence as 
a result of groundwater extraction from deep wells (Dutta et al, 2005; Babel et 
al, 2006). Legacies such as these which reduce resilience have helped to drive a 
vicious cycle of fl ood protection promises that cannot be kept; responses involve 
building more infrastructure rather than changing the way in which development 
unfolds in the fi rst place.
DISCUSSION
Explaining promises
Promises to protect urbanizing regions are made and pursued to different degrees 
for a variety of reasons. Five mechanisms help to explain this range: the knowledge 
of experts; organizational interests; capacities to control resources; advocacy 
coalitions; and social-ecological legacies (see Figure 11.1).
Society often turns expectantly towards experts following disasters and ‘close 
calls’. Experts – especially specialists in drainage, hydrology and climatology – are 
widely perceived as key to fl ood and disaster management. Expert knowledge 
helps to explain why certain kinds of promises are made and others are kept. The 
knowledge of experts is infl uential in terms of the authority that experts have in 
project documentation, planning and implementation. Such fugitive power (e.g. 
Farrell, 2004) is crucial to actual practices. But it is not limitless.
The interests of individuals and specifi c agencies involved in the construction 
and operation of infrastructure are an important factor in making decisions 
about investing in particular interventions (see Figure 11.1). Interests do not 
just trump expertise: they also enslave it. This can be seen in how the promise 
of fl ood protection is used by organizations in their proposals despite evidence 
contradicting claims about benefi ts or pointing out new burdens and risks. Projects 
have a functional value (Ferguson, 1994) beyond their impacts upon on risks of 
fl ooding per se. This is why they keep resurfacing in the pursuit of individual and 
compatible organizational interests. Floods and disaster are political opportunities 
to produce projects. Projects do not have to be new.
Interests, however, are unlikely, in practice, to be suffi cient to secure projects 
or to implement changes. This requires a capacity to control both fi nancial and 
human resources. Much of the politics behind fl ood protection is bureaucratic, 
including the power to control resources. The protection promise is easy to make 
because nobody is against safety; but it is diffi cult to keep because everybody is 
in favour of retaining a budgetary advantage for themselves. One of the ways in 
which actors gain more control is by forming alliances with others.
Advocacy coalitions emerge around major infrastructure projects as promises 
are developed and declared. Support for, and resistance against, the modifi cation 
of rivers by dams has generated the strongest disputes among actors and led to 
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extensive coalition-building. Coalitions are rarely a neat and static separation 
between state and non-state actors; rather, they are a dynamic mixture, with 
many only active for short periods of time – for example, around fl ood threats or 
crises.
Finally, the social-ecological legacies associated with particular places are also 
needed to explain promises and practices. For instance, a recent history of reliance 
on dikes, dams or diversions strongly shapes current perceptions of risk. Past 
infrastructure constrains, by its impact upon the hydrological features of the basin 
or fl oodplain, what interventions can later be made. Infrastructure solutions of 
different kinds, in turn, are supported and maintained by various social institutions 
and norms that arise around them. These may be very resistant to change.
Form, complexity and novelty
Promises made using different forms of intervention – dikes or dams, drains or 
diversions – probably involve different combinations of the fi ve mechanisms we 
introduced in Figure 11.1. One reason is that the scale and, hence, the set of actors 
that are drawn in by a promise of protection can be quite different. Upstream 
dams affect and involve people in locations that are far removed from the places 
for which promises of protection are made. Drains and pumps are usually about 
much more immediate redistributions of burdens and risks. Dikes and diversions 
are somewhat intermediate, often playing out in the peri-urban fringe. As a 
consequence, the kinds of expertise and coalitions likely to be formed are somewhat 
distinct. Another reason is that the physical form of infrastructure has implications 
regarding its control: infrastructure that is small or compact is likely to be easier 
to manage than that which is large or sprawling. Long dikes and diversion canals 
pass through many different jurisdictions, whereas a pumping station inherently 
includes possibilities of greater local control. 
Promises made in simple and complex settings are also likely to have different 
dynamics. First, consider complex situations where the interactions between 
rainfall, land and water uses, and physical interventions are not well understood and 
there are major uncertainties regarding how people will respond to changes in fl ood 
risks or particular kinds of fl ood events. In these circumstances, different groups 
can easily argue for different forms of interventions, drawing on alternative expert 
opinions to back their options. Diverse organizational interests can be pursued as 
each uniquely frames problems and solutions. Coalition-building, especially with 
actors capable of controlling key resources, is crucial to securing favourable fl ood 
protection projects. In very simple settings, in contrast, knowledge issues are small, 
so experts have little power. Multiple coalitions are pointless as there is only one 
course of action under consideration and the choice is primarily support or not. 
Promises of protection may still benefi t some groups more than others; but there 
is not much less scope for hidden transactions and a real ‘danger’ that the problem 
could be solved ‘once and for all’.
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Another way of thinking about the role of complexity is to consider the number 
of options involved in making decisions and the number of agents that would 
need to be coordinated in order to keep a protection promise. This, for example, 
depends upon the degree to which the river basin falls within a jurisdiction – say, 
an individual national territory. Options for physical interventions in the name of 
fl ood protection for Vientiane or Phnom Penh, lying on mid-stream banks of the 
Mekong, a large international river, have many more constraints than those for 
Bangkok. Hanoi with much, but not all, of the Red River Basin within Vietnamese 
territory falls somewhere in between.
Climate change, insofar as it represents new risks associated with altered fl ood 
regimes, appears to be easily accommodated by current modes of making protection 
promises. Indeed, climate change is rapidly becoming part of the vocabulary of 
fl ood experts. Thus, Professor Nguyen Sinh Huy, who directs a fl ood project for 
Ho Chi Minh City, points to sea-level rises as high as 0.9m by 2070 to argue that 
more dikes needed to be built in order to improve the fl ood protection of Ho Chi 
Minh City (Viet Nam News, 2008a). The proposed dikes are 2.5m high and 8.5m 
wide, and when complete would add 165km to the total length of dikes (Viet 
Nam News, 2008a). Massive infrastructure projects have also been proposed to 
protect Bangkok from sea-level rises caused by climate change. A recent example, 
launched by disaster experts and politicians, was a proposal to build an 80km long 
wall 300m offshore and 3m higher than moderate sea-level to protect Bangkok and 
two surrounding provinces (Wipatayotin, 2007). Smith Dharmasorjana, chairman 
of the National Disaster Warning Committee of Thailand, believes that a system 
of dikes offshore is needed to protect areas of Bangkok from sea-level rises caused 
by climate change, as well as intrusions of sea water into major rivers (Bangkok 
Post, 2008b).
A deeper treatment of these three themes – infrastructure forms, complexity 
and climate change – are beyond the scope of this chapter but are worthy of 
follow-up. A study that looked more carefully at the links between physical 
infrastructure and social systems could also address in much more detail questions 
of performance. In this chapter, moreover, we have not attempted to systematically 
assess the consequences of different fl ood protection promises for risks and burdens 
to different stakeholders.
In summary, fl ood protection promises are made and kept, or not, for a variety 
of reasons that largely can be understood in terms of knowledge, interests and 
power. But a deeper understanding also requires appreciation of social-ecological 
legacies.
Governing practices
The consequences of why and how promises are made are important because 
they involve allocating burdens and risks from fl oods and fl ood interventions. We 
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saw many examples of the side-effects of fl ood protection interventions in this 
chapter. From these concerns we draw several implications for initiatives and other 
efforts aimed at improving decision-making and practices with respect to fl ood 
management in the Mekong region.
First and foremost, fl ood management needs to be deliberated in the public 
sphere. To date, the input of experts has been too narrow, while the proposals of 
government agencies with strong interests, and of consultant and construction fi rms 
with vested interests, have been insuffi ciently scrutinized. The promise of fl ood 
protection requires wider deliberation (Lebel and Sinh, 2007). Multi-stakeholder 
processes are recommended. Even if these do not immediately alter organizational 
strategies or the design and pursuit of particular projects, they should at least lead 
to a better, shared, understanding of risks. Done well, they should produce fl ood 
management strategies that are much better integrated with the changes in land 
use and water use that accompany urbanization.
Second, much more attention must be paid to the adverse side-effects of 
intervention made in the name of fl ood protection for particular cities. Too often 
there is insuffi cient information about, and institutional mechanisms to offset, 
adverse impacts upon ‘other’ peoples and places. The promise of fl ood protection 
should be accompanied not just with analysis of the costs of construction and 
operations, but also with full consideration of compensation, insurance and other 
fi nancial instruments that may be needed to fairly reallocate burdens and risks.
Third, the notions that flood disasters can be eliminated and complete 
protection afforded should be discarded. The risk of flood disasters may be 
minimized, and some control of fl ood water is possible; but there are always, in 
practice, real and important limits on what magnitude and types of fl oods can be 
dealt with effectively. Full protection through infrastructure is rarely a realistic 
option for rapidly urbanizing regions in developing countries (Schultz, 2002). 
Understanding risks is a better strategy than ignorance. A likely outcome is greater 
emphasis on integrating complementary strategies within fl ood management, 
including extending early warning systems and improved disaster preparedness.
Fourth, flood protection strategies need to pay much more attention to 
controlling land use, not just planning and describing it. This means attention 
must be given to institutional development to ensure that responsible agencies 
have adequate authority, that administratively there is capacity to assign and 
reassign rights, and that there is a functional, independent, legal system in place 
where disputes can be settled and cases of unfair treatment by authorities brought 
forward (Lebel et al, 2006). Multi-stakeholder processes that inform negotiations 
around more contentious land-use plans should help to ensure that all voices are 
heard and not just those of powerful landowners or agencies with vested interests 
in construction or operation of new infrastructure.
Fifth, and in line with the fi rst four points above, individual urban dwellers and 
commercial property owners are often keen on high levels of protection, whereas 
farmers and others in the peri-urban periphery do not wish to become victims 
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of fl ood protection measures. These actors have agency that cuts across formal 
institutions and coordination efforts. The cumulative, largely self-organizing, 
responses to efforts to move water from one place to another cannot be discounted. 
People and fi rms build higher, use pumps and organize at local levels (Few, 2003; 
Molle et al, 2003). Within the bureaucracy of larger metropolitan areas, a similar 
phenomenon is observable: different districts ‘game’ each other’s fl ood protection 
operations. The result in both cases is that actual movement of fl ood waters is often 
complex, and the ultimate effectiveness of individual fl ood protection measures is 
often much more uncertain than assessments based on linear no-reaction analyses. 
The contributing causes to fl ooding in urbanizing regions are both local and more 
distant, and often interact (Tran and Shaw, 2007; Chang et al, 2008).
The high costs, unintended side-effects and fallibility of infrastructure-centred 
approaches inherent in pursuing promises of fl ood protection imply that fl ood 
management needs to be redirected. Much greater emphasis should be placed upon 
land-use planning, both in terms of the use of fl oodplains and the way in which 
different vegetation draws upon water resources. Ecosystem-informed approaches 
that make room for water outside and within urban areas should enable people to 
live better with more natural fl ood cycles. Greater investments in early warning 
systems and community-oriented disaster preparedness may do more for reducing 
vulnerabilities and risks than a narrow adherence to a logic of control, prevention 
and protection. 
Such alternatives are only likely to emerge as part of wider fl ood management 
strategies with changes to current governing practices. Taken together, the fi ve 
points above emphasize the need to make those in power, with responsibility and 
authority, more accountable for the promises they make. Much greater opportunity 
for public scrutiny of proposals and deliberation of alternative approaches to fl ood 
management is needed.
CONCLUSIONS
The promise of fl ood protection is easy to make, but hard to keep. Promises of 
protection and how they are pursued, it turns out, are better explained in terms 
of beliefs, interests and power. Promises played out in concrete – as dikes and 
dams, drains and diversions – regularly exaggerate benefi ts and ignore the often 
unanticipated side-effects on people living elsewhere and on the environment. 
Effi cacy in reducing risks of fl ood-related disasters is often downplayed to a side-
effect of projects pursued for other reasons. This does not imply that infrastructure 
has no role in fl ood management; but it does underline how frequently the promise 
of fl ood protection rings false.
302 INSTITUTIONS, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This chapter presents fi ndings from PN50 Enhancing Multi-Scale Mekong Water 
Governance, a project of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR) Challenge Programme on Water and Food. We thank our 
colleagues in M-POWER (www.mpowernet.org) for sharing fi ndings with us over 
the years.
NOTE
1 34 baht = US$1.
REFERENCES
ADB (Asian Development Bank) (2008) Lao People’s Democratic Republic: Vientiane Urban 
Infrastructure and Services Project, Completion Report for Project Number 33432, 
ADB, Manila
Babel, M. S., Gupta, A. D. and Domingo, N. D. S. (2006) ‘Land subsidence: A 
consequence of groundwater over-exploitation in Bangkok, Thailand’, International 
Review for Environmental Strategies, vol 6, no 2, pp307–327
Bangkok Post (2006a) ‘Farmers to sue irrigation agency over fl ood diversion’, Bangkok Post, 
3 November
Bangkok Post (2006b) ‘Is disaster inevitable?’ Bangkok Post, 26 November 
Bangkok Post (2008a) ‘Samak to revive old dam project: PM on collision course with 
environmentalists’, Bangkok Post, 6 June
Bangkok Post (2008b) ‘Dikes planned to prevent city fl ooding’, Bangkok Post, 18 June
CCFSC (Central Committee for Flood and Storm Control) (2006) National Strategy and 
Action Plan for Disaster Prevention, Control and Mitigation in Viet Nam – 2001 to 2020, 
CCFSC, Hanoi
Chang, H., Franczyk, J. and Kim, C. (2008) ‘What is responsible for increasing fl ood 
risks? The case of Gangwon Province, Korea’, Natural Hazards, doi: 10.1007/s11069-
008-9266-y
Charoenpo, A. (2008) ‘Warnings on fl oods faulted: MRC bulletins “not reaching” 
villagers’, Bangkok Post, 17 August
DDMFSC (Department of Dike Management, Flood and Storm Control) (1999) 
Suggestions on Emergency Measures for Extreme Floods Mitigation in Northern Viet Nam 
and Ha Tinh Province, Socialist Republic of Vietnam, DDMFSC, Vietnam
Dutta, D., Babel, M. S. and Gupta, A. D. (2005) An Assessment of the Socio-Economic 
Impacts of Floods in Large Coastal Areas, Asian Institute of Technology, Bangkok
Farrell, K. N. (2004) ‘Recapturing fugitive power: Epistemology, complexity and 
democracy’, Local Environment, vol 9, no 5, pp469–479
Ferguson, J. (1994) The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development’, Depoliticization, and 
Bureaucratic Power in Lesoth, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN
THE PROMISE OF FLOOD PROTECTION 303
Few, R. (2003) ‘Flooding, vulnerability and coping strategies: Local responses to a global 
threat’, Progress in Development Studies, vol 3, no 1, pp43–58
FLOCODS (2003) Modelling Embankment Failures in the Red River Dike System: Volume 
1, Dikes and Failures – Characterization and State-of-the-Art, Proc. 0605/1714403, 
DHA/NRE, Lisbon
Fox, C. and Sneddon, C. (2005) Flood Pulses, International Watercourse Law, and Common 
Pool Resources: A Case Study of the Mekong Lowlands, Research paper no 2005/20, 
World Institute for Development Economics Research, United Nations University, 
Helsinki, Finland
Garden, P. (2007) The Chiang Mai Floods of 2005, USER Working Paper WP-2007-19, 
Unit for Social and Environmental Research, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai
Grachangnetara, S. (2005) ‘Thailand’s Kaeng Sua Ten Dam revisited: The fl ood protection 
benefi t of a controversial agricultural project’, TDRI Quarterly Review, vol 20, no 3, 
pp20–27
Hangsapruek, S. (2007) Flooding Situation and Mitigation Measures in Thailand, Report 
on Japan–Thailand–China Joint Symposium on Current Policy and Directions on 
Flood Damage Mitigation, Cooperative Research Report of Public Works Research 
Institute no 366, Public Works Research Institute, Japan Science and Technology 
Agency, Tsukuba
Hirsch, P. and Wyatt, A. (2004) ‘Negotiating local livelihoods: Scales of confl ict in the Se 
San river basin’, Asia Pacifi c Viewpoint, vol 45, no 1, pp51–68
Hongthong, P. (2006) ‘Farmers upset over huge fl oodwater diversions’, The Nation, 6 
December, Bangkok
Hung, H. V., Shaw, R. and Kobayashi, M. (2007) ‘Flood risk management for the RUA of 
Hanoi: Importance of community perception of catastrophic fl ood risk in disaster risk 
planning’, Disaster Prevention and Management, vol 16, no 2, pp245–258
Kamolvej, T. (2006) The Integration of Intergovernmental Coordination and Information 
Management in Response to Immediate Crises: Thailand Emergency Management, PhD 
thesis, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh
Kinh, T. B. (2006) ‘City looks to solve drainage woes’, Viet Nam Economic Times, 6 
September, Ho Chi Minh City
Lebel, L. and Garden, P. (2006) Bureaucrats, Consultants and Stakeholders: An Emerging 
Knowledge System for the Upper Ping River Basin, Northern Thailand, USER Working 
Paper WP-2006-11, Unit for Social and Environmental Research, Chiang Mai
Lebel, L. and Sinh, B. T. (2007) ‘Politics of fl oods and disasters’, in Lebel, L., Dore, 
J., Daniel, R. and Koma, Y. S. (eds) Democratizing Water Governance in the Mekong 
Region, Mekong Press, Chiang Mai
Lebel, L., Nikitina, E., Kotov, V. and Manuta, J. (2006) ‘Assessing institutionalized 
capacities and practices to reduce the risks of fl ood disasters’, in Birkmann, J. (ed) 
Measuring Vulnerability to Natural Hazards: Towards Disaster Resilient Societies, United 
Nations University Press, Tokyo
Maiklad, P. (1999) ‘Development and achievements in fl ood control and management 
in Thailand’, in UN-ESCAP (ed) Regional Cooperation in the 21st Century in Flood 
Control and Management in Asia and the Pacifi c, United Nations, New York, NY
Manuta, J., Khrutmuang, S., Huaisai, D. and Lebel, L. (2006) ‘Institutionalized incapaci-
ties and practice in fl ood disaster management in Thailand’, Science and Culture, vol 
72, no 1–2, pp10–22
304 INSTITUTIONS, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER
Molle, F. (2007) ‘Scales and power in river basin management: The Chao Phraya River in 
Thailand’, The Geographical Journal, vol 173, no 4, pp358–373
Molle, F. and Hoanh, C. T. (2007) Implementing Integrated River Basin Management: 
Lessons from the Red River Basin, Vietnam, Working paper, Institut de Recherche pour 
le Développement, Mekong Programme on Water Environment and Resilience, 
International Water Management Institute, Marseille, Chiang Mai and Colombo
Molle, F., Shah, T. and Barker, R. (2003) The Groundswell of Pumps: Multilevel Impacts of 
a Silent Revolution, ICID-Asia Meeting, Taiwan
MRC (Mekong River Commission) (2008) Flood Situation Report, August 2008, 
MRC Technical Paper no 21, 1 September, Mekong River Commission Secretariat, 
Vientianne
The Nation (2006a) ‘King’s move helps save capital’, The Nation, 11 October
The Nation (2006b) ‘Large areas “needed for overfl ows”’, The Nation, 12 October 
The Nation (2007) ‘Shelved Kaeng Sua Ten Dam project may be given green light’, The 
Nation, 17 January
The Nation (2008) ‘DSI to investigate the BMA bribery allegation’, The Nation, 16 July, 
Bangkok
Ngo, L. L., Madsen, H., Rosbjerg, D. and Pedersen, C. B. (2008) ‘Implementation and 
comparison of reservoir operation strategies for the Hoa Binh Reservoir, Vietnam 
using the Mike 11 model’, Water Resources Management, vol 22, pp457–472
Oudomchit, B. (2006) ‘Flood forecasting system and fl ood management in Lao PDR’, 
in IFNET (ed) IFNET Action Report 2006, International Flood Network, Tokyo, 
www.internationalfl oodnetwork.org/AR2006/AR13Oudmicht.pdf
Pham, N. D. (2006) Những thách thứ c môi trương của Hà Nô· i hiện nay và các giải pháp 
khắa phục [Current Challenges to Ha Noi Environment and Solutions], Ministry of 
Science and Technology, www.moc.gov.vn/Vietnam/Management/ScienceTechnolog
y/6270200612121700330/’, accessed 28 September 2007
Phanayanggoor, P. (2006) ‘Local against dike-levelling’, Bangkok Post, 6 February
Phi, H. L. (2007) ‘Climate changes and urban fl ooding in Ho Chi Minh City’, Paper 
presented to the Third International Conference on Climate and Water, Helsinki, 
Finland
Ross, H., Poungsomlee, A., Punpuing, S. and Archavanitkul, K. (2000) ‘Integrative analysis 
of city systems: Bangkok Man and the Biosphere programme study’, Environment and 
Urbanization, vol 12, no 2, pp151–161
Samabuddhi, K. (2008) ‘Mekong shows its new face’, Bangkok Post, 25 August
Sathirathai, S. and Kittiprapas, S. (2000) ‘Confl ict management for environmental and 
social sustainability’, Paper presented to the Second Annual Global Development 
Conference (GDN 2000), Tokyo, Good Governance for Social Development and the 
Environment Institute, Bangkok
Schultz, B. (2002) ‘Role of dams in irrigation, drainage and fl ood control’, Water Resources 
Development, vol 18, no 1, pp147–162
SGGP (2007) Mưra lớ n gây ngập nhiều tuyến đường và kẹt xe [Ho Chi Minh City: Big Rain 
Caused Flooding and Traffi c Jams in Many Streets], TPHCM, 30 July 2007, accessed 29 
September 2007, www.sggp.org.vn/moitruongdothi/2007/7/113022/, Sao Gon Giai 
Phong
THE PROMISE OF FLOOD PROTECTION 305
Socialist Republic of Vietnam (1999a) Quyet Dinh So 185/1999/TTg cua Thu Tuong Chinh 
Phu Ve Chinh Sach Ho tro doi voi vung phan lu, cham lu thuoc he thong Song Hong [The 
Decision Number 185/1999/QD-TTg on 14 September 1999 on the Compensation Policy 
for Flood Diversion and Flood Retard Areas in Red River System], Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, Hanoi
Socialist Republic of Vietnam (1999b) Nghi Dinh So 62/1999/ND-CP cua Chinh Phu 
ve viec Ban Hanh Quy che ve Phan Lu, Cham Lu thuoc he thong Song Hong de bao ve 
an ninh thu do Hanoi [The Decree Number 62/1999/ND-CP on 31 July 1999 on the 
Regulation for Flood Diversion and Flood Retard in Red River System to Protect the Capital 
of Hanoi], Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Hanoi
Sokhem, P. and Sunada, K. (2006) ‘The governance of the Tonle Sap Lake, Cambodia: 
Integration of local, national and international levels’, Water Resources Development, vol 
22, no 3, pp399–416
Takeuchi, K. (2001) ‘Increasing vulnerability to extreme fl oods and societal needs of 
hydrological forecasting’, Hydrological Sciences Journal, vol 46, no 6, pp869–881
Tebakari, T., Yoshitani, J. and Suvanpimol, C. (2005) ‘Effects of large-scale dams on the 
hydrological regime: A case study in Chao Phraya river basin, Kingdom of Thailand’, 
Journal of the Japan Society of Hydrology and Water Resources, vol 18, no 3, pp281–292
Thanopanuwat, S. (2007) The Current Situation (October 2006) on Flood Management in 
Chao Phraya River, Report on Japan–Thailand–China Joint Symposium on Current 
Policy and Directions on Flood Damage Mitigation, Cooperative Research Report 
of Public Works Research Institute no 366, Public Works Research Institute, Japan 
Science and Technology Agency, Tsukuba
Thu, P. (2008) ‘Lao capital to restore its Mekong dike’, VNDaily, Hanoi, 20 May
Ti, L. H. (1999) Experiences of Flood Control and Management in Asia Relevant to Economic 
and Social Development Strategies for Central Viet Nam in the Twenty-First Century, 
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacifi c, Bangkok
Tran, P. and Shaw, R. (2007) ‘Towards an integrated approach of disaster and environment 
management: A case study of Thua Thien Hue province, central Viet Nam’, 
Environmental Hazards, vol 7, pp271–282
Trieu, N. (2008) ‘Offi cials say canal needs to be cleaned, not widened’, Thanh Nien News, 
Hanoi, 28 June
Tuan, L. A., Hoanh, C. T., Miller, F. and Sinh, B. T. (2008) ‘Floods and salinity management 
in the Mekong Delta, Vietnam’, in Be, T. T., Sinh, B. T. and Miller, F. (eds) Challenges 
to Sustainable Development in the Mekong Delta: Regional and National Policy Issues 
and Research Needs, The Sustainable Mekong Research Network (SUMERNET), 
Stockholm, Sweden
Van, B. (2008) Challenging Issues Related to New Urban Development Plan of Hanoi City, 
www.tuanvietnam.net/vn/sukiennonghomnay/3424/index.aspx, accessed 12 April 
2008
Viet Nam News (2007) ‘After billions spent fl ighting fl oods, HCM City knee-deep in 
water’, Viet Nam News, Hanoi, 5 November
Viet Nam News (2008a) ‘Offi cials step up efforts to prevent fl oods in HCM City’, Viet 
Nam News, Hanoi, 10 March
Viet Nam News (2008b) ‘Parts of Ha Noi to face fl oods’, Viet Nam News, Hanoi, 21 
May
306 INSTITUTIONS, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER
Vongvisessomjai, S. (2006) Flood Risk Reduction Plan for Chao Phraya River, TEAM Group 
of Companies, Bangkok, www.teamgroup.co.th/attach/article4.pdf (in Thai)
Wipatayotin, A. (2007) ‘Group fl oats plan to keep rising sea out’, Bangkok Post, 25 
November
Wipatayotin, A. (2008) ‘MRC defends China over Thai fl oods’, Bangkok Post, 16 August 
Wongpreedee, W. (2008) ‘BMA asks Japan to aid bribery probe’, Bangkok Post, 9 July 
Xuan, S. P. (2006) ‘Cac Giai phap chong lu cho Dong Bang Song Hong’ [‘Flood control 
measures in the Red River Delta’], Tap Chi Nong Thon Moi [The New Countryside 
Journal], vol 178, pp3–4
12
Songs of the Doomed: 
The Continuing Neglect of 
Capture Fisheries in Hydropower 
Development in the Mekong
Richard Friend, Robert Arthur and Marko Keskinen
INTRODUCTION
Since early 2007 there has been a rapid acceleration in hydropower development 
in the Mekong Basin. The value and importance of capture fisheries in the 
Mekong Basin and the threat of hydropower development to their productivity 
and sustainability is now well established, widely cited and rarely challenged 
(MRC, 2003; ADB, 2004; MRCS/WUP-FIN, 2007). Yet, despite this, on the 
rare occasions in which fi sheries enter public debate on hydropower development, 
they do so in a constrained manner, as something of an afterthought and as an 
unavoidable, slightly unfortunate, cost of the inevitable march of progress and 
development.
Fisheries are being downplayed rather than completely denied. There are 
several factors that appear to be at play. Some of these relate to the nature of policy-
making processes, knowledge production and power (e.g. Hirsch 2003; Sneddon 
and Fox, 2006), and, of course, to the enduring potency of a hydropower-based 
regional development narrative that traces its roots to the 1950s (Bakker, 1999). 
These dimensions of policy neglect have been discussed elsewhere.
There is something more deeply ingrained in this neglect. For even when 
debates about capture fi sheries do emerge – whether within the fi sheries and 
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hydropower sectors or more broadly – the discussion reverts to a ‘conventional 
wisdom’ that the capture fi sheries are doomed, facing a very bleak future under 
practically any circumstances. While similar narratives about the future of fi sheries 
can be observed elsewhere in the world (Pauly, 1990; Wilson et al, 1994; Béné, 
2003; World Bank, 2004; Thorpe et al, 2005), it is important to consider how 
they endure in the Mekong given their signifi cance in terms of global fi sheries 
production, and the special historical, cultural, social and economic importance of 
capture fi sheries in this region. The aim of this chapter is to place this ‘conventional 
wisdom’ of doom under closer critical scrutiny. In doing so, this chapter builds on 
recent work addressing policy that combines the critical analysis of the arguments, 
assumptions and narratives that underpin policy approaches (Roe, 1995; Shore 
and Wright, 1997; Hajer and Versteeg, 2005; Johnson, 2006; Verweij et al, 2006). 
Our concern is that the scale of these fi sheries impacts and the implications are so 
far-reaching that it is important that these narratives and assumptions are explored 
in the public domain. So far, this has not happened.
Development policy is an attempt to shape the world by making complex 
problems identifi able and situations of uncertainty manageable. In legitimizing 
a certain course of action, narratives play a central role in development policy 
by creating simple storylines of how a ‘problem’ has arisen and will unfold, and, 
hence, what the necessary course of action should be. Development narratives 
are the ‘conventional wisdom’ that are so deeply embedded that they are rarely 
challenged, or even considered to be an area that is necessary to be critiqued (Roe, 
1991; Johnson, 2006). Narratives legitimize certain types of knowledge and exclude 
others, and are the means by which actors and institutions make claim to action 
and ownership over resources (Fairhead and Leach, 1997).
The more complex the situation, the more such narratives endure (Roe, 1991). 
This is precisely what we see in development policy both within the worlds of 
fi sheries and of hydropower in the Mekong region. Fisheries are complex, diverse 
and dynamic in many different ways (Wilson et al, 1994). Yet, fi shery discussions 
and policies seem to be dominated by gross simplifi cations of this complexity, 
wrapped up in a narrative of doom that leads to their marginalization and neglect 
in development policy.
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ‘IMPORTANCE’ OF 
FISHERIES IN THE MEKONG
The story of the Mekong presents some unique dimensions to what appears to be 
a global tale. While the neglect of capture fi sheries, particularly inland fi sheries, 
in policy arenas is a phenomenon that is not exclusive to the Mekong Basin 
(see Thorpe et al, 2005), there are few regions in the world that have seen such 
a concerted and largely successful effort to raise the profi le of fi sheries and to 
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conduct extensive research on a range of fi sheries issues covering biology, ecology, 
livelihoods and nutrition. This is what makes this story so interesting. We see 
that while this research has highlighted the importance of fi sheries, particularly 
in terms of employment and nutrition, fi sheries have increasingly slipped off the 
development agendas.
Certain themes have endured in development discourse in the Mekong region. 
In most of the plans for Mekong development from the early 1950s until the 1980s, 
fi sheries were recognized as ‘valuable’ in some way. The large numbers of people 
engaged in fi shing, and fi sheries’ central importance in nutrition, has been widely 
recognized for many decades (see Tubb, 1966). For example, the Indian Mekong 
Tonle Sap Team (1962, p1) start their report by saying:
The importance of fi sh in the economic life of Cambodia is too well 
known to need any special emphasis here. Apart from the fact that it 
constitutes one of the most vital ingredients in the nutritional content 
of the people, it is also an important commodity of export.
Yet, despite this recognized value, the role of fi sheries in basin development visions 
during this period was minimal. For example, when describing the Master Plan for 
the Mekong, the executive agent of the Mekong Coordination Committee (Schaaf, 
1966, p5) presented a vision that excluded fi sheries, stating:
The project seeks the comprehensive development of the water resources 
of this lower basin, including mainstream and tributaries, in terms of 
hydroelectricity, irrigation, fl ood control, drainage, navigation improve-
ment, water management and water supply, along with related far-
fl ung economic and social growth, for the benefi t of all the people of the 
area without distinction as to politics or nationality.
Even among fi sheries experts themselves, a narrative of the limited future of fi sheries 
can be detected dating back several decades. For example, United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Regional Fisheries Offi cer J. A. Tubb (1966) 
highlights the importance of Mekong fi sheries, but also the limitations of scientifi c 
knowledge about the fi sheries. He also draws attention to the ‘almost cataclysmic 
changes in the ecology’ (Tubb, 1966, p63) that will result from basin development 
plans, but concludes that such development could and should not be avoided:
Water is required and will be used for many other things other than fi sh 
production, for irrigation, hydroelectric power, domestic supplies, and 
these on the whole are likely to have a greater economic value than the 
mere maintenance of areas of water for the production of fi sh. (Tubb, 
1966)
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We see here the emergence of a central theme – that the developmental potential 
from capture fi sheries will be less than from other development options, and that 
these losses can be managed even at a time in which the full value of fi sheries is 
openly acknowledged to have not been adequately assessed.
A decade later, there was a further effort to understand the scale and importance 
of capture fi sheries and potential impacts from basin development under the 
Mekong Basin-Wide Fishery Studies. Assessments, including estimates of the 
numbers of people involved in fishing, suggested that a quarter of the total 
population of the Lower Mekong Basin was involved in fi sheries in one way 
or another (University of Michigan, 1976). Additionally, while recognizing the 
potential of basin development impacts upon the production and value of capture 
fisheries, similar conclusions were reached. Ultimately, it was suggested that 
improvements, particularly in the area of aquaculture, could increase the fi shery 
yields so signifi cantly that these possible losses to the capture fi shery should not 
be a cause for concern (University of Michigan, 1976).
Capture fi sheries started to have more of a public profi le during the mid 
1990s. This was driven partly by civil society concerns over impacts of hydropower 
projects, such as the controversial Pak Mun Dam in Thailand (Roberts, 1993; 
Bakker, 1999; WCD, 2000; see also Chapter 3 in this volume). At this stage, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), activists and independent researchers were 
generating important information on capture fi sheries (Roberts, 1993; TERRA, 
1993; Claridge et al, 1996). It was also infl uenced by the emergence of a revitalized 
Fisheries Programme within the Mekong River Commission (MRC) (Sverdrup-
Jensen, 2002; Sneddon and Fox, 2006).
A central component of the MRC Fisheries Programme was an attempt to 
assess and value the productivity of the capture fi shery, and from this to identify 
likely impacts as a result of water resource development, including hydropower 
(MRC, 1996). This approach had been infl uenced by an MRC-commissioned 
report in the mid 1990s, which argued for data and information on the potential 
impacts upon fi sheries related primarily to ‘main stem dam developments’, but 
also ‘related to irrigation, fl ood protection, agriculture development, navigation 
and other changes (Hill and Hill, 1994). The MRC Fisheries Programme of the 
1990s can be seen to be a response to this long-established hydropower agenda, 
and crafted largely in its shadow.
Additional core elements of the MRC’s Fisheries Programme have been 
similarly shaped to focus on managing reservoir fi sheries (that would be created as 
a result of hydropower development) and on promoting aquaculture (with a later 
emphasis on indigenous species) as a strategy to cope with degradation of capture 
fi sheries. The initial MRC interest in capture fi sheries was thus very much framed 
in terms of understanding the potential impacts of water resource development. 
Originally, it was less driven by an interest in the fi sheries for their own values 
and potential for economic development. However, it has grown to be the main 
source of information on the importance of capture fi sheries in the region, and an 
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innovative infl uence in areas such as participatory management and indigenous 
knowledge (Sneddon and Fox, 2007). Most signifi cantly, the information from 
the MRC has become widely established and widely cited (Baran, 2007; MRC, 
2007).
This renewed interest in capture fi sheries in the Mekong since the 1990s 
generated wider recognition of the hydrological and ecological drivers of fi sheries 
production and a greater understanding of fi sh species diversity, migration and 
spawning patterns (Baran et al, 2006; Lamberts, 2006; ADB, 2004; van Zalinge 
et al, 2004). As a result of this research effort, certain ‘facts’ have been more widely 
established, although it is also recognized within the research community that there 
are still some uncertainties.
These efforts have led to dramatic revisions of estimates of production. For 
example, during the mid 1970s, total production was put in the region of 48,000 
tonnes with a value of US$6 million (University of Michigan, 1976). In contrast, 
the overall production of the Mekong capture fi sheries is now widely cited as being 
in the region of between 2 and 2.5 million tonnes per year, with an estimated value 
of around US$2 billion (MRC, 2003; Baran, 2007; MRC, 2007). This level of 
production is said to constitute 2 per cent of total global fi sh production and even 
up to 17 per cent of global inland fi sheries production (Baran et al, 2006). The 
basin’s fi sheries are also recognized as being based on a system with high species 
diversity (see Coates et al, 2003), with over 1300 species estimated to occur in 
the Mekong Basin. As with earlier descriptions of the fi sheries, aquatic resources 
are also widely recognized as central to nutrition and food security, with current 
estimates of between 27 and 78 per cent of animal protein in diets of rural people 
across the Mekong Basin (Hortle and Bush, 2003; Meusch et al, 2003). Fisheries 
are also acknowledged to be of particular importance for poor people partly due 
to their nature as common property resources, and a safety net and coping strategy 
(STREAM, 2001; Dixon et al, 2003; Smith et al, 2005; MRCS/WUP-FIN, 
2007).
However, even these broad, accepted ‘facts’ reveal only a partial picture as they 
merely provide an aggregate representation at the basin level. As a result, much 
of the Mekong fi sheries remain largely invisible. One of the main challenges in 
talking about ‘the fi shery’ of the Mekong is that, in reality, there are many different 
fi sheries in the region. Across the Mekong Basin, fi sheries range from the larger, 
more visible, examples, such as Tonle Sap and the large river basin-fl oodplain 
systems, to the diverse and diffuse small-scale fi sheries in ponds, streams and 
rice fi elds (Gregory and Guttman, 1996), as well as to small-scale yet productive 
upland fi sheries (e.g. Degen et al, 2005). While some attention has been paid to 
these larger-scale fi sheries, particularly Tonle Sap, there has been far less attention 
directed towards the smaller-scale fi sheries that, when combined, constitute the 
greater part of the overall picture. As a result, the full scale of involvement in 
fi sheries and its signifi cance for local livelihoods has usually been underestimated 
(Coates, 2002; Keskinen, 2003; MRCS/WUP-FIN, 2007). Even though the broad 
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evidence concerning capture fi sheries is acknowledged, more detailed, nuanced 
representations remain largely overlooked (Arthur and Sheriff, 2008).
Two main problems appear with the ‘facts’ of the Mekong region’s fi sheries. 
The fi rst is that the accepted truths and facts are incomplete. When the term 
‘fi sheries’ appears in hydropower debates, it tends to conjure particular images 
that are not representative of the full complexity of the Mekong. The second 
problem is in the interpretation of these facts and their implications. Even though 
the established broad facts are rarely questioned, the interpretation of their 
meaning and signifi cance is very much being challenged. As we discuss, the current 
importance of capture fi sheries becomes diminished by an enduring narrative. Even 
though production estimates have gone up from 48,000 tonnes to 2.5 million 
tonnes in the last 30 years, this narrative of doom has endured.
SONGS OF THE DOOMED: FISHERIES IN THE MEKONG
In this section we consider how the evidence and arguments generated over the 
last decade have failed to shift a narrative of doom and despair that runs so deep, 
and is so heavily institutionalized in the states and departments of fi sheries of the 
region, that it continues to shape the way in which issues, problems and debates 
are framed.
This enduring narrative of the Mekong contains within it two main elements, 
one of doom and one of simple solutions, with four distinctive yet overlapping 
storylines (cf. Roe, 1991; Hajer and Versteeg, 2005):
1 the inevitable decline of an open access resource in the face of population 
growth and development;
2 fi shing as a marginal activity with limited potential for generating economic 
development;
3 aquaculture as the replacement for wild-capture fi sheries; and
4 trade-offs between fi sheries and development.
We will now critically examine each of these storylines in turn.
The inevitable decline
The storyline of inevitable decline is the most pervasive of all, underpinning 
arguments related to fi sheries, while also appealing to an intuitive logic that 
somehow escapes the need for scientific or empirical evidence. In meetings, 
workshops and consultations, it is often alluded to but rarely addressed directly. It 
is a storyline that reveals the common sense of received wisdom.
The lynchpin of this storyline is a ‘tragedy of the commons’ (see Hardin, 
1968; Roe, 1991). Capture fi sheries are assumed to be ‘open access’ resources and 
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decline is thus seen as inevitable in the face of rising populations, and – along 
with such demographic changes – the overwhelming pressures of changes in land 
use and infrastructure development. For example, it is argued that as a result of 
‘unprecedented pressure from overexploitation and environmental change, there 
has been a cumulative decline in total volume of fi sh caught and average size of 
fi sh’ (Bush, 2008, p332). Essentially, it is a storyline of unavoidable decline that 
draws on both the internal nature of capture fi sheries as a commons resource, but 
also includes an implicit recognition of the threats to this resource that come from 
external developments.
The storyline is simple and appealing. By their very nature, fi sheries have 
no clear boundaries, covering river systems and fl oodplains that straddle villages, 
provinces and nation states. Fish themselves are migratory and the habitats upon 
which they depend are highly dynamic. Whatever happens in one part of the 
fi shery has implications for some other. Capture fi sheries are thus easily presented 
as a classic common property resource facing the inevitable pressures of open 
access in the face of weak, ineffective management and with no barriers to entry 
for newcomers (e.g. World Bank/ADB, 2006).
These pressures are argued to be exacerbated by growing populations. Although 
there is no evidence of a serious discussion of whether populations of fi shers are 
actually increasing, it is inferred by reference to general population increase and 
assumptions of population increase among poor people. While the arguments that 
fi sheries, like other common pool resources, are of particular importance for poor 
people have been widely accepted (Smith et al, 2005), these have also become an 
explanation for the overwhelming threats that fi sheries now face. For the story 
continues that as the numbers of people (and particularly the poor) increase, the 
threats on fi sheries will intensify. For example, Wong et al (2007, p38) single out 
the ‘huge scale of subsistence fi shing … [that] is heavy and destructive and there 
is evidence of declining fi sh populations as a result’. This is very much what Pauly 
(1990) describes as Malthusian overfi shing. While acknowledging the importance 
of fi sheries for poor people, it presents those same poor people as the greatest threat 
to their sustainability.
A further dimension of this storyline is the inevitability of threats to the 
capture fi shery that arise from the demands for development. This aspect implicitly 
recognizes that economic development will have an impact upon capture fi sheries. 
But placed in the context of population growth and subsequent economic demands, 
these impacts are seen as unavoidable. Management of fi sheries can only hope to 
minimize such impacts as best they can and that fi sheries will become a subject for 
conservation in the face of development (Wong et al, 2007).
These arguments of impending doom have a long history in the Mekong 
Basin. For example, McCormick Smith (1925) expressed dismay at the apparent 
overwhelming pressure on the capture fi sheries of Thailand, and documented local 
fi shers’ perceptions of a widespread decline in production. His prognosis for the 
future was gloomy, arguing that the combined pressures of population growth and 
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economic progress would inevitably undermine the continued sustainability of the 
capture fi sheries. These kinds of prognoses later appeared during the 1960s amid 
the early considerations of basin development (e.g. Pantulu, 1966; Tubb, 1966) and 
were infl uential in laying out the central elements of regional inland fi sheries policy 
–  conservation of fi sh stocks combined with the expansion of aquaculture.
The notion of the inevitable decline also suggests that even if capture fi sheries 
are important today, the threats that they face are so insurmountable that, in the 
future, they will not be able to provide the benefi ts that they are acknowledged as 
generating now. A recurring theme is that fi sheries production has peaked and, as 
in the case of the Tonle Sap, has potentially ‘exceeded the optimum supported by 
its ecosystem productivity base’ (Lamberts, 2006, p489). Without even needing 
to address the social, economic and cultural acceptability of the impacts of 
hydropower upon fi sheries, the debate can easily be shifted towards future scenarios 
that no longer include the capture fi sheries as a viable option. As we discuss, such 
a shift requires the combined notions of economic limitations to fi sheries and the 
potential of viable alternatives.
Fishing is an economically marginal activity for poor people
The second storyline addresses the economic importance and developmental 
potential of capture fi sheries. The fact that many people engage in some form of 
fi shing becomes less of a concern if this engagement is somehow marginal and with 
only limited potential for economic development.
Across the Mekong Basin the vast majority of people fi sh as part of a diversifi ed 
household livelihood portfolio (e.g. Dixon et al, 2003; Smith et al, 2005). There 
are relatively few people who engage as full-time professional fi shers. In Laos, 
for example, over 90 per cent of the catch may be attributed to rural people for 
whom fi shing is not a primary activity (Lorenzen et al, 2000). Capturing the 
signifi cance of this fi shing activity can be a challenge (Keskinen, 2003). There 
are no reliable fi gures on the numbers of people engaged in fi shing (see Coates, 
2002), but there are frequent suggestions that a majority of rural people across 
the basin engage in some form of fi shing activity (Gregory and Guttman, 1996; 
Sverdrup-Jensen, 2002; Baran et al, 2006; World Bank/ADB, 2006). Where this 
kind of fi shing activity is identifi ed, it is most frequently referred to as a secondary 
or supplementary occupation (Ahmed et al, 1998). This terminology has important 
connotations: that fi shing is of less importance than other activities; the numbers 
of people dependent upon fi sheries and for whom fi shery is important, and the 
extent of this importance, can be downplayed.
Fishing can also be presented as an activity to which people turn when other 
options are not viable – for example, as a coping strategy or activity of ‘last resort’ 
for the marginalized poor. This can be presented to reinforce arguments that 
fi shing is essentially unimportant except for those who have no other choice. It 
acknowledges the importance of fi shing for the poor and the potential implications 
SONGS OF THE DOOMED 315
of degradation of their main natural resource. As Béné (2003) observes, this is a 
persistent argument in which the story goes, that poor people fi sh, and people are 
poor because they fi sh.
The combination of these arguments is that capture fi sheries have limited oppor-
tunities for economic development. In the case of Thailand with a growing industrial 
marine fl eet, inland capture fi shing has been regarded as an occupation for the poor 
and having limited potential for development other than through the introduction 
of aquaculture, or through the promotion of alternative employment. In general 
terms, inland fi shery is regarded as having no real future in its present form and 
no real prospects for economic development (Masae and McGregor, 1996). State 
policy on capture fi sheries across the region has focused on a conservation strategy 
of minimizing degradation, but, as we discuss below, has concentrated efforts on 
increasing production through aquaculture and stocking (Bush, 2008).
An additional dimension of development policy targeting fi shers themselves 
has been to promote alternative livelihoods, moving fishers into other more 
productive economic activities. Picking up on the storylines of both the tragedy 
of the commons and limited opportunities for economic development, the World 
Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB) recently stated the case for hydropower 
development: ‘It can be argued that the best basis for intervening in these “common 
property” problems is provided by the existence of alternative sources of income 
(as provided by irrigated agriculture) and development generally (as facilitated by 
the availability of power)’ (World Bank/ADB, 2006). This basic perception drives 
much of regional fi sheries policy, with an emphasis on promotion of aquaculture 
and of alternative livelihoods (World Bank, 2004). Moreover, this serves as a 
convenient justifi cation for the development of hydropower since the compelling 
and influential storyline is that through the generation of electricity to spur 
economic growth, the underlying cause for people’s dependence upon fi sheries 
– namely, poverty – can be addressed.
Aquaculture can and should replace the fi shery
The substitution of capture fi sheries with aquaculture is a global storyline. For 
example, the World Bank (2007) suggests: ‘As production from capture fi sheries 
stagnates, aquaculture is changing the face of our waters.’ In the Mekong it has 
also been argued that, whatever fi sheries have provided in the past, the future 
lies largely in the technology of aquaculture. For example, it has appeared in the 
press: ‘Increasing the amount of fi sh consumed by Lao people is necessary, but 
is unsustainable without an expanded aquaculture programme’ (Vientiane Times, 
2008a). In this way, aquaculture has emerged as a hegemonic discourse (Bush, 
2008). Throughout the Mekong Basin, aquaculture dominates state-led fi sheries 
policy (see Bush, 2008). Opportunities for increasing fi sheries production have 
been presented almost exclusively in terms of aquaculture production.
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These arguments for aquaculture have combined notions of the inevitability 
of fi sheries decline, largely as a result of unavoidable population growth and 
development. For example, Edwards and Demaine (1997, p11) argue:
The need for aquaculture to provide increased supplies of fi sh should 
be considered in relation to capture fi sheries. These currently dominate 
production, but are static or in decline globally and in most countries. 
As wild fi sh stocks are threatened by human population growth through 
overfi shing and environmental degradation, the stimulus and need for 
aquaculture are greatest in developing countries where at least 90 per 
cent of the global increase in population is predicted to take place before 
the world population stabilizes at a level at least double that of today.
The promotion of aquaculture refl ects development strategies that have focused 
on modernization and technocratic solutions. Mirroring the agricultural Green 
Revolution, the fi sheries sector has attempted to generate a Blue Revolution based 
on the development of fi sh farming (see Coull, 1993). While these strategies have 
not been limited to the Mekong Basin, this part of Asia has been regarded as having 
great potential for aquaculture development; Thailand and Vietnam have witnessed 
dramatic growth in aquaculture production, both inland and coastal.1
Recognizing the importance of the capture fi shery, one ex-chief executive 
offi cer of the MRC reaffi rmed the notions of peaked production and the threats 
of rising populations: 
Capture fi sheries are utilized at its maximum possible level already, and 
there are only limited possibilities for expanding it in reservoirs and 
other artifi cial water bodies. It is more than likely that the development 
of other sectors may lead to some decline in the overall fi sh production 
in the basin in the future.
With strong population growth in the Mekong Basin and a natural 
capture fi shery that can hardly be expanded, aquaculture has an import-
ant role to play in food security as a whole. It is the most important 
source for an increase in fi sh production required to cope with the popu-
lation increase. (Kristensen, 2001, p15)
This is a signifi cant assessment as it comes from the one institution credited with 
raising the profi le of capture fi sheries and during a period in which there was an 
explicit commitment to the rhetoric of sustainable development within the MRC. 
Even within this historical and institutional context, these assumptions remained 
strong.
The notion that aquaculture is an inevitable response to the decline of the 
capture fi shery has several dimensions. This creates a strange interdependence 
between aquaculture and capture fi sheries in which the uptake of aquaculture by 
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large numbers of fi shers and farmers (as opposed to commercial activities) actually 
depends upon a degraded capture fi shery or reduced access to the fi shery. Or to put 
it another way, the degradation of capture fi sheries actually becomes an opportunity 
for the promotion of aquaculture.
The promotion of aquaculture can also be seen as going hand in hand with 
the development of hydropower. The development of dams affects the wild 
fi shery, contributing to the creation of a degraded fi shery which is itself one of the 
preconditions for the uptake of aquaculture. At the same time, the change to river 
habitat by the creation of reservoirs provides the very types of water bodies that 
aquaculture desires. During the 1960s this led to recommendations for government 
agencies to focus their efforts on promoting aquaculture to take advantage of these 
opportunities. For example, Pantulu (1966, p65) argues that ‘human intervention 
can, through scientifi cally based developmental measures, increase fi sh production 
to levels probably impossible to achieve in unharnessed rivers’ and by taking 
advantage of the changed environment (Tubb, 1966).
More recently, the lack of suitable water bodies is argued to be one of the major 
constraints to aquaculture expansion. By creating reservoirs, hydropower provides 
an additional resource for aquaculture. As Costa-Pierce (1998) writes: ‘there are 
vast areas of new inland waters “locked up” in hydropower and irrigation reservoirs 
… hydropower and irrigation reservoirs may be Asia’s fi nal “aquatic frontier”.’ 
More recently, in talking of dams proposed for the Sekong River in Laos, a Lao 
government offi cial was quoted as suggesting that ‘hydropower not only supplied 
water for irrigation, but also provided a regular long-term source of fi sh for local 
people’ (Vientiane Times, 2008b). In this way the impacts of hydropower upon an 
already doomed resource are compensated for by the creation of new aquaculture 
opportunities.
Trade-offs and tough choices
The notion of trade-offs is increasingly being brought into play in the hydropower 
debates as a means of framing decisions about the costs and benefi ts of alternative 
development pathways as unavoidable choices that can be identifi ed, assessed and 
mitigated against. In this narrative, the possibility of potential impact upon the 
capture fi sheries is not necessarily denied, nor even downplayed. With connotations 
of balance, trade-offs have an important resonance. This marks an important shift 
in the discourse of hydropower development in the Mekong. It is acknowledged 
that dams do, indeed, have impacts upon capture fi sheries and that these can be 
signifi cant. But the issue becomes one of being in a tough situation where choices 
between fi sheries and dams have to be made, however unpleasant such choices 
might be. The challenge is to address poverty, although what constitutes ‘poverty’ 
and the options for reducing poverty are rarely discussed. For example, the MRC 
itself noted in 2007 that:
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Further pressure on wild fi sh stocks will also come from the increasing 
exploitation of the Mekong’s natural resources by other development 
sectors. But these developments must proceed, if we are to tackle poverty 
and underemployment in the basin. (MRC, 2007, p2)
In this context of poverty, the situation is said to be one in which a choice needs to 
be made between conservation and development, stagnation and progress, between 
fi sh and people (Chapman and Daming, 1996).
It is the framing of this situational context that is most signifi cant. The starting 
point for making trade-offs is in terms of the unavoidable drive for development, 
particularly hydropower, legitimized by a poorly defi ned poverty reduction agenda. 
The demand for hydropower is presented as being driven by ‘a pent-up demand for 
development’ (World Bank/ADB, 2006, p17), and so the choices of trade-offs are 
framed in terms of what must be sacrifi ced for the overall good. It is in this context 
that the sacrifi ce or loss of capture fi sheries becomes a regrettable but necessary 
trade-off. But this raises critical issues – whether the choices can be reduced so 
simply and crudely as between fi sh and people, whether these choices refl ect the 
developmental challenges, whether there are alternative means of framing the 
challenges and options, how these decisions are made, and who has the power to 
make them. For as much as it is a choice between fi sh and people, it is also a choice 
between food and air conditioning, and to who these benefi ts accrue.
Of course, this storyline of trade-offs depends upon viewing hydropower 
as necessary and unavoidable, and upon the associated storylines of the capture 
fi sheries discussed above. This is legitimized by recourse to the challenge of poverty, 
and the potential of hydropower to meet this challenge. The combined effect of 
notions of inevitable decline of capture fi sheries, the marginal value of fi shing and 
limited potential for economic development, and the viability of aquaculture to 
replace the degraded capture fi shery, all contribute to a narrative in which capture 
fi sheries can, indeed, be traded off for hydropower. Even though by doing so 
there may be unpleasant impacts, these are not overwhelming or unmanageable. 
Framing hydropower and capture fi sheries in terms of trade-offs closes the space 
for alternative development pathways.
PROSPECTS FOR A FISHERIES-BASED COUNTER-NARRATIVE: 
CRISIS UNDER SCRUTINY
A counter-narrative to hydropower development has begun to emerge among a 
diverse range of civil society groups at various levels, including local communities, 
NGOs and academics. In this counter-narrative, capture fi sheries and fi sheries-
based livelihoods have come to represent alternative values of development in 
which the natural dynamism of the waters are entwined with local culture and 
economics. This combination of concern for impacts and representations of 
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alternative development pathways lies at the heart of attempts to reconstitute the 
current debate on water resource development.
The emerging counter-narrative presents the river as having value beyond 
that of water as a commodity. Notions of nature, wisdom and culture are joined 
around three key arguments: 
1 the fundamental ecological, social, cultural and economic importance of cap-
ture fi sheries;
2 the wealth of local knowledge of fi sheries and river ecology; and 
3 the capacity of local fi shers to manage the Mekong region’s resources sustainably 
and equitably (e.g. Claridge et al, 1996; Shoemaker et al, 2001; Missingham, 
2003; Sretthachau and Deetes, 2004; Baird and Mean, 2005).
The counter-narrative also poses a powerful critique to the narratives of open 
access resources and notions of inevitable decline. Fisheries are argued to have 
been managed according to traditional rules and norms that have emphasized 
both sustainability and equity, with rural people acting as the custodians of river 
ecology (Shoemaker et al, 2001; Missingham, 2003). The degradation of resources 
is not a result of their perceived status as open access, but actually arises from the 
‘enclosure of the commons through power-based relations’ (Béné, 2003, p965) 
where political infl uence, corruption and mismanagement are leading to illegal 
fi shing and overfi shing. The threat to managing fi sheries is argued to arise from 
the encroachment of market forces and values, the failure of state-led management 
initiatives to recognize existing traditional practices, and the incompatibility of 
state-led fi sheries management polices with local management regimes. As pre-
existing custodians of river ecology, local fi shers are argued to deserve preferential 
rights in river basin management ahead of other resource users (TERRA, 1993).
This section is concerned with placing the underlying arguments upon which 
this crisis narrative is based under a more critical examination.
Is there a decline and is this inevitable?
Underpinning the claims of inevitable decline is the argument that capture fi sheries 
production has already peaked. While this argument has some intuitive appeal, it is 
very diffi cult to establish the actual status of stocks and production in the Mekong 
(Coates, 2002). This argument traced back to the 1960s is based on two seemingly 
contradictory elements: an assertion that fi sheries production has peaked and, 
alongside it, the recognition that there is not enough evidence to determine whether 
this is so. For example Tubb (1966, p64) argues, on the one hand, that ‘production 
may even now be approaching the maximum’, then immediately acknowledges 
that ‘reliable and comprehensive statistical data on production is entirely lacking’. 
Despite such apparent contradictions, these arguments have continued.
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From a purely biological perspective, it is difficult to assess the natural 
productivity of the Mekong fi sheries, which include a huge number of different 
species with different life cycles, a high seasonal abundance, the ability to migrate 
over large distances, and are largely invisible. Traditionally, a good deal of the 
information about a fi shery is derived from data taken from what people actually 
catch. People fi sh with different gear, targeting a range of habitats, with different 
levels of intensity at different times of the year. Much of the fi sh catch is consumed 
within the household, and as such is invisible to outsiders. As a result, getting a 
picture of the status of stocks and production across the basin that can be compared 
from year to year remains a huge challenge (Coates, 2002; Lamberts, 2006). In 
addition, there is a high natural variability from year to year, particularly for some 
species. Gathering data and assessing trends is thus extremely diffi cult (Coates, 
2002).
Information remains insuffi cient to determine whether stocks or production 
are in decline (Tubb, 1966; Hill and Hill, 1994; Baran and Myschowada, 2008), 
and certainly, if there is a decline, whether this is inevitable. An intriguing aspect 
of this argument of fi sheries being in decline is that although it can be traced 
back several decades, it has endured even through a period in which the estimates 
of fi sheries production have dramatically increased. For example, Baran (2007) 
summarizes the shifts in production estimates through the 1990s. Assumptions 
of decline have endured during a period in which offi cial production fi gures have 
increased almost sevenfold.
This is not to say that concerns about declines of the fi shery are not warranted; 
but this is essentially a management issue and, as such, it is crucial that the factors 
leading to any decline are identifi ed correctly. Portraying decline as ongoing and 
inevitable takes the concern out of the sphere of fi sheries management.
The tragedy of the commons rests on assumptions of a lack of management, 
and threats from rising populations of fi shers. Considerable effort has gone into 
documenting the wealth of traditional local management practices in the region 
that have aimed to ensure sustainability and equity (e.g. Claridge et al, 1996; 
Degen et al, 2005; Garaway et al, 2006). In contrast to the perception of an 
unmanageable open access resource, the Mekong Basin provides a wealth of local 
management regimes, many of which are highly adaptive to changing social and 
natural environments. Even in cases that are supposedly open access, there is no 
free for all. There is evidence from across the basin of such management for a range 
of fi shery resources, including river fi sheries, fl oodplains and rice fi elds providing a 
range of benefi ts. Where management regimes are undermined, this is a factor of 
weak governance rather than due to the intrinsic nature of the fi sheries (Thuon, 
2004; Keskinen et al, 2007).
The assumption that fi sheries face unavoidable pressures from rising populations 
of fi shers also does not hold. Overall, there is no evidence that numbers of fi shers 
are increasing or that where numbers of fi shers are increasing that this is a result 
of population change rather than other socio-economic factors which draw people 
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to the fi shery. Again, evidence from the Mekong suggests that the concern is not 
so much about aggregate numbers of fi shers increasing, but about commercial 
encroachment and use of large-scale destructive gear, privatization of common 
resources and weak rule of law.
The misrepresentation of fi shing within rural economies
The claim that fi shing is somehow of secondary importance to local livelihoods 
or an ‘activity of last resort’ is also unconvincing. From our perspective, fi shing is 
central to rural economies and fundamental to household livelihood strategies.
There have been several attempts at identifying the numbers of people engaged 
in full-time or part-time fi shing. For example, a comprehensive and often-cited 
assessment carried out in Cambodia during the late 1990s distinguishes between 
fi shing as a primary occupation or as a part-time occupation (Ahmed et al, 1998). 
This research suggests that from eight provinces surveyed, 10.5 per cent of the 
households are engaged in fi shing or related activities as a primary occupation, 
with an additional 34.1 per cent engaged on a part-time basis, indicating a total 
of 1 million people engaged in fi sheries in one form or another. For some areas of 
Cambodia, the involvement in fi sheries is argued to be even higher, up to 90 per 
cent (Thouk and Sina, 1997).
Yet, these distinctions between primary and secondary occupations can 
themselves be misleading. The majority of people engage in fi shing as a component 
of diversifi ed household livelihood strategies. For example, in Laos it has been 
reported that almost everyone who has access to water, fi shes (Claridge et al, 1996). 
The need is then to assess fi sheries in this context (Heady et al, 1995; Friend, 2001; 
Shoemaker et al, 2001; Meusch et al, 2003; Garaway, 2005; Smith et al, 2005; 
Resurreccion, 2006). Looking again at southern Laos, fi shing has an important 
role in the livelihoods of almost all rural households, and not just the poor, with 
fi shing accounting for up to 70 per cent of household fi sh consumed and sold across 
different wealth groups within the same villages (Garaway, 2005). In addition, 
rather than representing an activity of particular signifi cance in poorer households, 
people of all socio-economic classes fi sh and consume fi sh, with poorer households 
catching only slightly more on a per household basis (Garaway, 2005).
The majority of rural people across the Mekong Basin tend to refer to themselves 
as rice farmers (see Luco, 1997; Lorenzen et al, 2000). Yet, although rice farming 
holds a special place in people’s own imaginations and the rural culture of the 
region, in many cases the low value of rice production and its limited contribution 
to household economies compared to fi sheries is such that it could be argued that 
they are fi shers who farm, rather than farmers who fi sh (Gregory and Guttman, 
1996). As Keskinen (2003) argues for the situation in Cambodia, agriculture and 
fi shing are so intertwined it is impossible to separate them; but the approach of 
census surveys framed in terms of primary and secondary occupations fails to 
capture the interdependence of household multiple livelihood strategies.
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By considering the amount of time people invest in fi shing-related activities, 
the importance relative to these other activities becomes clearer, even in the 
smaller-scale fi sheries of upland areas (Degen et al, 2005). Other authors have 
argued that the fundamental importance of fi sheries and agriculture (mainly rice 
production) and water management is such that rural regions of the Mekong can 
be characterized as comprising ‘river-based livelihoods’ (Shoemaker et al, 2001) 
or ‘wetland livelihoods’ (Friend, 2007).
Can aquaculture really expect to replace capture fi sheries?
For proponents of aquaculture, there was some dismay that there were situations 
in which farmers proved reluctant to take up aquaculture, or if they did, remained 
reluctant to continue with aquaculture. Despite the efforts of aquaculture extension 
in many parts of the basin (e.g. the lower northeast of Thailand and southeast 
Cambodia), the uptake has remained disappointing (Pushpalatha, 2001) and yields 
and recapture rates differ from those expected (Lorenzen and Garaway, 1998; 
Garaway et al, 2001).
This led to a reassessment of aquaculture. It became apparent that in these 
specifi c areas, the capture fi shery that had been assumed to be no longer productive 
was far more vibrant than had been appreciated and remained an attractive 
livelihood activity for local people. This in turn led to some important shifts in 
how aquaculture began to be promoted. It was no longer to be presented as a 
replacement to the capture fi shery, but rather as a supplement, particularly for 
those engaged in diversifi ed livelihoods (Garaway et al, 2006). Increasingly it 
was recognized that involvement in both aquaculture and capture fi sheries could 
change from year to year, with people moving in and out of one or the other 
depending upon a range of factors, including availability of labour and credit, as 
well as the natural productivity of the capture fi shery (Friend and Funge-Smith, 
2002). There was also growing interest in the types of aquatic resource activities 
that combined elements of aquaculture and capture fi shery, rather than seeing the 
two as competing activities.
The most widespread example of this aquaculture–capture fi sheries interface is 
the stocking of capture fi sheries (often referred to as ‘enhanced’ or ‘culture-based’ 
fi sheries), where natural capture fi sheries and reservoirs are stocked with farmed 
fi ngerlings and juveniles. This is a key part of government policy throughout 
the Mekong (Claridge et al, 1996; Warren, 2000; Welcomme and Vidthayanon, 
2003). Experiences with village-managed culture-based fi sheries in southern Laos 
indicated that stocking increased the potential biological production. However, 
the low levels of effort applied as a combined result of restricted access that 
accompanied the stocking and selected harvesting of larger stocked fi sh often 
meant that while the effi ciency of harvesting increased, yields were no different 
from similar unstocked fi sheries (Lorenzen and Garaway, 1998; Garaway, 1999; 
Arthur, 2004; Garaway et al, 2006).
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A smaller-scale example can be seen in the management of refuge traps in 
fl oodplains. These traps are dug in areas of the fl oodplains that maintain water 
in the dry season and attract certain species of fi sh. While these trap ponds and 
similar management approaches in rice fi elds were identifi ed as traditional practices 
in many parts of the basin (Angporn et al, 1998), it was recognized that in some 
areas the use of trap ponds was growing and in some cases there was additional 
stocking of fi sh in the ponds, constituting a bridge between aquaculture and 
capture fi sheries.
In terms of uptake, it was recognized that while aquaculture involved fi sh, it 
did not necessarily fi t with fi shers’ livelihood portfolios, assets, skills and interests. 
In fact, there was a recognition that in many cases, aquaculture was more akin to 
farming than fi shing, and that the most enthusiastic uptake was often with farmers 
rather than fi shers. As Payne (2000, p2) notes: ‘farmers tend to make better fi sh 
farmers than people who primarily fi sh for a living’.
An alternative argument suggests that aquaculture can never expect to replace 
the capture fi shery. In this light, aquaculture is one element of aquatic resource 
management, but not a substitute for wild fi shery (Friend and Funge-Smith, 
2002).
When we consider current production levels of capture and culture fi sheries in 
the Mekong Basin, the challenge for aquaculture to replace capture fi sheries simply 
in aggregate production terms becomes clearer. Current estimates suggest that of 
total production in the Lower Mekong Basin, approximately 80 per cent comes 
from capture, with 10 per cent from aquaculture and 10 per cent from reservoir-
stocking (Sverdup-Jensen, 2002). The imbalance of production fi gures illustrates 
the magnitude of required increases in aquaculture to compensate for losses in 
capture fi sheries, even without considering the investments and technical support 
that would be needed to achieve this and the distribution of benefi ts.
There are important distributional dimensions in terms of producers and 
consumers. Aquaculture is currently restricted to farming a few species, as opposed 
to the great diversity found in local catches. Aquaculture producers are not always 
fi shers, and with growing commercialization, this is becoming even more so. 
Aquaculture production tends to target urban markets with specifi c commercially 
viable species. Typically, this type of production does not represent the daily 
aquatic resource consumption of the majority of rural people and, as such, is not 
a substitute.
The notion that hydropower reservoirs constitute the ‘last aquatic frontier’ 
(see Costa Pierce, 1998) is also misleading. Despite the gold-rush appeal of such a 
representation of reservoirs, experience has shown that stocking reservoirs has rarely 
succeeded in compensating for capture fi sheries lost in purely aggregate terms. 
Reservoirs change the biophysical and institutional nature of the fi shery. Stocked 
reservoirs support different fi sh assemblages from natural rivers, typically with 
less species diversity. In terms of how people fi sh, reservoirs represent a new type 
of fi shery for fi shers, requiring new skills and resources. Stocking reservoirs (and 
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other public water bodies) can end up displacing the people who had previously 
relied on these fi sheries. The few cases in the Mekong in which reservoir fi sheries 
have become highly productive are associated with a commercialization of the 
fi shery and the granting of high-investment concessions, such as in the Nam Ngum 
Reservoir in Laos. 
Trade-offs revisited
Framing hydropower and fi sheries in terms of trade-offs has an immediate appeal 
of reasonableness and balance. But at the same time, it reduces complex societal 
choices based on values of what development means to simplistic choices to 
be determined by an inferred technical, neutral decision. It simplifi es complex 
options to a set of polar choices, as if these were the only options available, and 
as if the choice between dams and fi sh were comparable. At its most crude, the 
use of the term trade-offs reduces complex economic, environmental, social and 
cultural values to aggregate economic values. In addition, the trade-offs usually 
fail to address the distributional aspects of different resources (MRCS/WUP-FIN, 
2007).
Inherent in the trade-offs approach is an assumption that society can afford to 
trade off fi sh for the benefi ts of hydropower. But it is not clear what exactly is being 
traded off. As many authors have argued, fi sheries are central to rural livelihoods, 
providing a range of social and cultural values and benefi ts. Putting aside these 
values and benefi ts, and only focusing on the value of fi sheries in terms of food 
security and nutrition, still highlights what is at stake. The notion that fi sheries 
can be traded off rests on an assumption that what is lost in terms of food can be 
replaced. As we have discussed above for aquaculture, this assumption is highly 
questionable. Moreover, the implicit assumption is that there are undifferentiated 
benefi ciaries, rather than considering who and where the winners and losers are.
Additional concerns emerge when this issue of trade-offs is placed in the 
context of current food production challenges, as well as growing climate change 
uncertainties. With declining global food reserves, changing agricultural practices 
towards non-food crop production and rising populations, this notion of trading 
off a viable, renewable natural resource that sustains large portions of the Mekong 
region’s population appears more risky, and is not a simple choice of trading like 
for like.
CONCLUSIONS
The narrative of doom surrounding the capture fi sheries of the Mekong is persistent 
and deeply entrenched. It is a narrative that is institutionalized in the fi sheries 
departments, policies and programmes of the region. It shapes the research agendas 
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that fi sheries science undertakes, and determines where, when and how fi sheries 
issues enter development debates. As such, it reinforces the current drive for 
hydropower rather than providing alternatives.
As with other development narratives, this crisis narrative of fi sheries in the 
Mekong simplifi es a set of complex issues. The many different fi sheries of the 
Mekong cover a wide geographical area, with signifi cant diversity in all of the key 
characteristics of a fi shery – fi shers, gear, habitats, species and fi shing practice. 
Fisheries are characterized by complexity and uncertainty, particularly in large river 
basins driven by complicated and dynamic ecological processes. Understanding 
this diversity and complexity is far from straightforward. Developing management 
and policy in this context of complexity is even more challenging.
The major problem with the ways in which fi sheries debates have been framed 
in the Mekong is that the complexity and diversity of fi sheries have not been 
captured adequately, or have been lost completely. All that has endured is a gross 
simplifi cation legitimizing a narrow set of management and policy options.
Fisheries science and research needs to seek ways in which they can be more 
infl uential. The evidence that has been generated has not been challenged directly 
– and yet seems to have had so little infl uence on the course of hydropower 
development. The problem seems to be the failure to generate compelling arguments 
that challenge this narrative of doom. Ultimately, the fate of the fi sheries of the 
Mekong region just does not seem to matter.
In this chapter we have attempted to provide an initial critique of the crisis 
narrative and the assumptions upon which it is based within the context of 
hydropower development in the Mekong River Basin. We have suggested that the 
assumptions and arguments embedded in these storylines can be challenged based 
upon empirical evidence. Yet, even this only takes us so far. Deconstruction alone 
will not infl uence policy outcomes until alternative pathways can be demonstrated 
and articulated. Because of this, there is an urgent need to reframe the evidence 
and arguments of capture fi sheries in the Mekong Basin. Essentially, this requires 
a move away from simply highlighting the socio-ecological, economic and cultural 
importance of capture fi sheries to creating a counter-narrative (see Roe, 1995) 
that reverses established thinking, and demonstrates the complexity and multiple 
realities of fisheries, fishery livelihoods and the fishers themselves across the 
Mekong Basin. This needs to set out a future scenario of how fi sheries and the 
people who depend upon them can contribute to setting development objectives. 
Such a rigorous and empirically based counter-narrative should seek to provide a 
future scenario in which fi sheries are not merely a resource of conservation value, 
but a resource whose management is central to meeting the varied developmental 
challenges of the Mekong River Basin.
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NOTE
1 Aquaculture, like farming or fi sheries, is a term that is used to cover a huge 
diversity of activity, in terms of technology, investment, scale and intensity, 
and with a variety of objectives from subsistence to export.
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The Anti-Politics of Mekong 
Knowledge Production
Mira Käkönen and Philip Hirsch
INTRODUCTION
Despite the enormous efforts of planning agencies and signifi cant amounts of 
time and money spent on feasibility studies for water resource infrastructure, 
the Mekong River has remained one of the world’s least developed of the world’s 
major rivers and is thus now perceived by national decision-makers and many 
international donor organizations as having ‘underused potential’. This is at a 
time when there is a major concern that most large rivers have been overdeveloped. 
There are clear signs that countries in the Mekong River Basin are striving more 
aggressively after ‘modern development’ in forms of large-scale dams, irrigation 
and hydraulic controlling structures. But at the same time, many in the region 
are aware of the failures of the modernist projects elsewhere, and in those parts of 
the region where dams and irrigation have been installed, the uncritical belief in 
human mastery over the forces of nature has been seriously questioned. There are 
also evolving domains of knowledge that actively contest the scientifi c and expert 
knowledge usually used for policy and development plans of the basin. It is thus 
important to look at how these modernist plans and aspirations, epitomized by 
large-scale dams and diversions, are being justifi ed and legitimized in relation to 
competing knowledge domains.
Knowledge produced by experts in the form of models, impact assessments 
and scenarios dealing with risk play a crucial role in the legitimization process. 
This chapter provides a perspective on the production of knowledge around 
major development issues in the Mekong River Basin. At a time when large-scale 
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development plans are being justifi ed and rationalized, it is relevant to ask in 
what ways scientifi c knowledge is being deployed, and whose visions of future 
waterscapes the dominant models and scenarios favour. Important questions also 
relate to the openness of expert knowledge: is it really open to the public, how is 
it framed, and what are the possibilities and manifestations of civil contestations 
and public participation in the current societies of the Mekong region? The focus 
of this chapter is on the Mekong River Commission (MRC), which is one among 
the main knowledge brokers in the region. The MRC is mainly foreign funded and, 
at least as perceived by those who fund it, the MRC has a central role in the water 
resources management of the Mekong Basin (on the MRC, see also Chapter 14).
Much discussion on the politics of knowledge in the Mekong River Basin and 
elsewhere draws lines of tension between expert knowledge that employs scientistic 
discourses, on the one hand, and, on the other, local knowledge of farmers, fi shers 
and other ordinary people who have a living understanding of, and dependence 
upon, the myriad natural resources of the land, forests and water bodies of the 
basin. In Thailand, and latterly in other countries of the Mekong, initiatives 
such as Tai Baan (e.g. Foran, 2006; Sretthachau, 2007) have promoted registers 
associated with quite different development preferences of the people on behalf of 
whom such knowledge is asserted. So successful has the new knowledge production 
been that relatively mainstream organizations, such as the International Union 
for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) have accepted it as a valid methodology and 
supported Tai Baan research in the region. 
Ironically, however, the participatory turn in mainstream institutions such 
as the MRC has another side to it. It is at constant risk of being far from a 
counterbalance to the expert knowledge. Especially as abstracted from its societal 
context in an international agency such as the MRC, participation tends to 
mirror a type of development-driven participation that can contribute to the de-
politicization of knowledge in support of a particular governance agenda.
This chapter addresses the process and problems of depoliticization of 
knowledge, or what we call the ‘anti-politics of knowledge production’.1 We 
focus on two seemingly contrasting aspects of the MRC’s work. In the fi rst part 
the focus is on the MRC’s hydrological models, which form the backbone of the 
MRC’s knowledge production and the main source for the MRC’s estimations of 
development impacts. The results of the MRC’s hydrological models have also 
been the main source of justifi cation for future development plans by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank. This domain of expertise is still 
relatively closed and exclusive. We discuss the knowledge produced by models 
not only in terms of accountability and validity, but also in relation to the social 
shaping of interpretations. 
The second part of the chapter covers the MRC’s response to contestations 
of the closed nature of its expertise and associated shortcomings of the assessment 
work. One component of the demands for more participation in knowledge 
production is that there should be more local knowledge and expertise included 
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in the assessment processes, as well as more diversifi ed and representative interests 
guiding the knowledge production. The embryonic participatory turn of the 
MRC is also part of the more general shift that the fi eld of development has gone 
through. Because the MRC depends heavily upon international donors, its public 
discourse needs to be in line with the current international discourses, where the 
new orthodoxy includes participatory decision-making. Hence, for the MRC, it is 
now not enough to provide only scientifi c bases for policy-making concerning new 
development plans. The MRC also has to prove that its expertise is being opened 
up and democratized, or at least shared more widely. The chapter thus seeks to 
discuss the rationale of this new participatory turn of the MRC, its promises and 
limitations in relation to knowledge production, and the role of mainstreamed 
participation, which tends to reinforce rather than defuse the depoliticization of 
knowledge.
Theoretical dimensions
Knowledge production related to the probable impacts of new development 
projects, mainly in the form of large mainstream dams, is closely related to the 
estimations of risk and to assumptions on risk management. Beck’s (1992) theory 
of risk society and his related modernization narrative offer one way of seeing the 
Mekong region’s current situation. Through Beck’s lenses, the region appears to 
be a hybrid of premodern, modern and refl exive modernity. As the Mekong still 
fl ows relatively freely, the unpredictable disasters that it brings in some years in the 
form of exceptionally strong fl oods or droughts are, in many parts of the basin, 
often still natural and thus not risks characteristic of modern society. Rather, they 
are hazards common to premodern societies.2 
Since the establishment of the Mekong Committee in 1957, there has been an 
enormous amount of planning effort and expenditure to materialize the ‘underused 
potential’ of the river and to engineer out the fl oods and droughts associated with 
its monsoon-derived hydrology. For the dam and irrigation plans, whose developers 
included former Tennessee Valley Authority engineers, the common denominator 
was the will to control and manipulate nature in order to trigger the economic 
growth of the region and to fi ght back the spreading communism (see also Chapter 
1). These could be seen as failed attempts to shift the area to the fi rst stage of the 
era of modernization in which wealth production is driven by a will to control and 
manipulate nature under the imperatives of economic growth.
After the establishment of a new Western donor-driven MRC in 1995, the 
emphasis shifted from ambitious plans for a series of large-scale dams to knowledge 
production on the impacts and risk assessments of proposed development 
interventions. New domains of knowledge are also evolving that actively contest 
the scientifi c and expert knowledge claims used for policy and development plans 
of the basin. This situation comes close to Beck’s key concept for the second stage 
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of modernization: the risk society or ‘refl exive modernization’ at the heart of 
which are issues of ecological crisis and contestations between citizen initiatives 
and formal authority. The key issue, thus, is how the status of knowledge begins to 
be contested, and how the risks that used to be a matter for experts and scientifi c 
legitimation become subject to public debate so that ‘modern’ scientifi c knowledge 
loses its monopoly over truth. The risks that were once presented as being calculable 
now start to seem incalculable. But still the aspirations of striving after modern 
development by the governments of the Lower Mekong Basin have not ceased, and 
the region is now closer than ever to the realization of several large-scale dams on the 
mainstream Mekong River. The hybrid nature and, even, dissonance of the basin 
and the MRC in relation to Beck’s modernization narrative thus manifests itself in 
that the underlying current of policy-making is still pursuing the modernization of 
the fi rst stage, while the knowledge production in the MRC simultaneously needs 
to face the expectations of the risk society.
Beck’s concept of risk is, however, not very benefi cial when analysing more 
profoundly the current knowledge production in which the MRC takes, most 
importantly, the form of basin fl ows analysis. For Dean (1999, p177), ‘risk is a 
way – or rather, a set of different ways – of ordering reality, of rendering it into 
calculable form. It is a way of representing events in a certain form so they might 
be made governable in particular ways, with particular techniques and for particular 
goals.’3 The analysis of how the concept of risk is used in the knowledge production 
and how it is part of political technologies of the MRC would deserve a deeper and 
more detailed discussion than is possible in this chapter. But one of the important 
aspects of the political technologies, also related to risk, is ‘technical rendering’, 
a concept developed by Nicolas Rose (1999). This is discussed in more detail in 
relation to the MRC’s hydrological models.
According to Dean (1999), increased numbers of assessments and participatory 
processes do not necessarily mean that the decisions made are better informed, 
but that the central target and objective of the governments becomes the reform 
of the performance of the existing governmental institutions and techniques. This 
comes hand in hand with the processes where governments are challenged by their 
capability to control the risks that they produce (Dean, 1999). The analysis of 
reforms in knowledge production and policy-making in MRC-like organizations 
benefi ts from this perspective of seeing them as ways of securing the mechanisms 
of government. 
A central idea of Dean (1999) and Rose (1999) is that the relations of power 
and truth are inseparably interwoven. In this chapter, the point is not to search 
only for the obvious ‘realpolitik’ dimension in knowledge production.4 To some 
extent, there have, indeed, been situations where undesirable assessment results 
are sidelined and participation often appears to be just a necessary condition for 
government and lender approval. But there are also less visible yet pervasive power 
relations that are not simply reducible to ‘realpolitik’ or to ‘conspiracies’. The 
assessment tools, like hydrological models, are already shaped by values and power 
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relations. And similarly, even the recent participatory approaches can be perceived 
as new forms of depoliticizing power relations (see also Brosius, 1999). 
HYDROLOGICAL MODELS AT THE HEART OF THE MEKONG 
RIVER COMMISSION’S (MRC’S) KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION
The core of knowledge production within the MRC Secretariat is still dominated 
to a great extent by technical and scientifi c expertise. Data-gathering is principally 
limited to data seen as relevant to the assessment and regulation of hydrological 
impacts of planned development projects. The backbone for all the assessments of the 
MRC consists of the Decision Support Framework (DSF) that has been developed 
over several years and is still being further improved. The DSF forms the foundation for 
the development scenario assessments of the MRC Basin Development Plan (BDP) 
and of the MRC’s Water Utilization Programme (WUP), which are supposed to 
help implement key elements of the 1995 Mekong Agreement and inform and 
shape negotiations that address water-sharing issues between the member states. 
The inherent simplifying aspect of models and other assessment tools, and the 
richness and diversity of living nature always create debates on how to interpret 
ecological and social complexities adequately. Interpretations of what is adequate 
and what is relevant to policy also vary quite differently in different knowledge 
domains. The examples below shed light on the MRC’s assessment work and on 
the discussions that they have evoked. To date, the MRC’s models have brought 
into focus rather limited aspects of the basin’s ecological and social dynamics, 
which in turn results in overestimation of macro-level economic returns and 
underestimations of the risks that the tributary and mainstream dams, water 
diversions and other interventions are likely to bring about.
MRC’s models: High investments, thin and 
controversial outputs
The original terms of reference of the MRC’s Decision Support Framework were 
very ambitious, and the DSF was planned to consist of tools that would enable 
comprehensive basin-wide hydrological, environmental and socio-economic 
impact assessments in line with the principles of integrated water resources 
management (IWRM), which acknowledge the complexity of relations between 
water, environment and livelihoods. However, so far the DSF appears to remain 
a rather narrow platform, consisting mainly of hydrological components that, in 
turn, consist of models which simulate two-dimensionally the fl ow regimes and the 
main hydrological aspects of the river basin (Sarkkula et al, 2007). The hydrologists 
behind the models themselves have stated that the ‘output of the models is quite 
narrowly hydrological – water utilized for irrigation and power generation; river 
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fl ow and stage at key locations; volumes; inundated areas, depths and duration of 
inundation; and salinity levels’ (World Bank, 2004, p1). But they also claim that 
‘these parameters can, in turn, provide insights into possible impacts on fi sheries, 
fl ood management, saline intrusion, navigation and the environment’ (World 
Bank, 2004). Because the models do not allow assessments on parameters such as 
water quality, and sediment transport in the river and the fl oodplain, the models’ 
ability to give relevant insights on impacts upon the environment and fi sheries has 
been questioned (Sarkkula et al, 2007).
The DSF has also received criticism on the basis that it has required high 
investments (the hydrological component has required approximately US$4.9 
million), while outputs have been very limited. In particular, the outputs to the 
public domain have been almost non-existent. Lack of transparency with the 
fi ndings is thus one of the core aspects questioning the legitimacy of MRC models 
(e.g. Affeltranger, 2008). When results have been published, they have been 
presented without giving information on the assumptions upon which they are 
based. One of the few outputs of the DSF process to the public domain has been 
the report Modelled Observations on Development Scenarios in the Lower Mekong 
Basin (World Bank, 2004), which emerged from a World Bank consultancy that 
drew on the DSF, but was not actually even an MRC output. The report was based 
on six scenarios:
1 baseline (representing the situation in 2000);
2 China dams (considers the Manwan and Dachaoshan dams) operating at the 
time of the report and the two largest proposed dams (Xiaowan and Nuozhadu 
dams); 
3 low development (baseline + increase of water usage in line with the estimated 
population growth to 2020 + dams in China and most likely dams in Laos);
4 embankments (low development + increased number of built structures in 
Cambodian fl oodplains);
5 agriculture (low development + substantial increases in irrigation and inter- and 
intra-basin water transfers);
6 high development (includes all the previous ones + several tributary dams and 
a mainstream dam in Cambodia).
The purpose of this report was to inform the Mekong Water Resources Assistance 
Strategy then being shaped by the World Bank (which was later joined by ADB). 
The results of the modelling exercises were reported to show that there were few 
major risks related to the different scenarios, including the high development 
scenario (World Bank, 2004). The vulnerability of fi sheries and other elements of 
the Mekong’s ecology were acknowledged; but the report gave mixed messages. For 
example, although the tested scenarios were reported not to reveal signifi cant negative 
impacts upon the fi sheries except ‘a small decline in fi sh feeding opportunities, the 
most pronounced reduction occurring in years of low fl ow’ (World Bank, 2004),5 
the report also stated that: 
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Nevertheless, any development which directly impedes fi sh migration 
in the mid and lower reaches of the river will have signifi cant negative 
impacts on fi sh production. Mainstream dams or weirs in the mid and 
lower Mekong are therefore most unlikely to be part of any balanced 
development scenario that complies with the objectives of the [Mekong] 
Agreement. (World Bank, 2004)
The report was initially available to the public but was later (in 2006) withdrawn by 
the MRC Secretariat (MRCS) and made internal and inaccessible to the public. The 
reasons for this were not made public either. Interviewed experts and consultants 
of the MRC Secretariat have commented that after this, it was also diffi cult for 
them to make direct references to the report, and one could not talk openly about 
the different scenarios used. Baseline, low-development and high-development 
scenarios were within the MRCS renamed as fl ow regimes 1, 2 and 3. At the same 
time, the content and the assumptions of the scenarios were made inaccessible. 
The use of the modelled scenarios thus became much more technical, opaque and 
less informative for the public, and, hence, less open for public debate. Although 
the entire report became diffi cult to access, an excerpted hydrograph was widely 
used in World Bank, ADB and MRCS presentations to suggest that there was little 
change in the shape of the hydrograph under even the high-development scenario. 
This excerpt misrepresented the more nuanced messages that emerged from closer 
reading of the 2004 report. 
A pretext sometimes used to restrict public release of such analyses is that they 
are developed by the consultants and await endorsement of the countries or of the 
MRC Secretariat. Yet, often there are also political reasons at stake: even though 
the report in question did not bring up very serious impacts of ‘high development’, 
it did, however, ask for a great degree of caution with the mainstream dams. This 
kind of statement would be perceived by at least some governments as a threat 
to their current development aspirations. A related explanation for the pressure 
to render the scenarios more technical might simply be that the countries do not 
want to discuss openly the different development plans. The limited information 
on the assumptions upon which the modelling exercises were based of course leaves 
little space for independent evaluation of the validity of the modelling results and 
their interpretations.
A second major occasion where results from MRC models were brought 
into the public domain was a working paper released by the World Bank and the 
ADB related to their Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy (MWRAS) 
for 2005 to 2010 (World Bank and ADB, 2006). The report strongly supports 
new large-scale water infrastructure projects in the Mekong Basin and states that 
the development has so far been too cautious. The MRC’s models play a central 
justifi cation role in the report. The assumptions behind the modelling results were 
not discussed in the report; but the modelling results were interpreted to show that 
there are no major risks related to new large-scale development plans: 
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The bottom line message of this Mekong Water Resources Assistance 
Strategy is that the analytical work on development scenarios has, for 
the fi rst time, provided evidence that there remains considerable poten-
tial for development of the Mekong water resources. (World Bank and 
ADB, 2006, p4)
And that: 
The development scenarios modelling exercise demonstrated that the 
Mekong river system has signifi cant tolerance for development, including 
of hydropower and water diversion for irrigation. (World Bank and 
ADB, 2006, p31)
Such statements refl ect the way in which an exercise whose design at best provides 
a hydrological building block to a basin-wide assessment of the complex linkages 
between hydrology, ecology and livelihood becomes a fi rm policy statement on the 
‘potential’ and ‘tolerance’ of the river to accommodate large dams.
The report received criticism from several civil society groups, including, 
for example, the International Rivers Network and Towards Ecological Recovery 
and Regional Alliance (TERRA) (IRN, 2006; Middleton and Lee, 2007). It also 
received academic comment, including from the Australian Mekong Resource 
Centre (AMRC, 2007). The critiques included remarks on the use of the models. 
The way in which the report referred to the models was claimed to be over-
simplifying and the capability of the models to assess environmental impacts was 
questioned because the models only simulate the water fl ow and do not address the 
ecology of the river. Central arguments were that bold claims on environmental 
and socio-economic impacts could be backed up with only narrowly hydrological 
results from MRC models (IRN, 2006; IUCN et al, 2006; AMRC, 2007), and 
that the macroscopic perspective could not address the likely localized negative 
impacts arising from infrastructure development (Middleton and Lee, 2007). Even 
the reliability of the models was questioned because the assumptions built into the 
model and the assessments of the robustness of the model have been unavailable to 
the public (IUCN et al, 2006). But even if the models were developed to a more 
reliable and credible standard, there is still always scope for social and political 
shaping of interpretation and presentation of the results.
The models have not only received criticism from civil society and university-
based groups. Some of the interviewed experts in the MRC stated, as well, that the 
model base is not yet diverse enough, nor have there been adequate comparisons 
with other scientifi c models. Some hydrologists have stated that there are still 
major challenges for the MRC to build a scientifi cally validated and credible model 
platform (Adamson, 2007; Sarkkula et al, 2007). Some interviewed experts who 
have worked in the MRC criticized the consultants of the MRC’s Water Utilization 
Project for working with too strong a private consultant mentality – keeping in 
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mind the policy preferences of the institutions funding their consultancy – which 
was seen to downplay the limitations of the models and associated risks and 
uncertainties (Shackley and Wynne, 1996). Yet, studies in science and technology 
have found that while modellers themselves often do understand the uncertainties 
and limits of their models, the more distant users, such as experts closer to policy-
making, become enchanted by the technologically sophisticated models and the 
unqualifi ed modelling results, especially when these are self-serving (MacKenzie, 
1990; Shackley and Wynne, 1996).6 
Models such as the recently developed and more comprehensive WUP-FIN 
model (see Chapter 9) tend to be received within the leadership echelons of the 
MRC and by policy-makers with more scepticism and emphasis on the uncertainties 
than the previous model exercises because the results of these models have, for 
example, raised questions on the vulnerability of the Tonle Sap ecosystem and its 
aquatic productivity. As Shackley and Wynne (1996) have stated, the appreciation 
of uncertainty increases when there is a motivation to critically explore the basis of 
the knowledge claims. Thus, there will always be politics over uncertainties when 
modelling results are discussed in terms of policy implications. 
The interwoven nature of facts and values: Models and their 
representation of the Mekong Basin
The social and political shaping of the interpretations of modelling results illustrates 
the blurred boundaries between science and politics. An even more profound issue 
is that defi nition of the scientifi c questions to be asked, and thus the relevant 
group of experts to answer them, is always also a value-laden and political act (e.g. 
Demeritt, 2006). Important questions here thus relate to why, despite the original 
ambitious plans of creating comprehensive and integrated assessments and the huge 
sums devoted to them, the de facto developed tools of knowledge production in 
the MRC have been reduced to relatively simple hydrodynamic models that do 
not allow ecosystem impact scenarios and, even less, impact assessments on natural 
resource-dependent livelihoods. And even more importantly: why in the fi rst place 
do the models play such a crucial role in the MRC’s knowledge production? A 
justifi cation often given for the importance of the models is that there are such 
wide gaps in environmental information on the Mekong region that models are 
the only way to go forward with the assessment work. But the underplaying of the 
complexities of the ecology and livelihood interlinkages inherent in this sort of 
modelling also conveniently serves the economical rationalities and power relations 
shaping the MRC’s approach to water issues.
The MRC’s Decision Support Framework is, most importantly, built to 
support the objectives of the 1995 MRC Agreement. The relevant principles of 
the Mekong Agreement here include the ‘reasonable and equitable utilization’ 
(Article 5) of water by the riparian states and the maintenance of minimum fl ows 
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on the mainstream (Article 6). These principles also guide the way in which the 
river is envisioned by the MRC. They also guide the knowledge production, as can 
be interpreted from the modelling report (World Bank, 2004, pv), which states 
that the rules required by the agreement ‘defi ne the key, monitorable indicators 
– in terms of times, locations, flow rates, levels, quantities, water quality or 
other variables – that are suffi cient to defi ne each country’s opportunities and 
responsibilities in the Mekong Basin’. 
Even though the MRC Agreement is often cited as a model for international 
river basins and as a promise of sustainable development in the developing world 
(e.g. Sonnenfeld and Mol, 2002), it has also been criticized as a manifestation 
of a state logic that violates the complex nature of the environment–livelihood 
linkages of large river basins (Fox and Sneddon, 2004; Sneddon and Fox, 2006). 
The principle of reasonable and equitable utilization is an important base for 
cooperation in international basins; but Fox and Sneddon (2004) argue that the 
interpretations of this principle should also be looked at critically. Because the 
main concern is the equitable allocation of water between the member states, 
the agreement establishes a vision of Mekong primarily as a watercourse, and not 
as a basin, with its complex socio-ecological dynamics. Following James Scott’s 
(1998) idea on state simplifi cations, they interpret that this makes the river legible 
to state-centric reasoning. As a watercourse, the river can be reduced to its parts, 
divided between states, and rationally managed through the application of universal 
legal principles. Because of the allocation paradigm, the focus is mostly on the 
quantities of water and, especially, on the maintenance of the minimum fl ows 
in the dry season.7 This leads to the neglect of the fl ood pulse-driven character 
of the Mekong’s ecosystems for which the tempering of the peaks of fl ood and 
drought are damaging. The fl ood pulse system has been recognized by ecologists 
as crucial to aquatic productivity, and it sustains the rich fi sheries of the basin and 
the livelihoods of millions of people who depend upon them (Lamberts, 2007; 
Sarkkula et al, 2007; Lamberts and Koponen, 2008; see also Chapter 9 in this 
volume).
Li (2006, 2007) has studied knowledge production in the development fi eld, 
inspired by Nicolas Rose’s concept of technical rendering. Technical rendering 
refers to processes in which the arena of intervention needs fi rst to be represented 
‘as an intelligible fi eld with specifi able limits and particular characteristics … whose 
component parts are linked together in some more or less systematic manner 
by forces, attractions and coexistences’ (Rose, 1999, p33, cited in Li, 2005). In 
his study of the ‘anti-politics’ of development, Ferguson (1994) has similarly 
described how knowledge production in the development fi eld is used for planning 
purposes and the generated data is often sui generis because it identifi es only those 
problems for which a technical remedy within the competence of the planners 
can be supplied. The knowledge production of the MRC seems to resonate with 
the rationale of technical rendering, which is an inherently depoliticizing process 
in its reduction of problems and their solutions as technical challenges and fi xes, 
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respectively. Through the use of the models, the river becomes dis-embedded from 
the ecosystem, livelihoods and meanings, and this facilitates the exercises of linking 
water back to society through economical reasoning and simplistic causal chains. 
The models generate powerful visualizations of the basin as a manageable system 
ripe for development interventions, which enables technocratic calculations and 
planned water allocations.
An example of this is a public statement by Jeremy Bird, the chief executive 
offi cer (CEO) of the MRC, that ‘in the medium turn, we’re going to see a situation 
where as a result of construction of dams upstream in China, there will be some 
signifi cant increases in dry season fl ows in the Mekong which actually then might 
facilitate Thailand taking water from the river because then there’ll be more 
water available during the dry season’ (Radio Australia, 2008). The results of the 
modelling have thus produced, in MRC explanations, an image where hydropower 
dams are seen in a positive light because ‘the excess water’ they allow in the dry 
season can be effectively utilized for water diversions and irrigation in another 
place.
Knowledge production, including the MRC’s models, is implicitly tied to the 
redistribution of rights to use the environment. The knowledge production and the 
production of political order (in terms of management and policies) should thus be 
seen as mutually constructing and reinforcing one another (Wynne, 1996, 2002; 
Forsyth and Walker, 2008). Like other technologies and innovations, however, 
models emerge in ‘a garden of forking paths’ (Williams and Edge, 1996), and the 
use or interpretation of the models is not predetermined. But the ways in which 
specifi c models developed by private consultants for the MRC have been used so 
far are clearly shaped predominantly by developmental values. This is not to say 
that different routes for their use are precluded. The questions raised by civil society 
on the models show that even though the model use was aimed at reaching closure 
over the discussion on the severity of impacts, this did not necessarily happen. And 
models are becoming more important as part of competing knowledge domains 
(e.g. advocacy coalitions, networks of action research or alternative discourses) 
shaped by different development aspirations.
An even more profound question, however, is whether the debate is limited to 
scientifi c facts. It is important to note that technical rendering refers, importantly, 
to a scientized rationality, which hides politics and depoliticizes development 
decisions. Because science is given such an instrumental role in legitimating policy, 
competing knowledge domains easily shift to questioning the science and presented 
facts, rather than questioning the reasons for policies or the specifi c ways in which 
the science is being framed and its results articulated. Critiques that restrict 
themselves to discussing the scientifi c validity of the knowledge production are thus 
problematic because they include a positivist expectation that political consensus 
about development plans will follow from scientifi c consensus of the impacts. If 
this paradigm is not opened, the politics behind seemingly science-based decisions 
are not really brought into the debate. Herein also lies the somewhat paradoxical 
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nature of the new participatory approaches in knowledge production, which are 
discussed in the next section.
THE MRC, THE PARTICIPATORY TURN IN DEVELOPMENT AND 
NEW OPENINGS IN KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION
The tools and technologies of knowledge production and the ways in which they 
have been used as presented above refl ect the still relatively closed nature of the 
expertise within the MRC Secretariat. But the MRC has also faced pressure to 
open up the expertise and to enhance its participatory processes. Several scholars, 
Ulrich Beck and Mitchell Dean included, have emphasized the ways in which 
risks inherent in modernist control schemes have created a need to include the 
participation of groups such as civil society organizations and local communities 
who have previously been excluded by a scientifi c-technological rationality of risk 
assessment.
The current development orthodoxy recognizes public participation as necessary 
for achieving sustainable and socially just development. If earlier schemes were 
often doomed to fail because they were based on overly simplifi ed representations, 
science now has to respond to the critique that it is missing contextualized and 
situated knowledge and practices. Participation has become something of a mantra 
even in the fi eld of water management, which has for long been the exclusive 
preserve of technical experts.
In the Mekong Basin, voices have been raised with increasing intensity over 
the past decade about the undemocratic and unaccountable nature of the basin’s 
water resources management. The MRC has typically responded to its critics by 
stating that as it is an intergovernmental organization, it principally serves its 
member states in ways that it is requested to. But recently, particularly in 2008, the 
MRC has begun to demonstrate a participatory turn. A fi rst Public Participation 
Strategy was circulated in 2003 (MRC Secretariat, 2003) and a booklet about 
Public Participation in the Lower Mekong Basin was published in 2005 (MRC, 
2005), but there has not been much follow-up action. The MRC’s programme on 
fi sheries has sought ways to create more space for local knowledge and spaces of 
inclusive decision-making at the community level. The MRC has also (somewhat 
reluctantly) participated in events such as Exploring Water Futures Together: 
Mekong Region Waters Dialogue (IUCN et al, 2006, 2007). More recently, two of 
its programmes in 2008 – Basin Development Planning (BDP) and Hydropower 
Programme – have hosted more extensive stakeholder consultations. These are not 
perfect; but for the MRC they are already signifi cant steps on the road not travelled 
of more participatory engagement with non-state actors.
Many critical remarks about previous efforts have been raised. The participation 
strategy, for example, gives all power to the riparian states to decide who they 
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consider relevant stakeholders and who they do not. This ensures that ‘the invited 
spaces of participation are likely to refl ect the dominant development aims of the 
riparian states’ (Sneddon and Fox, 2007, p2175). Participation has been enhanced 
mostly within the MRC’s own structures and member governments, and has not 
been extended to meaningful engagement with critical NGOs or local communities 
(Sneddon and Fox, 2006, 2007). It remains to be seen to what extent the expertise 
will be truly open to public review and whether there will be spaces where the 
technocratic risk assessment rationalities dominating the knowledge production 
can be meaningfully challenged. To take a step forward from ‘tokenism’, the debate 
needs to substantially expand beyond the received framings by experts on hydrology 
or policy-making.
The most relevant steps in relation to more participatory and inclusive 
knowledge production have been taken by the MRC Fisheries Programme 
(MRCFP). The methods developed in the Fisheries Programme hold the potential 
to produce knowledge where the complexities of the relations between water, 
ecology and livelihoods are not overlooked. In the programme’s studies, local fi shers 
have participated in identifying and tracking fi sh species and in evaluating the 
importance of the fi sheries for local livelihoods. The fi ndings of the studies have 
enhanced the knowledge base of the fi sh migration patterns and fi sh production, 
and also stressed the importance of fi sheries for basin residents (Sneddon and Fox, 
2007). There are, however, also signs that even within the Fisheries Programme, the 
appreciation of local knowledge still remains somewhat superfi cial. For example, 
the work of Thai Baan Research (see Box 13.1) has not received real acceptance 
from the MRC. Even though some space have been given, for example, in the 
MRC’s stakeholder consultation for presentations on Thai Baan or Sala Phoum 
(the Cambodian version of Thai Baan) research fi ndings, the MRC’s own reports 
have not built on or even referenced the fi ndings of Thai Baan Research. More 
fundamentally, local knowledge and participation of fi shers in producing fi sheries 
knowledge enrich a central knowledge base rather than, as is the principle of Thai 
Baan, knowledge from which fi shers themselves manage their own livelihood 
interests. The knowledge base of the MRCFP, produced with participatory 
methods, has certainly been important for raising awareness of the importance of 
fi sheries in a basin-wide framework; but it remains the experts and the technocrats 
who own and present this ‘mined’ knowledge.
The studies that acknowledge the different meanings which local communities 
attach to the fi sheries hold the potential to produce knowledge that is less amenable 
to state-centric reasoning and technocratic trade-off paradigms. This, in turn, could 
enable the inclusion of alternative visions on the basin’s development to the current 
debates. Ironically, the most crucial issue here is that while the MRC’s Fisheries 
Programme has aimed to develop more appreciation for local knowledge, the whole 
programme has been increasingly sidelined from the MRC’s core activities.
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BOX 13.1 LOCALIZED KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION 
THROUGH THAI BAAN RESEARCH 
Thai Baan Research – research undertaken by villagers – has recently emerged as a 
counter-hegemonic approach, aiming to reveal local knowledge about the environment 
and how villagers interact with it. It reveals their practical understanding of the complexity 
and dynamics of natural resources, the way in which resources have been used, and 
the moral economy of those who depend upon them for their livelihoods. 
Thai Baan Research was established in 2000 when the Thai government agreed to 
open the Pak Mun Dam sluice gates to evaluate the social and environmental impacts 
from the dam’s operation. In this case, for the Pak Mun villagers who tried many ways 
to voice their concern and register their grievances about the environmental, economic 
and social impacts of dam construction, Thai Baan Research was identifi ed as a new 
way of infl uencing the contested dam project (see Chapter 3 in this volume). Many 
academic institutes were assigned by the Thai government to conduct various types 
of research; but the reports did not refl ect the social and ecological realities as seen 
by affected villagers. Academics from Chiang Mai University, the Southeast Asia Rivers 
Network (a regional non-governmental organization) and villagers affected by the Pak 
Mun Dam developed the Thai Baan Research approach in order to collect data on 
issues such as local knowledge of fi sh, traditional fi shing gear, natural plants and herbs, 
ecosystems and activities, which returned after the opening of the dam gates. The 
research conducted was published and submitted to the Thai government to coincide 
with fi ndings submitted by academic institutes. This type of research was meaningful 
for the villagers because they were able to take control over the process and ‘write’ 
their own story on how they perceive and interact with their environment and how to 
live in harmony with it.
The fi ndings of the Thai Baan Research at Pak Mun have gained acceptance by 
academics, the media and civil society groups. The methodology utilized has been 
adopted and replicated throughout other areas in Thailand, such as Rasi Salai, along 
the Upper Mekong in Chiang Khong, the Salween River along the Thai–Burmese border 
and the Songkhram River Basin in the northeast (see Chapter 7). This expansion has 
allowed for an informal network of researchers to develop, share information and learn 
from each other. In 2004, the Thai Baan approach was expanded to the Ramsar sites 
in the Lower Mekong in Cambodia and Vietnam. In Cambodia, Thai Baan Research 
(which is known as ‘Sala Phoum’) has been carried out by ethnic groups in Stung Treng, 
the NGO Culture and Environmental Preservation Association (CEPA), Health Unlimited 
(HU) and the World Conservation Union (IUCN)-led Mekong Wetlands Biodiversity 
Programme (MWBP). In Vietnam, Thai Baan Research is conducted by An Giang 
University, Tram Chim National Park, Lang Sen Preserve Forest, Care International and 
the MWBP. 
The Thai Baan approach also provides a basis for more informed, balanced 
negotiations between local stakeholders and government. By working with local 
development institutions and gaining the support of provincial and national government 
agencies the Thai Baan is complementary to decentralization initiatives and national 
policy towards more integrated water resources planning and the establishment of river 
basin organizations.
Source: adapted from Sretthachau (2006)
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Knowledge production and the entry of participation discourse 
in the riparian states 
The MRC is not the only relevant level for observations on the changes of water-
related knowledge production in the Lower Mekong Basin. The MRC Secretariat 
often reminds its critics that it is an intergovernmental organization. The MRC’s 
ability to foster and implement participatory processes is, therefore, closely bound 
to the political cultures of its member governments. Here we briefl y discuss the 
different country-level situations through selected illustrative examples.
The degrees of political freedom and spaces for civil society organizations 
(CSOs) differ signifi cantly in the riparian countries, Thailand having the most 
active and effective advocacy groups and networks, and Laos and Vietnam having 
very limited space for CSOs. In all four countries, there have been struggles or 
contestations over large-scale water development projects (e.g. controversies over 
Pak Mun Dam in Thailand; dams on the Sekong, Sesan and Srepok rivers in 
Cambodia; Son La Dam in Vietnam; and Nam Theun 2 Dam in Laos PDR). The 
struggles have also, in some cases, resulted in attempts to create more participatory 
processes (see Chapter 3). A signifi cant push for more participation has also come 
from aid agencies or infl uential international non-governmental organizations 
(INGOs) (Molle, 2005).
Nevertheless, the literal and societal translation of participation has varied from 
one national context to another. In Thailand, participation translated as kaan mii 
suan ruam – ‘having a part in joining’ – took hold as a discourse during the 1980s, 
fi rst among NGOs, soon to be followed by government development programmes. 
Its interpretation, however, varied from one actor to another (Hirsch, 1990) 
along lines similar to those proposed by Arnstein (1969) in her ladder of citizen 
participation. Yet, with the democratization of Thai society and the promulgation 
of a progressive constitution in 1997, the notion of participation with empowering 
potential is well entrenched, even if bureaucrats often continue to interpret it as a 
willingness to engage with state-set agendas. In Laos, in contrast, a similar discourse 
of participation, translated directly from Thai (kaan mii suan huam), has a much 
less nuanced interpretation and remains at the level of preparedness to devote 
time, energy and resources to helping meet state and party-led development goals. 
Neither independent local NGOs nor a culture of challenge to policy articulated by 
the state are features of the Lao civil society landscape. In Vietnam, participation 
translated as su tham gia maintains a collectivist connotation of willingness to join 
the common cause (of development); but while the political structures remain 
largely state based, the culture of challenge and assertion of alternative ideas is 
quite vibrant at a local level. In Cambodia, the offi cial discourse of participation as 
kaa chaul ruam translates as a compound ‘enter-join’, imparting a sense of joining 
a preset and usually state-sanctioned agenda. On the other hand, Cambodia has 
a vibrant NGO community with alternative perspectives, but which does not 
necessarily rely on participation as a key part of the alternative discourse.
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The promises and limitations of participation 
in knowledge production
Even though participation has been very partial and rhetorical, and strategy papers 
face great challenges to translate into practices what would meaningfully open up 
expertise, the participatory turn is still on the upswing and, more importantly, is 
praised by many actors as a remedy to all ills, if properly implemented. It is therefore 
important to discuss more profoundly the promises and limitations of these 
attempts to shift the paradigm. Important questions include: what expectations 
exist related to more open use of expertise? In what ways could democratization of 
knowledge production matter? Could democratization of the assessment processes 
meaningfully infl uence development plans? In what ways is participation likely to 
fall short of promises?
The promises of participation relate to at least two different dimensions of 
knowledge production. One relates to the quality and validity of the assessments 
and the other to the power relations that shape the knowledge production, 
particularly where enhanced inclusiveness of different perspectives holds potential 
of democratization.
The examples given above of the model-based impact assessments demonstrate 
that the knowledge production of the MRC still fails to address the risks that the 
current development plans present to the basin’s ecosystem and livelihoods. The 
exclusive nature of the expertise is one part of this story. External consultants or 
scientists are more likely to underestimate complex and interrelated ecology and 
livelihood systems as they often have no experience of the region they study prior 
to their assignment. In the Mekong region, there remain numerous unstudied areas 
where there is no accumulated ‘scientifi c knowledge’. For example, the taxonomy, 
distribution, abundance and movement of fi sh is still far from sorted out. Often 
fi shers themselves have the best available knowledge of the fi shery and thus are 
more reliable experts than outside consultants. More inclusive approaches could 
enhance the actual ‘scientifi c’ quality of the assessments. As already discussed 
above, the MRC has taken this on board in a limited way in its fi sheries assessment 
programmes. But this has not then reached the core of knowledge production, 
such as the modelling exercises that infl uence decisions by national governments 
on dams and diversions.
In principle, participatory approaches such as multi-stakeholder platforms and 
dialogues could contribute to more balanced framings of the knowledge production 
now driven by developmentalist objectives and values that mostly represent the 
interests and worldviews of powerful elite groups. But if one concentrates on 
participation only in knowledge production, the possibilities of contestations are 
narrowed and they may fail in contesting the technocratic core of the approaches 
that still reign at the MRC; in addition, they do not challenge the paradigm of 
looking for science to give indisputable answers in policy-making. As stated by 
Szerszynski (1996, p113), this kind of approach ‘simply obscures the political 
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nature of decisions about how we should live’. If the development plans can only 
be contested on scientifi c grounds, then the opponents are left to argue over 
scientifi c facts even though they might be actually opposing the plans for other 
reasons (Demeritt, 2006; see also Rayner, 2003). The ‘fact’-driven debates also 
‘free’ policy-makers from the inherently political nature of the decisions. This is 
why participation that is narrowed only to scientifi c knowledge production easily 
becomes a part of the ‘anti-politics’ machine of development.
Is the participatory turn necessarily counter-hegemonic?
At a more profound level, critical scholars have even questioned the very possibility 
of a participatory turn in development to form a counter-hegemonic force; indeed, 
they have shown how the participatory discourse may become an entrenched or 
even ‘tyrannical’ part of prevailing power structures and disempowering practices 
(Cooke and Kothari, 2001). This discussion does not refer specifi cally to knowledge 
production, and it also goes beyond analysing the failures of participation in specifi c 
programmes or organizations. Rather, it addresses the very rationale behind the 
whole paradigm shift. Henkel and Stirrat (2001), for example, have referred to 
the current emphasis on empowerment, the marginal distrust of the state, and 
celebration of ‘local’ knowledge as the ‘new participatory orthodoxy’. This new 
orthodoxy has received different kinds of criticism, the conservatives claiming that 
the state and the experts actually do know the things better than the ‘locals’, and 
‘progressives’ claiming that participatory policies do not lead to participation and 
empowerment because they are too naive and do not sway the dominant power 
structures. But as Henkel and Stirrat (2001) point out, most of these critiques fail 
to see that the participatory approach is actually a new form of governance, and 
not only a counter-hegemonic process. They state that:
Empowerment in this sense is not just a matter of ‘giving power’ to 
formerly disempowered people. The currency in which this power is 
given is that of the project of modernity. In other words, the attempt 
to empower people through the projects envisaged and implemented by 
the practitioners of the new orthodoxy is always an attempt, however 
benevolent, to reshape the personhood of the participants. It is in this 
sense that we argue that ‘empowerment’ is tantamount to what Foucault 
calls subjection. (Henkel and Stirrat, 2001, p182)
The ‘subjection’ refers to the productive side of power relations, which in this case 
means that participatory processes shape the subjectivities of the participants and 
the ways in which the rationalities of the more powerful actors can be contested.8 
It is thus important to note that participation is not failing to fulfi l its promises 
simply because it is trapped by the managerial discourse, but because it is actually 
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an integral part of that discourse and of the present mentality of government. 
Dean (1999) has given several examples of how contemporary liberal rationalities 
of government endeavour to operationalize the self-governing capacities of the 
governed in the pursuit of governmental objectives, and he has also given many 
illustrations of how empowerment and self-government have become components 
of power relations.9 These points are important to keep in mind as the MRC and 
the riparian states contemplate expanded participation. The main message of 
these discussions does not mean that the participatory techniques of governmental 
organizations form an end to political contestations; but they do not necessarily 
make contestation easier either.
CONCLUSIONS: GOVERNING WATER THROUGH 
DEPOLITICIZED KNOWLEDGE
The ‘realpolitik’ in knowledge production about the Mekong should not be 
dismissed. Problems such as lack of transparency relate to the development interests 
of the MRC’s member states, and secretive processes around knowledge production 
have been clearly intentional and guided by the interests of the basin’s riparian 
populations. Yet, politics does not manifest in any simple way; the politics of 
knowledge production implies much more ‘invisible’ nuances of power relations 
than intentional misuses or falsifi cations of the assessment processes. Important 
questions relate to the values and aspirations that guide and shape knowledge 
production and the interpretations of the assessment results that are presented 
as neutral. In the case of hydrological models, the social shaping relates to the 
differing interests between model developers and users, and between different 
knowledge domains with different policy motivations, and importantly to power 
relations at and between different scales. Hydrological models form the current 
core of the MRC’s knowledge production and they represent an area of expertise 
that is still relatively closed and exclusive. Motivated by state-centred reasoning, 
the models simplify the complex ecosystem and related socio-economic dynamics 
of the basin and back up visions of the Mekong as a watercourse and a system of 
water channels. This is why the results of the assessments tend to fi nd the risks of 
the development interventions less critical than the more comprehensive studies 
that acknowledge the complexity of the Mekong’s ecology. But even if there were 
more critical fi ndings, it is not self-evident that they would actually infl uence 
decisions and policy-making.
In accordance with current international discourses of development and the 
requirements of both objective science-based risk assessments and participatory 
processes in the legitimizing of projects, participation in knowledge production 
is presented as key to redressing the power imbalances that shape the production 
of knowledge. But the participatory approaches of knowledge production do 
not necessarily challenge the overly scientized nature of politics. And better and 
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more inclusive science and assessment procedures are still rarely a suffi cient and 
appropriate remedy for the unequal power structures underlying policy decisions. 
Even in dialogue processes, the contested knowledge domains tend to be debated 
in terms that do not challenge the technocratic core of assessments and the interest 
of MRC member states, as well as their enduring developmentalist vision of the 
Mekong’s future.
Water and river basin management are inherently political processes, involving 
decisions that affect different groups in different ways and negotiation of diverse 
interests and values. The MRC is an inherently political body, established to 
manage the interests of its member states regarding the use of water and related 
resources of the Mekong River. The role of the MRC as a knowledge production 
agency that infl uences policy and decisions on how the river is to be used, managed 
and developed should not be to pretend to take the politics out of decision-making, 
but rather to foster a political dialogue between and within riparian countries that 
is informed by a better understanding of the implications of particular decisions 
and policy approaches. The ‘anti-politics’ of knowledge production that we have 
described in this chapter obscure rather than enhance the embedding of river basin 
management within the realm of informed social and political negotiation.
NOTES
1 The inspiration for the chapter’s title comes from the famous book by James 
Ferguson (1994) entitled The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization and 
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. 
2 As Beck has stated, in premodern society, risks as such do not exist in the sense that 
there is no calculus of control or assessment. Rather, natural and unpredictable disasters 
remain in the domain of hazards to be coped with but not infl uenced or calculated.
3 Dean is a central scholar in the fi eld of so-called governmentality studies that follow 
the Foucauldian approach in the studies of power and authority. The concept of 
‘governmentality’ refers to ways of thinking about governing. It examines how we 
conduct ourselves and others in all our spheres of life. It links together elements 
of politics, institutions and subjectivities and examines how power relations shape 
collective and individual practices, subjectivities and identity formations. Dean 
(1999) has stated that the way in which Beck approaches risk within a narrative of the 
modernization process is based on over-totalizing assumptions about risk. According 
to Dean, risk should be analysed as part of governmentality and, thus, as a component 
of assemblage of practices, techniques and rationalities concerned with how we govern 
others and ourselves. So it should not be approached as a naturally occurring entity, 
but as a form of calculation about reality: a way of thinking about and representing 
events. 
4 By realpolitik we mean the very visible power relations through which powerful actors, 
like the representatives of the riparian states in the case of the MRC, pursue their 
particular interests.
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5 The data of water fl ow, height and area inundated used in the models were taken in 
the report as preliminary indicators of the fi sh production through estimations of 
changes in fi sh feeding opportunities. The report acknowledged that these should be 
seen as only preliminary indicators (World Bank, 2004).
6 Some, like Lahsen (2005), have criticized this interpretation as an oversimplifi cation. 
Lahsen reminds us that modellers themselves also get seduced by the simulations they 
have produced because of the high stakes they have in the model development, which 
often requires several years, even decades, of dedication.
7 This does not mean that agreement on minimum fl ows would be easy. The equitable 
sharing and maintenance of minimum fl ows does not provide a straightforward set 
of targets and criteria of mutual acceptability to all the Lower Mekong states, as 
evidenced, for example, in the diffi culty of agreeing on basic questions such as the 
defi nition of the length of the dry season. So far the differing national interests of the 
countries have been diffi cult to overcome (Hirsch and Mørck-Jensen, 2006). Vietnam 
and Thailand, in particular, have had a history of mistrust between them because of 
Vietnam’s worries over Thailand’s plans to implement large-scale water diversions. In 
this level of discussion, the Mekong Agreement and the DSF models can, of course, 
be seen as important elements in reaching balanced cooperation between the basin’s 
governments. But the concept of national interest is tricky in the sense that it does not 
seem to mean that the diverse interests of all stakeholders within each country would 
be captured by it (Hirsch and Mørck-Jensen, 2006). Furthermore, such interests 
are embedded within wider sets of political relations, which in the case of Vietnam 
and Cambodia, for example, tend to supersede assertion of country interests around 
water. 
8 This sheds light on why, for example, in the debates on the development plans in 
the Mekong Basin the focus often remains on what should be included in the impact 
assessment calculations (such as economic valuations of ecosystems), rather than on 
questioning the very rationales underlying the assessments of technocratic knowledge 
production. 
9 The context that Dean mostly refers to is the failure of welfare government. More 
generally, it refers to the growing distrust of direct state interventions and how 
government now seeks to operate through free individuals. In development practice, 
corresponding processes include decentralization and participatory processes.
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De-marginalizing the Mekong 
River Commission
John Dore and Kate Lazarus
INTRODUCTION
A new water governance paradigm is needed in the Mekong region to assist societies 
in making better choices about how to share and manage water for the production 
of food and energy. On mainstreams and tributaries, disputes exist, resulting 
from interventions to natural fl ow regimes and overt or default management 
decisions. These interventions are justifi ed on the grounds of fl ood control, more 
irrigation for food or fi bre production, urban or industrial supply, improving ease 
of navigation, or boosting energy production via hydropower. There are associated 
disputes about altered sediment and nutrient loads, groundwater use, water 
reuse and diversions (inter-state, intra-state, inter-basin and intra-basin). New 
regional water governance is vital because these issues have territorial, ecological 
and political dimensions that need to be managed via regional protocols, rules or 
benefi t-sharing processes.
Numerous dams and water diversions are on the agendas of mobile private 
and quasi-public-sector developers, transnational capital providers, and the six 
governments of the region: Cambodia, China, Laos, Myanmar/Burma, Thailand 
and Vietnam. A recent count found 82 existing and 179 potential hydropower 
projects in the wider region (King et al, 2007) (see Chapters 1 and 2), many 
on Mekong River tributaries.1 Planned dams and diversions will transform the 
waterscapes of the region.
Our vision is for a more deliberative water politics in the Mekong region. To 
be clear, when speaking of deliberation, we mean: 
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Deliberation is debate and discussion aimed at producing reasonable, 
well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise 
prefer ences in light of discussion, new information, and claims made by 
fellow participants. Although consensus need not be the ultimate aim of 
deliberation, and participants are expected to pursue their interests, an 
overarching interest in the legitimacy of outcomes (understood as justifi -
cation to all affected) ideally characterizes deliberation. (Chambers, 
2003, p309)
Thus far, deliberation has been in short supply. This is partly because proponents 
of deliberation meet resistance from actors who prefer to reinforce contexts that 
are unfriendly to deliberation and favourable to pursuance of their vested interests. 
Many actors still believe, or at least rhetorically pretend or are instructed, that 
domestic criticism of public policy is unpatriotic. There is often an unhelpful 
confl ation where dissent is mistakenly seen as synonymous with disloyalty. Enquiry 
or criticism of water resources development plans, which impact across state 
borders, is seen by many as encroachment on hard-won state sovereignty and 
legitimate national security concerns. Hence, the resistance to transnational 
deliberative politics should not be underestimated.
The Mekong River Commission (MRC) is mandated to engage in water 
resources development in the so-called ‘Lower’ Mekong part of the region – the 
Mekong River Basin in Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. Different people 
call on the MRC to be  a social and environmental guardian of the basin; a platform 
for information exchange; a knowledge producer, synthesizer and broker; an 
investment facilitator; and convenor of multi-stakeholder processes demonstrating 
high-quality deliberative practice. Can it play all these roles simultaneously?
Since 1995, the MRC (and its predecessors since the 1950s) has been and 
remains the focus of substantial organization-building efforts. During recent years, 
the MRC has received much attention from people intent on using, improving, 
empowering or criticizing it. This chapter refl ects on the practice and potential of 
the MRC at a time when all Mekong region governments need to make informed 
decisions about whether, or how, to proceed with major projects that will have 
dramatic, transformative, national and transboundary impacts.
UNDERUTILIZED
The Mekong River Commission has a contested governance mandate – embodied 
in the 1995 Mekong River Agreement – for the mainstream, tributaries and 
the lands of the basin within the territories of the Lower Mekong countries 
(Governments of Cambodia–Laos–Vietnam–Thailand, 1995; Browder, 2000; 
Öjendal, 2000). It is often referred to as a ‘regional’ initiative and endeavours to 
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include China and Myanmar in some of its activities and outreach. This Mekong 
cooperation was originally catalysed via the United Nations and has a 50-year 
history (Bui Kim Chi, 1997; ESCAP, 1997).
Article 1 of the agreement commits the four member countries to cooperate 
in all fi elds of sustainable development, utilization, management and conservation 
of the water and water-related resources of the Mekong River Basin in fi elds such 
as irrigation, hydropower, navigation, fl ood control and fi sheries.
The implementing organization for the agreement is the MRC, led by a 
governing Council at ministerial level, which meets once per year, and a Joint 
Committee (JC) of senior government offi cials, which meets formally twice per 
year, but increasingly now meets informally as the need arises (see Figure 14.1). The 
Council and JC are serviced by the MRC Secretariat (MRCS), which is responsible 
for implementing Council and JC decisions, advising and providing technical and 
administrative support. The MRCS is currently located in Vientiane, Laos.
Although not specifi cally mentioned in the agreement, there are also National 
Mekong Committees (NMCs) established in each member country, set up 
differently in each country depending upon national government preferences. The 
heads of the NMCs represent their countries on the Joint Committee. NMCs are 
serviced by NMC Secretariats (NMCSs). It is important to note that there is a 
political dynamic between each of these fi ve parts – that is, there is no homogeneous 
single ‘MRC’. Any joint position needs to be collectively negotiated between the 
Council and JC members. Moreover, the MRCS must also manage its working 
relationships with the NMCSs, who are quick to object if they feel left out of 
MRCS activities, or if they perceive the MRCS to encroach into their national 
space. In turn, the NMCSs also have to establish their own role and working space 
within their national polities, with their functional power much less than key 
water-related ministries and agencies in each country.
The MRC also recognizes ‘development partners’ that include international 
lenders and donors – who at this stage still provide most of the finance for 
the MRC to function – international fi nancial institutions (IFIs) such as the 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and other ‘internationals’ 
such as the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the International Union 
for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and the International Water Management 
Institute (IWMI). More recently, knowledge networks involving various regional 
universities, policy research institutes and civil society organizations, such as the 
coalition implementing the Mekong Programme on Water, Environment and 
Resilience (M-POWER), are also increasing their engagement with the MRCS. At 
the national level, the NMCs and NMCSs have historically had less engagement 
with non-state actors or civil society organizations, particularly if these articulate 
alternative development narratives.
As in any large family, it is not possible for all the interaction to be smooth. 
The vaunted ‘Mekong spirit’ of cooperation often seems optimistically overstated; 
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but that is not to deny the importance of doing everything possible to encourage 
a constructive spirit between the countries.
It is apparent that for much of its brief history, the MRC has been underutilized. 
In refl ecting on this, it is important to look at all members of ‘the family’, rather 
than just using the blanket term of MRC. Which parts of the MRC have been 
excluded or marginalized, why and by whom? Why have member governments 
chosen not to use their own river basin organization to engage in many of the major 
river basin development issues of this era? At present, individual national interests 
dominate over regional interests (Hirsch and Mørck-Jensen, 2006). Supporters of 
the MRC hope that it can become more a part of the solution to problems such 
as those illustrated in the following examples.
Sesan
On 4 March 2000, the water level in the Sesan River (a transboundary river 
fl owing through Vietnam and Cambodia) rose suddenly, causing deaths and 
Figure 14.1 Mekong River Commission structure
Source: www.mrcmekong.org
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loss of livelihoods of fi shers and farmers in north-eastern Cambodia’s Ratanakiri 
Province. The unexpected surge was caused by a release of water from the Yali 
Falls Dam in Vietnam. Cambodian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
and local communities brought forward details of the damage and encouraged the 
national and international public to consider the implications of this transboundary 
incident. During the incident, the fl ow of information between Cambodian and 
Vietnamese offi cials was minimal, and there was virtually no communication 
between the provincial governments on either side of the border (Badenoch, 
2001, p1). The MRC did not become involved before or in the tense immediate 
aftermath, despite having a mandate to do so.
Five years on, the topic of development on the Sesan, Sekong and Srepok 
rivers (often collectively referred to as the 3S) was still considered so sensitive that 
it was removed from the agenda of an MRC-convened conference on integrated 
water resources management (IWRM) that was held in tandem with the tenth 
anniversary of the signing of the 1995 Mekong Agreement. Eventually, the MRC 
has engaged in the process, principally via the NMCSs of Cambodia and Vietnam. 
More recently, the two countries are trying to better manage the hydropower 
operations on the Sesan in order to minimize the downstream impact upon local 
communities; but this has taken extensive advocacy by affected local communities 
and their supporters. There is now even an effort, facilitated by the ADB, to 
establish a new transboundary, sub-basin organization to ‘manage development’. 
For a long time MRCS had been an onlooker, but it is now engaging more with 
ADB in this new initiative.
Commercial navigation
A commercial navigation agreement was signed by transport offi cials from China, 
Laos, Thailand and Myanmar in 2001 for the stretch of the Mekong River between 
Simao (China’s Yunnan) and Luang Prabang (Laos). River trade between Thailand 
and China has since rapidly increased. Associated with the signing, a feasibility 
study was completed in late 2000, which supported, in principle, proposed 
alterations to the river, including rapids and reef removal. By September 2001, 
an environmental impact assessment (EIA), coordinated by the Government 
of China, had been prepared and sent to each of the other three governments. 
Thailand’s government approved the EIA in January 2002 and it was subsequently 
approved in Laos in April 2002 (SEARIN et al, 2002). The MRCS was not used 
by either Thailand or Laos to inform or actively participate in the initial agreement 
negotiations. The secretariat became involved afterwards in offering to conduct 
an independent EIA of the project (an offer not taken up) and in commissioning 
evaluations that were extremely critical of the substandard EIA (Cocklin and Hain, 
2001; Finlayson, 2002; McDowall, 2002). The intervention by the MRC was 
ineffective and extensive modifi cation, via blasting, of the Mekong mainstream has 
since taken place in the northern reaches. The MRCS has played no substantive role 
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in this ‘Upper’ Mekong navigation; however, at the time of writing, it is becoming 
more involved, and so this could change.
Thailand Water Grid
In 2003, then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra relaunched the idea of a 
Thailand water grid, which would triple the area of irrigation in the country and 
require diversion of water from the Mekong River, and possibly other rivers in Laos 
and Cambodia, into northeast Thailand. For a time, the whole process was treated 
as a national secret by the Government of Thailand, with senior water academics 
fearful of the consequences to their funding and employment of criticizing or 
sharing any information about the scheme. There was no public deliberation within 
Thailand, and the MRCS was conspicuously silent, having been excluded from the 
process. Molle and Floch (2007) have observed that Thaksin’s ‘war on poverty’ was 
presented as an unquestionable meta-justifi cation used to silence opposition despite 
the fact that most water experts, commenting off the record, thought the rationale 
dubious and the scale of the scheme completely unrealistic. At the time of writing, 
the MRC (all parts) remains publicly silent about the merits or failings of touted 
water diversions by Thailand from the Mekong River, siphoning under the Mekong 
River from Laos, or, as some pundits remark, ‘siphoning under the 1995 Mekong 
Agreement’. The grid, as well as every other Thailand water resources development 
scheme on the shelf, was relaunched in 2008 by the government of Prime Minister 
Samak Sundaravej (see Chapter 10 for more details). To our knowledge, no 
substantive information about this has been shared with the MRCS.
Mainstream dams
Construction since the mid 1990s of the Upper Mekong (Lancang) Dam cascade in 
Yunnan is so far the most signifi cant human intervention ever made in the natural 
order of the Mekong River ecosystem, with substantial and undoubtedly complex 
transboundary ecological, social, cultural, economic and political impacts (Dore, 
2003, p431). The regional/transborder nature of ecosystems requires regional/
transborder political cooperation. China has plans to build up to 15 mainstream 
dams. Despite the MRC having an annual consultation with Chinese water 
offi cials, the MRCS has not noticeably affected China’s construction agenda. Real- 
time fl ood data is now provided by China, and future consultations could fruitfully 
examine hydropower operation regimes in order to minimize negative downstream 
impacts – negotiations to do just that were propelled in 2008 by serious fl oods 
along the Mekong River, with the fl ood level reaching a height not seen since 1966. 
The impact of the Chinese dams is now included in MRC cumulative impact 
assessments and scenarios work; but dialogue by the MRC with Chinese offi cials 
has, to this point, been very limited. At least until 2008, exchanges have been 
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more substantial beyond the MRC. Outside the MRC processes there has been 
increasingly substantive cooperation between Chinese colleagues and southern 
neighbours discussing many aspects of the Chinese mainstream development. This 
has included visits to Cambodia by Chinese water scientists, hosted by Cambodian 
non-state organizations. Increasing the depths of these types of dialogues and 
exchanges may be of critical importance in demonstrating the constructive 
possibilities of greater international understanding and perspective-sharing.
China’s unwillingness to seriously engage with MRC has been problematic 
enough; but what is worse is when member country governments also choose 
not to use the MRC to share their own national water resources development 
intentions. More recently, there is renewed interest by all of the MRC member 
countries in building or investing in dams on, or diversions from, the Mekong 
River mainstream (see Chapter 2). At the time of writing, the only government to 
formally submit information to the MRCS about mainstream developments has 
been the Government of Laos, which in June 2008 advised that it is investigating 
eight dams on the mainstream. Despite the MRC Joint Committee having formally 
approved the Procedures for Notifi cation, Prior Consultation and Agreement 
(PNPCA) in November 2003, there has thus far been only very modest compliance 
by member countries. The MRCS is hopeful that this action by Laos signals a 
new openness to sharing information about possible projects, and that the other 
member countries choose to take similar steps.
TENSIONS
The most recent strategic overview of the MRC that took place in 2006 involved 
much rewriting and negotiation before being fi nally endorsed by the JC and 
accepted by the Council. By this time there was something in the strategy for 
everyone, and the organization was assigning itself multiple, sometimes confl icting, 
roles. At the aspirational level of the text, there was little disagreement between 
stakeholders. It is hard to fi nd anyone who disagrees with the stated goals and 
‘strategic IWRM’ directions which frame the plan, although Molle would remind 
us to be wary of a ‘nirvana concept’, such as IWRM, which can ‘obscure the political 
nature of natural resources management’, and the fact that some of the goals may 
be ‘frequently, if not always, antagonistic’ (hence, the confl icts and the fact that 
‘trade-offs are necessary and hard to achieve’) (Molle, 2008).
The differences that emerged were in the details and the intended emphases. 
The strategic plan preparatory process highlighted some of the tensions evident 
within the MRC and its wider constituencies, to which we now turn.
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Territorial domain: Mainstream only, or including the 
tributaries, basin wide?
Article 1 of the Mekong Agreement is clear that the territorial domain of the MRC 
is the entire Mekong River Basin. Acting in the China and Myanmar parts of the 
basin is diffi cult as these countries are not members, but multi-country overview 
BOX 14.1 GOALS AND STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS OF 
THE MEKONG RIVER COMMISSION STRATEGIC PLAN 
(2006 TO 2010)
The goals of the Mekong River Commission Strategic Plan are stated as follows:
• Promote and support coordinated, sustainable and pro-poor development.
• Enhance effective regional cooperation.
• Strengthen basin-wide environmental monitoring and impact assessment.
• Strengthen the integrated water resources management (IWRM) capacity and 
knowledge base of the Mekong River Commission (MRC) bodies, the National 
Mekong Committees (NMCs), line agencies and other stakeholders.
The ‘strategic IWRM’ directions of the plan are summarized as:
• Economic development and poverty alleviation: promote economic growth through 
the use and development of joint water resources in a manner that signifi cantly 
alleviates poverty.
• Integration through basin planning: implement a participatory multi-sectoral basin 
planning process that integrates economic, social and environmental concerns 
across the Lower Mekong Basin (LMB).
• Social development and equity: ensure equity in the allocation of water resources 
and services across different economic and social groups; reduce confl ict and 
promote socially sustainable development.
• Regional cooperation: integrate and coordinate water resource development and 
management between countries to optimize benefi ts from the joint resource and to 
minimize the risk of water-related confl icts.
• Governance: further and implement open, transparent and accountable institutions 
and regulatory frameworks that will promote IWRM at all levels.
• Environmental protection: protect the environment, natural resources, aquatic life 
and conditions, and the ecological balance of the Mekong River Basin from harmful 
effects of development.
• Climate variability: prevent, mitigate or minimize people’s suffering and economic 
loss due to climate variability.
• Information-based management: ensure that water resource management decisions 
are based on best available information.
Source: MRC (2006)
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of development in the LMB has also proved to be very diffi cult. At the time of 
the strategic planning process, many were disappointed that the MRCS had not 
been more involved in analysing and contributing to decision-making about 
development in the tributaries. The political role of the MRC had seemed reduced 
to mostly research and discussions about mainstream cooperation, with speculative 
emphasis on the impacts of Chinese mainstream developments, but with tributary 
development mysteriously scoped out of formal Council and JC discussions. Now 
mainstream projects are back on the agenda, and the MRC cannot again be silent. 
The MRCS recognizes this.
The Precautionary Principle: To apply or not?
Article 3 relates to the protection of the environment and ecological balance. It 
is of concern to many that the MRC has been too often subdued about the risks 
associated with many development projects – risks often borne involuntarily by 
those not clearly benefi ting (or potentially benefi ting) from project X, Y or Z. This 
silence has extended to the non-mention of the Precautionary Principle.2 Instead, 
the mantra from the secretariat has been ‘meeting the needs, keeping the balance’ 
and acceptance of an ever-changing baseline. It is important to ask: whose needs, 
and what risks or trade-offs are considered acceptable in the quest for balance?
Constituency: Governments or wider society?
There was much discussion of the MRC mandate and expectations during the 2006 
to 2010 strategic planning process. It was clear that the MRC did need to clarify 
its constituency and decide how much scope to give the MRCS to engage with a 
wider constituency than just the parts of the member state governments that have 
been tasked with MRC representation.
The fi nal plan refl ects the dominant attitude of the MRC towards engagement 
with non-state actors, suggesting that ‘improved stakeholder participation can be 
accomplished by working through the NMCs who are best able to implement 
improved participation, including civil society and NGOs (MRC, 2006, p43). 
Many civil society organizations beg to differ as engagement between them and 
the state-centric NMCs has been at a very basic level, although this is now being 
stepped up. Many donors and consultants have had far easier access to the MRC 
than local civil society and Mekong academia.
Many people who have been involved in the MRC over the past decade 
have recognized that they need to bring other actors and subject matter into 
the mainstream of their processes and provide a mechanism for the expression 
and exchange of what may be widely and fundamentally differing views about 
upstream and tributary development, inter-basin diversions, etc. The 2000 annual 
report acknowledged that it is ‘important that decisions on development include a 
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“bottom-up” process and are not confi ned to a “top-down” approach. The voice of 
the people directly affected, and of other stakeholders such as community groups 
or NGOs, must be heard.’ Moreover, it admitted that it ‘has virtually no experience 
in this vital fi eld’ and that it must ‘drastically accelerate activities to promote public 
participation’ (MRC, 2001).
Soon afterwards, one of the authors of this chapter wrote that the MRC’s lack 
of achievement thus far in genuine public participation is complex. The youth of 
the new version of the organization, the sustainability orientation and mindset 
of some of the agencies which dominate the National Mekong Committees, the 
politics between the member states, stinging criticisms by NGOs, realization of 
limited successes to this point, and operating rules that limit engagement with the 
wider basin community are all relevant. Collectively, this has resulted in the MRC 
lacking confi dence and being constrained in the extent to which it has proactively 
engaged with the large range of Mekong region actors outside of the MRC family. 
In relation to hydropower and the Water Utilization Programme (WUP), there 
has been a hypersensitive wariness of member country intergovernmental politics. 
There is also some resistance to being ‘lectured’ at by NGOs and past and present 
Mekong country experiences of being ‘directed by donors’ (Dore, 2003, p424).
The drastic acceleration did not eventuate. At least until 2008, progress in this 
area has been slow. For example, the consultants who undertook an organizational 
review (discussed below), several years later, noted: 
The Strategic Plan describes the importance of public involvement, 
public opinion, the civil society and NGOs in ensuring the success of 
inte grated water resources management of the Mekong River Basin. 
However, it is the impression of the Review Team that the present atti-
tudes and practices in MRC regard the member governments as the 
pri mary, if not the only, stakeholders that should be involved with 
MRC. A clear commitment and strategy for involving the civil society 
is lacking. (Hawkesworth et al, 2007, p16)
Knowledge broker or investment promoter?
The approach to knowledge-sharing or knowledge-broking has varied during the 
fi rst 13 years of the MRC. During this period the organization has had four chief 
executive offi cers (CEOs), punctuated by caretaker leadership.
During the Matoba-era of 1995 to 1998, the MRCS was a closed, state-
centric organization, lacking in confi dence and capacity, and with its potential 
constrained by the management style. It gave the impression of being a house for 
often independently operating donor projects.
Under the subsequent leadership of Joern Kristensen during 2000 to 2003, there 
was a clear shift towards being a ‘knowledge broker’, which implies enabling the 
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constituency to both contribute to and receive knowledge. The new commitment 
was to being a ‘learning organization’ and a centre of knowledge and information 
exchange with a strong commitment to improving the livelihoods of the people of 
the basin. There continued an understandable privileging of state members – after 
all, it is an intergovernmental organization; but there was also a new openness 
to knowledge contributions from a wider set of actors beyond states. Kristensen 
restructured the operations of the secretariat into programmes and insisted that all 
those working in the secretariat building were accountable to him. These were all 
positive changes. Morale within the secretariat noticeably improved.
After a lengthy caretaker period during which the secretariat transferred from 
Phnom Penh to Vientiane, Olivier Cogels took up the CEO position for 2004 to 
2007. The new leader was convinced that he would be the one to build the working 
relationship with China which had eluded his predecessors. Soon into his tenure 
he denounced any role of the MRCS being a ‘watchdog’ and launched a new push 
for the MRCS to be an investment promoter or facilitator. Both of these moves 
brought him into confl ict with the knowledge-brokering role, as the promoter/
facilitator was uninterested in any bad news about possible negative impacts of 
upstream, downstream or tributary development. Information exchanges, peer 
reviews and contestation, and characteristics of knowledge-building became 
more constrained. Morale within the MRCS staff dissolved as much analysis or 
commentary deemed counter-productive to the new mission – smooth sailing with 
the China relationship or investment promotion – was restricted. This tension was 
palpable during the strategic planning process. The authors’ own observation of this 
situation was similarly detected by the organizational Review Team, who noted: 
MRCS is starting to become known (among civil society organizations, 
scientifi c organizations) as an institution that will not release informa-
tion that may illustrate negative environmental and social consequences 
of development projects. This is a threat to the credibility of the organiza-
tion. (Hawkesworth et al, 2007, p20)3
Preparing projects for investment or assisting societies to 
evaluate proposals?
MRCS engagement in project preparation was assumed during the drafting 
process for the strategic plan to be part of the new development promotion role. 
An alternative perspective was that a better role for the MRCS would be for it to 
support national actors (state and civil society) in order to examine development 
projects, their likely impacts, and their claimed merits and costs. It is this latter 
role that the MRCS has attempted to play with the Don Sahong Dam discussed 
below.
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In any event, most perspectives about what the MRC should be doing ended 
up being included in the strategic plan, which in due course was adopted and 
quickly overtaken by the transformation in the region, part of which was the new 
avalanche of potential projects. A mid-term review of the MRC Strategic Plan 
2006–2010 is scheduled for late 2008. To the extent that it is possible, it is hoped 
this will remove some of the current ambiguities and, perhaps, make the roles of 
the various parts of the MRC a little clearer.
CASE STUDY: LAOS HYDROPOWER, DON SAHONG 
AND THE MEKONG RIVER COMMISSION (MRC)
No current development project better encapsulates the challenges facing the 
MRC than the present controversy over the Don Sahong Dam in southern Laos. 
If built, it would be the fi rst dam on the mainstream in the LMB.
Hydropower
Laos is at the centre of the current hydropower surge in the Mekong region. 
According to the Power Development Plan in Laos (as of May 2008), there are 77 
live hydropower projects: 10 are operational, 7 are under construction, 16 are 
under research and the remaining 44 have memoranda of understanding (MoUs) 
signed to move forward (see Chapter 2). There is a complex set of reasons driving 
the current surge. For the MRC, the explosion is a response to market demand: 
the increasing importance of regional trade and investment fl ows, rapidly growing 
energy demands (particularly in China, Thailand and Vietnam) and opportunities 
of an emerging regional power market have stimulated a new era of hydropower 
development in the basin, now mainly driven by private-sector actors (MRC, 
2008, p37).
Soaring (albeit fl uctuating) global energy prices and national commitments 
to energy security are also important drivers. Others include the ready availability 
of capital, at least until the advent of the global fi nancial crisis; a new boldness 
by Mekong governments to move ahead; and very attractive concession terms 
for developers. Another driver that is now taking effect is the recognition of the 
changes that large new storage dams in China will have on the fl ow regime of the 
Mekong mainstream. When the Xiaowan and the Nuozhadu dams are completed 
in Yunnan, the dry season river fl ow will increase signifi cantly and this will also 
make the LMB mainstream ‘run of river’ fi nancially more attractive.
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Fish
The Don Sahong story (see below) is not all about fi sh, but they are central; so 
before proceeding it is worth ensuring that the reader is familiar with the scale of 
the Mekong fi shery (see also Chapters 9 and 12).
Recent MRCS research has estimated the LMB annual consumption of inland 
fi sh to be about 2 million tonnes by a population of 56 million people. About 
90 per cent of the fi sh consumed in the LMB is from the wild-capture fi shery. In 
addition, about 0.5 million tonnes of other aquatic animals (OAA) are consumed. 
Collectively, the inland fi sh and OAA are estimated to provide 47 to 80 per cent 
(country range) of the animal protein of the people of the basin (Hortle, 2007). 
This equates to about 17 per cent of the total global freshwater fi shing catch and is 
worth in the order of US$2 billion. Other work by the MRC Fisheries Programme 
is showing that the bigger the fl ood (both in height and duration), the more fi sh 
you catch (in tonnes); and related to the previous point, the bigger the fl ood, the 
bigger the fi sh.4
These are extraordinary fi gures, showing massive reliance on a huge fi shery. 
However, this data and information about threats to the fi sheries seem to be having 
little impact upon river development policy-making (see Chapter 12). Bringing in 
fi sheries is proving to be a challenge for local livelihood champions, economists, 
fi sheries scientists and concerned political operators at all levels of decision-making. 
If it cannot be done at Don Sahong, it will be extraordinarily diffi cult anywhere 
else.
Don Sahong
In March 2006, the Government of Laos signed an MoU with a Malaysian 
engineering company, Mega First Corporation Berhad, to carry out a feasibility 
study for the run-of-river Don Sahong Hydro Energy Project (DSHEP) in the 
Khone Falls area, just north and upstream of the border between southern Laos 
and Cambodia.
In May 2007, a public letter from concerned scientists to governments 
and agencies responsible for managing and developing the Mekong River drew 
atten tion to and summarized ‘grave environmental impacts, particularly on fi sh 
and fi sheries but also on tourism and other signifi cant aspects of economy and 
livelihood, causing damage that will far exceed the net returns from the project’. 
In their view: 
While a degree of mitigation is sometimes feasible for some dams, the 
fi sheries impacts of the Don Sahong Dam simply cannot be mitigated. … 
There is no prospect that a fi sh pass could make a signifi cant difference 
to the blocking effects of this dam. (Baird et al, 2007)
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In June 2007, the concern about DHSEP was again summarized in a WorldFish 
Centre science briefi ng paper: 
Khone Falls is a key site for all Mekong fi sh resources. At the falls, the 
Mekong drops some 20m to 30m from the Khorat Plateau to the Mekong 
Plain. Here the river forms a complex network of narrow braided 
channels, named hoo in Lao. … Of special signifi cance are the 28 
scientifi c studies that show how it serves as a bottleneck for fi sh migration 
in the basin. Hoo Sahong, the site of the proposed dam, is especially 
important as it plays a unique role in Mekong fi sh migration. … A 
dam on the Hoo Sahong would block the only deep channel that allows 
fi sh to migrate through the falls year round. This could effectively block 
dry season fi sh movements between the Lower Mekong plains and the 
Mekong basin upstream. … Data on the economic value of the Mekong 
fi sheries, and on the impact of dams on fi sh migration, suggests that 
the economic costs from lost fi sheries production could outweigh the 
expected economic benefi ts of the dam. This analysis suggests that if 
the proposed dam is to be considered further, a comprehensive scientifi c 
assessment would be required to evaluate the costs and benefi ts in the 
larger context of Mekong fi sheries. (Baran and Ratner, 2007)
In July 2007, a ‘fi nal draft’ EIA report for DHSEP was completed and soon after 
submitted for evaluation by Lao authorities.5
The MRCS challenge
In September 2007, the MRCS was formally invited by the Government of Laos 
to contribute to its review of the EIA. This was a big step for Laos to include the 
MRCS in its internal processes. The staff within the MRCS supplied their best 
advice to Laos about the ‘completeness, accuracy and adequacy’ of the Mega First’s 
consultants report, fi nding it defi cient in many areas. Their report, prepared in 
November 2007, provides a clear critique of the EIA and offers objective advice to 
Laos. Included in their response, the MRCS pointed out the following: 
• The geographic and economic extent of the impact on fi sheries of the DHSEP 
has been underestimated.
• The proposed mitigation to allow upstream movement of fi sh cannot be proven 
to be effective prior to the DHSEP being built; and moreover the outfl ow from 
the turbines will attract fi sh to the blocked Hoo Sahong channel.
• The mortality of fi sh (all life history stages) that will be entrained through the 
turbines has been overlooked (MRC Secretariat, 2007, point 69).
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The JC has encouraged the MRCS to be responsive to governmental requests for 
technical advice. In this Don Sahong case, the MRCS has responded to an in-
confi dence request from the Government of Laos.  The MRCS analysis has not 
been released to the public, nor even shared with all member States. This is quite 
different to how the MRCS should be expected to act, as a transparent servant to 
all member countries. 
In November 2007, the representatives from the Government of Cambodia 
pointed out their concerns about a Khone Falls Dam at the annual meetings of 
the full MRC, held that year in Siem Reap. Just prior to the MRC meetings, 201 
citizens’ groups and individuals from 30 countries wrote to the MRC demanding 
that it uphold the 1995 Mekong Agreement and that it protect the river and its 
people from the resurgent threats posed by the proposed mainstream dams. Also 
released at this time was a statement by MRC donors calling on the MRC to ‘fully 
utilize its capacities, tools and mandate to assess hydropower development plans, 
with a view to transboundary environmental, economic and social impacts’ (MRC 
Donors, 2007). The donors followed up with another letter in December, signed 
by the German ambassador to Cambodia, again asking for information about how 
the MRC procedures for ‘timely notifi cation, prior consultation and agreement’ 
are being applied (Mann, 2007). The MRC Procedures for Notifi cation, Prior 
Consultation and Agreement (PNPCA) were adopted by the MRC Council in 
November 2003 (and are discussed below).
In February 2008, Mega First signed a project development agreement with 
the Government of Laos and announced that its studies show the project to be 
viable. None of these studies have yet been publicly released.
In March 2008, 51 citizens’ groups and individuals from the Mekong region 
wrote to the MRC asking it to engage more substantively and publicly in decision-
making about development of the Mekong River. Premrudee Daoroung, director of 
the regional NGO Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional Alliance (TERRA), 
had this to say: 
The new CEO must clearly state what steps the MRC will take in 
response to widespread concerns over the proposed mainstream dams. It 
can start by immediately releasing to the public all analyses relating to 
the Don Sahong Dam undertaken by the MRC. (TERRA, 2008) 
The new CEO responded in April 2008 that the MRCS would continue to work 
to develop a multifaceted understanding of the existing river system, prepare 
objective analysis of future development scenarios, provide advice on individual 
project proposals when requested by the member countries, and administer 
the procedures developed and negotiated (mostly during the Water Utilization 
Programme between 2000 and 2007) (Bird, 2008b).
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In a recent interview, refl ecting on the hydropower explosion, an analyst and 
campaigner for International Rivers acknowledged there is a ‘catch-22’ and that 
pleasing everyone is just not possible: 
If the MRC provides advice to government agencies that is perceived as 
critical of proposed hydropower projects, this advice could be unwelcome, 
ignored, and then no longer sought, undermining the MRC’s relevance 
in the eyes of the government agencies it considers itself primarily answer-
able to. Yet, by not providing this objective analysis and releasing it into 
the public domain, as it should do, the MRC faces a crisis of legitimacy 
in the eyes of the wider public that it is also intended to serve. (Nette, 
2008, interviewing Carl Middleton) 
The analyst says ‘as it should do’, and we would agree; but under the current 
norms of MRC behaviour, without the permission of the Government of Laos, 
the MRCS could not publicly release its Don Sahong analysis and advice without 
being seen as having betrayed the trust of its member state. The MRCS technical 
staff would be delighted if their analysis and advice were put in the public domain, 
but would prefer that it was done by the Government of Laos. Many Lao offi cials 
would also be more comfortable if the Don Sahong decision-making process was 
more transparent and deliberative.
The Don Sahong is not yet built, and there may yet be more twists in the 
tale; but it is salutary to refl ect on just how decisions actually get made about such 
projects. An actor in the Don Sahong case, who should not be identifi ed because 
it is not possible to speak openly about matters like this, is concerned: 
Development decisions in this region are almost entirely political. Tech-
nical matters play very little and sometimes no role in them. Water 
developments enable transfer of a dispersed, generalized wealth with 
no title  – or, more correctly, traditional public title – into a focused 
economic resource with private title. This is a very attractive proposition 
for people in positions of power.
A fi sheries scientist searching to be effective suggested: 
The real nature of politics and governance in the region is, indeed, 
one of the reasons why fi sheries are not on the agenda, and that can be 
depressing to the citizens we are; however, that should not spare us from 
a critical analysis of our contribution, as scientists, to the development 
process.
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Another colleague very familiar with the interdependencies between ecosystems and 
local livelihoods refl ected and recognized the need for more open deliberation: 
Decision-making processes on dams are not based on rational assessments, 
and certainly not infl uenced by sound science regarding fi sheries and 
their values. The irony is that we have had ten years of excellent research 
that has highlighted the importance of fi sheries – and that this evidence 
(much of which comes from MRCS) is widely accepted. So we have had 
a great research success – but a failure in terms of infl uencing policy. I 
do not think science alone will have much infl uence – although good 
research, evidence and arguments are necessary. What is clearly lacking 
is an open discussion of the options and implications – and a process 
that draws on case study experience in this region (plenty to draw from) 
and opens up the debate to include people who are directly impacted.
The Don Sahong example forces one to ask the question: how is it possible to 
have constructive, well-informed, deliberative processes before critical decisions are 
taken about water resources development? Thus far, the MRC has not been able to 
provide such a service to Mekong region societies. But things can change.
DE-MARGINALIZING
In early 2008, the MRC Joint Committee recommended, and the MRC Council 
subsequently appointed, new Chief Executive Offi cer Jeremy Bird, whose regional 
experience and existing working relationships ensure that he comes to the job 
with a solid grasp of the water politics of the place. He has previously worked in 
the Mekong region, including supervising cumulative impact assessment work in 
the Lao Nam Ngum River Basin (a sub-basin of the Mekong), and researching 
environmental considerations for sustainable hydropower development. The new 
CEO has laid out his vision for the period of 2008 to 2011 by proposing four 
areas of focus (Bird, 2008a) – regional and riparian; relevance; responsibility; risk 
reduction – which we use as departure points for the possible de-marginalization 
of the MRC.
Regional and riparian
The highest priority is for the MRC to become more regional, which is to us, in 
some ways, transnational. By this we mean addressing issues of joint concern to 
all the countries which share the land and waters of the basin, and to the extent 
possible, transcending solely national perspectives. Connected to regionalization 
is MRCS ‘riparianization’, which refers to the transition of the secretariat to an 
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organization clearly led and directed by citizens of the MRC member countries. 
Given the commitment of the MRC to riparianization of all key MRCS positions 
by 2011, including the CEO position, it is understood by all that Bird will be 
a single-term CEO with only three years in which to make his contribution. 
All positions in the Council, JC and NMCs have always been taken by citizens 
of the member countries. However, the MRCS has been increasingly criticized 
for having too many ‘international’ (i.e. from beyond the Mekong region) staff 
in key positions such as the CEO, chief fi nancial offi cer, chief of international 
cooperation, and programme managers.
Triggered by dissatisfaction with the overall performance, an independent 
review was commissioned in 2006 of the MRCS and the NMCSs. The consultants 
repeatedly encountered concerns about the staffi ng of the MRCS. They concluded 
that the overuse of internationals by the secretariat and the inadequate selection 
and retention procedures for riparians were preventing the MRCS from getting and 
keeping the best people from the member countries. Gate-keeping and control by 
the NMCs/NMCSs was identifi ed as part of the problem. The recommendation 
was clear: 
If there is going to be a successful professionalization and riparianization 
of MRCS, then it will be necessary to attract and secure the best qualifi ed 
candidates, not just from government but from the civil society as a 
whole. The process should be managed on a strictly competitive basis 
and administered by MRCS itself. (Hawkesworth et al, 2007, p37–
38)
The key MRC donors agreed: 
We strongly support the process towards riparianization. Riparian 
leadership, management and technical expertise in the MRC is critical 
to its long-term success and sustainability. To develop as a world class 
river basin management organization, the MRC employment proce-
dures need to attract, appoint and retain the best and brightest from 
the Mekong member countries. (MRC Donors, 2008)
MRC offi cials also agree with phasing down the role of internationals, but are fi nding 
it more problematic to make the riparian selection and retention systems more 
transparent and merit based. In early 2008, the JC rejected the recommendation, 
reducing the role of the NMCs. Donors are unlikely to accept anything less. So, it 
appears that all key positions in the secretariat will be ‘riparianized’ by 2011; but 
the processes for modernizing riparian recruitment and retention are still being 
negotiated.
DE-MARGINALIZING THE MEKONG RIVER COMMISSION 375
Relevant and engaged
The MRC must demonstrate that it is relevant by actively engaging in development 
decisions taken in the basin. The MRC has too often been absent from, or silent 
about, substantial decisions being taken on water resources development in the 
basin. As pointed out earlier, the MRCS has had little involvement and usually 
very limited information about the hydropower development on the Mekong River 
mainstream in China, and on tributaries in Laos and Vietnam. It was excluded 
from the decision-making about ‘channel improvement for navigation and trade’ 
and the associated mainstream river blasting in the Upper Mekong above Chiang 
Saen in northern Thailand. In the past, it has also been excluded from speculations 
about possible Lao–Thai water transfers, and diversions from the Mekong to 
irrigate more of northeast Thailand. Moreover, in recent years, it does not seem to 
have been trying to engage in these important issues. In the absence of deliberative 
action by the MRC, other actors have sought to open up regional water resources 
development debates via multi-stakeholder dialogues (Dore, 2007; IUCN et 
al, 2007a, 2007b) and the establishment of transnational knowledge networks. 
That said, these previous exclusions or inactivity would look minor if the MRC 
cannot now contribute to decision-making about LMB mainstream dams and 
diversions, which is now publicly (since 2007) fi rmly back on the agendas of all 
four member countries. In the latter half of 2008, the MRC, via the MRCS, scaled 
up its engagement.
Responsible and accountable
More than ever before, the MRC is being called to account and to act on the 
mandate articulated in the 1995 Mekong Agreement: under the agreement, the 
MRC is to conduct ‘assessment for the protection of the environment and the 
maintenance of the ecological balance of the Mekong River Basin’ (Article 24) 
and should ‘make every effort to avoid, minimize and mitigate harmful effects that 
might occur to the environment … from the development and use of the Mekong 
River Basin water resources’ (Article 7) (Rivers Coalition in Cambodia, 2007)
The MRC should clearly defi ne its own responsibilities (i.e. roles, duties and 
obligations), and also understand those of other Mekong region water actors. In 
doing so, constituencies and accountabilities are clarifi ed. Key questions include: 
what are the responsibilities of all stakeholders in a particular matter? Who is 
accountable to whom and for what? Are these responsibilities contested (Petkova 
and Veit, 2000; UN, 2006)?
Risk-reducing
The new CEO has expressed his desire for MRC to be risk-reducing, while the 
member countries are capitalizing on development opportunities. For these authors, 
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risk assessment and risk management are an important element of water use and 
related development. In the past, most attention was usually given to investment 
risk by either public or private investors. There is now often a much stronger focus 
on the risks of all actors affected by a decision. Distinguishing between different 
types of risk is a good way to start.
Voluntary risk-taking includes risks taken in the normal course of business 
– for example, when a private company invests in a hydropower dam, or a public 
company invests in a water supply systems – or business partnerships between the 
public and private sectors. Involuntary risk-bearing is quite different. For example, 
people displaced by a new reservoir, or those whose water entitlement is reduced 
as the result of a reallocation, are involuntary risk bearers.
Risk analysis should not ignore voluntary risk-taking, but should also focus 
on involuntary risk-bearing (WCD, 2000, p207; Dore et al, 2004), whether it is 
fair and effective, and, if not, how can it be made so. Key questions include: for 
different options, what are the possible risks? Who are the voluntary risk takers? 
Who are the involuntary risk bearers? How might risk be equitably shared and, 
especially, how might involuntary risk be reduced?
The new CEO takes the view that: 
The Secretariat has at least three roles in assessing and advising on oppor-
tunities and risks. One relates to the analysis of implications of projects, 
including the cumulative effects of national projects. This draws on 
work under a range of our programmes and, as I mentioned earlier, 
is being brought together by assessing various development scenarios 
under the Basin Development Plan. Another is to provide advice on 
specifi c projects where requested, including through our forthcoming 
Hydro power Programme. The third relates to administering the formal 
notifi cation and consultation procedures under the 1995 Agreement, 
and, where required, providing technical advice under such procedures 
and facilitating negotiation of agreements. (Bird, 2008a)
In comparison to his predecessors, these are extremely progressive statements 
embracing the tools of cumulative impact assessment and scenario-building, 
providing specific advice on projects and commitment to using the formal 
notifi cation and consultation procedures.
Examining rewards and respecting rights
There are two other ‘Rs’ worthy of further attention by MRC. Thus far, there has 
been very little examination of rewards (winners and losers) and their distribution; 
and there has been an aversion to tread on the sensitive topic of often overlapping 
claims and rights.
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The MRC could also emphasize the importance of identifying and unpacking 
rewards. This is not just the realm of economics, but rigorous economic assessment 
would be a good start. For different options, what are the possible multifaceted 
rewards or benefi ts (Sadoff and Grey, 2002, 2005)? Who stands to win? Who stands 
to lose? How might rewards be shared? Are there ‘net’ benefi ts? What is fair? What 
might be more ecologically, socially and economically sustainable?
The MRC could also display its concerns for the development of rights over 
and above territoriality and the sovereign rights of states. At various scales, water-
sharing rights, or entitlements, may be assumed, negotiated, bestowed, contested, 
bought, sold, rented, traded, perhaps agreed upon, and sometimes ignored (UN, 
2003; Scanlon et al, 2004). Rights analysis needs to be cognizant of a wide range 
of water-sharing regimes and the likely impacts of different options. An important 
departure point can be seeking answers to questions such as what is the history of 
water-sharing/management and use in a particular place or system? What are the 
entitlement claims of all stakeholders? Are these entitlements contested and, if so, 
on what grounds? Whose rights are affected by water resources development and 
allocation? How can these sometimes overlapping entitlement rights/claims be 
respected while searching for fair and effective workable agreements?
CONCLUSIONS
Governments need to make more informed decisions about whether to proceed 
with water resources development projects, taking into account comprehensive 
options assessment examining political, social, economic and ecological impacts 
– and drawing upon scientifi c evidence, situated local knowledge, and appreciating 
complexity and uncertainty. There has been an absence of informed discussion in 
the public space about the pros and cons of dams and diversions in Lower Mekong 
countries that have re-emerged on the agendas of national governments and 
transnational capital providers and developers. There is a need for transnational, 
transboundary public examination via high-quality, well-informed deliberative 
processes. This requires competent design, convening, facilitation, knowledge 
inputs and wise use of the media.
New fl ow regimes will have to be negotiated on Mekong River tributaries and, 
perhaps, the mainstream. Relatively little attention is being paid to how river fl ows 
will be ‘managed’ post-construction. There are many different possible scenarios. 
State and non-state actors need to become more familiar with fl ow negotiation 
tools and approaches that have the potential to ensure that all relevant issues and 
perspectives are taken into account in the inevitable negotiations ahead.
The MRC must increase its engagement in these issues. This will require 
applying existing and new research to discover methods appropriate for the 
Mekong region. Other essential ingredients are great diplomatic skill and social 
capital to allow equitable and informed negotiations to proceed. The MRC has 
378 INSTITUTIONS, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER
deservedly received criticism for its performance thus far; but there remain many 
optimistic, latent supporters of the MRC initiative, hoping ‘the family’ will 
be enabled to capably respond to the current challenges. This will require the 
member governments, at the highest level, to ‘de-marginalize’ the MRC and its 
implementing parts, allowing them to make their best contributions.
A worthy goal is to make it normal practice in the Mekong region for important 
national and transboundary water-related options and decisions to be examined 
in the public sphere from a range of perspectives. Openness and deliberation are 
still far from being normal practice. The MRC, as mandated, has the opportunity 
and responsibility to play an important role in creating new, deliberative political 
space for learning and negotiating.
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NOTES
1 King and his co-authors acknowledge that their data-compiling projects across the 
GMS is ‘suffi cient only for scoping purposes’ as the data were ‘compiled from a 
variety of sources and is unverifi ed’. Existing projects are defi ned as: existing + those 
with fi nancial closure + those under construction. Potential projects are defi ned as: 
committed + proposed + identifi ed to any level of study. It is not implied that all 179 
potential projects are necessarily going ahead. The fi gures used by King et al (2007) 
for Laos (11 existing, 32 potential) were assembled in 2006, and differ from the 2008 
data quoted in the case study later in the chapter, which reported 77 projects at various 
stages from conceptualization/design through to operation.
2 The Precautionary Principle states that if a public action or policy may cause severe 
or irreversible harm, it should not be carried out despite the absence of full scientifi c 
certainty that harm would ensue. The burden of proof thus falls on those who would 
advocate taking the action.
3 The Review Team also noted that there was ‘some concern among the staff about the 
consequences for themselves if they are too open with ideas and constructive criticism’ 
(Hawkesworth et al, 2007, p17).
4 Presentation given by Chris Barlow, MRC Fisheries Programme coordinator, Vientiane, 
20 June 2008.
5 The EIA was light in some technical areas (e.g. transboundary impacts), but spent 
considerable space exploring whether or not the development was a mainstream 
development (it is), pursuing a bizarre line that perhaps as the river is braided at this 
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point, the development could be seen as on a tributary; and, hence, whether, when 
and how it was compulsory, or not, for the Government of Laos to notify the MRC.
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Contested Mekong Waterscapes: 
Where to Next?
François Molle, Louis Lebel and Tira Foran
INTRODUCTION
The Mekong region has gone through massive human and material transformations 
(Rigg, 1997; de Koninck, 2005). Even as wars, expanding land frontiers, urbaniza-
tion and industrialization have profoundly remodelled landscapes and societies, 
rivers and wetland ecosystems have remained persistent defi ning elements of rural 
livelihoods and agricultural waterscapes. Large-scale water resources development, 
although locally signifi cant, has long remained short of the grand projects of 
‘harnessing’ and ‘taming’ the Mekong River and its tributaries pushed forward 
by various regional organizations, governments and investors during the second 
half of last century. Regional confl icts and an obvious poor fi t of many grand 
projects to local conditions and actual water/energy needs have thwarted large-scale 
investments (Kirmani, 1990).
Rising demands for energy, recent soaring fossil fuel and agricultural prices, 
and improved relations among China and other countries in the region have 
contributed to a renewed groundswell of interest in hydropower and irrigation 
projects. As earlier chapters show, many old projects are being dusted off; earlier 
concerns with environmental and social impacts are being addressed, or dismissed, 
with a fresh rhetoric of mitigation, trade-offs and best practices. Development 
banks and governments liken poverty alleviation to investments in infrastructure, 
while powerful new actors – private companies and banks from the region – have 
entered the scene and are reshaping patterns of water governance. The long 
imagined grand waterscapes of the Mekong region are once again being promoted, 
pursued and contested.
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Powerful coalitions are bent on instilling a sense of inevitability well incarnated 
in the statement that ‘development cannot wait’.1 Investments in health and 
education, as well as water and electricity infrastructure, are desirable and necessary 
to improve the lives and living conditions of people in the Mekong region. However, 
experience illustrates that ‘the subsidized construction of massive infrastructure is 
most unlikely to provide the optimal result in this respect for the poorer sections 
of the populations’ (Phillips et al, 2006). 
To different degrees according to place and time, the riparian countries of 
the Mekong all present tales of land, water and natural resource concentration: 
dam construction and reservoir water bodies displace residents; exclusionary 
forest zoning and watershed classifi cations dispossess ethnic minorities; dams that 
impact upon fi sh migration and natural fl ood regimes disrupt fi sheries in rivers and 
wetlands; more powerful and organized groups redirect and seize opportunities and 
benefi ts derived from fl ood protection measures and irrigation schemes.
Unchecked states, bureaucracies and attendant private or political interests almost 
invariably fail to achieve a balance between economic, social and environmental 
dimensions of development; and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that more 
balanced outcomes have largely resulted from various forms of contestation.
Sewell and White (1966) once pondered why the human dimensions of water 
management were seldom considered or studied ‘before the bulldozer moves 
in’. They found reasons ‘rooted partly in engineering practice, partly in lack of 
funds and trained personnel, and partly in lack of analytical techniques’; in other 
words, regrettable (but hopefully transient) defi ciencies in scientifi c tools and the 
understandable eagerness of the engineering profession to get the job done led to 
a predominance of infrastructural considerations over human concerns. This fi nal 
chapter, largely drawing on the preceding chapters, broadens Sewell and White’s 
question and answers by refl ecting on patterns of water governance in the past half 
century. We identify a much wider set of interests in water resources development 
and management – from fi nanciers and politicians, owners and operators of new 
infrastructure, to consumers, academics and organized community and civil groups 
or international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) of various stripes – and 
distil some of the key features of water politics in the Mekong region. We highlight 
how the governance and transformation of waterscapes in the Mekong region could 
move along a more fair and sustainable direction.
WATER GOVERNANCE IN THE MEKONG REGION
Understanding impacts
The issue of social and environmental impacts has bedevilled many projects; a 
lot of politics revolves around how these impacts are identifi ed, framed, assessed, 
valued, mitigated and compensated. Social and environmental impacts are usually 
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identifi ed by (often mandatory) impact assessments. These studies are often not 
made available to the public, sometimes undertaken after construction has started, 
and premised upon an approach of mitigating impacts. Impact assessments 
tend to be seen as a ‘bureaucratic “hoop” to be jumped through in order to start 
construction, not as an authentic mechanism to decide whether or not the dam 
should be built’ (Friesen, 1999). States are often content to take impact assessments 
as just another perfunctory step towards project approval or completion.
Salinization problems and confl icts over fl oodplain management around the 
Rasi Salai and Hua Na dams on the Mun River in Thailand have generated debates 
about environmental impact assessments (EIAs) and critiques about the ways in 
which substandard assessments are used to ‘green wash’ projects (see Chapter 10). 
For example, the fi rst EIA performed for the Songkhram Irrigation Project in 
1992 by consultants was rejected by the National Environmental Board (NEB), 
after fi nding that these were exact copies of EIAs that had been done earlier for 
another large-scale water diversion project, the Khong-Chi-Mun (Breukers, 1999; 
see Chapter 7). Likewise, the 1993 preliminary EIA of the Theun-Hinboun Project 
in Laos by Norconsult was rejected by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
because of its poor quality (Barney, 2007), while the independent assessment of 
the Chinese navigation project commissioned by the MRC in 2001 found that 
the EIA was ‘substantively inadequate and in many places fundamentally fl awed’ 
(Hirsch and Mørck-Jensen, 2006). Problems like these have led local groups to 
engage in grassroots research in order to mobilize local knowledge and to produce 
‘people’s EIAs’ (Manorom, 2007; see Chapter 13). 
In carrying out assessments, pre-existing benefi ts are frequently downplayed. 
In the Nam Songkhram wetlands (Chapter 7), people rely on diverse natural 
resources that provide both food and income. Many of these benefi ts are not 
evident in enumerations of cash incomes or macro-economic analyses measuring 
poverty levels.
Likewise, social and economic impacts are frequently glossed over. Differences 
between the number of people expected to suffer impacts both at the stage of 
the feasibility study and subsequently are often very large. In the case of the Pak 
Mun Dam, for example, the fi rst studies had identifi ed 243 households, while 
concerned people inventoried 1649 and the fi nal compensation was extended to at 
least 1821 households, or even 6200 households if compensations for lost fi sheries 
are included (see Chapter 3). In many cases, people receive ‘too little too late’, if 
anything. Compensations come under two guises: direct fi nancial compensations, 
or indirect economic opportunities or subsidies to develop other activities.
Early water projects in the region, many of them carried out in a context of 
war or political tension, have been planned and implemented as indisputable 
acts of national security. Inaugurated in 1971, the Nam Ngum 1 Dam in Laos 
displaced 800 families who did not receive compensation. In northern Vietnam, 
between 50,000 and 60,000 mainly ethnic minority people, the majority of whom 
continue to suffer impoverishment, were removed to make place for the Hoa Binh 
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Dam, initiated in 1971 at an estimated cost of US$1.5 billion (Hirsch, 1998). In 
northeast Thailand, populations resettled during the construction of the Ubol Rat, 
Lam Pao or Nam Oon dams suffered many hardships.2 Hori (2000) reckons that 
dam projects were saddled with many ‘severe problems with compensation for 
land’ that were based on low market values, with delayed payment not adjusted to 
account for infl ation, and moneylenders and middlemen taking advantage of the 
situation to lend money at high rates.
Financial compensations are often minimal and quickly absorbed in the 
purchase of goods. But if they are quite generous – as in the case of the Pak Mun 
Dam, where high sums were eventually proposed to affected people – they may 
buy people’s support for the project. This, in turn, can result in splitting protesters, 
and even in a desire by others to also be ‘affected’ and receive payments for land 
that exceed market values (see Chapter 3).
Other forms of compensation include financial subsidies or support for 
economic activities such as irrigation for intensification or diversification of 
agricultural production. Irrigation, however, does not necessarily benefi t those 
who have lost their land. Promises of profi table cash crop production (which are 
also heavily resorted to at the time of the feasibility study and seldom materialize 
as planned) often amount to wishful thinking. The Theun-Hinboun Hydropower 
Project in Laos initially lauded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) as a 
project with ‘little for the environmental lobby to criticize’ eventually resulted in 
widespread impacts upon fi sheries, river embankments and riparian agriculture. 
Activities launched as compensation and mitigation measures have largely failed 
despite hikes in the project budget (Blake et al, 2005; FIVAS, 2007). Nearby at the 
Nam Theun 2 Dam (NT2) in Laos, the viability of a proposed cash-crop agriculture 
programme for resettled villagers has been questioned due to the poor quality of 
soils, experimental cropping methods and hypothetical markets. Another promise 
is that of aquaculture within reservoirs. In the Water Grid Project in northeast 
Thailand, promises were clearly self-serving desktop exercises. Consultants in 
charge of project design simply took for granted that ‘farmers would have to greatly 
change their farming practices in order to shoulder water fees … [and] switch 
from rice cultivation to other cash crops, which consume less amounts of water 
than rice’ (Bangkok Post, 2004b). The problem of marketing was solved by merely 
‘recommending’ a contract farming system with agribusiness companies ‘to ensure 
that farmers can sell their produce at reasonable prices’.
Such assumptions typically make light of social and ecological complexity 
and production-cum-marketing risks that characterize much of smallholder 
production. In practice, many farmers do not have the skills, the knowledge, the 
capital or the labour force to engage in new activities with strong links to unstable 
markets (Cornford and Matthews, 2007), let alone the frequent cases where market 
opportunities remain elusive. Construction companies are usually well equipped 
to face technical challenges; but transforming ‘aggregations of houses, community 
facilities, cleared patches of still-smoking vegetation and disrupted families into 
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self-managed and self-sustaining communities, viable in all dimensions’ (McDowell 
et al, 2008) is another story altogether (see Chapter 4). Without ongoing pressure 
and scrutiny, such immense challenges frequently lead to failure; meanwhile, the 
project proponents and their consultants pack up their bags to move on to the 
next project.
International development banks or bilateral cooperation organizations 
sometimes have to withdraw or refrain from associating with sensitive projects. 
The Tasang Dam on the Salween River in Myanmar/Burma has been part of a 
master plan for a Mekong region power grid; but the ADB backed away after 
‘serious socio-environmental concerns’ were identifi ed and the project did not pass 
the ADB’s fi lters (see Chapter 5). Despite occasional complacency with shoddy 
EIAs, development banks foster a culture of impact assessment3 that, however, fi nd 
limited echo with governments in the region. While governments have passed ad 
hoc legislations that refl ect changing societal values, these are often to fulfi l lending 
and other requirements of banks and donors and ‘do not generally measure up to 
contemporary international standards’ (Hirsch and Mørck-Jensen, 2006).
Modes of engagement
How governments engage with the wider public in planning and implementing 
water projects varies tremendously from country to country in the Mekong region. 
Degrees of openness and transparency and the availability of channels for public 
participation and dissent are an initial measure of the quality of water governance. 
Practice differs from one case to the other, ranging from secrecy, forced displacement 
and overt suppression of dissent, buying-out or co-opting by representation in ad 
hoc committees or rewarding with well-paid consultancies, to genuine attempts to 
accommodate and incorporate diverse inputs from society.
As an example from one extreme, the construction of the Tasang Dam carried 
out under the military regime of Myanmar has constantly faced accusations of 
human rights abuses and potential widespread environmental damage (see Chapter 
5). Over the past ten years, the Myanmar army is believed to have relocated more 
than 60,000 villagers from areas adjoining the dam and the inundation zone 
(SSEO, 2006); forced labour, rapes and killings are being linked to the regime’s 
intimidating preparations to build the dam (EarthRights International, 2005).
Planning processes often unfold behind closed doors. The memorandum of 
understanding (MoU) signed by the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
(EGAT) regarding the build–operate–own Hutgyi Dam in Myanmar states 
that ‘each party shall strictly keep confi dential any and all technical, legal and 
commercial data and information’ (see Chapter 5). Likewise, in China, despite 
new regulations in 2003 providing for public input on the EIAs for large projects 
such as the Nu-Salween River dams, authorities in the development companies 
and the National Development and Reform Commission insist that the Nu is a 
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transboundary river and therefore detailed hydrological data on the river are of 
national security concern and the EIA cannot be made public (see Chapter 5).
In Thailand, the planning of large-scale irrigation schemes in the northeast 
(‘Green Isaan’, ‘Khong-Chi-Mun’, or ‘Water Grid’ projects) have been shrouded in 
secrecy with occasional media releases and offi cial declarations creating confusion 
rather than clarity around implausible targets and dubious assumptions (see 
Chapter 10). Water planning in the Songkhram Basin (see Chapter 7) and several 
weirs constructed on the Chi-Mun mainstream and tributaries have also been 
imposed without space for deliberation. The Pak Mun Dam sticks out as an 
exception (see Chapter 3), where contestation – after construction – compelled the 
scrutiny of the dam by outsiders, including a team from the World Commission on 
Dams (WCD) and Thai academics. But political space itself may be a temporary 
phenomenon. Efforts in 2004 by Thailand’s minister of natural resources and 
environment to reform the EIA procedures in the face of rapid economic growth 
and to promote participation from the public were not rewarded, and perhaps 
resulted in his subsequent removal and replacement by a politician supportive of 
the Water Grid Project (see Chapter 10).
Other multilateral actors involved in water resources development have tried 
to take the ‘participatory imperative’ more seriously. The 2000 annual report of 
the Mekong River Commission (MRC) acknowledges that it is ‘important that 
decisions on development include a “bottom-up” process and are not confi ned 
to a “top-down” approach. The voice of the people directly affected, and of other 
stakeholders such as community groups or NGOs, must be heard.’ In 2005 the 
MRC (2005) issued a strategy document on stakeholder consultation and public 
participation strategy. The 2006–2010 plan, however, partly refl ects the efforts of 
several donor states rather than the conviction of riparian governments, which ‘see 
participation as, at best, a tool of antidevelopment northern environmental groups 
or troublesome local NGOs and, at worst, as worthless’ (Sneddon and Fox, 2007). 
The MRC’s uneasiness at engaging with non-state actors is perceptible in that it 
refers stakeholder participation back to the National Mekong Committees (NMCs) 
arguing that they can best implement it. But many civil society organizations have 
been unable to engage with the state-centric NMCs beyond a very basic level (see 
Chapter 14).
The public does not always wait to be consulted. If suffi cient safe spaces are 
available, the actions of advocacy groups in civil society can be an important driver 
of decision-making processes. Moreover, public mobilization may be a prerequisite 
to compensation. After construction of the Theun-Hinboun Hydropower Project, 
for example, it gradually emerged that the project reduced fi shery catches by 
between 30 and 90 per cent along the three rivers it affected, and impacted upon 
the livelihoods of 30,000 people living downstream and upstream of the dam (see 
Chapter 2). It is only after independent external investigations and pressure from 
the International Rivers Network and the Association for International Water and 
Forest Studies (FIVAS) that the ADB acknowledged that the project impact area 
CONTESTED MEKONG WATERSCAPES: WHERE TO NEXT? 389
should be expanded, and established a ten-year US$4.7 million mitigation and 
compensation plan (Barney, 2007). In the case of the Pak Mun Dam (see Chapter 
3), villagers had to fi ght for each compensation (houses, land and lost fi sheries) and 
their 2000 blockade of the dam appears to have done what many months of sit-in 
demonstrations outside Government House since 1994 could not: it conveyed to 
EGAT senior management that they needed to take much more active measures 
to address local concerns and resolve the confl ict.
The lack of transparency in the planning process and in the operation of 
infrastructures nurtures ad hoc, emotional and often self-serving interpretations of 
events. A good illustration of this was the higher than usual fl ooding that occurred 
in the Mekong River in August 2008, which triggered a rapid response from a 
coalition of local and international organizations typically opposed to mainstream 
dams (see Chapter 11). These organizations were quick to assert that the serious 
fl ood conditions were, in part, a result of operations of dams in Yunnan Province 
of China, while the MRC stood in defence of China, saying there was no evidence 
that upstream dam operations had any impact upon the severity of the fl ood 
(Wipatayotin, 2008). It followed up quickly with more detailed analysis (MRC, 
2008). Poor analysis of, and lack of access to, credible information tend to beget 
suspicion and confl ict.
The NT2 dam in Laos, although not yet completed, has been heralded as a 
success story and an example of ‘doing dams right’ by the World Bank (Porter and 
Shivakumar, 2008). The World Bank and other NT2 proponents have claimed 
that the project achieved public acceptability in Laos through consultation 
processes that occurred throughout the project development period and that 
social and environmental impacts have been adequately addressed through ‘skilful 
management, effective communications and technical expertise’ (Porter and 
Shivakumar, 2008). Despite unprecedented attention and funding devoted to 
mitigating socio-environmental impacts, it is apparent that constant scrutiny by 
NGOs and other outsiders has led donors and developers to improve standards. 
As a senior staff from the Italian–Thai company involved in NT2 admitted,4 the 
technical alternative with regard to the tailrace channel, which greatly lessens the 
impact of the dam’s releases upon the Xe Bang Fay Basin residents, would not have 
been implemented had NGOs not provided pressing advocacy on the negative 
impacts of the project.
The World Bank and others touted the transparency and participation of the 
process, and pointed to the stacks of studies assessing NT2’s environmental and 
social impacts (see Chapter 4), while The Economist (2005) claimed that local 
people had been consulted until ‘they were blue in the face’. While the NT2 
project can be credited with several innovative aspects, such as the presence of 
independent monitors, a revenue management framework and a commitment to 
public reporting largely adhered to, shortcomings are also apparent as several social 
and environmental commitments are either loosely or not completely adhered to 
(see Chapter 4).
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More crucially, such efforts at improving governance, meant to pave the way for 
improvements in the planning of subsequent dams,5 may have brought about the 
opposite result: since NT2, the governments of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam have 
started bypassing international development banks in favour of private operators 
and bilateral agreements. Thus, rather than conduct a transboundary study required 
by the ADB that ultimately could have required them to pay compensation to the 
affected villagers, Electricity of Vietnam (EVN) ultimately acquired funding from 
Russian sources to go along with the Sesan 3 Dam (Hirsch and Wyatt, 2004). EVN 
has also welcomed other foreign assistance and funding sources with limited social 
and environmental conditionalities, including Chinese companies (for the Lao Cai 
Hydropower Station), the Indian Export-Import Bank (which provided a loan for 
the Nam Chien Hydropower Plant), and Russian fi nancial and technical support 
(e.g. Son La and Sesan 3 Dam projects) (see Chapter 2).
Finally, not all public responses to interventions in rivers for hydropower, 
irrigation and fl ood management are organized and explicit. Perhaps more often 
than is realized, individual local water users and people at risk adapt to changed 
fl ows, burdens, ecosystem conditions and opportunities. The aggregate response of 
many farmers, irrigation districts or city wards can signifi cantly change the effective 
way in which water is governed. Benefi ts, burdens and risks can be redistributed 
without a word being said or placard hoisted. The signifi cance of individual 
agency can be illustrated with responses to fl ood interventions. Bangkok, more 
than any other city, has acquired its fl ood protection system largely by fragmented 
accumulation (see Chapter 11). After major events, different parts of the city take 
action, acquiring pumps and building canals, river walls or dikes. Within the larger 
metropolitan bureaucracy, different districts ‘game’ each other’s fl ood protection 
operations. The result in both cases is that actual movement of fl ood waters is often 
complex. Adding new measures in such a complex system invariably creates side-
effects for others on the wrong side of the wall, end of the tunnel or receiving end 
of a drain (see Chapter 11). Each new intervention triggers a series of compensatory 
responses, both operational and infrastructural.
Interests and ideologies
Large-scale public investments provide opportunities for private gains to powerful 
players that typically include local/national politicians, bureaucrats, fi rms and 
funding partners. These groups are often associated in ‘iron triangles’ (Woodall, 
1993) or ‘iron rectangles’ (Molle, 2008b) – systems of vested interests that 
encourage bribery, bid-rigging, the exchange of favours, or simply overestimation of 
benefi ts and neglect of costs in order to secure a steady fl ow of projects. Collusion 
between business, politics and bureaucrats in the water sector is a commonality 
shared by virtually all countries (Repetto, 1986), is thus not specifi c to the Mekong 
region, and has been well documented in countries such as Japan (Feldhoff, 2002) 
and the US (Reisner, 1986; McCool, 1987).
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In the Mekong region, associations of groups with vested private interests are 
best documented in the case of Thailand (see Chapter 10). Chai-Anan Samudavanija 
(1995) underlines how ‘in the name of “economic development” the military and 
bureaucratic complex acquired additional fi nancial sustenance through sponsoring 
infrastructure construction in rural areas’ and points to the corruption associated 
with these projects that has helped the various patron–client networks maintain 
their political authority. Bruns’s (1991) study of water resource development in 
northeast Thailand shows evidence of how ‘irrigation projects are large and visible 
rewards that politicians can offer in exchange for support’. Members of parliament 
are active in lobbying the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) for projects either 
at the request of their constituencies or in self-interest.
Pondering over the announced megaprojects, Ekachai (2008) concludes that 
‘the construction business, the local godfathers-cum-politicians and the bureaucracy 
will get richer from these mega-projects. Not the villagers. Not Mother Nature. 
But that is not the government’s concern.’ At its worst, such collusion in schemes 
involves notorious godfathers, as shown by the relationships between high-ranking 
offi cers and mafi a leaders from Khon Kaen who assisted in the Green Isaan Project 
(Phongpaichit and Piriyarangsan, 1996). Myanmar’s largest construction company, 
Asia World Co, was founded in 1992 by Lo Hsing Han who also controls one of 
the largest armed drug traffi cking gangs in Southeast Asia (see Chapter 5).
Powerful and well-connected politicians or companies easily capitalize on 
large-scale water projects. In the lower Songkhram Basin, SunTech Group Ltd, 
which had acquired close to 10,000ha of fl oodplain land at very low prices (Blake, 
2008) and used state subsidies for eucalyptus plantations and for establishing a 
modern vegetable canning factory, saw possible projects in the lower basin as an 
unexpected opportunity to receive compensation for land after its undertaking 
completely failed (see Chapter 7). Flood protection schemes also allow offi cials 
or wealthy individuals to infl uence plans so that their land ends up protected by 
dikes; they can also buy land targeted for fl ood security and resell it for profi t (see 
Chapter 11). In eastern Bangkok, public pressure from groups affected by fl oods 
has led to river walls along 80km of the river at a high cost of 0.1 million to 0.3 
million baht (US$6000) per metre, a type of investment that provides benefi ts to 
many private interests.
Overlap between private interests and political functions is also apparent in the 
case of the Thai MDX company, which is steered by a former minister of foreign 
affairs and a minister of commerce once bent on opening neighbouring markets 
to Thai companies. Convergence of bureaucratic and private interests is not new. 
During the Vietnam War, the endless and costly dredging works undertaken in 
the Mekong Delta at public expense were frequently met with scepticism about 
whether aid was merely enriching French and American interests (see Chapter 
8), including American construction firms such as RMK-BRJ6 (now part of 
Halliburton). In the present era, concerns have surfaced about the infl uence of 
politically connected contractors, as well as planning and engineering departments 
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in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, in infrastructure development plans in the Ca 
Mau Peninsula (see Chapter 8). In some cases, private interests may emancipate 
themselves from bureaucratic control to the point that in late 2006 the Chinese 
Minister of Water Resources referred to the 13-dam cascade planned on the Nu-
Salween River as a case of ‘predatory development’.
Chomchai (1994) notes the pressure exerted, as early as the 1950s, by 
international aid organizations to formulate development plans and ‘mobilize 
maximum foreign assistance’, while Kirmani (1990) sees the Mekong Project as 
‘a classic example of external effort, external management and external planning 
with little involvement of the benefi ciaries’. Aid is sometimes part of fi shy deals, as 
illustrated by the Green Isaan Project, for which Margaret Thatcher’s government 
was ready to grant US$100 million and loan US$500 million if agreement was 
found on a planned major package of military equipment purchase (see Chapter 
10). The interests of development banks and their pervasive ‘lending culture’, where 
staff incentives are aligned with the maximization of loans, are also infl uential in 
the decisions to invest. While banks pretend to have policies driven by borrowers’ 
demands, it is readily apparent that their policies are often supply driven and 
internally defi ned. This is illustrated by an ADB offi cial who stated that ‘ADB has 
decided to prioritize water investments … the President has decided to double – up 
to $2 billion a year – investments in the water sector’ (Drooj, 2006).
In sum, the pivotal drivers of large-scale water resources development lie within 
webs of interests that associate the most powerful political, bureaucratic or business 
groups or sectors of society together with foreign companies or international 
organizations. Decision-making appears to be highly political, in the broad sense 
of the term, and only marginally based on technical or economic fundamentals.
But water resources development is also predicated upon viewpoints, values 
and ideologies (Molle, 2006; see Chapter 10). The vision of nature as a threatening 
environment that must be ‘harnessed’ or ‘tamed’ through massive injection of 
capital, technology and concrete has fuelled much of the 20th-century ‘hydraulic 
mission’ and is still a very pervasive mental framework (see Chapter 1). This is 
apparent in grandiloquent language, such as the promotion of ‘megaprojects’ 
expected to ‘eradicate poverty’; the ideology of ‘big is beautiful’ is also perceptible 
in minor details, such as the names of some construction companies in the region 
– for example, the Malaysian Mega First Corporation Berhad, which is involved 
in the Don Sahong Hydro Energy Project in Laos (see Chapter 14).
Extreme fl ood events provide opportunities to call for and strengthen control 
strategies. After the 1966 fl oods in the Mekong Basin, the executive secretary of 
the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) 
declared that the fl ood had ‘deepened the determination of all of us engaged in 
the Mekong effort to convert the wasted and destructive powers of the Mekong 
untamed into a giant tamed and harnessed to the uses of mankind’ (Jenkins, 
1968). Likewise, the study by NEDECO/TEAM (1983) on the Songkhram Basin 
came up with a plan to tame the ‘unruly’ Nam Songkhram River. Another central 
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argument (see Chapter 7) – albeit ubiquitous and not specifi c to the region – is 
that ‘water fl ows to the Mekong unused’ (Roongrueng, 1999), a typical statement 
insensitive to wider ecosystemic functions of the water regime, as well as to pre-
existing people’s livelihoods, echoed in 1995 by the foreign minister of Thailand, 
who found it ‘a pity to let the Mekong River, with its abundance of water resources, 
just fl ow to the sea’ (cited in Friesen, 1999; see Chapter 10).
Such approaches and views of nature have their root in colonial practice and 
in the iconic model of basin-wide ‘comprehensive development’ of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority (TVA), applied to northeast Thailand by the US Bureau of 
Reclamation in 1965, where almost every single tributary to the Chi and the Mun 
rivers was planned to be dammed in its upper course (Floch et al, 2007); the same 
model has been projected at the Mekong Basin scale. The culture of full control 
was strengthened by many visits from the Mekong Committee and Thai technical 
departments to the TVA, the Bureau of Reclamation and the Columbia River Basin 
Development Headquarters (Darling, 1962; Hori, 2000; Biggs, 2006).
The ‘great potential’ of this ‘majestic river’ was praised early on by Wheeler’s 
(1958) study and engineers would marvel at the ‘potential’ of all the ‘promising 
dam project’ sites they would identify and at the ‘tremendous potentialities for 
power production, irrigation, navigation and fl ood control’ that C. H. Schaaf, the 
fi rst executive agent of the Mekong Committee, saw lying in this ‘sleeping giant’. 
The heyday of heroic and enthusiastic engineering is epitomized in Hori’s (2000) 
account of the early Mekong development plans when ‘the Japanese team’s grand 
vision of development in Cambodia’ included the Stung Sen Dam, whose ‘grand 
scale … amazed ECAFE’.
These dreams did not remain unchallenged. US geographer Gilbert White and 
his colleagues (White et al, 1962) warned that the Lower Mekong countries could 
not ‘stand the luxury of monolithic concrete structures whose immediate return is 
infl ation of national ego’. When concerns related to the social and environmental 
impacts of the proposed Mekong Development Scheme emerged, the US Agency 
for International Development (USAID) also commissioned a study on the ‘social 
feasibility’ of the Pa Mong Dam (Ingersoll, 1969). But the report did not receive 
much attention from the Mekong Committee. As reported by Ingersoll (1969), C. 
H. Schaaf responded that ‘he had wanted no criticism of the Mekong River project: 
it was good, all good, nothing but good’. Despite greater emphasis on social and 
environmental issues, it is apparent to many observers that the developmentalist 
vision of resources use in the Mekong is well and alive, entrenched in narrow 
conceptions of sovereignty, and has been only marginally swayed by contestation 
(Friesen, 1999; Fox, 2000; Hudson-Rodd and Shaw, 2003; Goh, 2004; Hirsch 
and Mørck-Jensen, 2006).
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Discursive practices
A good deal of the debates and confl icts around water development or management 
decisions are linked to various, often antagonistic, discourses. These discourses (and 
associated options, ideas, values and narratives) can be observed in confrontation 
at meetings, public hearings and multi-stakeholder platforms, as well as in written 
texts and the media. The discursive dimension of power, although often ignored, 
is a key element of governance. Several chapters in this volume have evidenced 
different components of discursive power – from weaving narratives, labelling 
peoples and conjuring up meta-justifi cations – in debates over water resources 
development and management in the Mekong region.
Narratives are ‘a story with a beginning, middle and an end’ (Roe, 1991). They 
defi ne a problem, explain how it comes about, and frame it in a way that suggests 
particular courses of action while ignoring others (Keeley and Scoones, 1999). 
Likewise, positive narratives associate a desirable outcome, often reduced to an 
alluring rosy picture or a catchy motto, with obvious solutions, generally provided 
by a benevolent state bent on distributing the fruits of growth and development. 
Narratives and the visions and solutions they promote are frequently legitimized by 
association with powerful ‘nirvana concepts’ (e.g. good governance and integrated 
water resources management) that are by nature consensual and serve as a means 
of closing debates (Molle, 2008a). Projects such as NT2 are being repackaged as 
environmental management projects or, rather, ‘not as a project per se, but as a 
vehicle through which to make a considerable progress in the effort of poverty 
reduction’ according to Shengman Zhang, the World Bank’s managing director 
in 2003.
Regional politics have promoted the ‘Mekong spirit’, described by U. Nyun, 
executive secretary of ECAFE during the 1960s, as ‘the great goodwill, the friendly 
spirit of collaboration, the abundant enthusiasm which animates Mekong work’, 
and conveyed an ideal of solidarity, cooperation and mutual help expected to 
keep the committee members ‘above ideological and political disputes’ (Menon, 
1972). According to the all-purpose phrase of the committee founding document, 
activities were carried out ‘for the benefi t of all the people of the basin, without 
distinction as to nationality, religion or politics’. This ‘Mekong spirit’ rhetoric has 
endured over time and has helped to shape the eventful history of regional politics 
and development of the Mekong River as a success story, and fuelled a powerful 
narrative of converging goodwill and cooperation (Goh, 2004; Cornford and 
Matthews, 2007).7
The desirability – and inevitability – of developing the Mekong are the 
obvious feelings conveyed by most of the literature: ‘A simple enumeration of the 
needs that could be satisfi ed by harnessing the water of the river gives an idea of 
the necessity to develop the Mekong Basin.’ Hydropower generation, irrigation, 
fl ood protection, navigation and even fi sheries (which need to be ‘increased and 
diversifi ed to produce the proteins needed by the population’) are within reach to 
CONTESTED MEKONG WATERSCAPES: WHERE TO NEXT? 395
improve incomes and ‘ensure a political environment that offers better hopes and a 
larger stability’ (CCILMB, 1970). After recalling Li Ping’s irrigation development 
of the Chengdu plains in the third century BC, which transformed ‘5000km2 
of semi-desert into one vast market-garden’, another CCILMB (1972) report 
describes the Mekong development plan as ‘several thousands times more ambitious 
than Li Ping’s and, in fact, one of the largest water resources development schemes 
ever devised’. Visions of wealth and plenty associated with development, capital 
investments and water resources development have been distilled by leaders such 
as Subin Pinkayan, the former Thai minister of foreign affairs and minister of 
commerce, who once announced he wanted to turn the Southeast Asian mainland 
into Suwarnabhumi, or a ‘golden land’ (see Chapter 5). In the 1960s, then Prime 
Minister of Laos Prince Souvanna Phouma announced that the Nam Ngum Dam 
would irrigate 100,000 acres (40,468ha), transforming them into ‘orchards and 
gardens’ (Jenkins, 1968). Laos is now poised to become ‘the battery of Asia’, or 
even ‘another Switzerland crossed by roads and railways, a country of services and 
hydropower’.8 No doubt, all of these grand prospects and plans aiming to exploit 
water and other resources are legitimate; but casting expected benefi ts in such a 
glaring light often serves to justify and impose projects indiscriminately (as shown 
by experience worldwide), rather than establishing improved decision-making 
processes.
In the eyes of water engineers and power planners, the limited exploitation of 
the Mekong River system’s hydropower potential – in a region undergoing rapid 
economic growth – is a global rarity (Ratner, 2003; see Chapter 2). When negative 
impacts are acknowledged, they are generally framed in a discourse of trade-offs 
and mitigation. Already in 1972 the Mekong Committee boasted ‘the methods it 
employs to make sure that the benefi ts of development will be maximized and the 
costs – including ecological costs – are minimized’ (CCILMB, 1972). Three and 
a half decades later, the Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy (MWRAS) 
strategy claims that livelihood restoration programmes for affected communities 
can mitigate negative impacts from the projects, and the compensation schemes 
or alternative opportunities offered to these communities might even result in 
‘win–win’ situations (see Chapter 2).
If losses are unavoidable, these are, nevertheless, framed as an inevitable 
‘sacrifi ce’ for the common good of the nation and undervalued. For example, 
drawing attention to the ‘almost cataclysmic changes in the ecology’ that would 
result from basin development plans, Tubb (1966), a United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) fi sheries offi cial concluded, however, that such 
development could and should not be avoided because of the ‘greater economic 
value’ of planned water uses. The importance of capture fi sheries is constantly 
diminished by an enduring narrative of doom (see Chapter 12). The narrative 
suggests that poor people fi sh, and that people are poor because they fi sh; that 
resources are declining and facing ‘the tragedy of the commons’; and that natural 
fi sheries can be aptly replaced by modern techniques of aquaculture and ‘alternative 
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sources of income (as provided by irrigated agriculture) and development generally 
(as facilitated by the availability of power)’ (World Bank/ADB, 2006). The 
possibility of potential negative impact upon the capture fi sheries is not necessarily 
denied, nor even downplayed; but the inevitability of trade-offs, with their 
connotations of ‘balance’, is reaffi rmed (see Chapter 12). Another pervasive framing 
is that of fl oods as a threat and catastrophe (see Chapters 7 and 11).
Where the inevitability of negative impacts is not easily accepted, problems and 
solutions can be framed with visions of threats and doom. ‘Water crisis looms’, says 
a study on the Water Grid Project (Bangkok Post, 2004b), while the Bangkok Post 
(2008) discusses the hypothesis that at some time in the future Thailand would 
not be able to feed its own people, and a senior offi cial justifi es water transfer to 
the Phetchaburi Province that runs the risk of ‘becoming a “desert” because the 
province received less rainfall than the amount of water evaporating from its soil’ 
(Bangkok Post, 2004a). Promotional material printed for the Khong-Chi-Mun 
Project included drawings of Isaan as a piece of cracked soil traversed by unused 
rivers (see Figure 10.4 in Chapter 10).
Such framing of development issues in the Mekong region generates counter-
framing. For example, researchers involved in the Nam Songkhram Basin (see 
Chapter 7) try to undermine the negative framing of fl ooding by stating that ‘the 
local people consider it a disaster when there is no fl ooding’. The negative vision 
of wetlands as ‘swamps’ is likewise opposed by labelling wetlands as ‘nature’s 
supermarket’ where you need no money to ‘shop’ for the large variety of different 
resources they provide (MRCS/WUP-FIN, 2007). Critics of the Pak Mun Dam 
countered narratives of doomed capture fi sheries by demanding that the government 
open the gates of Pak Mun to restore fi sheries and livelihoods; they subsequently 
produced their own study showing positive restoration effects (see Chapter 3).
Another common discursive practice is labelling, which consists of simplifying 
the complexity of some particular categories of people, the range of interests they 
represent, and the diversity of both their experience and their resource endowment 
(especially the environmental constraints that they may face) (Sutton, 1999). In 
particular, some groups are frequently associated with labels that bear a strong 
positive or negative undertone. ‘Farmer’ is usually used as a positive label when 
mobilized to justify new water projects. ‘Farmers’ associated with an image of Isaan 
that emphasizes drought, parched soils and migrating rural population are a handy 
way to justify bringing more water to the region, irrespective of the fact that, on 
average, farming now only represents a portion of rural household incomes (and 
often a minor one). The labelling of Isaan as a poor and drought-prone region 
(see Chapter 10 and Bell, 1969) has featured prominently in all projects to divert 
the Mekong River.
Right until the last decade of the 20th century, the emotive term ‘communist’ 
has been used to demonize and disqualify protest or dissent (Sretthachau, 1999). In 
the Pak Mun Dam controversy (see Chapter 3), during the early 1990s the police 
described people who distributed leafl ets, wrote letters and attended demonstrations 
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as ‘communists’, or more commonly categorized them as a ‘minority’ or as ‘paid’ 
agents (Bangkok Post, 1991). Likewise, in certain Thai offi cial discourse, NGO 
has become a dismissive term: some offi cials distinguish ‘bad’ NGOs (those who 
engage in pressure politics and civil disobedience) from their ‘good’ (non-political) 
counterparts. Bad NGOs are sinister: they incite villagers (who are normally placid) 
to engage in sophisticated and disruptive ‘mob’ protests, so goes the dominant 
framing (Missingham, 2003; Foran, 2006).
A third form of discursive practice is to make appeals to justifi cations and 
goals with which almost everybody agrees. Meta-justifi cations are frequently 
mobilized to justify a particular project: they usually associate a sense of urgency 
with a general objective that can hardly be challenged, such as ‘development can’t 
wait!’ and ‘poverty eradication’. Invoking higher-level overriding benefi ts tends to 
make local counterclaims parochial, ‘selfi sh’, non-legitimate or ‘backward’. Further 
misrepresentations of the debate consist in overemphasizing expected benefi ts (rural 
income will increase, farmers will grow two crops, etc.) without consideration of 
costs, thus avoiding discussions about alternative investments either in the water/
agricultural sector or in the wider economy.
A particular strand of meta-justifications includes arguments that stress 
national security, or food self-suffi ciency objectives, that inherently refer to the 
state’s prerogatives and core duty. ‘Securitization’ of development objectives has 
been particularly prominent during the Cold War (see Chapter 10). Again, while 
such objectives may be desirable, they are frequently mobilized to justify both 
sound and poor projects indiscriminately. In Laos, internal resettlement is a key 
policy: it is justifi ed by the government’s expressed goals of ‘poverty alleviation’, 
‘rural development’ and ‘nation-building’. Ethnic minority populations living 
in mountainous areas are frequently seen as ‘holding the country back’ from 
achieving ‘development’ (Baird and Shoemaker, 2007). The government’s alleged 
goals of opium eradication, swidden agriculture reduction, and improvement 
of accessibility to government services, tinged by security and ‘nation-building’ 
concerns, eventually translate into forced cultural integration and massive internal 
displacement with severe social impacts.
People have learned – in the case of Thailand, after several decades of 
democratizing struggles – to challenge such sweeping development or security 
narratives. The Assembly of the Poor (AOP, 2000), for example, underlined that the 
‘sacrifi ce for the country’s development’, explicitly requested by the government, 
‘involved destruction of our lives and communities’ and was unimpressed by 
promises of a brighter future, adding that ‘we were never poor until the day that 
you appeared in the name of “development”’. As for the Pak Mun Dam, while 
the project was predicated upon the need to electrify northeast Thailand for 
development, its contribution in 2008 – if working at its design capacity, which it 
was far from achieving – would have lowered instantaneous electricity peak demand 
by a mere 0.6 per cent, equivalent to providing electricity for two large shopping 
malls in Bangkok (see Chapter 3).
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SHIFTING WATER GOVERNANCE 
The preceding sections convey a rather bleak picture of the governance of water 
resources development in the Mekong region. We have identifi ed a whole gamut 
of politics, attitudes and discourses, ranging from ‘hardcore’ developers insensitive 
to social-environmental issues, on one extreme, to, on the other extreme, activists 
opposed to any infrastructure, often seen as emblems of the transformation of 
nature into capital to benefi t an elite (Parnwell and Bryant, 1996). Avoiding either 
extreme, this book has refl ected on why current water governance is lopsided, and 
how debates and decision-making processes could be improved so as to ensure 
economically, socially and environmentally sound outcomes.
Five complementary and interdependent paths to improved water governance 
can be found in this volume. Each path attracts a different political traveller 
according to varying inclinations and professional backgrounds. The fi rst path is 
that of knowledge production: that of conventional science, but also of alternative 
knowledge registers and narratives. The second path is centred on concepts 
of negotiation and deliberative democracy, and seeks to bridge antagonistic 
viewpoints, foster social learning, and reach agreements or build consensus. The 
third path focuses on establishing rules, standards and norms in order to frame 
and constrain behaviours and to limit externalities. The fourth path is that of 
advocacy, where a more direct political struggle is seen as the most effective way of 
empowering marginalized groups, voicing their concerns and tilting the balance of 
power. Last, in the particular case of the international rivers of the Mekong region, 
efforts at improving transboundary management of resources may also shape and 
improve the evolution of waterscapes in the region. These paths are reviewed here 
in more detail.
Co-producing knowledge
A fi rst aspect of knowledge production is the generation of conventional science. 
Experts who are called to assess a particular project or to recommend adequate 
policies draw on a body of knowledge that is perpetually in the making. For 
example, whereas few Mekong river fi sh were regarded as migratory during the 
1960s (Hori, 2000), specialists now estimate ‘that over 70 per cent of the total fi sh 
catch in the Lower Mekong Basin is dependent on long-distance migrant species’ 
(Dugan, 2008). The ecological impacts of dam development in the basin are not 
well captured by conventional crude hydrologic models; investigating impacts 
on the Tonle Sap ecology (Chapter 9) or coupling ecological models of primary 
productivity with the ‘fl ood pulse’ (Lamberts and Koponen, 2008) provides further 
and badly needed insight on expected changes.
But many times, as shown earlier in the discussion of the politics of knowledge 
(see also Chapters 12 and 13), distorted common wisdoms do not only refl ect a 
CONTESTED MEKONG WATERSCAPES: WHERE TO NEXT? 399
possible imperfect knowledge, but also the particular narratives that are propelled 
by interest groups and that mirror power structures. It is therefore necessary to 
work on counter-narratives that re-establish a better balance in perceptions and 
understanding of reality. The myths and misperceptions about the projection of 
fl oods as disasters, or of fi sheries as a doomed resource, must be combated with 
new knowledge that sometimes has to emancipate itself from the usual channels 
of scientifi c production, as shown by the example of the Tai Baan Research (see 
Chapters 7, 11 and 12). In some cases, it is the very existence of a denied fact that 
must be established through investigation, as in the case of NGOs documenting 
the impact of the Yali Falls Dam in Cambodia (Öjendal et al, 2002; Hirsch and 
Mørck-Jensen, 2006).
In other cases, the very scientifi c narratives called in support of a project are 
partially or fl atly erroneous. Thailand’s Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej, for 
example, recently refl oated the idea of building the controversial Kaeng Sua Ten 
Dam on the Yom River in upper northern Thailand ‘to protect Bangkok from 
fl ooding’ (Bangkok Post, 2008), although consultants already demonstrated in 
the 1980s that the dam would have a completely marginal impact upon fl ooding 
in the lower part of the Chao Phraya Basin. Myths regarding the relationships 
between upland forest uses and downstream fl oods and droughts have also justifi ed 
the expansion of state enclosures (national parks, forest or wildlife reserves, etc.), 
afforestation schemes, and the removal of ethnic communities in the uplands of 
northern Thailand; these myths have now come under greater scrutiny and been 
increasingly challenged by scientifi c research (CIFOR, 2004; Forsyth and Walker, 
2008). The link between large hydropower development and poverty alleviation 
has also been cemented in development discourse in the region and notably in 
China (see Chapter 5), and alternative proposals have to deal with demonstrating 
the frailty of that link.
The ‘risk society’ described by Ulrich Beck (1992) associates the emergence 
of multiple ecological crises with the contestations of formal authority by social 
movements. The status of knowledge is now contested and risks that were perceived 
to be safely managed by experts have become subject to public debate. The Mekong 
River Commission (and, to some extent, development banks) have responded to 
these trends by repositioning themselves as knowledge brokers; but their scenarios, 
impact assessments and other cost-benefi t analyses have also generated intense 
debates. Hence, those who travel the path of knowledge production invariably 
face self-serving arguments, narratives rooted in bogus science and tunnel visions. 
While exposing harmful untruths is a matter of urgent necessity, all knowledge 
brokers work in highly politicized contexts that necessarily have a bearing on the 
knowledge that they produce.
400 INSTITUTIONS, KNOWLEDGE AND POWER
Debating alternatives
The negotiation path is predicated upon the observed possibility that actors 
engaged in controversies might not just negotiate based on predefi ned positions, 
but may actually somehow learn from each other, accept trade-offs and losses, 
gradually change their positions and viewpoints, and arrive at shared decisions or 
agreements, if not consensus (Dryzek, 2000; Warner, 2006; Karl et al, 2007).
At both local and basin scales, states’ views are often enforced with little 
discussion; few opportunities exist for defi ning modes of co-management. In 
the coastal part of the Mekong Delta, for example, the authorities have gated the 
outlets to the sea in order to conserve fresh water inland and to foster rice multiple-
cropping. But this decision undermined brackish water shrimp farming in the area 
and led to protests and structures being destroyed (Hoanh, 2003; see Chapter 8). 
This, in turn, forced the authorities to discuss with local villagers and enabled the 
defi nition of an agreement that allowed both rice and shrimp farming through 
adequate operation of gates. In the case of the NT2 Dam in Laos, as mentioned 
earlier, discussions with affected populations and NGOs allowed a technical 
alternative that minimized impact upon villagers in the Xe Bang Fai Valley to be 
found at an equivalent cost.
Decision-making is thus an (often long) process of social learning where 
the room for manoeuvre of actors and interest groups becomes constrained by 
public exposure of their interests, strategies and discourses, which may then be 
contested and scrutinized. Accessible policy conferences, public hearings and 
multi-stakeholder platforms all provide opportunities to advance in this direction 
(Warner, 2006; Dore, 2007).
Forums such as the Exploring Water Futures Together dialogue held in 
Vientiane in 2006 (IUCN et al, 2007) and the MRC’s Hydropower Forum in 2008 
brought together a diverse group of stakeholders, including elite policy-makers, 
developers, development bankers and advocates on behalf of vulnerable people. 
At their best, such events give space and legitimacy to suppressed narratives, such 
as the narrative of how the impacts upon fi sheries from the planned dams to be 
sited on the mainstream Mekong River cannot be mitigated, as recent scientifi c 
research shows that the diversity of Mekong fi sh species and their migrations makes 
it impossible to mitigate impacts using fi sh passes or aquaculture.
It can be extremely diffi cult to persuade elite actors to participate in such 
multi-stakeholder events. But positive interactions build rapport and trust that 
could catalyse more sustained interaction. 
Promoting standards
One particular pathway that potentially helps to charter the boundaries within 
which the different parties may act is to seek agreement on codes of conduct, or 
‘standards’. The World Bank and the ADB have, for example, defi ned guidelines 
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for project planning and implementation that standardize procedures and establish 
policies on issues such as data disclosure, social and environmental impact 
assessments, resettlement and compensation of people displaced by dams.
In the energy sector, international standards in electricity planning, such 
as integrated resources planning (IRP), are now common in many developed 
countries (see Chapter 2). Energy planning in the past has been biased towards 
overestimating future demand in energy projections, leading to energy surpluses 
and over-investments in new capacity that are socially and economically wasteful 
(but lucrative to developers). The planning processes currently in place, both at 
the national and regional levels, fall well short of these standards. In Thailand, 
IRP is well known; but incentives to adopt it are not compelling. Plans conducted 
according to IRP principles would include more demand-side energy-effi ciency 
measures. These would lower energy sales and construction of capacity, but are not 
‘attractive’ in a context where utilities are allowed to recover their costs plus fi xed 
rates of return on their investments. Not surprisingly, IRP in North America is 
typically a requirement imposed upon utilities by regulatory bodies.
But in contexts where regulatory regimes are still weak, self-regulation 
frameworks deserve mention. The Equator Principles, for example, are a set of 
guidelines aimed at private fi nanciers of large infrastructure projects, particularly 
projects over US$10 million that are ‘project fi nanced’. Project fi nance is a method 
of raising large amounts of capital from both equity investors and lenders, including 
both commercial and development banks. Loans are typically secured by cash 
fl ows from a project company (a new organization that is legally separate from 
the investing parent fi rms). In the event of fi nancial distress, lenders have limited 
recourse to the assets of the project company, but no recourse to the assets of the 
parent fi rms (Vaaler et al, 2008). This feature means that investors and sponsors 
have strong incentives to get projects built and operating on time, and weaker 
incentives to consider negative external effects (see Chapter 4).
The Equator Principles provide general guidance to investors for project 
evaluation, including initial risk screening; whether impact assessment is required 
and, if so, what standards to use; public disclosure; independent review; and 
compliance monitoring. The principles are based on existing guidelines and 
safeguards of the International Finance Corporation, in turn modelled after those 
of the World Bank. While these principles have been criticized as green ‘window 
dressing’, it is also apparent that many banks engaged in project fi nance have 
not signed up to the Principles, suggesting that complying with them imposes 
additional costs (Scholtens and Dam, 2007). Instead, signatories to the Principles 
tend to be larger banks with active Corporate Social Responsibility programmes. As 
of 2008, the Equator Principles were still new to the Mekong region. No regional 
banks had signed up. Further analysis of projects funded by Equator signatories 
(such as the Theun-Hinboun Expansion Project led by ANZ Bank) is necessary 
to tell if the Principles produce better projects.
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These standards, predictably, are neither used nor accepted by all parties. 
Private- sector hydropower developers from Thailand, Vietnam, China, Malaysia 
and Russia, often backed by infl uential political players, government bureaucracies 
and fi nanciers from their own countries, which have recently entered the dam 
building arena, are determined to build hydropower dams or irrigation schemes 
without becoming entangled within burdensome environmental and social 
dilemmas that have often dogged projects in the past. As a result, Mekong 
country governments may be tempted to make deals with such developers,9 while 
development banks may be tempted to weaken their own standards to stay the 
course and to remain ‘competitive’ (see discussion on the ADB in Chapter 2).
Even actors attempting to adhere to standards often end up retaining information 
or ignoring events. For example, as part of its decision to proceed with NT2, the 
World Bank commissioned a study based on IRP principles (Greacen and Palettu, 
2007). The study (du Pont, 2005) showed that feasible demand-side management, 
energy conservation measures and renewable energy generation in Thailand would 
exceed the output of NT2 and would provide energy to the customer at a cost 
approximately 25 per cent less than NT2 (see Chapter 4). However, the bank did 
not publish du Pont’s study until after its board had approved NT2.
The low attractiveness of these standards is linked to the additional costs and time 
delays that they impose on planners and project developers. The maximization of 
profi t works to edit out of the picture these nagging social or environmental impacts 
that will come in the way of bulldozers and building concrete infrastructures. What 
are the incentives for operators to adhere to constraining standards, especially in a 
context where those who adhere lose a competitive edge with regards to those who 
don’t? Just as in the case of polluting industrial activities, profi t and competitiveness 
are tightly linked to the non-consideration of the externalities generated.
In general, ‘best practices’ or standards address issues of concern to wider 
society through eliminating or minimizing externalities and sharing project benefi ts 
(see Chapter 2). Such practices may thus reduce political risk – for example, from 
protests or legal measures that could delay project construction or add unforeseen 
additional costs. Governments may also have an interest in selecting developers 
with a sound reputation to avoid political turmoil or social protests that could 
tarnish their reputation. However, commercial or strategic short-term interests 
often override the consideration of precautionary measures. Where corruption 
is high or local protest stifl ed, project developers perceive low political risk and 
feel less inclined to implement best practices. Past dam projects, unfortunately, 
confi rm that compensation schemes and other concessions from dam builders and 
governments have generally been secured only after substantial mobilization or 
protest (see Chapters 3 and 4). Overall, weak regulatory regimes seem to require 
more direct political action in order to improve governance outcomes.
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Contesting decision-making
Contexts with prevailing top-down, state-centred decision-making and weak 
political representation of marginal categories of population – not to mention 
cases where political freedom is restricted – are prone to producing projects where 
social and environmental impacts are discounted or ignored. Advocacy, whether 
organized around grassroots movements, networks of urban-based NGOs or 
transnational coalitions, is the path often chosen by those who suffer immediate 
losses of livelihoods and are left to their own devices (Young, 2001).
Advocacy coalitions in the Mekong region have been fast to move at challenging 
the alleged benefi ts of dams. The Pak Mun Dam story (see Chapter 3) is exemplary 
of several dimensions of political struggles around water development projects: this 
case study shows that compensations have been secured after repeated, protracted, 
costly and painful demonstrations and initiatives. Compensations and dam 
management adjustments were repeatedly promised and then denied, and sustained 
mobilization was necessary to ensure these mitigation measures. In other cases, 
including the Theun-Hinboun Dam Project (see Chapter 2) and the NT2 Dam 
Project (see Chapter 4), where the money spent on impact mitigation and the effort 
at ensuring transparency have arguably notably exceeded those of earlier projects, 
it is apparent that the constant pressure and scrutiny of outsiders have helped to 
raise the degree of adherence to standards or decent practices.
Yet, advocacy coalitions have their weaknesses. Grassroots movements, such 
as the Assembly of the Poor, that formed around the Pak Mun struggle may 
be undermined when the state organizes local opposition groups, engages in 
hostile media discourse or compensates free-riders. NGOs also have different 
priorities, with some more focused on conservation or biodiversity, and others 
more livelihood or human rights oriented. The IUCN, for example, supported the 
NT2 dam because it saw the revenue it would create as a means of establishing and 
maintaining protected areas in the Nakai Plateau around the proposed reservoir 
(Bakker, 1999). Other organizations, such as International Rivers or TERRA, 
opposed it on grounds of the expected destruction that it would bring to the local 
environment and to the impacts upon the livelihoods of local villagers around the 
dam site (see Chapter 4). While NGOs often accurately represent marginalized 
and vulnerable people, their advocacy narratives can drastically simplify complex 
development confl icts (see Chapter 3).
Perhaps the greatest hurdle that these actors face lies in promoting their 
messages of conservation, preservation and socio-environmental responsibility in 
areas where conditions of extreme poverty frequently prevail, without being seen as 
opposed to ‘development’ (see Chapter 4). Where the ‘balance point’ precisely lies 
between projects that clearly benefi t private interests rather than collective ones, on 
the one hand, and total paralysis, on the other, is hard to establish; in many cases, 
debates seem to pit developers unprepared to admit that a particular project may 
be unsound against activists who take expected impacts as a reason for opposing 
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any project. While the scope for energy savings or greener energy generation is 
substantial, meeting long-term projections in energy demand is likely to include 
projects that do have impacts.
Transboundary governance
While knowledge production, negotiations or political struggle often unfold at the 
national level, the linkages between the Mekong region countries through their 
dependence upon the same river system also opens up opportunities for improving 
water governance at a regional or basin level. There are now several overlapping 
institutions that have potential to contribute to improving transboundary 
governance.
The 1995 Mekong Agreement established a Mekong River Commission 
Secretariat and basic common principles and procedures. In the years since, 
member countries have struggled to negotiate specifi c and meaningful rules for 
water utilization, project notifi cation and the coordination of development plans 
(see Chapter 14). For the most part, members have successfully maintained a 
situation where they can pursue their own interests unfettered as much as possible 
by concerns of other states. But it is also a situation in which individual and 
collective infl uence over decisions and activities by upstream China is modest. The 
MRC and its secretariat, in particular, have often had to tread a thin line between 
strong competing interests of member countries and those of donor countries and 
multilateral agencies. They have also had to commit to promoting participation 
while not threatening the long-term agenda of member states (Sneddon and Fox, 
2007).
It is apparent10 that countries are reluctant to give up sovereignty and that 
national interests prevail over transboundary interests (Hirsch and Mørck-Jensen, 
2006). The 1995 Mekong Agreement, largely weakened to accommodate Thai 
interests and prerequisites (Ratner, 2003; Goh, 2004), is lacking ‘legal teeth’ to 
enforce its provisions (Dore, 2003). The representation of the Mekong River as a 
legal structure, as implied in the 1995 agreement, privileges the state and practices 
of sovereignty and confi nes transboundary management to an issue of allocation 
rules limited to the main stem of the river (Fox, 2000). In any case, there are no 
easy or consensual metrics to assess the effectiveness of the MRC. Sneddon and 
Fox (2006) caution that successful ‘cooperation’ might well result in ecological 
alterations and resource degradation for local people who depend upon river basins 
for their livelihoods. The MRC, ultimately, is ‘owned’ by its member states and 
cannot be expected to act against their agendas. It was fi rst weakened by a post-Cold 
War context that provided fewer incentives for states to cooperate (Ratner, 2003) 
and is now at risk of being increasingly sidelined because of the irruption of private 
banks and investors making direct deals with governments in the region.
Other intergovernmental frameworks for cooperation, such as the Greater 
Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) initiatives established and facilitated by the ADB, 
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have not yet played a central role on water, although they have become increasingly 
important in related energy and transport sectors. Hydropower-related initiatives 
illustrate the potential of multilateral actors to support development and acceptance 
of standards – for example, for investment projects.
Civil society networks have also made some effort to go beyond national 
boundaries and to tackle regional governance problems. One of their advantages 
is that they are often less intimidated by dominant actors or beholden to prevailing 
options and agendas. Thai-based and international organizations, however, still 
dominate many of these initiatives. These are also limitations in terms of continuity 
of effort as such cooperation is often not strongly institutionalized. Even so, the 
contributions of non-state actors and the networks that they drive and support are 
becoming an emergent feature of water governance in the Mekong region.
The fi ve interconnected pathways towards shifting Mekong water governance 
deserve the attention of both practitioners and scholars. Both can help to shed 
light on possible approaches in specifi c Mekong contexts, as well as to develop a 
more fundamental understanding of how these pathways are activated, subverted 
or sustained (Foran, 2007).
CONCLUSIONS
The future of the waterscapes of the Mekong region has been, and will continue 
to be, contested. However, the recent history of water governance gives grounds 
for both concern and hope.
On the one hand, vested, powerful interests continue to dominate decision-
making around major hydropower and irrigation infrastructure projects. They 
do so by keeping key information about plans secret or hard to access, project 
procedures closed, and by labelling queries, debate and opposition as ‘anti-
development’ and undermining legitimate concerns on impacts by reference to 
uncertainties. Sophisticated technologies of mapping, modelling and assessment, 
and even stakeholder consultation, are often turned around and made to serve 
project sponsors. With little transparency, much of the debate is reduced to 
ideological rhetoric and positioning.
The promises of benefi ts from fl ood protection, dams or irrigation schemes are 
often not realized. The devil that dwells in development projects’ details usually 
writes the next phase of the story: ‘alternatives jobs’ do not materialize as expected; 
the markets for cash crops and aquaculture products proposed as alternatives are 
nowhere to be found; resettlement takes longer than planned due to delays in 
new house construction or to villagers refusing to budge; fl ow alteration incurs 
severe impacts upon fi sheries, recession agriculture or embankment stability; etc. 
In other words, the social and environmental complexity that is glossed over at the 
planning stage suddenly erupts and strikes back: the state ‘tunnel vision’ that had 
oversimplifi ed the real world (Scott, 1998) is laid bare; the time- and cost-cutting 
logic of investors works against identifi cation and compensation of impacts.
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This, perhaps, explains why the repeated assurance that development actors 
have ‘learned from past mistakes’, or that all necessary safeguards are being 
enforced, sounds hollow. Even when standards have been established and are 
supposed to be adhered to, capital-intensive projects inserted in contexts where 
affected populations have limited political clout, environmental values are not 
well recognized, and poor governance and corruption are pervasive and tend to 
generate costs and risks that are unequally distributed. Claims of processes that 
screen poor investments or generate ‘good dams’ end up being hard to uphold and 
involve a degree of wishful thinking.11 Experience tells us that irrigation projects 
that promise hundreds of thousands of hectares in Cambodia or Thailand, even if 
eventually not developed on the scale announced, must be considered with much 
circumspection.
On the one hand, all well-wishing stakeholders may feel compelled to adhere to 
a vision whereby ‘a river of promises is to be transformed into a river of prosperity’, 
new vast paddy irrigation schemes convert water into ‘white gold’, and hydropower 
dams are ‘powering progress’ and ‘kick-start[ing] development’12 in order to ‘lift 
people from poverty and promote sustainable development for all’.13 On the other, 
no comfort is offered by recalling sorrowful episodes of the recent past, including 
the loss of lives and destruction of livelihoods in the Sesan Valley in Cambodia 
after the construction of the Yali Falls Dam in Vietnam; the late recognition 
– under public pressure – of the impacts generated by the Theun-Hinboun Dam; 
the disruptions and mayhem wrought by the Pak Mun Dam for the production 
of around 0.2 per cent of Thai electricity generation; and the fl urry of dam and 
irrigation projects under consideration and that are being planned again with 
insuffi cient mechanisms to assess impacts, crowd out unsound projects or come 
up with just compensations. Indeed, it makes one uneasy to compare the US$1 
million fi rst reserved for mitigation and compensation by the Theun-Hinboun 
Power Company, with annual revenues of around US$60 million, and the US$2 
billion in revenue to the Government of Laos (let alone the return to investors) 
over 25 years expected from the NT2 dam with the US$90 million earmarked for 
all social and environmental compensations and mitigations (see Chapter 4).
‘Local’ issues or problems are downplayed by picturing them against national 
strategies and interests and then ‘scaled out’ by framing regional development and 
cooperation as an overriding goal and irresistible transformation towards prosperity 
(Mitchell, 1998; Sneddon and Fox, 2006). Basin hydrologic models depict macro-
level changes in the fl ow regime, but not local impacts and ecosystem productivity. 
Regional cooperation agreements focus on the main stem of the Mekong River 
and leave wider systemic relationships with tributaries, as well as land and water 
use, to the responsibility of individual states.
In a recent interview, refl ecting on the hydropower explosion, a regional analyst 
and campaigner for International Rivers acknowledged that pleasing everyone is 
just not possible: many projects will be undertaken and impacts will have to be 
dealt with. Some impacts are amenable to mitigation, but not all. To avoid the 
CONTESTED MEKONG WATERSCAPES: WHERE TO NEXT? 407
‘race to the bottom’ suggested by the new deals made between governments in the 
region and banks or construction companies with poor or no social/environmental 
commitment, it is necessary to constantly and tirelessly reopen and challenge 
the ‘black box’ of decision-making, redress power imbalances, and contest the 
production and mobilization of particular registers of knowledge.
Examples exist of governments, business and communities pursuing, with 
varying degrees of enthusiasm, iterative and fair approaches to evaluating projects 
and alternatives. Such examples underline the diverse knowledge sources and 
understandings that need to be brought together to comprehend livelihoods, 
ecosystem services, burdens and risks at multiple levels. They also underline the 
importance of maintaining arenas for deliberation in which people can challenge 
and express dissent about projects in both their grand conceptions and specifi c 
details. As schemes become more elaborate, the needs for public scrutiny and 
contestation correspondingly increase. Before the waterscapes of the Mekong 
region are irreversibly transformed, it is crucial that a diverse range of alternatives 
are fully explored by those who must continue to live within them.
NOTES
 1 An ADB offi cial at the Exploring Water Futures Together dialogue in Vientiane, 
2006.
 2 As illustrated in the fi lm Tongpan directed by Paijong Lai-sakul (1977). See also 
Sluiter (1992).
 3 ‘More often than not the ADB has forced the government to undertake an EIA’ 
(King, 2006).
 4 Pers comm at the Vientiane Mekong Dialogue in July 2006.
 5 NT2 promoters argued that the project’s preparation was a model for future 
hydropower development and could be used to strengthen the Lao government’s 
capacity to manage new hydropower projects (see Chapter 4).
 6 The Raymond Morrison Knudsen-Brown Rootes Jones (RMK-BRJ) company did 
97 per cent of the works undertaken by the American army in Vietnam.
 7 See, for example, Wheeler (1970), MRC (1995) and Le-Huu and Nguyen-Duc 
(2003) for unsullied views of Mekong cooperation efforts.
 8 The chairman of the Lao National Economic Committee, in 1995, quoted in Goh 
(2004).
 9 Regulation begets bypass strategies, as shown, for example, by the logging bans in 
China and Thailand that have merely displaced logging activities to poorer neighbour 
states with looser control (Lang, 2002).
10 Although this is the dominant view of analysts, several accounts stick to the image of 
the success story mentioned earlier. Le-Huu and Nguyen-Duc (2003), for example, 
consider that ‘the Mekong Committee and current MRC have provided a forum for 
the four member countries to work out the best solution so that no development is 
missed or unnecessarily delayed’.
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11 The World Bank’s December 2004 Country Economic Memorandum pointed to the 
weak governance environment in Laos and noted that without signifi cant governance 
improvements upfront, hydropower revenues will not result in good development 
outcomes (see Chapter 4). Likewise, the ADB noted in its technical assistance 
paper for NT2 that ‘the government’s capacity to implement large-scale complex 
hydropower projects still remains a major concern’. According to one diplomat based 
in Vientiane, the Laotian government is ‘pretty good at starting then stopping’ its 
promised reforms, and passing but not implementing regulations to get more foreign 
aid (Richardson, 2002).
12 ‘So that we can compete with other countries’: an offi cial with the Prime Minister’s 
Offi ce, quoted in Richardson (2002).
13 The primary goal of the GMS programme, as stated at the GMS Summit Meeting in 
2002.
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With a diverse set of authors from assorted countries and mixed walks of life,
this book brings a grounded, radical and refreshing perspective to the study
of water in the Mekong region, a field of research that too often descends
into technological simplifications.
Jonathan Rigg, University of Durham, UK and author of Southeast Asia:
The Human Landscape of Modernisation and Development
This important book is overdue now that ill-advised mainstream dams
are back on the development agenda ... The authors' 'alternative water futures'
based on 'improved water governance' are essential.
Thayer Scudder, Professor Emeritus, California Institute of Technology
and author of The Future of Large Dams
The catchment area of the Mekong River and its tributaries extends fromChina , through BurmalMyanmar, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia, to
Vietnam. The water resources of the Mekong region - from the Irrawaddy and
Nu-Salween in the west, across the Chao Phraya to the Lancang-Mekong and
Red River in the east - are increasingly contested. Governments, companies
and banks are driving new investments in roads, dams, diversions, irrigation
schemes, navigation facilities, power plants and other emblems of conventional
'development'. Their plans and interventions should provide some benefits, but they also pose
multiple burdens and risks to mill ions of people dependent on wetlands, flood plains and aquatic
resources (in particular, the wild capture fisheries of rivers and lakes).
Contested Waterscapes in the Mekong Region examines how large-scale
projects are being proposed, justified and built. How are such projects
contested and how do specific governance regimes influence decision-
making? The book shows how diverse, and often antagonistic, ideologies and
interests are contesting for legitimacy. It argues that the distribution of decision-
making, political and discursive power influences how the waterscapes of the
region will ultimately '9 0k and how benefits, costs and risks will be distributed.
Also highlighted are the emergence of new actors, rights and trade-off debates, and the social
and environmental consequences of 'water resources development' . These issues are crucial for
the transformation of waterscapes and the prospects for democratizing water governance in the
Mekong region .
Franf;:oisMolle is a Senior Researcher at the Institut de Recherchepour le Developpement, France, and
holds a joint appointment with the International Water Management Institute. Tira Foran is a Research
Fellowat Chiang Mai University's Unit for Social and Environmental Research, Thailand. Mira Ki:ikonen is
a Researcher at Helsinki University of Technologyin Water and Development Research Group, Finland.
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